COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 5 MUMBAI vs. M/S. ESSAR TELEHOLDINGS LTD. THROUGH ITS MANAGER

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2165 OF 2012 COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 5 MUMBAI       … APPELLANT(S) VERSUS M/S. ESSAR TELEHOLDINGS LTD. THROUGH ITS MANAGER … RESPONDENT(S) WITH C.A.No.1429 of  2018 @ SLP(C) No. 36560  of  2012,  C.A. No. 117 of  2015,  C.A. No. 5101  of  2012,  C.A. No. 118  of  2015,   C.A. No. 6727   of   2015,   C.A. No. 119   of   2015,   C.A. No. 116   of 2015,  C.A. No. 194  of  2015,  C.A. No. 114  of  2015,  C.A. No. 120  of  2015,  C.A. No. 7395  of  2012, C.A. No. 7394  of  2012, C.A.   No.   121     of     2015,     C.A.   No.   122     of     2015,     C.A. Nos.1430­1432 of  2018 @ SLP(C) No. 8507­ 8509  of  2012,  C.A. No. 128  of  2015, C.A.No.1433 of  2018 @ SLP(C) No. 21294  of  2012 C.A. No. 113 of 20151,   C.A. No. 7797 of 2012,   C.A. No. 381 of 2013 ,  C.A. No. 7426 of 2012, C.A. No. 8195 of 2012,  C.A. No. 126 of   2015,     C.A.   No.   8800   of   2012,     C.A.   No.   3273   of   2013, C.A.No.1434 of  2018 @ SLP(C) No. 10986 of 2013,  C.A. No. 124 of 2015,  C.A. No. 1101 of 2013, C.A. No. 129 of 2015,  C.A. No. 125 of 2015,    C.A. No. 127 of 2015, C.A.No.1435 of  2018 @ SLP(C) No. 21845 of 2013,   C.A. No. 6313 of 2013,   C.A. No. 6733 of 2013, C.A. No. 6191 of 2013,  C.A. No. 8921 of 2013,  C.A. No. 6192 of 2013,   C.A. No. 3355 of 2015,   C.A. No. 7167 of 2013,   C.A. No. 8376 of 2013,  C.A. No. 7172 of 2013,  C.A. No. 7170 of 2013,  C.A. No. 9183 of 2013,  C.A. No. 8341 of 2013,  C.A. No. 7168 of 2013, C.A. No.8256 of 2013,   C.A. No. 7171 of 2013,   C.A. No. 7974 of 2013,   C.A. No. 8342 of 2013,   C.A. No. 7173 of 2013,   C.A. No. 8343 of 2013,  C.A. No. 8933 of 2013,  C.A. No. 8909 of 2013,  C.A. No. 9832 of 2013,  C.A. No. 9833 of 2013,  C.A. No. 9184 of 2013, C.A. No. 3359 of 2015, C.A.No. 1436 of 2018 @ SLP(C) No. 36388 of 2014,  C.A. No. 3781 of 2015, C.A. No. 3358 of 2015, C.A.No. 1437 Digitally signed by ASHWANI KUMAR Date: 2018.04.03 10:10:41 IST Reason: Signature Not Verified

2 of   2018 @   SLP(C) No. 18398 of 2015,   C.A. No. 6294 of 2015, C.A.No.1438  of  2018 @ SLP(C) No. 19303 of 2015,  C.A.No.1439  of 2018 @ SLP(C) No. 20478 of 2015,  C.A. No. 7892 of 2015,  C.A. No. 9251 of 2015,  C.A. No. 9252 of 2015,  C.A. No. 14525 of 2015, C.A. No. 8178 of 2016,  C.A. No. 8177 of 2016,  C.A. No. 3279 of 2016, C.A.No.1440 of   2018 @ SLP(C) No. 23624 of 2016,   C.A.No.1441 of 2018 @ SLP(C) No. 16185 of 2016,  C.A. No. 5044 of 2016,  C.A. No. 5417   of   2016,   C.A.   No.   6019   of   2016,   C.A.No.1442   of     2018   @ SLP(C)No.26278 of 2016, C.A.No.1443 of   2018 @ SLP(C)No. 4243 of 2017,   C.A. No. 4539 of 2017, C.A.No.1444 of   2018 @ SLP(C) No. 19098 of 2017, C.A.No.1445 of   2018 @ SLP(C) No. 17499 of 2017, C.A.No.1446 of   2018 @ SLP(C) No. 25337 of 2017,   C.A.No.1460 of 2018 @ SLP(C)No. 3447of 2018 (Diary No. 19735 of 2017), C.A.No.1462 of     2018   @   SLP(C)No.3450   of   2018   (Diary   No.   24346   of   2017), C.A.No.1461 of  2018 @ SLP(C)No. 3448 of 2018,(Diary No. 36596 of 2017). J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. Delay Condoned. Leave granted. 2. This appeal when alongwith several appeals were heard on 16.11.2016, this Court noticed that in batch of cases, four questions have arisen.   The present batch of cases of which Civil   Appeal   No.   2165   is   a   leading   case   relates   only   to Question No.2, which is to the following effect:­ “Whether   sub­section   (2)   and   sub­section   (3)   of Section 14A inserted with effect from 01.04.2007 will apply to all pending assessments? Whether Rule 8D is retrospectively applicable?”

3 been   heard   together   and   are   being   decided   by   this   common judgment.   For   deciding   all   these   appeals,   it   shall   be sufficient to refer facts and proceedings in Civil Appeal No. 2165 of 2012. FACTS Civil Appeal No. 2165 of 2012 4. This appeal has been filed against the judgment of Bombay High Court dated 12.09.2011 in Income Tax Appeal (L) No. 947 of 2011 by which judgment the High Court has dismissed the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax following an earlier judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 12.08.2010 in the  case   of  Godrej   Boyce   and  Manufacturing  Company   Limited Vs.   Deputy   Commissioner   of   Income   Tax,   Mumbai   &   Anr., reported in (2010) 328 ITR 81(Bom.).   The assessment year in issue is 2003­2004.  The assessee (respondent in appeal) filed his   return   of   income   on   01.12.2003   declaring   a   loss   of Rs.69,92,67,527/­.   A notice under Section 143(2) was issued to the assessee.  The Assessing Officer vide its order dated 27.03.2006 held that during the year under consideration, the assessee   company   was   in   receipt   of   both   taxable   and non­taxable   dividend   income.     Accordingly,   the   dividend   on investment exempt under Section 10(23G) was considered by the A.O.   for   the   purpose   of   disallowance   U/S.14A.     Hence,

4 proportionate   interest   relating   to   investment   on   which exemption   u/s.10(23G)   is   available   as   per   the   working amounting   to   Rs.26   crores   was   disallowed   U/S.14A   r.w.s. 10(23G) of the I.T. Act. 5. The assessee filed an appeal, which was partly allowed by order dated 05.03.2009.  The assessee filed an appeal before the ITAT.  The ITAT allowed the assessee’s appeal relying on the   Bombay   High   Court’s   judgment   in  Godrej   and   Boyce Manufacturing  Company  Limited  versus   Deputy  Commissioner   of Income   Tax,   Mumabi   &   Another.,   reported   in   (2010)   328   ITR 81(Bom.).  The ITAT held that Rule 8D is only prospective and in the year under consideration Rule 8D was not applicable. ITAT set aside the order of CIT(A) and restored the issue back to the file of the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication without invoking the provisions of Rule 8D.  Against the order of ITAT, the revenue filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court following its earlier judgment of  Godrej and Boyce  Manufacturing  Company  Limited  Vs.  Deputy  Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr. (supra)  dismissed the appeal. The Commissioner of Income Tax aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court has come up in this appeal. 6. In the appeal, the only question, which has been pressed

5 for our consideration is the first question, which was raised before the High Court, which is to the following effect:­ “Whether on the facts and circumstance of the case and in law, the Hon’ble ITAT is right in holding that applicability of Rule 8D is only prospective in operation and for the year under assessment it was not applicable?” 7. Thus, in this batch of appeals, the only question to be considered and answered is as to whether Rule 8D of Income Tax Rules is prospective in operation as held by the High Court or it is retrospective in operation and shall also be applicable in the assessment year in question as contended by learned counsel for the revenue. 8. We   have   heard   Shri   Yashank   Adhyaru,   learned   senior counsel, Shri Arijit Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant Shri S.K. Bagaria, learned senior counsel, Shri Ajay Vohra, learned   senior   counsel   and   other   learned   counsel   have   been heard for different assessees in this batch of appeals. “SUBMISSIONS” 9. Learned counsel for the appellant (revenue) submit that provisions of Section 14A being clarificatory in nature and Rule   8D   is   a   procedural   provision   which   provided   only   a machinery for the implementation of sub­sections (2) and (3), Rule 8D is retrospective in nature.  The machinery provisions

6 by which the charging section is to be implemented or workable are   to   be   given   retrospective   effect,   which   is   co­terminus with the period of operation of the main charging provision. The   charging   section   i.e.   Section   14A   admittedly   being retrospective, the machinery provision, i.e. Rule 8D has also to be retrospective. 10. Learned counsel for the revenue has placed reliance on judgments  of   this  Court,   i.e.,  Commissioner   of  Wealth  Tax, Meerut   Vs.  Sharvan   Kumar   Swarup  &  Sons,  (1994)  6  SCC   623; Commissioner of Income Tax I, Ahmedabad Vs. Gold Coin Health Food Private Limited, (2008) 9 SCC 622 and Commissioner of Income Tax – III Vs. Calcutta Knitwears, Ludhiana, (2014) 6 SCC 444. 11. Shri S.K. Bagaria, learned senior counsel appearing for the assessee refuting the submission of learned counsel for the   revenue   contends   that   provisions   of   Rule   8D   are   only prospective in nature.  He submits that when a new liability is imposed by a statutory provision then the same cannot be retrospective.  He submits that provisions inserted by Rule 8D are new provision for computing the expenditure which can in no manner be retrospective.  He submits that Rule 8D was made applicable by Fifth Amendment Rules, 2008 providing in Clause 2 i.e. “they shall come into force from the date of their

7 publication in the official gazette”.   He submits that the Central   Board   of   Direct   Taxes   vide   its   circular   dated 28.12.2006 while explaining the substance of the provision of sub­sections (2) and (3) of Section 14A clearly mention that the aforesaid provisions were to be applicable from assessment year 2007­2008 onwards.   Hence, Rule 8D, which is framed to give   effect   to   the   provisions   of   sub­sections   (2)   and   (3) cannot   operate   from   any   date   prior   to   assessment   year 2007­2008. 12. Shri   Ajay   Vohra,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for assessee submits that Rule 8D has been amended by Income Tax (14th Amendment Rules, 2016) w.e.f. 02.06.2016 by which a new methodology of computing the expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of the total income has been brought in place.  In event, the argument is accepted that Rule 8D is retrospective, which rule shall hold the field, whether Rule 8D   as   inserted   w.e.f.   24.03.2008   or   one   which   has   been substituted   w.e.f.   02.06.2016?   The   amendment   made   w.e.f. 02.06.2016 reinforces that the methodology of computing the expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of the total income is prospective and has been change w.e.f. 02.06.2016,   no   other   interpretation   is   permissible.     He further   submits   that   subordinate   legislation   is   ordinarily

8 prospective and Rule 8D being subordinate legislation can have no retrospective effect.   Learned counsel for the assessees have also placed reliance on various decisions of this Court, which shall be referred to while considering the submissions in detail. 13. Shri   S.S.H.   Rizvi,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the assessee in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) 16185 of 2016 submits that Revenue has already agreed before the ITAT that matter be remitted to Assessing Officer for fresh decision in light   of   judgment   of   the   Bombay   High   Court   in  Godrej   and Boyce   Manufacturing   Company   (supra),   hence,   it   had   no jurisdiction   to   file   an   appeal   before   the   High   Court.     He submits that High Court has rightly dismissed the appeal of the Revenue, relying on the judgment of the Bomabay High Court in  Godrej   and   Boyce   Manufacturing   Company   (supra)  after noticing the fact that no interim order was passed by this Court   in   Special   Leave   Petition   filed   against   the   said judgment. It has been submitted by Shri Rizvi that no other question arose in the appeal before the High Court hence the Revenue has approached this Court by filing this Special Leave Petition without any basis. Relevant Statutory Provisions 14. Rule 8D has been framed to give effect to the provisions

9 of Section 14A sub­section (2) and (3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).   The statutory scheme   as   delineated   by   Section   14A   has   to   be   understood before correctly appreciating the nature and purport of Rule 8D.  Section 14A was first inserted by Finance Act, 2001 with retrospective   effect   w.e.f.   01.04.1962.     Section   14A   as originally inserted reads as under:­ “14A. Expenditure incurred in relation to income not   includible   in   total   income.   ­–   For   the purposes of computing the total income under this Chapter, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of   expenditure   incurred   by   the   assessee   in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act.” 15. The   purpose   for   which   Section   14A   was   introduced   was given in the explanatory memorandum issued with the Finance Bill, 2001, which reads a sunder:­ “Certain   incomes   are   not   includible   while computing   the   total   income   as   these   are   exempt under   various   provisions   of   the   Act.   There   have been cases where deductions have been claimed in respect   of   such   exempt   income.   This   in   effect means   that   the   tax   incentive   given   by   way   of exemptions   to   certain   categories   of   income   is being used to reduce also the tax payable on the non­exempt   income   by   debiting   the   expenses incurred to earn the exempt income against taxable income.   This   is   against   the   basic   principles   of taxation whereby only the net income, i.e., gross income   minus   the   expenditure,   is   taxed.   On   the same analogy, the exemption is also in respect of the net income. Expenses incurred can be allowed only   to   the   extent   they   are   relatable   to   the earning   of   taxable   income.   It   is   proposed   to insert   a   new   section   14A   so   as   to   clarify   the

10 intention of the Legislature since the inception of   the   Income­tax   Act,   1961,   that   no   deduction shall   be   made   in   respect   of   any   expenditure incurred   by   the   assessee   in   relation   to   income which does not form part of the total income under the   Income­tax   Act.   The   proposed   amendment   will take effect retrospectively from 1st April, 1962 and   will   accordingly,   apply   in   relation   to   the assessment year   1962­1963 and subsequent assessment years.” 16. Section   14A   being   retrospective   in   operation   w.e.f. 01.04.1962,   was   being   used   by   the   Assessing   Officers   for reopening the assessments, the Central Board of Direct Taxes came with a clarification vide Circular No. 11 of 2001 dated 23.07.2001.  Para 4 of the Circular stated as follows:­ “The Board have considered this matter and hereby directs that the assessments where the proceedings have become final before the first day of April, 2001 should not be re­opened under section 147 of the Act to disallow expenditure incurred to earn exempt income by applying the provisions of newly inserted section 14A of the Act.” 17. By   Finance   Act,   2002,   a   statutory   provision   was   also inserted by way of proviso to Section 14A.  What was clarified by the Circular have been statutorily engrafted in the proviso to the following effect:­ “Provided that nothing contained in this section shall   empower   the   assessing   officer   either   to reassess   under   section   147   or   pass   an   order enhancing   the   assessment   or   reducing   a   refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of   the   assessee   under   section   154,   for   any assessment year beginning on or before the Ist day of April, 2001.”

11 18. By   Finance   Act,   2006,   Section   14A   was   numbered   as sub­section (1) and after sub­section (1) sub­sections (2) and (3) were inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2007 to the following effect:­ "(2)   The   Assessing   Officer   shall   determine   the amount of expenditure incurred in relation to such income   which   does   not   form   part   of   the   total income   under   this   Act   in   accordance   with   such method   as   may   be   prescribed,   if   the   Assessing Officer,   having   regard   to   the   accounts   of   the assessee, is not satisfied with the correctness of the   claim   of   the   assessee   in   respect   of   such expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act. (3) The provisions of sub­section (2) shall also apply   in   relation   to   a   case   where   an   assessee claims   that   no   expenditure   has   been   incurred   by him in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act.” 19. Memorandum   explaining   the   provisions   in   Finance   Bill, 2006 in reference to the method for allocating expenditure in relation to exempt income mentioned following:­ “Under   the   existing   provisions   of   the   said section,   it   has   been   provided   that   for   the purposes   of   computing   the   total   income,   no deduction   shall   be   allowed   in   respect   of expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under the Income­tax Act. It   is   proposed   to   number   the   said   section   as sub­section   (1)   thereof   and   to   insert   a   new sub­section   (2)   in   the   said   section   so   as   to provide that the Assessing Officer shall determine the amount of expenditure incurred in relation to such income which does not form part of the total

12 income, in accordance with such method as may be laid down by the Central Board of Direct Taxes by rules, if the Assessing Officer having regard to the   accounts   of   the   assessee,   is   not   satisfied with the correctness of the claim of the assessee in   respect   of   expenditure   in   relation   to   income which does not form part of the total income. It is   also   proposed   to   provide   that   provisions   of sub­section (2) shall also apply in relation to a case where an assessee claims that no expenditure has   been   incurred   by   him   in   relation   to   income which does not form part of the total income. This   amendment   will   take   effect   from   1st   April, 2007 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2007­08 and subsequent years.” 20. After the changes made in Section 14A by the Finance Act, 2006, a Circular No.14/2006 dated 28.12.2006 was issued, in which Para 11 of the Circular gave following explanation:­ “11.1 Section   14A   of   the   Income­tax   Act,   1961, provides   that   for   the   purposes   of   computing   the total income under Chapter­IV of the said Act, no deduction   shall   be   allowed   in   respect   of expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under the Income­tax Act. In the existing provisions of section 14A, however, no method of computing the expenditure incurred in relation to income   which   does   not   form   part   of   the   total income has been provided for. Consequently, there is considerable dispute between the taxpayers and the Department on the method of determining such expenditure. 11.2 In view of the above, a new sub­section (2) has been inserted in section 14A so as to provide that   it   would   be   mandatory   for   the   Assessing Officer   to   determine   the   amount   of   expenditure incurred in relation to such income which does not form part of the total income in accordance with such   method   as   may   be   prescribed.   However,   the

13 Assessing   Officer   shall   follow   the   prescribed method if, having regard to the accounts of the assessee, he is not satisfied with the correctness of   the   claim   of   the   assessee   in   respect   of expenditure in relation to income which does not form   part   of   the   total   income.   Provisions   of sub­section   (2),   will   also   be   applicable   in relation to a case where an assessee claims that no   expenditure   has   been   incurred   by   him   in relation to income which does not form part of the total income. 11.3 Applicability ­ From assessment year 2007­08 onwards.” 21.  Income Tax Rules, 1962 were amended by notification dated 24.03.2008   by   which   Rule   8D   was   inserted   to   the   following effect:­ “Method for determining amount of expenditure in relation to income not includible in total income. 8D (1) Where the Assessing Officer, having regard to   the   accounts   of   the   assessee   of   a   previous year, is not satisfied with – (a)  the   correctness   of   the   claim   of expenditure made by the assessee; or (b) the   claim   made   by   the   assessee   that   no expenditure has been incurred in relation to income which does not form part of   the   total   income   under   the   Act   for   such previous year, he shall determine the amount of expenditure   in   relation   to   such   income   in accordance with the provisions of sub­rule (2). (2) The expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of the total income shall be the aggregate of following amounts, namely :— (i)  the   amount   of   expenditure   directly relating to income which does not form part of total income;

14 (ii) in a case where the assessee has incurred expenditure   by   way   of   interest   during   the previous   year   which   is   not   directly attributable   to   any   particular   income   or receipt, an amount computed in accordance with the following formula, namely :— A X B C Where   A=   amount   of   expenditure   by   way   of interest   other   than   the   amount   of interest   included   in   clause   (i) incurred during the previous year; B= the   average   of   value   of   investment, income   from   which   does   not   or   shall not form part of the total income, as appearing in the balance sheet of the assessee,   on   the   first   day   and   the last day of the previous year ; C= the   average   of   total   assets   as appearing in the balance sheet of the assessee,   on   the   first   day   and   the last day of the previous year; (iii) an amount equal to one­half per cent of the average of the value of investment, income from which does not or shall not form part of the total income, as appearing in the balance sheet of the assessee, on the first day and the last day of the previous year." 3. For   the   purposes   of   this   rule,   the   'total assets'  shall  mean,  total  assets  as  appearing in the balance sheet excluding the increase on account of revaluation of assets but including the   decrease   on   account   of   revaluation   of assets.” 22. After setting out the legislative scheme of Section 14A and   Rule   8D,   now,   we   proceed   to   consider   the   submissions raised by learned counsel for the parties on the question in

15 issue. Important Principles of Statutory Interpretation 23. The legislature has plenary power of legislation within the fields assigned to them, it may legislate prospectively as well   as   retrospectively.   It   is   a   settled   principle   of statutory   construction   that   every   statute   is  prima  facie prospective   unless   it   is   expressly   or   by   necessary implications   made   to   have   retrospective   operations.   Legal Maxim  “nova   constitutio   futuris   formam   imponere   debet   non praeteritis“,   i.e. ‘a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past’, contain a principle of presumption of prospectivity of a statute. 24. Justice   G.P.   Singh in   “Principles   of   Statutory Interpretation”   (14th  Edition,   in   Chapter   6)   while   dealing with operation of fiscal statute elaborates the principles of statutory interpretation in the following words: “Fiscal   legislation   imposing   liability   is generally governed by the normal presumption that it   is   not   retrospective   and   it   is   a   cardinal principle   of   the   tax   law   that   the   law   to   be applied is that in force in the assessment year unless   otherwise   provided   expressly   or   by necessary implication. The above rule applies to the   charging   section   and   other   substantive provisions   such   as   a   provision   imposing   penalty and   does   not   apply   to   machinery   or   procedural provisions   of   a   taxing   Act   which   are   generally

16 retrospective   and   apply   even   to   pending proceedings. But a procedural provision, as far as possible, will not be so construed as to affect finality of tax assessment or to open up liability which   had   become   barred.   Assessment   creates   a vested right and an assessee cannot be subjected to reassessment unless a provision to that effect inserted   by   amendment   is   either   is   either expressly

necessary

implication retrospective.   A   provision   which   in   terms   is retrospective   and   has   the   effect   of   opening   up liability   which   had   become   barred   by   lapse   of time,   will   be   subject   to   the   rule   of   strict construction.   In   the   absence   of   a   clear implication such a legislation will not be given a greater   retrospectivity   than   is   expressly mentioned; nor will it be construed to authorize the Income­tax Authorities to commence proceedings which, before the new Act came into force, had by the   expiry   of   the   period   then   provided   become barred.   But   unambiguous   language   must   be   given effect   to,   even   if   it   results   in   reopening   of assessments which had become final after expiry of the   period   earlier   provided   for   reopening   them. There is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative   intent   to   give   retrospectivity   to   a taxation enactment......” 25. A three­Judge Bench of this court in  1976 (1) SCC 906, Govind   Das   and   others   Versus   the   Income   Tax   officer   and another,  noticing   the   settled   rules   of   interpretation   laid down following in paragraph 11: “11. Now   it   is   a   well   settled   rule   of interpretation hallowed by time and sanctified by judicial   decisions   that,   unless   the   terms   of   a statute   expressly   so   provide   or   necessarily require it, retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an existing   right   or   create   a   new   obligation   or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards matters of procedure. The general rule as stated

17 by Halsbury in Vol. 36 of the Laws of England (3rd Edn.) and reiterated in several decisions of this Court as well as English courts is that “all statutes other than those which are   merely   declaratory   or   which   relate only   to   matters   of   procedure   or   of evidence are prima facie prospective” and   retrospective   operation   should   not be given to a statute so as to affect, alter   or   destroy   an   existing   right   or create   a   new   liability   or   obligation unless   that   effect   cannot   be   avoided without   doing   violence   to   the   language of   the   enactment.   If   the   enactment   is expressed   in   language   which   is   fairly capable   of   either   interpretation,   it ought   to   be   construed   as   prospective only.   If   we   apply   this   principle   of interpretation,   it   is   clear   that sub­section   (6)   of   Section   171   applies only to a situation where the assessment of a Hindu undivided family is completed under Section 143 or Section 144 of the new   Act.   It   can   have   no   application where   the   assessment   of   a   Hindu undivided family is completed under the corresponding provisions of the old Act. Such a case would be governed by Section 25­A   of   the   old   Act   which   does   not impose   any   personal   liability   on   the members in case of partial partition and to   construe   sub­section   (6)   of   Section 171   as   applicable   in   such   a   case   with consequential   effect   of   casting   of   the members personal liability which did not exist   under   Section   25­A,   would   be   to give

retrospective

operation

to sub­section (6) of Section 171 which is not   warranted   either   by   the   express language   of   that   provision   or   by necessary   implication.   Sub­section   (6) of Section 171 can be given full effect by interpreting it as applicable only in a case where the assessment of a Hindu

18 undivided   family   is   made   under   Section 143 or Section 144 of the new Act. We cannot, therefore, consistently with the rule   of   interpretation   which   denies retrospective   operation   to   a   statute which   has   the   effect   of   creating   or imposing a new obligation or liability, construe sub­section (6) of Section 171 as embracing a case where assessment of a Hindu undivided family is made under the provisions of the old Act. Here in the present case, the assessments of the Hindu   undivided   family   for   Assessment Years 1950­51 to 1956­57 were completed in accordance with the provisions of the old Act which included Section 25­A and the   Income   Tax   Officer   was,   therefore, not entitled to avail of the provision enacted   in   sub­section   (6)   read   with sub­section   (7)   of   Section   171   of   the new   Act   for   the   purpose   of   recovering the tax or any part thereof personally from   any   members   of   the   joint   family including the petitioners.” 26. A Constitution Bench of this court speaking through one of us, Dr. Justice A.K.Sikri, in the case of The Commissioner of Income Tax(Central – 1 New Delhi) Vs. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd., 2015 (1) SCC 1, while considering as to whether Proviso inserted in Section 113 of Income Tax Act w.e.f. 01.06.2002 is prospective   or   clarificatory   /retrospective   noticed   the general principles concerning retrospectivity. Following was laid down by the Constitution Bench in Paras 28, 29 and 33: “28. Of the various rules guiding how legislation has   to   be   interpreted,   one   established   rule   is that   unless   a   contrary   intention   appears,   a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have

19 a   retrospective   operation.   The   idea   behind   the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do   it   keeping   in   view   the   law   of   today   and   in force   and   not   tomorrow’s   backward   adjustment   of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively   upset.   This   principle   of   law   is known   as  lex   prospicit   non   respicit:   law   looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips v.  Eyre6, a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the   conduct   of   mankind   is   to   be   regulated   when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts   ought   not   to   change   the   character   of   past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law. 29.  The   obvious   basis   of   the   principle   against retrospectivity   is   the   principle   of   “fairness”, which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in  L’Office Cherifien des Phosphates  v. Yamashita­Shinnihon   Steamship   Co.   Ltd.7 Thus, legislations   which   modified   accrued   rights   or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach   a   new   disability   have   to   be   treated   as prospective   unless   the   legislative   intent   is clearly   to   give   the   enactment   a   retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying   an   obvious   omission   in   a   former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on   the   subject   because   aforesaid   legal   position clearly   emerges   from   the   various   decisions   and this  legal  position  was  conceded  by  the  counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few   judgments   containing   this   dicta,   a   little later. 33. A   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in Keshavlal   Jethalal   Shah  v.  Mohanlal   Bhagwandas, while   considering   the   nature   of   amendment   to

20 Section   29(2)   of   the   Bombay   Rents,   Hotel   and Lodging   House   Rates   Control   Act   as   amended   by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965, observed as follows: (AIR p. 1339, para 8) “8. … The amending clause does not seek to explain any pre­existing legislation which   was   ambiguous   or   defective.   The power of the High Court to entertain a petition   for   exercising   revisional jurisdiction   was   before   the   amendment derived from Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the legislature has by   the   amending   Act   not   attempted   to explain   the   meaning   of   that   provision. An   explanatory   Act   is   generally   passed to   supply   an   obvious   omission   or   to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act.” 27. A   two­Judge   Bench,   speaking   through   one   of   us,   Dr. Justice   A.   K.   Sikri   in    Jayam   and   company   Vs.   Assistant Commissioner & Ors., (2016) 15 SCC 125, again reiterated the broad legal principles while testing a retrospective statute in Paragraphs 14 and 18 which is to the following effect: “14.  With   this,   let   us   advert   to   the   issue   on retrospectivity. No doubt, when it comes to fiscal legislation, the legislature has power to make the provision   retrospectively.   In  R.C.   Tobacco   (P) Ltd.  v.  Union of India, this Court stated broad legal   principles   while   testing   a   retrospective statute, in the following manner: (SCC pp. 737­38 & 740, paras 21­22 & 28) “(i)   A   law   cannot   be   held   to   be unreasonable   merely   because   it   operates retrospectively; (ii)   The   unreasonability   must   lie   in some other additional factors; (iii) The retrospective operation of a fiscal statute would have to be found to

21 be   unduly   oppressive   and   confiscatory before it can be held to be unreasonable as to violate constitutional norms; (iv)   Where   taxing   statute   is   plainly discriminatory or provides no procedural machinery for assessment and levy of tax or that is confiscatory, courts will be justified in striking down the impugned statute as unconstitutional; (v) The other factors being period of retrospectivity and degree of unforeseen or unforeseeable financial burden imposed for the past period; (vi) Length of time is not by itself decisive   to   affect   retrospectivity.” (Jayam and Co. case1, SCC Online Mad para 85) 18. The entire gamut of retrospective operation of fiscal statutes was revisited by this Court in a Constitution   Bench   judgment   in  CIT  v.  Vatika Township (P) Ltd. in the following manner: (SCC p. 24, paras 33­35) “33. A Constitution Bench of this Court in  Keshavlal   Jethalal   Shah  v.  Mohanlal Bhagwandas, while considering the nature of   amendment   to   Section   29(2)   of   the Bombay   Rents,   Hotel   and   Lodging   House Rates Control Act as amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965, observed as follows: (AIR p. 1339, para 8) ‘8. … The amending clause does not seek   to   explain   any   pre­existing legislation   which   was   ambiguous   or defective.   The   power   of   the   High Court   to   entertain   a   petition   for exercising   revisional   jurisdiction was   before   the   amendment   derived from   Section   115   of   the   Code   of Civil Procedure, and the legislature has   by   the   amending   Act   not attempted to explain the meaning of that   provision.   An   explanatory   Act is   generally   passed   to   supply   an obvious   omission   or   to   clear   up

22 doubts   as   to   the   meaning   of   the previous Act.’ 34.   It   would   also   be   pertinent   to mention that assessment creates a vested right   and   an   assessee   cannot   be subjected   to   reassessment   unless   a provision   to   that   effect   inserted   by amendment   is   either   expressly   or   by necessary   implication   retrospective. (See CED v. M.A. Merchant.) 35.   We   would   also   like   to   reproduce hereunder the following observations made by this Court in Govind Das v. ITO, while holding Section 171(6) of the Income Tax Act   to   be   prospective   and   inapplicable for   any   assessment   year   prior   to 1­4­1962,   the   date   on   which   the   Income Tax   Act   came   into   force:   (SCC   p.   914, para 11) ‘11. Now it is a well­settled rule of   interpretation   hallowed   by   time and sanctified by judicial decisions that, unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide or necessarily require   it,   retrospective   operation should not be given to a statute so as   to   take   away   or   impair   an existing   right   or   create   a   new obligation or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards matters of procedure.   The   general   rule   as stated by Halsbury in Vol. 36 of the Laws   of   England (3rd   Edn.)   and reiterated   in   several   decisions   of this Court as well as English courts is that “all statutes other than those which are   merely   declaratory   or   which relate only to matters of procedure or   of   evidence   are   prima   facie prospective

and

retrospective

23 operation should not be given to a statute   so   as   to   affect,   alter   or destroy an existing right or create a new liability or obligation unless that   effect   cannot   be   avoided without   doing   violence   to   the language   of   the   enactment.  If   the enactment   is   expressed   in   language which   is   fairly   capable   of   either interpretation,   it   ought   to   be construed as prospective only.”’” 28. The sub­section (2) and sub­section (3) were inserted in Section 14A by Finance Act, 2006. The memorandum explaining the   provision   in   Finance   Bill,   2006,   in   reference   to   the methods   for   allocating   expenditure   in   relation   to   exempt income   as   extracted   above   clearly   mentions   that   amendments brought   by   Finance   Bill,   2006   will   take   effect   from 01.04.2007.   The   last   paragraph   of   memorandum   was   to   the following effect: “this amendment will take effect from 01.04.2007 and   will   accordingly,   apply   in   relation   to   the assessment year 2007­08 and subsequent years” 29. The Constitution Bench of this court in the Commissioner of Income Tax and ors. Vs. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd., (Supra), has taken into consideration the notes of clause appended to the Finance Bill to decipher the nature of the legislative scheme.   In   paragraph   42.1,   Constitution   Bench   stated   as follows:

