CENDUIT (INDIA) SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED,BANGALORE vs. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CIRCLE-2(1)(1), BANGALORE

The assessee, Cenduit India is a subsidiary of Cenduit LLC. USA which is a specialized Interactive Response Technology (IRT) solutions provider. One of the IRT enable service offered by Cenduit LLC USA is preparation and management of clinical studies, based on the study- specific requirements of its customers. The assessee undertakes two types of activities namely; (a) providing Support Services to Cenduit LLC in configuring the clinical trial study based on the clients requirement: and (b) providing Software Development Services to Cenduit LLC on a contract basis.

The assessee works on the IRT to configure it to capture the client's requirements pertaining to manner of conducting the study. The IRT is a web-based software / platform which is owned by and hosted in Cenduit LLC's server outside India. Cenduit LLC does not provide access to the source code of the IRT to Cenduit India and accordingly the configuration does not result in development / creation of a new software / technology. In configuring the study, the assessee shall ensure that drugs are not mi- dosed, mis-randomised and balancing i.e. blinding) is not compromised.

The assessee configures the study under the broad supervision and instruction of Cenduit LLC. On completion of configuration of the study, Assessee sends intimation to Cenduit LLC or to the clients on behalf of Cenduit LLC. The clients undertake User Acceptance Test (UAT), post which the study is uploaded in the website of Cenduit LLC to go live.

It is submitted that the assessee is not engaged in performing any marketing related functions. The major teams of assessee comprising of around 2961 people as on 31st March 2016 involved in providing support

As per the Transfer Pricing (TP) document, the assessee has entered into the following International Transactions to its Associated Enterprises (AEs):

The financials of the assessee in the TP study are as under:-

After examination of the TP study of the assessee and considering the objections of the assessee, the TPO arrived at the final set of comparables as follows:-

Pursuant to the directions of the DRP, while there was no variation in the ITeS segment, the TPO revised the margin computation of the comparable companies in the IT Services as follows:-

Against this, the assessee is in appeal before us. Now the contention of the ld. AR before us by way of above grounds is that the turnover filter is to be applied ranging from 1 to 200 crores in respect of above comparables in ITS as well as ITeS segments. Being so, the IT(TP)A No.227/Bang/2021 Page 12 of 23 companies with 1 to 200 crores turnover has to be included as comparables and other companies excluded.

We have heard both the parties and perused the material on record. Admittedly, this issue came up for consideration before this Tribunal in assessee’s own case in IT(TP)A No.59/Bang/2016 order dated 24.4.2019 wherein it was held as under:-

In view of the above order of the Tribunal and taking a consistent view, we direct the AO/TPO to consider the comparables in both ITS and ITeS segments having turnover of 1-200 crores and decide the issue accordingly.

Ground No.11 is regarding non-grant of deduction for education cess and secondary & higher education cess.

After hearing both the parties, we are of the opinion that this issue came for consideration before the Bangalore Bench in the case of Wipro Ltd., 122 taxmann.com 268 (Bangalore - Trib.) wherein it was held as under:-

Besides, when it comes to interpretation of the IT Act, it is well established that no tax can be imposed on the subject without words in the Act clearly showing an intention to lay a burden on him. The subject cannot be taxed unless he comes within the letter of the law and the argument that he falls within the spirit of the law cannot be availed of by the department. [See CIT v. Motors & General Stores 66 ITR 692 (SC)].

In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied, into the provisions which has not been provided by the legislature [See CIT v. Radhe Developers 341 ITR 403 ]. One can only look fairly at the language used. No tax can be imposed by inference or analogy. It is also not permissible to construe a taxing statute by making assumptions and presumptions [See Goodyear v. State of Haryana 188 ITR 402(SC)].

There are several decisions which lay down rule that the provision for deduction, exemption or relief should be interpreted liberally, reasonably and in favour of the assessee and it should be so construed as to effectuate the object of the legislature and not to defeat it. Further, the interpretation cannot go to the extent of reading something that is not stated in the provision [See AGS Tiber v. CIT 233 ITR 207].

Applying the aforesaid principles, we find that the legislature, in Section 40(a)(ii) has provided that "any rate or tax levied" on "profits and gains of business or profession" shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession". There is no reference to any "cess". Obviously therefore, there is no scope to accept Ms. Linhares's contention that "cess" being in the nature of a "Tax" is equally not deductable in computing the income

If the legislature intended to prohibit the deduction of amounts paid by a Assessee towards say, "education cess" or any other "cess", then, the legislature could have easily included reference to "cess" in clause (ii) of Section 40(a) of the IT Act. The fact that the legislature has not done so means that the legislature did not intend to prevent the deduction of amounts paid by a Assessee towards the "cess", when it comes to computing income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession".

