PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs. M/S.BARBIL MINING AND INDUSTRIES PVT.LTD.
What did the High Court hold?
The Tribunal held that the applicants could not re-agitate the issue of whether they were fronts and benamidars of late Harshad Mehta, or whether their attached assets could be utilized for discharging the liabilities of the late Harshad Mehta and the group. This was based on the consistent view of the Special Court regarding the "group theory," as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the cases of Rasila S. Mehta and Jyoti Mehta, and successive orders of the Special Court. The Tribunal found that the doctrine of stare decisis and the principles of res judicata applied, precluding a fresh determination of the group theory issue. Consequently, the applicants' contention that they did not owe any liability was rejected. The Tribunal stated that once it is held that the applicants are members of the Harshad Mehta group and their attached assets are liable to be utilized for discharging the group's liabilities under Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992, the quantum of individual assets and liabilities becomes less significant. The Court would consider the assets and liabilities of the group as a whole for distribution. The Tribunal also noted that the question of whether attached assets ought to be released upon de-notification does not arise for consideration at this stage and has not been delved into, as it can be determined in an appropriate case where it warrants adjudication.
What were the facts?
The applicants, legal representatives of Rasila S. Mehta (deceased) and Rina S. Mehta, sought de-notification from the Custodian under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (TORT Act 1992). They claimed their assets were wrongly attached since June 8, 1992, alleging they were not involved in the securities scam orchestrated by late Harshad Mehta. The Custodian had notified them on January 4, 2007, approximately 15 years after notifying Harshad Mehta and his associates. Previous applications for de-notification by the applicants were dismissed by the Special Court and upheld by the Supreme Court. The applicants contended that their notification was malafide and unjustifiable, and that the Custodian had wrongly released Rs. 259.65 Crores belonging to them to the State Bank of India.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the applicants, as members of the Harshad Mehta group, are liable for the liabilities of the group, and if their attached assets can be utilized for discharging such liabilities, under Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992? (Question of law) Assessee's contention: The applicants argued that their notification was malafide and unjustifiable. They claimed they were not involved in the securities scam and that their assets were wrongly attached. They also asserted that the Custodian had wrongly released Rs. 259.65 Crores to the State Bank of India and sought recovery of this amount with interest. They relied on the Jankiraman Committee Report and the Audit Report of M/s Vyas and Vyas as inadmissible evidence. Revenue's contention: The Custodian argued that the applicants were fronts and benamidars of late Harshad Mehta and members of the Harshad Mehta Group. They contended that the Supreme Court's judgments in Rasila S. Mehta and Jyoti Mehta cases, along with the Special Court's orders, established the "group theory" and bound the current court. The Custodian asserted that the issue of group theory was concluded and could not be re-agitated.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 3(2),Section 3(3),Section 3(4),Section 4(1),Section 11,Section 11(2)(a),Section 11(2)(c),Section 9A
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Arun Sankpal IN THE SPECIAL COURT AT BOMBAY Constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992
MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 5 OF 2018 Rasila S Mehta (deceased) 1(1) Ashwin S Mehta 1(2) Dr. Hitesh Mehta 1(3) Sudhir S Mehta, Legal representative of late Rasila S Mehta, All residing at 32, Madhuli Apartments, Dr. Annie Besant Road, Worli, Mumbai 400 018. 2. Rina S Mehta, Residing at 32, Madhuli, Dr. Annie Besant Road, Worli, Mumbai 400 018. ...Applicants Versus THE CUSTODIAN, Office of the Custodian, 10th Floor, Nariman Bhavan, Nariman Point, Mumbai 400 021. …Respondent Mr. Ashwin Mehta, for the Applicants. Mr. Hormoz Daruwalla, Senior Advocate, with Mr. J. Chandran, i/b Ms. Shilpa Bhate, for the Custodian. CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J. Judge, Special Court JUDGMENT RESERVED ON: 4th OCTOBER 2024 JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 9th JUNE 2025 1/49 ARUN RAMCHANDRA SANKPAL Digitally signed by ARUN RAMCHANDRA SANKPAL Date: 2025.06.09 21:02:17 +0530