24 “42.1. “Notes on Clauses” appended to the Finance Bill,   2002   while   proposing   insertion   of   proviso categorically   states   that   “this   amendment   will take   effect   from   1­6­2002”.   These   become epigraphic** words, when seen in contradistinction to other amendments specifically stating those to be clarificatory or retrospective depicting clear intention of the legislature. It can be seen from the same Notes that a few other amendments in the Income Tax Act were made by the same Finance Act specifically

making

those

amendments retrospective.   For   example,   Clause   40   seeks   to amend Section 92­F. Clause (iii­a) of Section 92­F is amended “so as to  clarify  that the activities mentioned in the said clause include the carrying out   of   any   work   in   pursuance   of   a   contract” (emphasis  supplied).   This  amendment  takes  effect retrospectively   from   1­4­2002.   Various   other amendments   also   take   place   retrospectively.   The Notes   on   Clauses   show   that   the   legislature   is fully aware of three concepts: (i)   prospective   amendment   with   effect from a fixed date; (ii) retrospective amendment with effect from a fixed anterior date; and (iii) clarificatory amendments which are retrospective in nature.” 30. It   is   also   relevant   to   know   as   to   how   the   statutory provisions of Section 14A sub­section (2) and sub­section (3), Rule 8D was understood by the Income Tax department itself. After   insertion   of   sub­section   (2)   and   sub­section   (3)   in Section 14A by Finance Bill, 2006, circular dated 28.12.2006 was issued by the department wherein paragraph 11.3, following was stated: “11.3.   Applicability­   from   assessment   year 2007­2008 onwards.”

25 31. The methodology for determining amount of the expenditure in addition to income not includable in total income was for the   first   time   prescribed   by   Rule   8D   as   was   envisaged   in Section 14A sub­section (2) and sub­section (3). It is also relevant   to   notice   that   Constitution   Bench   in the Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd., has also referred to and relied the CBDT circular to find out the understanding of the Central Board of Direct Tax itself in context of Provision which was in issue in the above case. 32. Explanatory memorandum issued with the Finance Bill, 2006 and   the   CBDT   circular   dated   28.12.2006,   thus,   clearly indicates that department understood that sub­section (2) and sub­section   (3)   was   to   be   implemented   with   effect   from assessment year 2007­2008. The Rule 8D prescribing the method was brought into statute book with effect from 24.03.2008 to implement sub­section (2) and sub­section (3) with effect from assessment year 2008­2009, is clear indicator of the fact that a new method for computing the expenditure was brought in by the rules which was to be utilized for computing expenditure for the Assessment Year 2008­2009 and onwards. 33. When Section 14A was inserted by Finance Act, 2001, it

26 was   with   retrospective   effect   with   effect   from   01.04.1962 where   as   Finance   Act,   2006,   by   which   sub­section   (2)   and sub­section   (3)   to   Section   14A   were   inserted,   it   was   with effect from 01.04.2006 which was mentioned in clause 1(2) of Finance Act, 2006 which was to the following effect: “1(2).   Save   as   otherwise   provided   in   this   Act, Sections 2 to 57 shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April, 2006.” Rule   8D   which   was   inserted   by   notification   dated 24.03.2008. Rule 1 sub­rule (2) provides as under: “1. (1) These rules may be called the  Income­tax (Fifth Amendment) Rules, 2008. (2). They shall come into force from date of their publication in the Official Gazette.” It   is,   however,   well   settled   that   the   mere   date   of enforcement of statutory provisions does not conclude that the statute is prospective in nature. The nature and content of statute have to be looked into to find out the legislative scheme and the nature, effect and consequence of the statute. 34. The   submissions   which   have   been   much   pressed   by   the counsel for revenue is that the Section 14A of the Act being clarificatory in nature having retrospective operation, Rule 8D, which is a machinery provisions have also to be held to be retrospective to make machinery provisions workable.

27 35. It   is   to   be   noted   that   Section   14A   was   inserted   by Finance   Act,   2001   and   the   provisions   were   fully   workable without their being any mechanism provided for computing the expenditure.   Although   Section   14A   was   made   effective   from 01.04.1962   but   Proviso   was   immediately   inserted   by   Finance Act,   2002,   providing   that   Section   14A   shall   not   empower assessing officer either to reassess under Section 147 or pass an order enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessees under Section 154, for any assessment year beginning on or before 01.04.2001. Thus, all concluded transactions prior to 01.04.2001 were made final and not allowed to be re­opened. 36. The memorandum of explanation explaining the provisions of Finance Act, 2006 has clearly mentioned that Section 14 sub­section (2) and sub­section (3) shall be effective with effect from the assessment year 2006­07 alone which is another indicator   that   provision   was   intended   to   operate prospectively. 37. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   have   placed   heavy reliance   on   a   three­Judge   Bench   Judgment   of   this   Court   in Commissioner   of   Wealth   Tax,   Meerut   versus   Sharvan   Kumar Swarup & Sons, (1994) 6 SCC 623. This Court in the above case

28 had   to   interpret   Rule   1­BB,   inserted   in   Wealth   Tax,   1957 w.e.f. 01.04.1979.   For Assessment Year 1977­78 and 1978­79 assessment order was passed on 08.02.1983 by which time Rule 1 BB had been introduced in the Rule. The assessee contended that   properties   to   be   valued   applying   the   Rule   1­BB.     The claim   was   rejected   and   Assessing   Officer   had   valued   the immovable property independently of Rule 1­BB. 38. Appeal preferred by assessee was allowed. Appeal by the Revenue   before   the   Income   Tax   Appellate   Tribunal   was   also dismissed.  High Court also answered the question against the Revenue, which was taken in appeal before this Court.   This Court,   after   noticing   the   various   principles   of   “statutory interpretation” held that “procedural law” generally speaking is   applicable   to   pending   cases.   Interpreting   Rule   1­BB following was held in para 23 and 25: “23. We may now turn to the scope and content of Rule 1­BB. The said rule merely provides a choice amongst   well­known   and   well­settled   modes   of valuation. Even in the absence of Rule 1­BB it would not have have been objectionable, nor would there be any legal impediment, to adopt the mode of valuation embodied in Rule 1­BB, namely, the method of capitalisation of income on a number of years' purchase value. The rule was intended to impart   uniformity   in   valuations   and   to   avoid vagaries   and   disparities   resulting   from application   of   different   modes   of   valuation   in different cases where the nature of the property is similar.” 25. On   a   consideration   of   the   matter   we   are

