K.L. SWAMY vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

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C.A. No.-003704-003704 - 2012Supreme Court2023 INSC 2813 January 2023Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH47 pages
For Petitioner: SENTHIL JAGADEESANFor Respondent: RAJ BAHADUR YADAV
AI SummaryPartly Allowed

What did the Supreme Court hold?

The Supreme Court held that interest under Section 158BFA(1) is leviable for belated filing of a return under Section 158BC, even if the notice was issued under Section 158BD, and that the amendment to Section 158BD was clarificatory. The Court also held that assessees are not liable to pay surcharge under Section 113.

What were the facts?

A search was conducted, and the appellant was issued a notice under Section 158BD to file a return for a block period. The Assessing Officer levied interest under Section 158BFA(1) for belated filing. The High Court reversed the ITAT's decision, holding the interest levy valid.

What were the issues?

Whether interest under Section 158BFA(1) is leviable for a return filed under Section 158BD without a notice under Section 158BC, and whether surcharge under Section 113 is applicable.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 158BFA(1),Section 158BD,Section 158BC,Section 113

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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3704 OF 2012 K.L. Swamy

...Appellant(s) Versus The Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr.      …Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3706 OF 2012 CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3705 OF 2012 CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3707 OF 2012 CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3708 OF 2012 CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3709 OF 2012 J U D G M E N T : 1 : Digitally signed by R Natarajan Date: 2023.01.13 16:29:07 IST Reason: Signature Not Verified

M.R. SHAH, J. 1. As common question of law and facts arise in this group of appeals,   all   these   appeals   are   decided   and   disposed   of together by this common judgment and order. 2. In all these appeals, the dispute is with respect to levy of interest under Section 158BFA(1) of the Income Tax Act in respect of assessment completed under Section 158BD of the Act for belatedly filing the return of income for the block period and also the levy of surcharge under Section 113 of the Income Tax Act. 3. For the sake of convenience Civil Appeal No.3706 of 2012 arising out of the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in ITA No.277 of 2004, is being treated and considered as a lead matter. 4. The facts leading to the present appeal in nut­shell are as under : 4.1 That the appellant is an individual and Director Partner in Khoday Group of Company concerns. A search under Section 132 was conducted in the residential premises of the family : 2 :

members of Khoday Group and the warrant was issued in the name of M/s. Khoday India Limited. The appellant was served with the notice under Section 158BD to file the return of income for the block period of 01.04.1986 to 13.02.1997. The appellant filed return for the block period in response to notice under Section 158BD by including the undisclosed income of Rs.45,00,000/­ for the block period. The Assessing Officer levied interest under Section 158BFA(1) for the period from 18.01.1998 to 19.01.1999 at the rate of 2% per month for 13 months and levied interest of Rs.7,12,296/­ on the tax amount of Rs.27,49,600/­. 4.2 The appellant being aggrieved by the order of the Assessing Officer filed an appeal before the learned CIT (A). It was the case on behalf of assessee that levy of interest under Section 158BFA(1) was not justified. The learned CIT (A) held that Section 158BFA provides for levy of interest for late filing of return of block assessment in response to the notice under Section 158BC similar to the provisions of Section 234A. The CIT(A) also held that levy of interest under Section 234A is compensatory in nature and is attracted the moment there is : 3 :

a default. The appellant – assessee being aggrieved by the order of CIT(A) filed an appeal before the ITAT, Bangalore. Before the ITAT, it was contended on behalf of assessee that provisions of Section 158BFA(1), the levy of interest would be attracted only in a case where there was a failure or delay in filing the return in response to notice under Section 158BC. It was contended that in absence of any notice under Section 158BC,   the   Assessing   Officer   was   not   justified   in   levying interest. It was also contended that in Section 158BD after the words “that Assessing Officer shall proceed” the words “under Section 158BC” was inserted w.e.f. 01.06.2002 by the Finance Act, 2002. It was contended that the amendment was specifically brought to cure the anomaly and the fact that   it   has   been   made   prospective   w.e.f.   01.06.2002   and therefore, the interest cannot be validly levied under Section 158BFA(1) in a case where notice under Section 158BD was issued prior to 31.05.2002 and in the present case the notice was  issued  on  28.11.1997.  The  learned  ITAT   allowed  the appeal preferred by the assessee by observing that Section 158BFA(1)   inserted   w.e.f.   01.01.1997,   prescribes   levy   of : 4 :

interest and never require to pay the self­assessment tax due along   with   the   return   of   income.   Interest   is   leviable   on undisclosed income determined with the assessment. It was observed   that   140A   requiring   to   pay   self­assessment   tax along with the return of income filed under Section 158BC(a) was amended w.e.f. 01.06.1999 only. It was observed that in the present case the return was filed on 19.01.1999 and at the relevant point of time there was no provision to pay self­ assessment   tax   along   with   the   return   of   income   and therefore no interest was leviable under Section 158BFA(1). 4.3 The revenue being aggrieved by the order passed by the ITAT, filed an appeal before the High Court being ITA No.277 of 2004. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has reversed the decision of the ITAT. The High Court has observed   that   the   amendment   to   Section   140A   is   of   no consequence   so   far   as   determination   of   interest   under Section 158BFA(1) is concerned. The High Court negatived the submission on behalf of the assessee that in absence of any specific notice under Section 158BC, there shall not be any   levy   of   interest   under   Section   158BFA(1)   on   the : 5 :

submission that prior   to   the   amendment   by   including Section   158BC   within   the   scope   of   Section   158BD   by Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. 01.06.2002. So far as a notice under Section   158BD,   provision   of   Section   158BFA(1)   was   not attracted. The High Court has observed and held that levy of provisions   of   Section   158BD   prior   to   the   amendment   in terms   of   Finance   Act,   2002   i.e.   before   adding   the   words “under Section 158BC”, section itself indicates the procedure that was required to be followed by the Assessing Officer, is only in terms of the very provisions of Chapter XIV­B of the Act and therefore Section 158BC as well as 158BFA(1)  are even otherwise attracted and just because the Legislature thought it fit to add or to mention Section 158BC by way of amendment through Finance Act, 2002, it would not make any   difference   to   the   earlier   provision   of   Section   158BD which even otherwise envisages within itself the provisions and   applicability   of   Section   158BD   and   158BFA(1). Consequently, the High Court has answered the questions of law in favour of the revenue and against the assessee and consequently allowed the said appeal. : 6 :