JUDGMENT: 1. The Applicants, who are the parties notified by the Custodian (R1) under the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (“TORT Act 1992”), have preferred this Application for their de-notification and the consequential reliefs of release of all the attached assets, and permission to pursue the recovery of the amounts which have been wrongly released in favour of the Banks and the Revenue. BACKGROUND FACTS: 2. In the wake of the securities scam involving large scale irregularities and malpractices in transactions in both Government and other securities, indulged in by some brokers in collusion with the employees of various banks and financial institutions, resulting in diversion of funds from banks and financial institutions to the individual accounts of certain brokers, the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities), Ordinance 1992 was promulgated, on 6th June 1992. The Ordinance was eventually replaced by the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, (“TORT Act 1992”). 2/49
Section 3 of the TORT Act 1992 envisaged the appointment of a Custodian. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 empowered the Custodian to notify any person who has been involved in any offences relating to transactions in securities, during the period 1st April 1991 to 6th June 1992 (the statutory/priority period), by a Notification in the Official Gazette. Under sub-Section (3) of Section 3, on and from the date of the Notification under sub-section (2), any property, movable or immovable, or both, belonging to any person notified under the said sub-Section shall stand attached simultaneously with the issuance of the Notification. Sub-Section (4) of Section 3 ordained that, the property attached under sub-Section (3) shall be dealt with by the Custodian in such manner as the Special Court may direct. Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992 deals with the discharge of the liabilities and distribution of the property attached under Section 3. 4. The TORT Act 1992 thus introduced a mechanism of statutory and simultaneous attachment of the property belonging to notified party and its disposal for the discharge of the liabilities, in the order envisaged by sub-Section (2) of Section 11 thereof. NOTIFICATION OF THE APPLICANTS: 5. Immediately after the promulgation of the TORT Ordinance 1992, the Custodian notified late Harshad Mehta and his family members and 3/49
several entities promoted by the late Harshad Mehta and his family members, vide Notification dated 8th June 1992. Consequent to the Notification, all the properties belonging to late Harshad Mehta and his family members and associates/entities came to be attached simultaneously. 6. Rasila Mehta, the deceased-Applicant No.1, was the mother of late Harshad Mehta. Rina, Applicant No.2, is the wife of Sudhir Mehta, the brother of late Harshad Mehta, who was also notified on 8th June 1992 alongwith late Harshad Mehta. 7. The Applicants claim that they were holding their bank accounts as well as securities along with the other notified parties and thus, effectively, their properties also stood attached under Section 3(3) of the TORT Act 1992, since 8th June 1992. The names of the other family members of the Applicants, (who were notified), were included as second or third holders only for the sake of the safety and convenience, yet, those assets belonging to the Applicants also got attached with effect from 8th June 1992. 8. Hence, the Applicants had filed Application for release of their assets. At that stage, the Applicants claim, the Custodian malafidely notified the Applicants on 4th January 2007, almost 15 years after notifying late Harshad Mehta and his other family members and associates, and thereby the assets of the Applicants were also attached 4/49
though the Applicants were not even remotely involved in the alleged transactions in securities by late Harshad Mehta and his associates. PREVIOUS APPLICATIONS FOR DE-NOTIFICATION: 9. The Applicants assailed their notification by filing an Application under the provisions of Section 4 of the TORT Act 1992, being SPMA No.1 and SPMA No. 2 of 2008. Those Applications were dismissed by the Special Court by an order dated 26th February 2008. The Applicants carried the matter in Appeal before the Supreme Court and by the Judgment and Order dated 6th May 2011 reported in Rasila S. Mehta Vs the Custodian, Nariman Bhavan, Mumbai,1 the said order passed by the Special Court was upheld by the Supreme Court. INSTANT APPLICATION FOR DE-NOTIFICATION: 10. The Applicants aver that, their notification under Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992 was malafide and wholly unjustifiable. The Custodian in breach of the statutory functions, which the Custodian is expected to discharge under the provisions of the TORT Act 1992, has acted to the prejudice of the Applicants, in particular, and the late Harshad Mehta and his family members, in general. 11. The Custodian filed a report, i.e., Custodian’s Report No. 14 of 2011 for release of the amount from the attached accounts of the Applicants to State Bank of India with an oblique motive. It was falsely projected before the Special Court that, in the case of Rasila S Mehta
(2011) 6 SCC 220. 5/49
