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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, “C” BENCH : BANGALORE
Before: SHRI N.V. VASUDEVAN & Ms. PADMAVATHY S
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL “C” BENCH : BANGALORE BEFORE SHRI N.V. VASUDEVAN, VICE PRESIDENT AND Ms. PADMAVATHY S, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
IT(TP)A No.2243/Bang/2019 Assessment year : 2015-16
Harman Connected Services Vs. The Assistant Commissioner Corporation India Pvt. Ltd., of Income Tax, No.3 & 3/A, EOIZ Industrial Circle 3(1)(2), Area, Survey No.85 & 86, Bengaluru. Sadarmangala Village, Krishnarajapuram Hobli, Bengaluru – 560 066. PAN: AABCG 5658E APPELLANT RESPONDENT
Assessee by : Shri T. Suryanarayana, Advocate Respondent by : Shri. Biju, M.K., CIT(DR)(ITAT), Bengaluru.
Date of hearing : 07.09.2022 Date of Pronouncement : 16.09.2022 O R D E R Per Padmavathy S, Accountant Member This appeal is against the order of ACIT Circle 3(1)(2), Bangalore dated 29.8.2019 passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [the Act] for the assessment year 2015-16.
The assessee raised grounds pertaining to the following issues:-
(i) Ground Nos.1 to 8 : Transfer Pricing adjustment made towards interest on outstanding receivables from AE.
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(ii) Ground No.9 : Restriction of depreciation on computer server and networking equipment to the extent of 15%. (iii) Ground No.10: Disallowance u/s. 14A. (iv) Ground No.11 : Non-grant of deduction u/s. 80G of the Act. (v) Ground No.12: MAT credit being not granted. (vi) Ground No.13 : Short credit of TDS.
The assessee is a company registered under the Companies Act 1956, and is engaged in the business of rendering software development and related services to its AEs. Symphony Teleca Corp. USA. is the ultimate holding company of the assessee.
4. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2015-16, the assessee filed the return of income on 27.11.2015 declaring a total income of Rs.162,92,31,690 under the normal provisions of the Act and book profits of Rs.191,53,33, 857 under the MAT provisions u/s. 115JB. The case was selected for scrutiny and notice u/s. 143(2) was duly served on the assessee. Since the assessee had international transactions with its Associated Enterprises (AE), a reference was made to the Transfer Pricing Officer [TPO]. The TPO concluded that the assessment u/s. 92CA by making an adjustment of Rs.3,73,72,659 with respect to the interest on delayed receivables. The AO passed a draft assessment order incorporating the TP adjustment and further made disallowance towards depreciation on networking equipments and disallowance u/s. 14A. The assessee raised its objections before the DRP. The DRP gave a marginal relief by reducing the disallowance u/s. 14A. The AO passed the final
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assessment order as per the directions of the DRP against which the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal.
Interest on delayed receivables
During the course of TP proceedings, the AO treated interest on delayed receivables as a separate international transaction and called on the assessee to furnish invoice-wise details of all trade receivables from AE during the year. The TPO made a TP adjustment by applying interest @ 6 months LIBOR + 400 basis points. The assessee raised objections before the DRP by submitting that the interest on delayed receivables is subsumed in working capital adjustment and that a separate adjustment is not required. The assessee also submitted that the interest cost is embedded dint eh pricing of the services to the AE and therefore no separate adjustment is required to be made towards interest. The assessee further submitted that the assessee is not charging any interest from the non-AEs and therefore interest cannot be charged on AE transactions. The DRP rejected the contentions of the assessee and upheld the calculation of interest on the delayed receivables considering the credit period of 30 days. Aggrieved, the Assessee has preferred the appeal before the Tribunal.
The ld. AR reiterated the submissions made before the lower authorities. He further submitted that the TP adjustment can be made only on real income and not on notional or hypothetical income. The ld. AR contended that the trade receivables cannot be treated as an unsecured loan to charge interest. It was also brought to our notice that
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there are payables to the AE and the AE is not charging any interest and as per the inter-company agreement entered into between the assessee and its AE there is a credit period of 90 days from the date of invoice which has not been considered by the lower authorities. Without prejudice, the ld. AR submitted that the TPO has not considered the payable as a deduction from the receivables and has computed the interest on the gross receivables instead of making it against the payables to the AE.
The ld. DR relied on the order of the lower authorities.
We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material on record. The impugned issue is squarely covered by the decision of the coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Swiss Re Global Business Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) wherein it was held as under:-
“35. The only other issue that remains for adjudication is ground No.15 with regard to re-characterizing certain trade receivables as unsecured loans and computing notional interest on such trade receivables. The main contention of the ld. AR is that deferred receivables would not constitute a separate international transaction and need not be benchmarked while determining the ALP of the international transaction. In our opinion, this issue was considered by the Tribunal in assessee’s own case for AY 2014-15 and in para 23 to 23.9 of the order dated 21.5.2020 this Tribunal held as under:- “23. Ground No. 14-17 alleged by assessee against adjustment of notional interest on outstanding receivables. From TP study, it is observed that payments to assessee are not contingent upon payment received by AEs from
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their respective customers. Further Ld.AR submitted that working capital adjustment undertaken by assessee includes the adjustment regarding the receivables and thus receivables arising out of such transaction have already been accounted for. Alternatively, he submitted that working capital subsumes sundry creditors and therefore separate addition is not called for. 23.1. Ld.TPO computed interest on outstanding receivables under weighted average method using LIBOR + 300 basis points applicable for year under consideration that worked out to 3.3758% on receivables that exceeded 30 days. It has been argued by Ld.AR that authorities below disregarded business/commercial arrangement between the assessee and its AE's, by holding outstanding receivables to be an independent international transaction. 23.2. Ld.AR placed reliance on decision of Delhi Tribunal in Kusum Healthcare (P.) Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2015] 62 taxmann.com 79, deleted addition by considering the above principle, and subsequently Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Pr. CIT v. Kusum Health Care (P.) Ltd. [2018] 99 taxmann.com 431/[2017] 398 ITR 66, held that no interest could have been charged as it cannot be considered as international transaction. He also placed reliance upon decision of Delhi Tribunal in case of Bechtel India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2016] 66 taxman.com 6 which subsequently upheld by Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide order in Pr. CIT v. Bechtel India (P.) Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 379 of 2016, dated 21-7-16] also upheld by Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order, in CC No. 4956/2017. 23.3. It has been submitted by Ld.AR that outstanding receivables are closely linked to main transaction and so the same cannot be considered as separate international transaction. He also submitted that into company agreements provides for extending credit period with mutual consent and it does not provide any interest clause in case of delay. He also argued that the working capital adjustment takes into account the factors related to delayed receivables and no separate adjustment is required in such circumstances.
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23.4. On the contrary Ld.CIT.DR submitted that interest on receivables is an international transaction and Ld.TPO rightly determined its ALP. In support of the contentions, he placed reliance on decision of Delhi Tribunal order in Ameriprise India (P.) Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2015] 62 taxmann.com 237 wherein it is held that, interest on receivables is an international transaction and the transfer pricing adjustment is warranted. He stated that Finance Act, 2012 inserted Explanation to section 92B, with retrospective effect from 1.4.2002 and sub-clause (c) of clause (i) of this Explanation provides that: (i) the expression "international transaction" shall include— . . . . . (c) capital financing, including any type of long- term or short-term borrowing, lending or guarantee, purchase or sale of marketable securities or any type of advance, payments or deferred payment or receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business;. . . . ' 23.5. Ld.CIT.DR submitted that expression 'debt arising during the course of business' refers to trading debt arising from sale of goods or services rendered in course of carrying on business. Once any debt arising during course of business is an international transaction, he submitted that any delay in realization of same needs to be considered within transfer pricing adjustment, on account of interest income short charged or uncharged. It was argued that insertion of Explanation with retrospective effect covers assessment year under consideration and hence under/non-payment of interest by AEs on debt arising during course of business becomes international transactions, calling for computing its ALP. He referred to decision of Delhi Tribunal in Ameriprise (supra), in which this issue has been discussed at length and eventually interest on trade receivables has been held to be an international transaction. Referring to discussion in said order, it was stated that Hon'ble Delhi Bench in this case noted a decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Patni Computer Systems Ltd. [2013] 33 taxmann.com 3/215 Taxman 108 (Bom.), which dealt with question of law:
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"(c) 'Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal did not err in holding that the loss suffered by the assessee by allowing excess period of credit to the associated enterprises without charging an interest during such credit period would not amount to international transaction whereas section 92B(1) of the Income- tax Act, 1961 refers to any other transaction having a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets of such enterprises?" 23.6. Ld.CIT.DR submitted that, while answering above question, Hon'ble Bombay High Court referred to amendment to section 92B by Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 1.4.2002. Setting aside view taken by Tribunal, Hon'ble Bombay High Court restored the issue to file of Tribunal for fresh decision in light of legislative amendment. It was thus argued that non/under-charging of interest on excess period of credit allowed to AEs for realization of invoices, amounts to an international transaction and ALP of such international transaction has to be determined by Ld.TPO. Insofar as charging of rate of interest is concerned, he relied on decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in CIT v. Cotton Naturals (I) (P.) Ltd. [2015] 55 taxmann.com 523/231 Taxman 401 holding that currency in which such amount is to be re-paid, determines rate of interest. He, therefore, concluded by summing-up that interest on outstanding trade receivables is an international transaction and its ALP has been correctly determined. 23.7. We have perused the submissions advanced by both the sides in the light of the records placed before us. This Bench referred to decision of Special Bench of this Tribunal in case of Special Bench of ITAT in case of Instrumentation Corpn. Ltd. v. Asstt. DIT (IT) [2016] 71 taxmann.com 193/160 ITD 1 (Kol. - Trib.), held that outstanding sum of invoices is akin to loan advanced by assessee to foreign AE., hence it is an international transaction as per Explanation to section 92B of the Act. We also perused decision relied upon by Ld.AR. In our considered opinion, these are factually distinguishable and thus, we reject argument advanced by Ld.AR.
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23.8. Alternatively, it has been argued that in TNMM, working capital adjustment subsumes sundry creditors. In such situation computing interest on outstanding receivables and loans and advances to associated enterprise would amount to double taxation. Hon'ble Delhi Tribunal in case of Orange Business Services India Solutions (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2018] 91 taxmann.com 286 has observed that: "There may be a delay in collection of monies for supplies made, even beyond the agreed limit, due to a variety of factors which would have to be investigated on a case to case basis. Importantly, the impact this would have on the working capital of the assessee would have to be studied. It went on to hold that, there has to be a proper inquiry by the TPO by analysing the statistics over a period of time to discern a pattern which would indicate that vis-a- vis the receivables for the supplies made to an AE, the arrangement reflected an international transaction intended to benefit the AE in some way. Similar matter once again came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Avenue Asia Advisors Pvt. Ltd v. DCIT [2017] 398 ITR 120 (Del). Following the earlier decision in Kusum Healthcare (supra), it was observed that there are several factors which need to be considered before holding that every receivable is an international transaction and it requires an assessment on the working capital of the assessee. Applying the decision in Kusum Health Care (supra), the Hon'ble High Court directed the TPO to study the impact of the receivables appearing in the accounts of the assessee; looking into the various factors as to the reasons why the same are shown as receivables and also as to whether the said transactions can be characterised as international transactions." 23.9. In view of the above, we deem it appropriate to set aside this issue to Ld.AO/TPO for deciding it in conformity with the above referred judgment. Needless to say, the assessee will be allowed a reasonable opportunity of being heard in accordance with law.”
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Accordingly, we are of the opinion that deferred receivables would constitute an independent international transaction and the same is required to be benchmarked independently as held by the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in PCIT v. AMD (India) Pl. Ltd., ITA No.274/2018 dated 31.8.2018. 37. Once we have held that the transaction between the assessee and AE was in foreign currency with regard to receivables and transaction was international transaction, then transaction would have to be looked upon by applying the commercial principles with regard to international transactions and accordingly proceeded to take into account interest rate in terms of London Inter Bank Offer Rate [LIBOR] and it would be appropriate to take the LIBOR rate + 2%. For this purpose, we place reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Aurionpro Solutions Ltd., 99 CCH 0070 (Mum HC). It is ordered accordingly” 9. In view of the above discussion and considering the decision of the of the coordinate bench of the Tribunal and the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of AMD (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra), we hold that the treatment of interest on deferred receivables is rightly considered as an independent international transaction and benchmarked separately by the revenue authorities.
With regard to calculation of interest we notice that the assessee had submitted the invoice wise details before the AO. In respect of the services rendered by the Assessee to its AE, it raises invoices, under which the AE is granted 90 days’ time to make payment. During the course of hearing the ld.AR brought to our attention that the TPO in assessee’s own case for the assessment year 2014-15 has allowed the
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credit period of 90 days and prayed that the same may be allowed for the year under considered.
Since the TPO has not done a separate bench marking for the interest on delayed receivables, we remit the issue back to the TPO for fresh consideration. The TPO is directed to consider the payables by the assessee to AEs and also the fact that TPO in the AY 2014-15 has given a credit period of 90 days while computing the interest on receivables. Needless to say that the assessee may be given reasonable opportunity of being heard.
Depreciation on networking equipment
In this regard, it was submitted that the networking equipment broadly comprises of servers, routers, server hard disk and other network accessories. These form an essential part of computer and function as an input processor, storage and output devices, and cannot operate independent of a computer system. Therefore, it was submitted that the said items are eligible for depreciation at the rate of 60%. Reliance in this regard was placed on the following decisions:
• PCIT v. Mphasis Ltd. (reported in (2021) 128 taxmann.com 138 (Kar.)); • CIT v. BSES Yamuna Powers Ltd. (reported in (2013) 40 taxmann.com 108 (Delhi)); and • OnMobile Global Limited v. ACIT (reported in (2014) 45 taxmann.com 346 (Bangalore-Trib), which was affirmed by the Hon’ble High Court in [2021] 129 taxmann.com 254 (Karnataka).
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The learned counsel for Assessee according prayed that depreciation ought to be granted at 60%.
The learned DR relied on the order of the DRP.
We have considered the rival submissions. We find that the issue is no longer res-integra and has been decided by the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Mphasis Ltd., (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court held that computer accessories such as switches and routers form part of peripherals of computer system and hence entitled to depreciation at 60%. Following the same, we allow this ground by the assessee.
Disallowance u/s. 14A
During the assessment proceedings, the AO has invoked provisions of section 14A r/w Rule 8Dand made a disallowance of Rs.95,31,950. The DRP against the objections raised by the assessee gave the following directions:
i) The DRP directed the AO to delete the amount of Rs.20,388 under Rule 8D(2)(i).
ii) The DRP directed the AO to delete the disallowance of Rs.9,97,669 under Rule 8D(2)(ii).
iii) Further, the DRP directed the AO to recomputed the disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii).
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In the final assessment order, the AO recomputed the disallowance to arrive at a sum of Rs.85,10,621. Aggrieved, the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal.
During the course of hearing, the ld. AR submitted that the AO did not consider the suo motu disallowance made by the assessee, the workings of which is given in page 124 of PB. It is also submitted that the AO while considering the investments for calculating the disallowance applying Rule 8D(2)(iii) has taken the entire investments and not the investments which earn exempt income.
The ld. AR submitted that while considering the average investment, the AO has taken the whole of the investments at the beginning and at the end of the year, whereas only those investments which yield tax free income ought to be considered for the purpose of computing the disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii). In this regard, he relied on the decision of the ITAT Delhi Bench in the case of ACIT v. Vireet Investment (P.) Ltd., [2017] 82 taxmann.com 415 (Del Trib.)(SB) wherein it was held as under:-
“11. We have considered the submissions of both the parties and have perused the record of the case. The basic issue for consideration is that the investment, which did not yield any exempt income, should enter or not enter into the computation under Rule 8D, while arriving at the average value of investment, income from which does not or shall not form part of the total income. 11.1 In the present case, our decision is restricted only to the extent of interpretation of language employed in Rule 8(2)(iii). The submission of ld. counsel for the assessee is that this issue is
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now covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Hofcin India (P.) Ltd. (supra), wherein it has been held that if no dividend income was earned, section 14A could not be invoked. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court has referred to the decisions, which we have noted earlier i.e.: - Shivam Motors (P) Ltd's. case (supra) - Winsome Textile Industries Ltd's. case (supra) - Lakhani Marketing Inc. case (supra) - Corrtech Energy (P.) Ltd's. case (supra). - CIT v. Hero Cycles Ltd. [2010] 323 ITR 518/189 Taxman 50 (Punj. & Har.). 11.2 The submission of ld. Principal CIT(DR) is that ITAT in the case of Delhi Special Bench in the case of Cheminvest Ltd. (supra) has specifically held that even if there is no exempt income, the provisions of section 14A are applicable in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad Moody (supra). His submission is that the decision of Hon'ble Delhi Court reversing the decision of Special Bench in Cheminvest should not be followed because that is contrary to the principles laid down in Rajendra Prasad Moody's case (supra). 11.3 It is against these submissions, we first refer to the facts as were obtaining in these two decisions. 11.4 In the case of Cheminvest Ltd. (supra), the assessee had borrowed funds of Rs. 8,51,65,000/- and during the previous year relevant to assessment year 2004-05 paid interest of Rs. 1,21,02,367/-thereon. Out of this unsecured loan, the assessee invested a sum in purchase of shares, which was shown as investment for the purpose of long term capital gains. The AO disallowed interest proportionate to the investment in shares, though no exempt income was earned during the year. The CIT(A) affirmed this but held that the net interest debited to the P&L A/c was required to be apportioned and not the interest expenditure. The Tribunal held that interest expenditure incurred by the assessee was for borrowing used for the purposes of investment in shares, both held for trading as well as investment purposes. Irrespective of whether or not there was any yield of
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dividend on the shares purchased, the interest incurred was relatable to earning of dividend on the shares purchased. The dividend income being exempted from tax by virtue of section 10(34) of the Act, the interest paid on borrowed capital utilized in purchase of shares, being the expenditure incurred in relation to dividend income not forming part of the assessee's total income, was held to be not an allowable deduction. In coming to the conclusion, the Special Bench primarily relied on the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad Moody (supra). 11.5 In the case of Rajendra Prasad Moody (supra), the facts were that the assessees were brothers and each of them had borrowed. moneys for the purposes of making investment in shares of certain companies. During the relevant assessment year they paid interest on the moneys borrowed but did not receive any dividend on the shares purchased with these moneys. Both of them made a claim for deduction of the amount of interest paid on borrowed moneys but this claim was negated by the ITO and on appeal by the AAC on the ground that during the relevant assessment year the shares did not yield any dividend and, therefore, interest paid on the borrowed moneys could not be regarded as expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of making or earning income chargeable under the head 'income from other sources', so as to be allowable as a permissible deduction u/s 57(iii). The Tribunal. however, on further appeal, disagreed with the view taken by the taxing authorities and upheld the claim of each of the two assessees for deduction u/s 57(iii). 11.6 In the backdrop of these facts the Tribunal's order was upheld by the Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, inter alia, held that it is the purpose of the expenditure that is relevant in determining the applicability of section 57(iii) and that purpose must be making or earning of income. It was further held that section 57(iii) does not require that this purpose must be fulfilled in order to qualify the expenditure for deduction. It does not say that the expenditure shall be deductible only if any income is made or earned. There is in fact nothing in the language of section 57(iii) to suggest that
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the purpose, for which the expenditure is made, should fructify into any benefit by way of return in the shape of income. 11.7 Thus, in both the decisions viz. in the case of Cheminvest Ltd. (supra), and in the case of Rajendra Prasad Moody (supra), the issue related to allowability of expenditure which had direct nexus with the earning of income. The borrowing in both the cases has not been disputed being for acquiring shares. Hon'ble Delhi High Court has specifically held in para 21 as under:— "21. There is merit in the contention of Mr. Vohra that the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad Moddy (supra) was rendered in the context of allowability of deduction under Section 57(iii) of the Act, where the expression used is for the purpose of making or earning such income'. Section 14A of the Act on the other hand contains the expression 'in relation to income which does not form part of the total income.' The decision in Rajendra Prasad Moody (supra) cannot be used in the reverse to contend that even if no income has been received, the expenditure incurred can be disallowed under Section 14A of the Act. " 11.8 In the case of Holcin India (P) Ltd. (supra) the facts were that the respondent- assessee was a subsidiary of Holderind Investments Ltd., Mauritius, which was formed as a holding company for 'making downstream investments in cement manufacturing ventures in India. In the return of income filed for the Assessment Year 2007-08, the respondent-assessee declared loss of Rs. 8.56 Crores approximately. The respondent-assessee had declared revenue receipts of Rs. 18,02,274/- which included interest of Rs. 726/- from Fixed Deposit Receipts and profit on sale of fixed assets of Rs. 16,52,225/-. As against this, the respondent assessee had claimed administrative and miscellaneous expenditure written off amounting to Rs. 8.75 Crores. For the Assessment Year 2008-09, the assessee had filed return declaring loss of Rs. 6.60 Crores approximately. The assessee had declared revenue receipts in the form of foreign currency fluctuation difference gain of Rs. 12,46,595/-. It had claimed expenses amounting to Rs. 7.02 Crores as personal expenses, operating and other expenses, depreciation and financial expenses.
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11.9 In both the assessment orders, the Assessing Officer held that the respondent-assessee had not commenced business activities as they had not undertaken any manufacturing activity or made downstream investments. It was observed that the respondent-assessee, after receiving approval of Foreign Investment Promotion Soard (FIPS) dated 20.12.2000 acquired shares capital of Ambuja Cement India Ltd. This, the Assessing Officer felt, was not sufficient to indicate or hold that the respondent-assessee had started their business. He, accordingly, disallowed the entire expenditure of Rs. 8.75 Crores for the Assessment Year 2007-08 and Rs. 7.02 Crores for the Assessment Year 2008-09. 11.10 Ld. CIT(A) did not agree with the findings of Assessing Officer that the business of the respondent- assessee had not been set up or commenced. The CIT(A) observed that the respondent- assessee had been set up with the business objective of making investment in cement industry after due approval given by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry vide letter dated 18.12.2002 and 20.12.2012. It was observed that in fact, the respondent-assessee was not to undertake any manufacturing activity themselves. After considering the FIPS approval and the purchase of shares in the said company of Rs. 1850.91 crores, ld. CIT(A), inter alia, observed that the assessee was engaged in the business of holding of investment and was entitled to claim expenditure provided. There was a direct connection between expenditure incurred and business of the assessee company. However, he pointed out that since the business of the respondent-assessee was to act as a holding company for downstream investment and as it was an accepted fact that they had incurred expenses to protect their business and explore new avenues of investment, the provisions of section 14A were applicable. 11.11 The Hon'ble High Court observed that the reasoning given by the CIT(A) was ambiguous and unclear and on clarity being sought from the Revenue it was pointed out that "the stand of the assessee contained a contradiction to the extent that on the issue of setting up of business, it was stated that the assessee had incurred expenditure on acquiring the shares, therefore, the
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assessee could not now take different stand than the one taken in the first issue". 11.12 The Hon'ble High Court, after considering in detail the decision of ld. CIT(A) finally observed in para 13 as under: "13. We. are confused about the stand taken by the appellant-Revenue. Thus, we had asked Sr. Standing Counsel for the-Revenue, to state in his own words, their stand before us. During the course of hearing, the submission raised was that the shares would have yielded dividend, which would be exempt income and therefore, the CIT(A) had invoked Section 14A to disallow the entire expenditure. The aforesaid submission does not find any specific and clear narration in the reasons or the grounds given by the CIT(A) to make the said addition. Possibly, the CIT(A), though it is not argued before us, had taken the stand that the respondent-assessee had made investment and expenditure was incurred to protect those investments and this expenditure cannot be allowed under Section 14A." 11.13 Thus, Hon'ble Delhi High Court primarily decided the issue regarding applicability of section 14A even if no dividend income was earned. The Hon'ble High court in paras 14 to 16 of its decision observed as under: '14. On the issue whether the respondent-assessee could have earned dividend income and even if no dividend income was earned, yet Section 14A can be invoked and disallowance of expenditure can be made, there are three decisions of the different High Courts directly on the issue and against the appellant-Revenue. No contrary decision of a High Court has been shown to us. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Faridabad v. M/s. Lakhani Marketing Incl, ITA No. 970/2008, decided on 02.04.2014, made reference to two ' earlier decisions of the same Court in CIT v. Hero Cycles Limited, [2010] 323 ITR 518 and CIT vs. Winsome Textile Industries Limited, [2009] 319 ITR 204 to hold that Section 14A cannot be invoked when no exempt income was earned. The second decision is of the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax-I v. Corrtech Energy (P.) Ltd. [2014] 223 Taxmann 130 (Guj.). The third decision is Of the Allahabad High Court in Income
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Tax Appeal No. 88 of 2014, Commissioner of Income Tax II Kanpur, v. M/s. Shivam Motors (P) Ltd. decided on 05.05.2014. In the said decision it has been held:- "As regards the second question, Section 14A of the Act provides that for the purposes of computing the total income under the Chapter, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under the Act. Hence, what Section 14A provides is that if there is any income which does not form part of the income under the Act, the expenditure which is incurred for earning the income is not an allowable deduction. For the year in question, the finding of fact is that the assessee had not earned any tax free income. Hence, in the absence of any tax free income, the corresponding expenditure could not be worked out for disallowance. The view of the C1T(A), which has been affirmed by the Tribunal, hence does not give rise to any substantial question of law. Hence, the deletion of the disallowance of Rs. 2,03,752/- made by the Assessing Officer was in order" 15. Income exempt under Section 10 in a particular assessment year, may not have been exempt earlier and can become taxable in future years. Further, whether Income earned in a subsequent year would or would not be taxable, may depend upon the nature of transaction entered into in the subsequent assessment year. For example, long term, capital gain on sale of shares is presently not taxable where security transaction tax has been paid, but a private sale of shares in an off market transaction attracts capital gains tax: It is an undisputed position that respondent assessee is an investment company and had invested by purchasing a substantial number of shares and thereby securing right to management. Possibility of sale of shares by private placement etc. cannot be ruled out and is not all improbability. Dividend may or may not be declared. Dividend is declared by the company and strictly in legal sense, a shareholder has no control and cannot insist on payment of dividend. When declared, it is subjected to dividend distribution tax.
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what is also noticeable is that the entire or whole expenditure has been disallowed as if there was no expenditure incurred by the respondent-assessee for conducting business. The CIT(A) has positively held that the business was set up and had commenced. The said finding is accepted. The respondent-assessee, therefore, had to incur expenditure for the business in the form of investment in shares of cement companies and to further expand and consolidate their business. Expenditure had to be also incurred to protect the investment made. The genuineness of the said expenditure and the fact that it was incurred for business activities was not doubted by the Assessing Officer and has also not been doubted by the CIT(A).' 11.14 Now the position of law as stands is that the decision of Hon'ble Jurisdiction High Court is directly on the point in dispute whereas the decision of Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Rajendra Prasad Moody (supra) has been rendered in the context of section 57(iii), the applicability of which has been ruled out by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Cheminvest (supra). 11.15 Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the courts function under the supervisory jurisdiction of Hon'ble High Court. The decisions rendered by Hon'ble High Court are binding on all subordinate courts working within its jurisdiction. In this regard we may refer to the following decisions:— '(i) CIT v. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd. (1994) 206 ITR 727 (Bom.), wherein on the issue of "whose decision is binding on whom", the. Hon'ble Bombay Court considered in detail the hierarchy of the courts and has observed as under: "It is also well-settled that though there is no specific provision making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts, it is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that the Tribunals subject to its supervision would conform to the law laid down by it. It is in that view of the matter that the Supreme Court in East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs AIR 1962 SC 1893 (at page1905) declared:
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"We, therefore', hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is binding on authorities or Tribunals under its superintendence, and they cannot ignore it. ...." This position has been summed up by the Supreme Court in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of West Bengal AIR 1960 SC 936 (at page 941) as follows: "Judicial decorum no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. If one Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench, and holding the view that the earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view, the result would be utter confusion. The position would be equally bad where a judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion that the previous decision of another single judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench." The above decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Bhimsen Dixit, AIR 1972 SC 2466, wherein the legal position was reiterated in the following words (at page 2469) : "It would be anomalous to suggest that a Tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a Tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that all the Tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would
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also be conducive to their smooth working; otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer," (ii) CIT v. Sunil Kumar (1995) 212 ITR 238 (Raj.), it was observed as under: "The point which has been raised could have been considered to be debatable because other High Courts have taken a different view. But since the view taken by this court is binding on the Tribunal and other authorities under the Act in this State, it could not be considered to be a debatable point in view of the decision of this court in the case of CIT v. M.L., Sanghi [1988] 170 ITR 670." (iii) Indian Tube Company Ltd. v. CIT & others (1993) 203 ITR 54 (Col.) , it was observed as under: "In the impugned order, respondent No.1 has rejected the petitioner's contention by stating that, although the Calcutta High Court had held that an assessee was entitled to interest on such refund calculated up to the date of the order passed consequent upon an appeal or revision of the original assessment, this view had not been accepted by the Bombay High Court, the Allahabad High Court and the Kerala High Court. Respondent No.1, accordingly, chose to accept the view of the Bombay, Allahabad and Kerala High Courts in preference to the view of the Calcutta High Court. In my view, the order of respondent No. 1 cannot be sustained on the simple ground that respondent No. 1 is an authority operating within the State of West Bengal and is bound by the decisions of the High Court of this State (see CIT v. Indian Press Exchange Ltd. [1989] 176 ITR 331 (Cal) ; East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs AIR 1962 SC 1993, paragraph 29). In that view of the matter, the impugned order must be set aside and the Commissioner is directed to consider the matter afresh in keeping with the decisions of this court after giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard. At least 48 hours clear notice must be given to the petitioners. The Commissioner will communicate the final
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order to the petitioner within eight weeks from the date of hearing. (iv) CIT v. J.K. Jain [1998] 230 ITR 839 (P&H), observing as under: "We have carefully examined the records and have heard learned counsel representing the parties. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Omega Sports and Radio Works' case [1982] 134 ITR 28, as also the decision of this court in Mohan Lal Kansal's case [1978] 114 ITR 583. Following the decision in the two cases referred to above, we hold that it was not a case of divergence of opinion inasmuch as the opinion expressed by this court was binding upon the Tribunal."' 11.16 Therefore, in our considered opinion, no contrary view can be taken under these circumstances. We, accordingly, hold that only those investments are to be considered for computing average value of investment which yielded exempt income during the year. 11.17 As far as argument relating to meaning to be ascribed to the phrase 'shall not' used in Rule 8D(2)(iii) is concerned, the Revenue's contention is that it refers to those investments which did not yield any exempt income during the year but if income would have been yielded it would have remain exempt. There is no dispute that if an investment has yielded exempt income in a particular year then it will enter the computation of average value of investments for the purposes of Rule 8D(2)(iii). The assessee's contention that if there is no certainty that an income, which is exempt in current year, will continue to be so in future years and, therefore, that investment should also be excluded, is hypothetical and cannot be accepted. 11.18 In view of above discussion, the matter is restored back to the file of AO for recomputing the disallowance u/s 14A in terms of above observations. Thus, revenue's appeal is dismissed and assessee's cross-objection, on the issue in question, stand allowed for statistical purposes, in terms indicated above.”
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In the instant case, the AO has considered the entire investments for the purpose of arriving at the average investments, which is not in conformity with the ratio laid down by the decision of the Delhi Special Bench (supra). Respectfully following this decision of the Special Bench, we remit the issue back to the AO to recompute the disallowance u/s. 14A r.w. R.8D(2)(iii) taking into account only those investments for computing average value of investment which yielded exempt income during the year.
Non-granting of deduction u/s. 80G
After hearing both the parties, we direct the AO to verify and allow deduction u/s. 80G towards the donations made by the assessee in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard.
MAT credit
The AO is directed to grant relief of additional MAT credit on the recomputed income as per the directions given above.
Short credit of TDS
It is submitted that the AO has not given the credit for TDS as has been claimed by the assessee. We therefore direct the AO to verify the claim of the assessee and allow the tax credit in accordance with law.
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Additional ground
The assessee raised additional ground with respect to educational cess and secondary & higher education cess. During the course of hearing, the ld. AR did not press for the said ground in view of the recent amendment to the statute. Therefore the ground is dismissed as not pressed.
In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
Pronounced in the open court on this 16th day of September, 2022.
Sd/- Sd/-
(N. V. VASUDEVAN) (PADMAVATHY S) VICE PRESIDENT ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
Bangalore, Dated, the 16th September. 2022. /Desai S Murthy /
Copy to: 1. Assessees 2. Respondent 3. CIT 4. CIT(A) 5. DR 6. Guard file
By order
Assistant Registrar, ITAT, Bangalore