4.4 Now so far as the levy of surcharge under Section 113 of the Income Tax Act, the High Court has held the said question also in favour of the revenue relying upon the decision of this Court   in   the   case   of  Commissioner   of   Income   Tax   vs. Suresh N. Gupta – (2008) 297 ITR 322 (SC). 4.5 Being   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, the assessee has preferred the present appeals. 5. Shri Preetesh Kapur, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the assessee – appellant and Shri Balbir Singh, learned ASG has appeared on behalf of the Revenue. 6. Now, so far as the liability to pay the interest – applicability of Section 158BFA to persons who have not been issued notice   under   Section   158BC   prior   to   the   amendment   in Section   158BD   by   Finance   Act,   2002,   it   is   vehemently submitted by Shri Kapoor, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of assessee that in the present case admittedly the present   assessee   was   never   issued   notice   under   Section 158BC, but was issued notice only under Section 158BD. It : 7 :

is   submitted   that   in   fact   prior   to   amendment   in   Section 158BD by Finance Act, 2002, there was no requirement to issue notice to the “other person” under Section 158BC. It is submitted that in view of the above factual position, Section 158BFA applies only where a return “as required by notice under Clause (a) of Section 158BC” has not been furnished within time. It is further submitted that in absence of such notice under Clause (a) of Section 158BC, the fundamental pre­requisite of the section is not fulfilled. 6.1 It is submitted that if on its plain words a section does not apply then liability under that section cannot be imposed. It is submitted that as consistently being held by this Hon’ble Court that for liability to be fastened upon the assessee, it must be shown that he unambiguously falls within the letter of the  section.  Reliance  is  placed on  the  decision  of  this Court   in   the   case   of  Mathuram   Agrawal   Vs.   State   of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 8 SCC 667 (Paras 13 and 14). 6.2 It is submitted that therefore since Section 158BFA does not cover a situation where notice has been issued under Section 158BD, no interest under that section can be recovered from : 8 :

the present assessee. 6.3 It   is   further   submitted   that   the   department’s   argument before   the   High   Court   was   that   amendment   in   Section 158BD vide Finance Act, 2002, introducing the requirement of issuing notice under Section 158BC to the “other person”, applied   even   to   pending   proceedings   is   erroneous   and against the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case   of  Commissioner   of   Income   Tax   (Central)­I,   New Delhi Vs. Vatika Township Private Limited – 2015 (1) SCC 1 (Para 28), wherein the Constitution Bench has clearly laid down   that   the   presumption   is   that   every   amendment   is prospective and the amendment applies from the assessment year in which it is introduced. 6.4 It is further submitted that in any event, consequence of the said argument will be that the entire block assessment (not just levy of interest) would be rendered non­est inasmuch as this Court in the aforesaid decision has laid down that where a   section   requires   issuance   of   notice   such   notice   is   a jurisdictional pre­requisite and in the absence of such notice, the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed. Reliance is : 9 :

placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner  of  Income  Tax   and  Anr.  Vs.  Hotel  Blue Moon, (2010) 3 SCC 259 (Para 22). It is submitted that in other words if the amendment applied retrospectively, then issuance of notice under Section 158BC was mandatory even to the “other person” (being the assessee herein) and in the absence thereof the entire block assessment would fail. 6.5 It   is   submitted   that   even   the   submission   on   behalf   of department that issuance of notice under Section 158BC is a mere formality and that no notice under Section 158BC is required   to   be   issued   to   “other   person”   even   after   the amendment to  Section 158BD  vide Finance Act,  2002, is concerned, it is submitted that the said submission is also erroneous for the following reasons : “(i) The said argument goes against the specific mandatory language of section 158BD as it stands now namely. “…..and that Assessing Officer shall proceed [under section 158BC] against such other person …….” {As submitted above, in view of the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in Hotel Blue Moon, the issuance of a notice under the specified section, would be a jurisdictional   pre­requisite,   and   hence   the   entire : 10 :

block assessments would be rendered non­est.} (ii) Furthermore, the argument renders otiose the specific amendment in section 158BD adding the words   “under   Section   158BC”   vide   Finance   Act, 2002. If the Department’s contention is correct then this amendment was unnecessary. (iii) In any event, this argument does not answer the contention of the assessee that section 158BFA on a plain reading, applies only where a return “as required   by   a   notice   under   clause   (a)   of   section 158BC” has not been furnished within time. In the present   case   we   are   concerned   with   the   limited issue   of   levy   of   interest   under   section   158BFA. Even   if   {for   the   sake   of   argument}   notice   under section   158BC   is   not   mandatory,   that   does   not change the specific words of section 159BFA and cannot bring within its net a person who has not been issued a notice under section 158BC. On the other   hand,   the   argument   being   raised   by   the assessee ensures that post 2002 even the “other person”   comes   within   the   purview   of   section 158BFA. (iv) This argument of the Department also goes against the specific pari materia provision namely section 153C. as rightly pointed out by the learned ASG, post 31st May, 2003, in case of a search, the provisions of 153A to 153C apply and that section 153C is pari materia with 158BD.” 6.6 Making   above   submissions,   it   is   prayed   to   hold   that   in absence of the notice under Section 158BC, served upon the assessee   –   “other   person”,   the   Assessing   Officer   was   not : 11 :

justified in levying the interest under Section 158BFA. 6.7 Now, so far as the levy of surcharge under proviso to Section 113   of   Income   Tax   Act   is   concerned,   it   is   vehemently submitted that as such the said question is now covered in favour of the assessee by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Vatika Township Private Limited (supra) (Para 37 to 40). It is submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of Suresh N. Gupta (supra) that has been   relied   upon   by   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned judgment has been specifically overruled by the Constitution Bench in Vatika Township Private Limited (supra). 6.8 Now,   so   far   as   chargeability   of   interest   under   Section 158BFA prior to 01.06.1999 in the case of persons issued notice under Section 158BC is concerned, it is submitted that   interest   only   follows   the   principal.   In   this   case   the principal being the tax payable. It is submitted that in other words the liability to pay interest cannot arise if there was no liability to pay the tax itself along with the return, at the relevant point of time. It is submitted that interest only being : 12 :