The legislative history bears out that the Income-tax Bill, 1961, as introduced in the Parliament, had Section 40(a)(ii) which read as follows : "(ii) any sum paid on account of any cess, rate or tax levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession or assessed at a proportion of, or otherwise on the basis of, any such profits or gains"

However, when the matter came up before the Select Committee of the Parliament, it was decided to omit the word "cess" from the aforesaid clause from the Income- tax Bill, 1961. The effect of the omission of the word "cess" is that only any rate or tax levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession are to be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession". Since the deletion of expression "cess" from the Income-tax Bill, 1961, was deliberate, there is no question of reintroducing this expression in Section 40(a)(ii) of IT Act and that too, under the guise of interpretation of taxing statute.

In fact, in the aforesaid precise regard, reference can usefully be made to the Circular No. F. No. 91/58/66- ITJ(19), dated 18th May, 1967 issued by the CBDT which reads as follows :-

The Board desire that the changed position may please be brought to the notice of all the Income-tax Officers so that further litigation on this account may be avoided.[Board's F. No. 91/58/66-ITJ(19), dated 18-5- 1967.] 27. The CBDT Circular, is binding upon the authorities under the IT Act like Assessing Officer and the Appellate Authority. The CBDT Circular is quite consistent with the principles of interpretation of taxing statute. This, according to us, is an additional reason as to why the expression "cess" ought not to be read or included in the expression "any rate or tax levied" as appearing in Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act.

In the Income-tax Act, 1922, Section 10(4) had banned allowance of any sum paid on account of 'any cess, rate or tax levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession'. In the corresponding Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961 the expression "cess" is quite conspicuous by IT(TP)A No.227/Bang/2021 Page 18 of 23 its absence. In fact, legislative history bears out that this expression was in fact to be found in the Income-tax Bill, 1961 which was introduced in the Parliament. However, the Select Committee recommended the omission of expression "cess" and consequently, this expression finds no place in the final text of the provision in Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961. The effect of such omission is that the provision in Section 40(a)(ii) does not include, "cess" and consequently, "cess" whenever paid in relation to business, is allowable as deductable expenditure.

In Kanga and Palkhivala's "The Law and Practice of Income Tax" (Tenth Edition), several decisions have been analyzed in the context of provisions of Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961. There is reference to the decision of Privy Council in CIT v. Gurupada Dutta 14 ITR 100, where a union rate was imposed under a Village Self Government Act upon the assessee as the owner or occupier of business premises, and the quantum of the rate was fixed after consideration of the 'circumstances' of the assessee, including his business income. The Privy Council held that the rate was not 'assessed on the basis of profits' and was allowable as a business expense. Following this decision, the Supreme Court held in Jaipuria Samla Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. v. CIT [82 ITR 580] that the expression 'profits or gains of any business or profession' has reference only to profits and gains as determined in accordance with Section 29 of this Act and that any rate or tax levied upon profits calculated in a manner other than that provided by that section could not be disallowed under this sub-clause. Similarly, this sub-clause is inapplicable, and a deduction should be allowed, where a tax is imposed by a district board on business with reference to 'estimated income' or by a municipality with reference to 'gross income'. Besides, unlike Section 10(4) of the 1922 Act, this sub-clause does not refer to 'cess' and therefore, a 'cess' even if levied upon or calculated on the basis of business profits may be allowed in computing such profits under this Act.

The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) in Income-tax Appeal No. 52/2018 decided on 31st July, 2018 (Chambal Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT Range-2, Kota ), by reference to the aforesaid CBDT Circular dated 18th May, 1967 has held

Ramani, in fact pointed out three decisions of ITAT, in which, the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Chambal Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd. (supra) was followed and it was held that the amounts paid by the Assessee towards the 'education cess' were liable for deduction in computing the income chargeable under the head of "profits and gains of business or profession". They are as follows :- (i) DCIT v. Peerless General Finance and Investment and Co. Ltd. (ITA No. 1469 and 1470/Kol/2019 decided on 5th December, 2019 by the ITAT, Calcutta; (ii) DCIT v. Graphite India Ltd. (ITA No. 472 and 474 Co. No. 64 and 66/Kol/2018 decided on 22nd November, 2019) by the ITAT, Calcutta; (iii) DCIT v. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance (ITA No. 1111 and 1112/PUN/2017 decided on 25th July, 2019) by the ITAT, Pune.

Again, Ms. Linhares, learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue was unable to say whether the Revenue had instituted the appeals in the aforesaid matters. Mr. Ramani, learned Senior Advocate for the Appellant submitted that to the best of his research, no appeals were instituted by the Revenue against the aforesaid decisions of the ITAT.

The ITAT, in the impugned judgment and order, has reasoned that since "cess" is collected as a part of the income tax and fringe benefit tax, therefore, such "cess" is to be construed as "tax". According to us, there is no scope for such implications, when construing a taxing statute. Even, though, "cess" may be collected as a part of income

Ms. Linhares, has relied upon M/s Unicorn Industries v. Union of India and others, 2019 SCC Online SC 1567 in support of her contention that "cess" is nothing but "tax" and therefore, there is no question of deduction of amounts paid towards "cess" when it comes to computation of income chargeable under the head profits or gains of any business or profession.