29 persuaded   to   the   view   that   Rule   1­BB   is essentially a rule of evidence as to the choice of one of the well accepted methods of valuation in respect of certain kinds of properties with a view   to   achieving   uniformity   in   valuation   and avoiding   disparate   valuations   resulting   from application   of   different   methods   of   valuation respecting   properties   of   a   similar   nature   and character. The view taken by the High Courts, in our opinion, cannot be said to be erroneous.” 39. This Court in the above case held that Rule 1­BB shall be applicable even prior to the enforcement of the rule holding that the said rule merely provides a choice amongst well­known and well­settled modes of valuation.  It was held that even in the absence of Rule 1­BB, it would not have been objectionable to adopt the mode of valuation embodied in Rule 1­BB, namely, the   mode   of   capitalisation   of   income   on   a   number   of   years purchased   value.   The   said   judgment   is,   clearly, distinguishable in context of issue which has arisen before us. In the present case, methodology as provided under Rule 8D was neither a well­known nor well­settled mode of computation. The new mode of computation was brought in place by Rule 8D. No   Assessing   Officer,   even   in   his   imagination   could   have applied the methodology, which was brought in place by Rule 8D.   Thus,   retrospective   operation   of   Rule   8D   cannot   be accepted on the strength of law laid down by this Court in the above case.

30 40. The next judgment relied by the Revenue is  Commissioner of   Income   Tax   I,   Ahmedabad   versus   Gold   Coin   Health   Food Private Limited, (2008) 9 SCC 622.   In the above case, this Court considered the amendments made by the Finance Act, 2002 to Section 271(1)(c)(iii) of the Act. This Court held that the Parliament clarified the position by changing the expression “any”   by   “if   any”,   which   was   not   a   substantive   amendment creating   penalty   for   the   first   time.     The   amendment   as specifically noted in the notes of “Clauses” was clarificatory in nature. In para 5 following was laid down: “5. It   is   pointed   out   that   prior   to   the amendment, Section   271(1)(c)(iii)   read   as follows: "271.(1)(c)(iii) in the cases referred to in   clause   (c),   in   addition   to   any   tax payable by him, a sum which shall not be less   than,   but   which   shall   not   exceed twice,   the   amount   of   the   income   in respect   of   which   the   particulars   have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished." It was submitted that bare reading of the   provision   made   the   position   clear that it was not necessary that income tax must be payable by the assessee as sine qua   non   for   imposition   of   penalty.   The word “any” made the position clear that the penalty was in addition to any tax which   may   be   paid   by   the   assessee.

31 Therefore,   even   if   no   tax   was   payable, the penalty was leviable. It is in that context submitted that even prior to the amendment it could not be read to mean that   if   no   tax   was   payable   by   the assessee   because   of   filing   a   return disclosing   loss,   the   assessee   is   not liable   to   pay   penalty   even   if   the assessee   concealed   and/or   furnished inaccurate particulars. Because some High Courts   took   the   contradictory   view, Parliament   clarified   the   position   by changing   the   expression   "any'   by   "if any".   This   was   not   a   substantive amendment which created a penalty for the first time. The amendment by the Finance Act as specifically noted in the Notes on Clauses makes the position clear that the amendment was clarificatory in nature and would apply to all assessments even prior to Assessment Year 2003­04.” 41. The   three­Judge   Bench   also   referred   to   Departmental Circular   dated   24.07.1976,   which   was   found   relevant   for interpreting   for   finding   out   the   nature   of   the   amended provision. The three­Judge Bench, further held in Para 16 to the following effect: "16. The law is well settled that the applicable provision would be the law as it existed on the date   of   the   filing   of   the   return.   It   is   of relevance to note that when any loss is returned in any return it need not necessarily be the loss of   the   previous   year   concerned.   It   may   also include carried­forward loss which is required to be set up against future income under  Section 72

32 of the Act. Therefore, the applicable law on the date of filing of the return cannot be confined only   to   the   losses   of   the   previous   accounting years.” The three­Judge Bench, after noticing the earlier cases and   principles   of   the   statutory   interpretation   recorded following conclusion in para 21: “21. Above   being   the   position,   the   inevitable conclusion   is   that   Explanation   4   to   Section 271(1)(c)  is clarificatory and not substantive. The   view   expressed   to   the   contrary   in   Virtual case, (2007) 9 SCC 665 is not correct.” The above case is also clearly distinguishable and not applicable in the facts of the present case. It was held that amendments were clarificatory in nature, hence shall operate retrospectively. 42. The Revenue has also relied on the judgment of this Court in  Commissioner of Income Tax­III versus Calcutta Knitwears, Ludhiana,   (2014)   6   SCC   444.     The   above   judgment   has   been relied by the Revenue for the preposition that it is the duty of the Court, while interpreting machinery   provisions of a taxing statute to give effect to its manifest purpose. In para 34 following was laid down: “34. It is the duty of the court while interpreting the  machinery  provisions  of  a  taxing   statute  to give effect to its manifest purpose. Wherever the intention to impose liability is clear, the courts

33 ought not be hesitant in espousing a commonsense interpretation to the machinery provisions so that the charge does not fail. The machinery provisions must,   no   doubt,   be   so   construed   as   would effectuate the object and purpose of the statute and not defeat the same (Whitney v. IRC, 1926 AC 37 (HL), CIT  v. Mahaliram Ramjidas,  (1940) 8 ITR 442, Indian United Mills Ltd. v. Commr. of Excess Profits  Tax,   (1955)  27  ITR   20(SC),  and   Gursahai Saigal v. CIT,(1963) 48 ITR 1(SC); CWT v. Sharvan Kumar   Swarup   &   Sons,   (1994)   6   SCC   623;  CIT   v. National Taj Traders, (1980) 1 SCC 370; Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. CTO, (1981) 4 SCC 578. Francis Bennion   in   Bennion   on   Statutory   Interpretation, 5th Edn., Lexis Nexis in support of the aforesaid proposition   put   forth   as   an   illustration   that since charge made by the legislator in procedural provisions   is   excepted   to   be   for   the   general benefit  of  litigants  and   others,  it  is   presumed that   it   applies   to   pending   as   well   as   future proceedings.” 43. There   cannot   be   any   dispute   to   the   preposition   that machinery provision of taxing statute has to give effect to its manifest purposes.  But the applicability of the machinery provision whether it is prospective or retrospective depends on   the   content   and   nature   of   the   Statutory   Scheme.   In   the above   case,   the   Court   was   not   considering   the   question   of prospectivity or retrospectivity of the machinery provision, hence the above case also does not help the appellant in the present case. 44. The   Constitution   Bench   in  Commissioner   of   Income   Tax (Central)­I, New Delhi versus Vatika Township (supra), after noticing the principle of Statutory Interpretation, as noted