an   element   to   compensate   the   revenue   for   having   been deprived of the tax, interest can start running only once a liability to deposit tax arises. 6.9 It is submitted that in the present case it is clear that neither Section 158BC nor Section 158BFA require the assessee to pay   tax   along   with   the   return.   It   is   submitted   that   this liability   to   deposit   the   tax   along   with   return   arises   only under Section 140A. However, at the relevant point of time Section 140A did not apply to Section 158BC  and hence there was no liability to deposit tax along with the return. It is submitted that this lacuna was noticed by Parliament and by the Finance Act, 1999, the words “Section 158BC” have been   inserted   in   Section   140A   w.e.f.   01.06.1999.   It   is submitted   that   for   the   period   prior   to   01.06.1999   the submission on behalf of the department that Section 158BFA is to be seen independently from Section 140A may not be accepted. It is submitted that therefore at the relevant point of time there being no liability to deposit tax along with the return, there can be no levy of interest” on that tax for mere failure to file return. : 13 :

6.10 Making above submissions, it is prayed to allow the present appeals and answer the issues / questions of law in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. 7. All   these   appeals   are   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri   Balbir Singh, learned ASG appearing on behalf of the revenue. 7.1 It is submitted that the present appeals arise out of search conducted   on   13.02.1997   in   the   Khoday   Group   of companies.   All   appeals   raised   one   common   question regarding the levy of interest under Section 158BFA on the undisclosed   income   of   the   assessee.   It   is   submitted   that pursuant to the search conducted on 13.02.1997, Section 158BD notice was issued to the assessee (“other person”) to file   return   for   the   block   period   1987­88   to   1997­98, whereafter   the   Assessing   Officer   passed   the   order   of assessment   under   Section   158BD   and   determined   the income.   The   Assessing   Officer   also   levied   interest   under Section 158BFA(1) for different periods, depending on the date of filing of return in each case. It is submitted that pursuant to the notice issued to file return, there was delay : 14 :

in filing return and Section 158BFA(1) being mandatory in nature as per which the interest became payable and was liable to be paid by the assessee after the due date stipulated in the notice and the date of actual filing of return. 7.2 It is submitted that the interest under Section 158BFA(1) of the Act is levied to compensate the government for delay in filing or non­filing  of return  by the assessee pursuant to determination under Section 158BC / 158BD of the Act. 7.3 It is further submitted that subsequently, Section 140A (1) of the Income Tax Act was amended by the Finance Act, 1999, w.e.f. 01.06.1999 incorporating Section 158BC making the assessee liable to pay  tax before furnishing return under Section 158BC and also file the proof of payment along with return. By insertion of Section 158BC in Section 140A, the Legislature casts an additional onus on the assessee to pay self­assessment tax under Section 140A (1) of the Income Tax Act when the return of income was filed in response to the   notice   under   Section   158BC.   It   is   submitted   that therefore it is very clear that when the return was filed by the assessee for the block period under Section 158BC, there : 15 :

was no requirement to pay tax under Section 140A (1) of the Income Tax Act and the entire liability was limited to period of delay and not be delayed in payment of tax. 7.4 It is submitted that Chapter XIV­B of the Income Tax is a special   provision   with   respect   to   “searched   person”   and “other than searched person”. It is submitted that the scope and intent behind introduction of Chapter XIV­B has been explained in detail by the Kerala High Court in the case of P.P. Umerkutty Vs. ACIT – (2005) 279 ITR 213 Kerala. It is submitted that as explained by the Kerala High Court in the   aforesaid   decision,   the   provision   relating   to   block assessment   under   Chapter   XIV­B   are   self­contained   note, providing for variation of the manner in which the liability for payment of tax is determined and covering a situation where undisclosed income relatable to the block period had not suffered tax only due to non­disclosure coming to light in course of certain search proceedings etc. 7.5 It   is   submitted   that   the   scheme   of   block   assessment introduced  under   Chapter  XIV­B   has  been  explained  and considered by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the : 16 :

case   of  Vatika   Township   Private   Limited   (supra).   It   is submitted that as observed by this Court, Chapter XIV­B of the   Act   deals   with   block   assessment   which   lays   down   a special procedure for search cases. It is submitted that as observed, the main reason for adding this provision in the Act was to curb tax evasion and expedite as well as simplify the assessment in such searched cases. It is submitted that even as observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision Chapter XIV­B is a complete code in itself providing for self­contained machinery for assessment of undisclosed income for the block period of ten years or six years as the case may be. 7.6 It   is   submitted   that   the   levy   of   interest   under   Section 158BFA(1) is linked to the period of filing of return and that period alone is to be taken into consideration particularly as the levy of interest being only for delayed period of filing return. It is submitted that delay of interest is not linked to delay   in   payment   of   taxes   but   due   to   delay   in   filing   the return. 7.7 Insofar as the submission on behalf of the assessee that in : 17 :

absence of any notice under Section 158BC to the “other person”   prior   to   the   amendment   in   Section   158BD   vide Finance   Act,   2002   and   thereby   entire   block   assessment would be rendered non­est and the submission on behalf of the assessee that the amendment vide Finance Act, 2002 in Section   158BD   adding   the   words   “under   Section   158BC” would become otiose it is vehemently submitted that the said contentions are without any merit. Relying upon Notes of Clauses appended to Clause 64 of the Finance Bill, 2002, whereby said words “under Section 158BC” was inserted it is submitted that the words “under Section 158BC” in Section 158BD   has   been   inserted   so   as   to   clarify   that   Assessing Officer   shall   proceed   against   such   “other   person”   under Section 158BC. It is further submitted that Chapter XIV­B prescribes a special procedure for computation of income for the block period in search and seizure cases. Section 158BD indicates the procedure that was required to be followed by Assessing Officer when any person other than a person with respect to whom search was made. It is submitted that even bereft of clarificatory amendment brought in vide Finance : 18 :

Act,   2002,   Section   158BD   provided   that   provision   of Chapter­XIV­B   of   the   Act   would   apply   accordingly   and therefore the provision of Section 158BC and 158BFA was attracted. It is submitted that insertion of “under Section 158BC” only makes it clear what was always existing under Section 158BD. 7.8 It is submitted that if the contention of the assessee that Section 158BFA would not be attracted unless notice under Section 158BC is provided then for the period prior to the clarificatory   amendment   brought   in   prior   to   Finance   Act, 2002,   is   accepted,   in   that   case,   the   provision   of   Section 158BD will be rendered nugatory qua Section 158BFA. It is submitted that such an interpretation will result in absurdity and the whole intention behind Section 158BD being on the statute book will be lost. 7.9 Now so far as the chargeability  of interest under Section 158BFA prior to 01.06.1999 in case of persons issued notice under   Section   158BC   and   the   submission   on   behalf   of assessee that since the interest only follows principal, the liability of payment of interest does not arise as there was no : 19 :

liability to pay tax along with return, since at the relevant point of time, Section 140A did not apply to Section 158BC , there was no liability to deposit tax along with return, hence, there can be no levy of interest on that tax for mere failure to file   return,  it  is  submitted   that  the   said   contention   runs contrary to the mandatory and compensatory language of Section 158BFA(1). Reliance is placed on Notes on Clauses and   the   memorandum   explaining   amendment   to   Section 140A of the Act more particularly Clause 63 by which it was sought to amend Section 140A of the Income Tax Act. It is submitted that a conjoint reading of the Note on Clauses and the memorandum it is very clear that Legislature originally intended to make assessee liable to pay taxes and interest when   the   return   was   filed   under   Section   139   or   under Section 142 or under Section 148. It is submitted by virtue of amendment   the   Legislature   proposed   to   make   those assessees who are filing return under Section 158BC also liable   to   pay   tax   and   interest   under   Section   140A.   It   is submitted  that  memorandum   explaining   the   provisions   of Finance   bill   further   makes   it   clear   that   the   existing : 20 :

provisions of Section 140A are not applicable to Chapter XIV­ B relating to assessment of income of block period in search and seizure cases. The said memorandum also recognizes that the admitted tax declared in return cannot be collected till the assessment is completed. Therefore, the Legislature intended to amend Section 140A by incorporating Section 158BC so as to make liable those persons who are filing return  under  Section  158BC also. Thus,  by virtue  of the amendment,  a  new  class  of  assessee  was  brought   to  the statute book whose income are subject to the assessment under Chapter XIV­B, in Section 140A compelling them to pay self­assessment tax. It is submitted that therefore if the Legislature wanted to apply the provisions of Section 140A, they would have expressly stated so. The very fact that there is no provision in Chapter XIV­B for applying provision of Section 140A, clearly shows that Legislature never intended to apply the provisions of Section 140A before 01.06.1999. This was also made clear in the memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 1999, by saying that there is no corresponding provision in Chapter XIV­B for payment of self­assessment : 21 :

tax   at   the   time   of   filing   the   return.   It   is   submitted   that therefore interest under Section 158BFA is leviable on stand­ alone basis for non­filing of return which ceases on the day return is filed. It is submitted that said provision is similar to Section 234A. 7.10 It is submitted that in the impugned judgment and order the High Court has explained the rationale behind introduction of Section 158BC in Section 140A and has specifically held that “the liability of payment of interest does not stop merely on filing of return but it is attracted in terms of Section 140A in payment of tax in terms of Section and even now the provision   of   Section   158BFA(1)   and   140A   operate independently”. It is submitted that in view of the same, the submission on behalf of assessee to refute its liability to pay interest under Section 158BFA deserves to be negatived. 7.11 Now insofar as the levy of surcharge under proviso to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act is concerned Shri Balbir Singh, learned ASG appearing for revenue has fairly conceded that the said issue has been decided in favour of the assessee in terms of the decision of this Court in the case of  Vatika : 22 :

Township Private Limited (supra). 8. Heard   the   learned   counsels   appearing   on   behalf   of   the respective parties at length. The questions of law posed for the consideration of this Court in the present appeals are: (i) levy of interest under Section 158BFA(1) of the Income Tax Act for late filing of the return for the block period in absence of any notice under Section 158BC of   the   Act   and   for the   period   prior   to   01.06.1999?   and   (ii)   the   levy   of   the surcharge under proviso to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act. 9. Now insofar as the levy of the surcharge under proviso to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act is concerned, the said issue is now not  res integra  in view of the decision of this Court   in   the   case   of  Vatika   Township   Private   Limited (supra). In paragraphs 37 to 40, 44 and 45, it is observed and held as under: “Answer to the reference : 23 :

37.

When we examine the insertion of the proviso in   Section   113   of   the   Act,   keeping   in   view   the aforesaid principles, our irresistible conclusion is that the intention of the legislature was to make it prospective   in   nature.   This   proviso   cannot   be treated   as   declaratory/statutory   or   curative   in nature. 38. There are various reasons for coming to this conclusion which we enumerate hereinbelow. Reasons in support 39. The first and foremost poser is as to whether it was possible to make the block assessment with the addition of levy of surcharge, in the absence of proviso   to   Section   113?   In Suresh   N. Gupta [CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, (2008) 4 SCC 362] itself, it was acknowledged and admitted that the position prior to the amendment of Section 113 of the Act whereby the proviso was added, whether surcharge   was   payable   in   respect   of   block assessment   or   not,   was   totally   ambiguous   and unclear.   The   Court   pointed   out   that   some assessing   officers   had   taken   the   view   that   no surcharge   is   leviable.   Others   were   at   a   loss   to apply a particular rate of surcharge as they were not   clear   as   to   which   Finance   Act,   prescribing such   rates,   was   applicable.   It   is   a   matter   of common knowledge and is also pointed out that the surcharge varies from year to year. However, the assessing officers were indeterminative about the date with reference to which rates provided for in the Finance Act were to be made applicable. They had four dates before them viz.: (Suresh N. : 24 :

Gupta case [CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, (2008) 4 SCC 362], SCC p. 379, para 35) (i)   Whether   surcharge   was   leviable   with reference to the rates provided for in the Finance Act of the year in which the search was initiated; or (ii)   the   year   in   which   the   search   was concluded; or (iii) the year in which the block assessment proceedings under Section 158­BC of the Act were initiated; or (iv)   the   year   in   which   block   assessment order was passed. 39.1. The   position   which   prevailed   before amending Section 113 of the Act was that some assessing officers were not levying any surcharge and   others   who   had   a   view   that   surcharge   is payable   were   adopting   different   dates   for   the application   of   a   particular   Finance   Act,   which resulted   in   different   rates   of   surcharge   in   the assessment orders. In the absence of a specified date, it was not possible to levy surcharge and there could not have been an assessment without a particular rate of surcharge. As stated above, in Suresh N. Gupta [CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, (2008) 4 SCC 362] itself, the Court has pointed out four different dates which were bothering the assessees as   well   as   the   Department.   The   choice   of   a particular date would have material bearing on the : 25 :

payment of surcharge. Not only the surcharge is different for different years, it varies according to the   category   of   assessees   and   for   some   years, there is no surcharge at all. This can be seen from the   following   table   prescribing   surcharge   for different assessment years: PART I Finan ce Act Relevant section of the Finance Act Para A Para B Par a C Para D Para E IND, HUF, BOI, AOP Cooperati ve society Fir m Local authori ty Companies 1995 Section 2(3) ­ ­ ­ ­ 1996 Section 2(3) ­ ­ ­ ­ 15% 1997 Section 2(3) ­ ­ ­ ­ 7.50% 1998 Section 2(3) ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ 1999 Section 2(3) ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ 2000 Section 2(3) 10% 10% 10 % 10% 10% 2001 Section 2(3) 12% or 17% 12% 12 % 12% 13% 2002 Section 2(3) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2003 Section 2(3) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 39.2. The rate  at which tax,  or for that matter surcharge is to be levied is an essential component of   the   tax   regime.   In Govind   Saran   Ganga : 26 :

Saran v. CST [1985   Supp   SCC   205   :   1985   SCC (Tax) 447 : (1985) 155 ITR 144], this Court, while explaining   the   conceptual   meaning   of   a   tax, delineated   four   components   therein,   as   is   clear from   the   following   passage   from   the   said judgment: (SCC pp. 209­10, para 6) “6. The components which enter into the concept of a tax are well known. The first is the character of the imposition known by its   nature   which   prescribes   the   taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear indication of the person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged to pay the tax, the third is the rate at which the tax   is   imposed,   and   the   fourth   is   the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for computing  the tax  liability. If those   components   are   not   clearly   and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the  levy  exists  in  point   of  law.   Any uncertainty or vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity.” It is clear from the above that the rate at which the tax is to be imposed is an essential component of tax and where the rate is not stipulated or it cannot   be   applied   with   precision,   it   would   be difficult   to   tax   a   person.   This   very conceptualisation   of   tax   was   rephrased in CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty [(1981) 2 SCC 460 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 119 : (1981) 128 ITR 294], in the following manner: (SCC p. 465, para 10) : 27 :

“10. … The character of computation of provisions in each case bears a relationship to   the   nature   of   the   charge.   Thus   the charging   section   and   the   computation provisions together constitute an integrated code. When there is a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply at all, it   is   evident   that   such   a   case   was   not intended   to   fall   within   the   charging section.” 39.3. In   absence   of   certainty   about   the   rate, because   of   uncertainty   about   the   date   with reference   to  which   the   rate  is  to  be  applied,   it cannot be said that surcharge as per the existing provision was leviable on block assessment qua undisclosed income. Therefore, it cannot be said that the proviso added to Section 113 defining the said date was only clarificatory in nature. From the aforesaid table showing the different rates of surcharge in different years, it would be clear that choice of date has to be formed as in some of the years, there would not be any surcharge at all. 40. Pertinently,

the

Department

itself acknowledged   and   admitted   this   fact   which   is clear from the manner the issue was debated in a Conference   of   Chief   Commissioners   which   was held   sometime   in   the   year   2001.   In   this Conference,   some   proposals   relating   to simplification   and   rationalisation   of   procedures and   provisions   were   noted   in   respect   of   block : 28 :

assessment. The foofaraw made in the Conference by those who had to apply the provision, was not without   substance   because   of   the   garboil   [Ed.: From   the   French   word   gérable:   meaning   a confused   disordered   state;   turmoil.]   situation which   this   provision   had   created   and   is   amply reflected in the proposals which were submitted in the following terms: “In the case of a block assessment, there are two problems in relation to the levy of surcharge.   The   first   is   that   Section   113 does   not   mention   a   Central   Act.   In   the absence of a reference to another Central Act   in   the   charging   section,   it   becomes difficult to justify levy of surcharge. Even if it is assumed that reference in the Finance Act to Section 113 is a sufficient authority to levy surcharge, the second problem is that the Finance Act levies surcharge on the amount of income tax on the income of a   particular   assessment   year   whereas   in the block assessment tax is levied on the undisclosed   income   of   the   block   period. Absence of a specific assessment year in the block assessment may render the levy suspect. Yet another problem is the rate of surcharge   applicable.   To   illustrate,   if   the search   took   place   on,   say,   4­4­1996, whether   the   rate   of   surcharge   is   to   be adopted   as   applicable   to   the   assessment year   1996­1997   or   the   assessment   year 1997­1998,   the   rate   of   surcharge   being different for the two years? The provisions : 29 :

of   Section   113   or   the   provisions   of   the Finance Act do not offer any guidance on the issue. Suggestions The   foregoing   problem   indicates   that levy of surcharge on undisclosed income is a   matter   of   uncertainty   and   is   prone   to litigation.   In   the   circumstances,   it   is suggested   that   Section   113   may   be amended retrospectively in order to provide for levy of surcharge at the rate applicable to   the   assessment   year   relevant   to   the financial   year   in   which   the   search   was concluded.” The Chief Commissioners accepted the position, in no uncertain terms, that as per the language of Section 113, as it existed, it was difficult to justify levy of surcharge. It was also acknowledged that even if Section 113 empowered to levy surcharge, since   block   assessment   tax   is   levied   on   the undisclosed income of the block period, absence of specific assessment year in the block assessment would render the levy suspect. XXXXXXXXXXXX 44. The  Finance  Act,   2003,  again   makes   the position clear that surcharge in respect of block assessment   of   undisclosed   income   was   made prospective. Such a stipulation is contained in the second proviso to sub­section (3) of Section 2 of : 30 :