The issue involved in Unicorn Industries (supra) was not in the context of provisions in Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act. Rather, the issue involved was whether the 'education cess, higher education cess and National Calamity Contingent Duty (NCCD)' on it could be construed as "duty of excise" which was exempted in terms of Notification dated 9th September, 2003 in respect of goods specified in the Notification and cleared from a unit located in the Industrial Growth Centre or other specified areas with the State of Sikkim. The High Court had held that the levy of education cess, higher education cess and NCCD could not be included in the expression "duty of excise" and consequently, the amounts paid towards such cess or NCCD did not qualify for exemption under the exemption Notification. This view of the High Court was upheld by the Apex Court in Unicorn Industries (supra).

The aforesaid means that the Supreme Court refused to regard the levy of education cess, higher education cess and NCCD as "duty of excise" when it came to construing exemption Notification. Based upon this, Mr. Ramani contends that similarly amounts paid by the Appellant - Assessee towards the "cess" can never be regarded as the amounts paid towards the "tax" so as to attract provisions of Section 40(a)(ii) of the IT Act. All that we may observe is that the issue involved in Unicorn Industries (supra) was not at all the issue involved in the present matters and therefore, the decision in Unicorn Industries (supra) can be of no assistance to the Respondent - Revenue in the present matters.

Mr. Linhares, learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue however submitted that the Appellant - Assessee, in its original return, had never claimed deduction towards the amounts paid by it as "cess". She submits that neither was any such claim made by filing any revised return before the Assessing Officer. She therefore relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Goetze (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [2006] 284 ITR 323 (SC) to submit that the Assessing Officer, was not only quite right in denying such a deduction, but further the Assessing Officer had no power or jurisdiction to grant such a deduction to the Appellant - Assessee. She submits that this is what precisely held by the ITAT in its impugned judgments and orders and therefore, the same, warrants no interference.

Although, it is true that the Appellant - Assessee did not claim any deduction in respect of amounts paid by it towards "cess" in their original return of income nor did the Appellant - Assessee file any revised return of income, according to us, this was no bar to the Commissioner (Appeals) or the ITAT to consider and allow such deductions to the Appellant - Assessee in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The record bears out that such deduction was clearly claimed by the Appellant - Assessee, both before the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the ITAT. 39. In CIT v. Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders (P.) Ltd. 349 ITR 336, one of the questions of law which came to be framed was whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the ITAT, in law, was right in holding that the claim of deduction not made in the original returns and not supported by revised return, was admissible. The Revenue had relied upon Goetze (supra) and urged that the ITAT had no power to allow the claim for deduction. However, the Division Bench, whilst proceeding on the assumption that the Assessing Officer in terms of law laid down in Goetze (supra) had no power, proceeded to hold that the Appellate Authority under the IT Act had sufficient powers to permit such a deduction. In taking this view, the Division Bench relied upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ahmedabad Electricity Co. Ltd. v. CIT (199 ITR 351 to hold that the Appellate Authorities under the IT Act have very wide powers while considering an appeal which IT(TP)A No.227/Bang/2021 Page 22 of 23 may be filed by the Assessee. The Appellate Authorities may confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or remand the case to the Assessing Officer. This is because, unlike an ordinary appeal, the basic purpose of a tax appeal is to ascertain the correct tax liability of the Assessee in accordance with law.

The decision in Goetze (supra) upon which reliance is placed by the ITAT also makes it clear that the issue involved in the said case was limited to the power of the assessing authority and does not impinge on the powers of the ITAT under section 254 of the said Act. This means that in Goetze (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was not dealing with the extent of the powers of the appellate authorities but the observations were in relation to the powers of the assessing authority. This is the distinction drawn by the division Bench in Pruthvi Brokers (supra) as well and this is the distinction which the ITAT failed to note in the impugned order.

Besides, we note that in the present case, though the claim for deduction was not raised in the original return or by filing revised return, the Appellant - Assessee had indeed addressed a letter claiming such deduction before the assessment could be completed. However, even if we proceed on the basis that there was no obligation on the Assessing Officer to consider the claim for deduction in such letter, the Commissioner (Appeals) or the ITAT, before whom such deduction was specifically claimed was duty bound to consider such claim. Accordingly, we are unable to agree with Ms. Linhare's contention based upon the decision in Goetze (supra).

For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the substantial question of law No. (iii) in Tax Appeal No. 17 of 2013 and the sole substantial question of law in Tax Appeal No. 18 of 2013 is also required to be answered in favour of the Appellant - Assessee and against the Respondent-Revenue. To that extent therefore, the impugned judgments and orders made by the ITAT warrant interference and modification." Respectfully following the decision rendered by Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court and the Bombay High Court (referred

No other grounds were pressed before us, accordingly they are dismissed.

In the result, the assessee’s appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes.