MEIDEN (T AND D) INDIA LTD vs. DCIT, CC - 6, DELHI AND ORS

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W.P.(C)/17349/2024HC DelhiDLHC01094511202417 December 2024Bench: HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA3 pages
AI SummaryAllowed

What did the High Court hold?

The Delhi High Court held that the notice dated 31.08.2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 2017-18, was barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the period of six years from the end of AY 2017-18 expired on 31.03.2024. As the impugned notice was issued after this date, it was beyond the permissible time limit as per the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the interpretation provided by the Supreme Court in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal. The Court found that the six-year period under the old regime had expired, and the new time limits did not apply retrospectively in a manner that would validate the notice. Consequently, the impugned notice was set aside.

What were the facts?

The petitioner, Meiden (T and D) India Ltd, filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court challenging a notice dated 31.08.2024 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year (AY) 2017-18. The petition also challenged the notice under Section 148A(b) and the order passed under Section 148A(d) that preceded the Section 148 notice. The petitioner argued that the issue was covered by previous High Court decisions. The respondent was the DCIT, CC - 6, Delhi, and others.

What were the issues?

1. Whether the notice dated 31.08.2024 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2017-18 is barred by limitation. Assessee's contention: The petitioner argued that the issue is covered by the decision in Manju Somani v. Income Tax Officer Ward-70(1) & Ors and the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal. Specifically, they relied on passages from Rajeev Bansal which stated that a notice under Section 148 of the new regime cannot be issued if the time limit under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime has expired. For AY 2017-18, the six-year period from the end of the assessment year expired on 31.03.2024, and the notice was issued thereafter, making it time-barred. Revenue's contention: The learned counsel for the respondent concurred with the assessee's view.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 148,Section 148A,Section 149(1)(b)

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

$~51 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + W.P.(C) 17349/2024, CM APPL. 73884/2024 & CM APPL. 73885/2024

MEIDEN (T AND D) INDIA LTD

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Gaurav Patel, Advocate

versus

DCIT, CC - 6, DELHI AND ORS

.....Respondent Through: Mr. Ruchir Bhatia, Senior Standing Counsel with Mr. Anant Mann and Mr. Abhishek Anand, Advocates.

CORAM:

HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA

O R D E R %

17.12.2024 1. The petitioner has filed the present petition, inter alia, impugning a notice dated 31.08.2024 (hereafter the impugned notice) issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereafter the Act) for the assessment year (AY) 2017-18. 2. The petitioner also impugns the notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Act, and the order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Act prior to the issuance of the impugned notice. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the issue stands covered by the decision of this Court in Manju Somani v. Income Tax Officer Ward-70(1) & Ors: Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:5411-DB. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 24/12/2024 at 11:57:52

4.

Learned counsel also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693 and drew the attention of this Court to the following passages from the said judgment: “46. The ingredients of the proviso could be broken down for analysis as follows: (i) no notice under Section 148 of the new regime can be issued at any time for an assessment year beginning on or before 1 April 2021; (ii) if it is barred at the time when the notice is sought to be issued because of the “time limits specified under the provisions of” 149(1)(b) of the old regime. Thus, a notice could be issued under Section 148 of the new regime for assessment year 2021-2022 and before only if the time limit for issuance of such notice continued to exist under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime. ***

***

*** 49. The first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) requires the determination of whether the time limit prescribed under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime continues to exist for the assessment year 2021-2022 and before. Resultantly, a notice under Section 148 of the new regime cannot be issued if the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year has expired at the time of issuance of the notice. This also ensures that the new time limit of ten years prescribed under Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime applies prospectively. For example, for the assessment year 2012-2013, the ten year period would have expired on 31 March 2023, while the six year period expired on 31 March 2019. Without the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime, the Revenue could have had the power to reopen assessments for the year 2012-2013 if the escaped assessment amounted to Rupees fifty lakhs or more. The This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 24/12/2024 at 11:57:52

proviso limits the retrospective operation of Section 149(1)(b) to protect the interests of the assesses.”

5.

In the present case, the period of six years from the end of the relevant (AY) 2017-18 expired on 31.03.2024. The impugned notice has been issued thereafter, and the same is thus barred by limitation. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent concurs with the aforesaid view. 7. In view of the above, the impugned notice is set aside. 8. The petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending application also stands disposed of.

VIBHU BAKHRU, ACJ

TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J DECEMBER 17, 2024 yrj

Click here to check corrigendum, if any This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 24/12/2024 at 11:57:52

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