the   Finance   Act,   2003.   This   proviso   reads   as under: “Provided   further   that   the   amount   of income tax computed in accordance with the   provisions   of   Section   113   shall   be increased by a surcharge for purposes of the Union as provided in Paras A, B, C, D or E, as the case may be, of Part III of the First  Schedule  of  the  Finance  Act   of  the year in which the search is initiated under Section 132 or requisition is made under Section 132­A of the Income Tax Act:” Addition of this proviso in the Finance Act, 2003 further makes it clear that such a provision was necessary to provide for surcharge in the cases of block   assessments   and   thereby   making   it prospective in nature. The charge in respect of the surcharge, having been created for the first time by the insertion of the proviso to Section 113, is clearly a substantive provision and hence is to be construed   prospective   in   operation.   The amendment   neither   purports   to   be   merely clarificatory nor is there any material to suggest that it was intended by Parliament. Furthermore, an amendment made to a taxing statute can be said to be intended to remove “hardships” only of the   assessee,   not   of   the   Department.   On   the contrary,   imposing   a   retrospective   levy   on   the assessee would have caused undue hardship and for   that   reason   Parliament   specifically   chose   to make the proviso effective from 1­6­2002. : 31 :

45.

The aforesaid discursive of ours also makes it   obvious   that   the   conclusion   of   the   Division Bench in Suresh N. Gupta [CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta,

(2008)   4   SCC   362]   treating   the   proviso   as clarificatory and giving it retrospective effect is not a   correct   conclusion.   The   said   judgment   is accordingly overruled.” 9.1 While passing the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has relied upon earlier decision of this Court in the case of Suresh N. Gupta (supra). However, the said decision has been specifically overruled by this Court in the case of Vatika Township Private Limited (supra). 9.2 In view of the above, the question of law with respect to levy of the surcharge under proviso to Section 113 of the Income Tax   is   held   in   favour   of   the   assessee   and   against   the revenue. It is observed and held that in the present case the assessee is not liable to pay the surcharge under proviso to Section   113   of   the   Income   Tax   Act.   To   that   extent   the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and the assessment order qua the surcharge under proviso to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act deserves to be quashed : 32 :

and set aside. 10. Now so far as levy of the interest under Section 158BFA(1) of the Income Tax Act in absence of any notice served upon the assessee under Section 158BC of the Act and the liability to pay the interest under said provision for the period prior to 01.06.1999   is   concerned,   while   considering   the   issue   the reason for adding Chapter XIV­B for the block assessment is required to be considered. The reason, object and purpose of Chapter   XIV­B   has   been   adequately   dealt   with   and considered by this Court in the case of  Vatika Township Private   Limited   (supra).   It   is   observed   and   held   that Chapter XIV­B which deals with block assessment lays down a special procedure for searched cases. The main reason for adding the said provisions in the Act was to curb tax evasion and  expedite  as   well  as  simplify  the  assessment  in  such searched cases. It is observed and held that the essence of the new procedure under Chapter XIV­B is a separate single assessment of the “undisclosed income”, detected as a result of search and this separate assessment has to be in addition : 33 :

to   the   normal   assessment   covering   the   said   period. Therefore, a separate return covering the years of the block period is a pre­requisite for making block assessment. It is observed and held that Chapter XIV­B is a complete code in itself providing for self­contained machinery for assessment of undisclosed income for the block period of 10 years or 6 years as the case may be. In paragraphs 22 to 25, it is observed and held as under: “Scheme of Chapter XIV­B 22. Before we proceed to answer the question, it would be necessary to keep in mind the scheme of block assessment introduced in Chapter XIV­B to the Finance Act, 1995 w.e.f. 1­7­1995. 23. As already mentioned in brief by us, Chapter XIV­B   of   the   Act   which   deals   with   block assessment   lays   down   a   special   procedure   for search cases. The main reason for adding these provisions in the Act was to curb tax evasion and expedite as well as simplify the assessments in such search cases: 23.1. Undisclosed incomes have to be related in different years in which income was earned under block assessment. This is because in such cases, the “block period” is for previous years relevant to 10/6 assessment years and also the period of the : 34 :

current previous year up to the date of the search i.e. from 1­4­2000 to 17­1­2001, in this case. The essence   of   this   new   procedure,   therefore,   is   a separate   single   assessment   of   the   “undisclosed income”, detected as a result of search and this separate assessment has to be in addition to the normal   assessment   covering   the   same   period. Therefore, a separate return covering the years of the block period is a prerequisite for making block assessment.   Under   the   said   procedure,   the Explanation is inserted in Section 158­BB, which is the computation section, explaining the method of   computation   of   “undisclosed   income”   of   the block   period.   It   is   now   well   accepted   that   this Chapter is a complete code in itself providing for self­contained   machinery   for   assessment   of undisclosed   income   for   the   block   period   of   10 years or 6 years, as the case may be. 23.2. In   case   of   regular   assessments   for   which returns are filed on yearly basis, Section 4 of the Act is the charging section. However, at what rate the income is to be taxed is specified every year by Parliament

the

Finance

Act.