34 above, has laid down the following in para 36,  37 and 39: “36. In  CIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., AIR   1961   SC   1633,   this   Court   held   that   as   the liability to pay tax is computed according to the law in force at the beginning of the assessment year  i.e. the first day of April, any change in law affecting tax liability after that date though made during the currency of the assessment year, unless   specifically  made  retrospective,  does  not apply to the assessment for that year. Answer to the reference 37. When we examine the insertion of proviso in Section   113  of   the   Act,   keeping   in   view   the aforesaid principles, our irresistible conclusion is that the intention of the legislature was to make it prospective in nature. This proviso cannot be treated as declaratory/statutory or curative in nature.” Reasons in support “39. The first and foremost poser is as to whether it was possible to make the block assessment with the addition of levy of surcharge, in the absence of   proviso   to  Section   113?   In   Suresh   N.   Gupta itself, it was acknowledged and admitted that the position prior to the amendment of Section 113 of the   Act   whereby   the   proviso   was   added,   whether surcharge   was   payable   in   respect   of   block assessment   or   not,   was   totally   ambiguous   and unclear. The Court pointed out that some assessing officers had taken the view that no surcharge is leviable.   Others   were   at   a   loss   to   apply   a particular   rate   of   surcharge   as   they   were   not clear  as   to  which  Finance  Act,  prescribing  such

35 rates, was applicable. It is a matter of common knowledge   and   is   also   pointed   out   that   the surcharge varies from year to year. However, the assessing officers were indeterminative about the date with reference to which rates provided for in the  Finance Act  were to be made applicable. They had four dates before them viz.:(Suresh N. Gupta case, (2008) 4 SCC 362, SCC p. 379, para 35) (i) Whether surcharge was leviable with reference   to   the   rates   provided   for   in the Finance Act of the year in which the search was initiated; or (ii)   the   year   in   which   the   search   was concluded; or (iii)   the   year   in   which   the   block assessment   proceedings   under   Section 158­BC of the Act were initiated; or (iv) the year in which block assessment order was passed.” 45. As noted above, that Rule 8D has again been amended by Income   Tax   (Fourteenth   Amendment)     Rules,   2016   w.e.f. 02.06.2016, by which Rule 8D sub­rule (2) has been substituted by a new provision which is to the following effect: [(2) The expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of the total income shall be the aggregate of following amounts, namely:­ (i) the   amount   of   expenditure   directly relating   to   income   which   does   not   form part of total income; and

36 (ii) an amount equal to one per cent of the   annual   average   of   the   monthly averages   of   the   opening   and   closing balances   of   the   value   of   investment, income from which does not or shall not form part of total income: Provided that the amount referred to in clause (i) and   clause   (ii)   shall   not   exceed   the   total expenditure claimed by the assessee.] 46. The   method   for   determining   the   amount   of   expenditure brought in force w.e.f. 24.03.2008 has been given a go­bye and a new method has been brought into force w.e.f. 02.06.2016, by interpreting   the   Rule   8D   retrospective,   there   will   be   a conflict in applicability of 5th  & 14th  Amendment Rules which clearly indicates that the Rule has a prospective operation, which   has   been   prospectively   changed   by   adopting   another methodology. 47. One of the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the assessee also needs to be noticed. Learned counsel for the assessee   submits   that   it   is   well­settled   that   subordinate legislation ordinarily is not retrospective unless there are clear   indication   to   the   same.   Reliance   has   been   placed   on judgment of this Court in State of Jharkhand & Ors. Vs. Shiv Karampal Sahu, (2009) 11 SCC 453. In para 17 following has been stated:

37 “17. Ordinarily, a subordinate legislation should not be construed to be retrospective in operation. The   Circular   Letter   dated   7­5­2003   was   given   a prospective effect. The father of the respondent died on 19­5­2000. There is nothing to show that even   Circular   dated   9­8­2000   had   been   given retrospective effect. In any view of the matter, as the State of Jharkhand in the Circular Letter dated   7­5­2003   adopted   the   earlier   circular letters   issued   by   the   State   of   Bihar   only   in respect  of  cases  where  death  had   occurred  after 15­10­2000 i.e. the date from which the State of Jharkhand came into being, the High Court, in our opinion,   committed   a   serious   error   in   giving retrospective  effect   thereto  indirectly  which  it could   not   do   directly.   Reasons   assigned   by   the High   Court,   for   the   reasons   aforementioned,   are unacceptable.” There is no indication in Rule 8D to the effect that Rule 8D intended to apply retrospectively.

38 Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Limited versus Deputy Commissioner  of  Income   Tax,  Mumbai   and  Another,  (2010)  328 ITR   81(Bom.),   where   the   Division   Bench   of   the   Bombay   High court   after   elaborately   considering   the   principles   to determine   the   prospectivity   or   retrospectivity   of   the amendment has concluded that Rule 8D is prospective in nature. Against the aforesaid judgment of the Bombay High court dated 12.08.2010 an appeal was filed in this court which has been decided  vide  its   judgment   reported   in  Godrej   and   Boyce Manufacturing   Company   Limited   Vs.   Deputy   Commissioner   of Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr. (2017) 7 SCC 421. This Court, while deciding the above appeal repelled the challenge raised by the assessee regarding  vires  of Section 14A. In para 36 of the judgment,   this   Court   noticed   that   with   regard   to retrospectivity of provisions Revenue had filed appeal, hence the said question was not gone into the aforesaid appeal. In the above case, this Court specifically left the question of retrospectivity to be decided in other appeals filed by the Revenue.   We   thus   have   proceeded   to   decide   the   question   of retrospectivity of Rule 8D in these appeals. 50. In view of our opinion as expressed above, dismissal of the appeal by the Bombay High Court is fully sustainable. As held above, the Rule 8D is prospective in operation and could

39 not   have   been   applied   to   any   assessment   year   prior   to Assessment Year 2008­09. 51. In   result,   all   the   appeals   filed   by   the   Revenue   are dismissed.

..........................J. ( A.K. SIKRI ) ..........................J.

( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) NEW DELHI, JANUARY 31,2018.