In contradistinction, when it comes to payment of tax on the undisclosed income relating to the block period, the rate is specified in Section 113 of the Act. It remains static at 60% of the undisclosed income   which   is   the   categorical   stipulation   in Section 113 of the Act. Section 158­BA(2) of the Act   clearly   states   that   the   total   undisclosed income   relating   to   the   block   period   “shall   be charged   to   tax”   at   the   rates   specified   under Section   113   as   income   of   the   block   period : 35 :

irrespective   of   previous   year   or   years.   Under Section 113 of the Act, the undisclosed income is chargeable to tax at the rate of 60%. 24. From   the   above,   it   becomes   manifest   that Chapter XIV­B comprehensively takes care of all the   aspects   relating   to   the   block   assessment relating   to   undisclosed   income,   which   includes Section   156­BA(2)   as   the   charging   section   and even the rate at which such income is to be taxed is mentioned in Section 113 of the Act. No doubt, Section  4  of  the   Act  is  also  a  charging  section which   is   made   applicable   on   “total   income   of previous year”. As per Section 2(45), “total income” means the total amount of income referred to in Section 5, computed in the manner laid down in the Act. Section 5 of the Act enumerates the scope of total income and prescribes, inter alia, that it would include all income which is received or is deemed to be received in India in any previous year by or on behalf of a person who is a resident. No   doubt,   undisclosed   income   referred   to   in Chapter   XIV­B   is   also   an   income   which   was received but not disclosed, therefore, in the first blush,   the   argument   of   the   Department   that undisclosed income referred to in Chapter XIV­B is also a part of total income and consequently Section 4 becomes the charging section in respect thereof as well. However, a little closer scrutiny leads us to conclude that that is not the position as per the scheme of Chapter XIV­B. In the first place, income referred to in Section 5 talks of total income of any “previous year”. As per Section 2(34) of the Act, “previous year” means previous year as : 36 :

defined   in   Section   3.   Section   3   lays   down   that previous   year   means   “the   financial   year immediately   preceding   the   assessment   year”. Undisclosed income referred to in Chapter XIV­B is   not   relatable   to   the   previous   year.   On   the contrary, it is for the block period which may be 6 years or 10 years, as the case may be. 25. Consequently,   as   already   mentioned,   while analysing   the   scheme   of   Chapter   XIV­B,   such chapter   is   a   complete   code   in   respect   of assessments of “undisclosed income”. Not only it defines what is undisclosed income, it also lays down   the   block   period   for   which   undisclosed income can be taxed. Further, it also lays down the procedure for taxing that income. It is very pertinent   to   note   at   this   stage   that   for   this purpose, specific provision in the form of Section 158­BA(2) is inserted making it a charging section. Thus, a diagnostic of Chapter XIV­B of the Act leads to irresistible conclusion that it contains all the provisions starting from charging section till the   completion   of   assessment,   by   prescribing   a special procedure in relation thereto, making it a complete code by itself. Looking at  it from this angle, the character and nature of “undisclosed income”   referred   to   in   Chapter   XIV­B   becomes quite distinct from “total income” referred to  in Section 5. It is of some significance to observe that when  a  separate  charging   section   is  introduced specifically,   to   assess   the   undisclosed   income, notwithstanding   a   provision   in   the   nature   of Section 4 already on the statute book, this move of the legislature has to be assigned some reason, : 37 :

otherwise,   there   was   no   necessity   to   make   a provision in the form of Section 158­BA(2). It could only be that for assessing undisclosed income, the charging provision is Section 158­BA(2) alone.” 10.1 Thus, with respect to assessment of undisclosed income for the block period including the filing of the return etc., the normal assessment proceedings including under Section 140 of the Income Tax Act shall not be applicable. Therefore, the submission on behalf of the assessee that  interest under Section 158BFA for the period prior to 01.06.1999 in view of insertion of the words “Section 158BC” in Section 140A w.e.f. 01.06.1999, shall not be chargeable, cannot be accepted. At this stage, it is required to be noted that it is the case on behalf   of   the   assessee   that   the   interest   only   follows   the principal   and   in   this   case   the   principal   being   the   tax payable, there was no liability to pay the tax along with the return prior to 01.06.1999 which came to be introduced by insertion of the words “Section 158BC” in Section 140A and therefore the liability to pay interest cannot arise if there was no liability to pay the tax itself along with the return at the relevant time, has no substance. At this stage, it requires to : 38 :

be noted that neither Section 158BC nor Section 158BFA required   the   assessee   to   pay   tax   along   with   the   return. Liability   to   deposit   the   tax   along   with   return   arises   only under Section 140A. However, at the relevant point of time Section 140A did not apply to Section 158BC and hence there was no liability to deposit tax along with the return. The said lacunae was noticed by the Parliament and by the Finance Act, 1999, the words “Section 158BC” have been inserted in Section 140A w.e.f. 01.06.1999. That does not mean   that   interest   under   Section   158BFA   would   not   be leviable in case of late filing of return. The return under Section 158BC was required to be filed as per Chapter XIV­B and on the delay in filing the return, there shall be liability to pay interest leviable under Section 158BFA(1). 10.2 At this stage, the Notes on Clauses and the memorandum explaining the said provision which is reported in  (1999) 236 ITR (St) 141 and 187 are required to be considered and reproduced, which read as under: “Clause 63 seeks to amend section 140A of the Income Tax Act relating to self­assessment. : 39 :

Under the existing provisions, if any tax is payable on the basis of any return required to be furnished under section 139 of section 142 or section 148, the assessee shall be liable to pay such tax along with interest payable under the Act before furnishing the return   and   the   return   shall   be   accompanied   by proof of payment of such tax and interest. It is proposed to provide that any person before filing of the return under section 158BC shall also be liable to pay tax and interest in accordance with the   provisions   contained   in   sub­section   (1)   of section 140A. It is further proposed to provide that after a block assessment under section 158BC has been made, any amount paid under sub­section (1) of section 140A shall be deemed to have been paid towards the block assessment under section 158BC. These   amendments   will   take   effect   from 01.06.1999.” Further,   the   Memorandum   Explaining   the Provisions reads as follows, “Under section 140A of the Income Tax Act, the assessee is required to pay tax on the basis of income   declared   in   the   return   and   such   tax   is required to be paid before the return is furnished and the return is accompanied by the proof of such payment. The existing provisions of section 140A are not applicable to Chapter XIV­B relating to the assessment of the income of the block period in search   and   seizure   cases.   There   is   also   no corresponding   provision   in   Chapter   XIV­B   for payment of self­assessment tax at the time of filing the   return.   Therefore,   the   tax   on   the   admitted income declared in the return cannot be collected : 40 :

till   the   assessment   is   completed.   In   view   of   the above,   it   is   proposed   to   amend   section   140A   of Income Tax Act to provide for the requirement of payment of self­assessment tax at the time of filing the return under section 158BC relating to block assessment of search cases.” 10.3 Thus, on conjoint reading of the above Notes on Clauses and Memorandum, it is very clear that the Legislature originally intended   to   make   the   assessee   liable   to   pay   taxes   and interest   when   the   return   was   filed   under   Section   139   or under   Section   142   or   Section   148.   By   virtue   of   the amendment, the Legislature thus proposed to make those assessees who are filing the return under Section 158BC also liable to pay tax and interest under Section 140A. The memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill further makes it clear that the existing provisions of Section 140A   were   not   applicable   to   Chapter   XIV­B   relating   to assessment   of   income   of   the   block   period   in   search   and seizure  cases.  It  further recognizes  that  the  admitted  tax declared in the return cannot be collected till the assessment is completed. Therefore, the Legislature intended to amend Section 140A by incorporating Section 158BC so as to make : 41 :

liable   those   persons   who   are   filing   return   under   Section 158BC also. Thus, by virtue of the amendment, a new class of assessee was brought onto the statute­book whose income are subject to be assessed under Chapter XIV­B, in section 140A compelling them to pay self­assessment tax. Thus, the interest   under   Section   158BFA   is   leviable   on   standalone basis for late or non­filing of return, which ceases on the day return is filed. In the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has elaborately and comprehensively explained the   rationale   behind   introduction   of   Section   158BC   in Section 140A and has specifically observed and held that the liability of payment of interest does not stop merely on filing of the return but is attracted in terms of Section 140A till payment of tax in terms of the section and even now the provisions of Section 158BFA(1) and Section 140A operate independently. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. 10.4 Now so far as the main submission on behalf of the assessee that in absence of any notice under Section 158BC served upon the concerned assessee and in view of insertion of the : 42 :

words   “Section   158BC”   in   Section   158BD   inserted   vide Finance Act, 2002, there shall not be any liability to pay interest under Section 158BFA is concerned, the aforesaid submission is absolutely erroneous and has no substance. It is required to be noted that prior to amendment in Section 158BD   vide   Finance   Act,   2002   and   even   thereafter,   the provisions of Section 158BC would be applicable in case of “searched persons”. Section 158BD would be applicable in case of persons “other than searched persons”. Therefore, in case of a person “other than searched person”, no notice under Section 158BC which is required to be issued in case of   “searched   persons”   was   required   to   be   issued.   For   a person “other than searched person”, notice under Section 158BD is sufficient. 10.5 Now so far as the submission on behalf of the assessee that the   words   “under   Section   158BC”   has   been   inserted   in Section   158BD   vide   Finance   Act,   2002   and   therefore,   in absence   of   any   notice   under   Section   158BC   prior   to   the amendment, there shall not be any liability to pay interest : 43 :

under Section 158BFA is concerned, a perusal of the Notes on Clauses appended to Clause 64 of the Finance Bill, 2002, it appears that the same is clarificatory in nature. Clause 64 of the Finance Bill 2002, provides that:­ “In section 158BD of the Income­tax Act, after the words “that Assessing Officer shall proceed”, the words, figures and letters “under Section 158BC” shall be inserted with effect from the 1st  day of June, 2002.” The Notes on Clauses appended to Clause 64 of the Finance Bill 2002 states the following:­ “It is proposed to insert the words “under section 158BC”   after   the   words   “that   Assessing   Officer shall proceed” so as to clarify that the Assessing Officer   shall   proceed   against   such   other   person under section 158BC”. 10.6 At this stage, it is required to be noted that as observed by this Court in the case of Vatika Township Private Limited (supra), Chapter XIV­B prescribes a special procedure for computation of income for the block period in search and seizure cases. Section 158BD shall be applicable in case of any person other than a person with respect to whom search : 44 :

was made. As observed Chapter XIV­B is a complete code in itself providing for self­contained machinery for assessment of undisclosed income for the block period. Therefore, in case of the person other than searched person the notice under Section 158BD would be required/sufficient and in case of late filing of the return under Section 158BC, the interest will   be   leviable   under   Section   158BFA.   Any   other interpretation would lead to Section 158BD nugatory. It can be seen that by inserting the words “under Section 158BC” in Section 158BD, the Parliament intended to clarify that the assessment for the block period in case of the persons other than searched persons would also be as per the procedure under Section 158BC of the Income Tax Act. At this stage, it is required to be noted that in the present case as such M/s. Khoday India Limited, and M/s. Khoday Breweries Limited – the   persons   searched   were   issued   notice   under   Section 158BC and in case of K.L. Swamy, who is the “other person”, the notice under Section 158BD has been issued. 10.7 Therefore, the submission on behalf of the assessee that in absence of any notice under Section 158BC served upon the : 45 :

assessee   –   persons   other   than   searched   persons   for   the period   prior   to   the   amendment   in   Section   158BD   vide Finance Act, 2002, there shall not be any liability to pay interest under Section 158BFA, has no substance and the same  is  required to  be rejected  and the  said  question  is required to be answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 11 In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeals succeed in part. It is observed and held that the respective assessees are not liable to pay the surcharge under   proviso   to   Section   113   of   the   Income   Tax   Act.   The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is required to be modified to the aforesaid extent. So far as the liability   to   pay   the   interest   under   Section   158BFA   of   the Income Tax Act for late filing of the return  under Section 158BC of the Income Tax Act, in absence of any notice under Section   158BC   upon   the   assessee   –   persons   other   than searched persons, the said question is held in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is hereby confirmed and : 46 :

it is observed and held that the assessee – persons other than searched persons shall be liable to pay the interest on late filing of the return under Section 158BC even in absence of a notice under Section 158BC of the Income Tax Act and even for   the   period   prior   to   01.06.1999.   To   that   extent,   the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is hereby confirmed. Present appeals are accordingly disposed of in terms of the above. There shall be no orders as to costs. ………………………………….J. [M.R. SHAH] NEW DELHI; ………………………………….J. JANUARY 13, 2023. [C.T. RAVIKUMAR] : 47 :

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