(Supra), the Supreme Court had upheld the finding of this Court that the Applicants were the fronts and benamidars of late Harshad Mehta and were the members of the alleged Harshad Mehta Group. An endeavour has been made by the Applicants to demonstrate as to how the said inference is not borne out by a correct reading of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra). 12. The Custodian, the Applicants assert, mischievously filed Report No. 11 of 2011, seeking sale of the assets of the Applicants by deliberately misreading the Judgment in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra). And, without providing an effective opportunity of hearing, the said Report was allowed by an Order dated 10th June 2011 by the Special Court. The Supreme Court, by an order dated 30th September 2011, however, stayed the said order in Civil Appeal No. 8437 of 2011. Even the order dated 9th September 2011, passed by the Special Court in Report No. 14 of 2011, was stayed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2563 of 2011. An amount of Rs.259.65 Crores belonging to the Applicants has been wrongly paid over to the State Bank of India. The Applicants are thus entitled to recover the said amount along with the interest thereon. 13. The thrust of the Applicants' claim is that there was no mandate to transfer large amounts from the bank accounts of the Applicants to meet the liabilities of late Harshad Mehta. The only power the 6/49
Custodian had, was to cancel the transactions between the parties under Section 4 (1) of the TORT Act, 1992. The said power has not been exercised by the Custodian. Instead, by propounding a theory that the Applicants are the fronts and benamidars of late Harshad Mehta, the Custodian has diverted the assets belonging to the Applicants to discharge the alleged liabilities of late Harshad Mehta. In the process, according to the Applicants, the Custodian has used inadmissible and unproven material in the form of the Jankiraman Committee Report and the Audit Report of M/s Vyas and Vyas. The Applicants asserts that it has been authoritatively enunciated that the aforesaid material does not constitute the evidence on the strength of which the liabilities can be fastened on the notified parties. 14. It is the grievance of the Applicants that the Custodian not only illegally notified the Applicants but also obtained favourable orders from the Special Court upholding their notification by misrepresentation and deliberate false statements and suppression of material facts. Even the Custodian mislead the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2915 and 2924 of 2008. 15. At any rate, the Judgment in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra), according to the Applicants, is against the settled position in law. The Applicants are thus entitled to relief of de-notification as the said Judgment in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra) was bad-in-law, the 7/49
Custodian has played fraud upon the Courts, and, even otherwise, the said judgment does not bind the Applicants. 16. The Custodian, the Applicants alleged, hurriedly and malafide sold a number of shares belonging to the Applicants to discharge the liabilities of late Harshad Mehta. The sale was not in conformity with the scheme governing the sale of the shares of the notified parties. An endeavour has been made by the Applicants to document the various acts of commission and omission which, according to the Applicants, indicate that the Custodian had been acting malafide against the late Harshad Mehta and his family members. 17. The demands raised by the Revenue are stated to be false and exaggerated. It cannot be said that the demands raised by the Revenue constitute ‘ascertained tax liability’. Several of the demands were disputed and challenged before the Appellate Authorities. Reference is made to the various orders passed by the authorities under the Income Tax Act, setting aside or drasticly reducing the assessment. 18. The Custodian has singularly failed to establish any nexus between the Applicants and the alleged transactions in securities or to show that late Harshad Mehta had credited any amounts to the accounts of the Applicants. It is also the contention of the Applicants that the Custodian has suppressed the true state of the assets and liabilities of late Harshad Mehta. The position which has now emerged 8/49
is such that the assets of late Harshad Mehta are in surplus. Thus there is no justification to use the assets of the other family members and corporate entities to meet the liabilities of late Harshad Mehta. Thus the continuation of the Applicants as the notified parties with a view to attach and sale the asserts of the Applicants to meet the liabilities of late Harshad Mehta and the other notified parties is not at all sustainable. 19. In substance, the group theory propounded by the Custodian to keep the assets of the Applicants under the attachment, is not legally sustainable. As the Applicants do not owe any liability to any bank or financial institution, or for that matter, the Revenue, the Applicants seek a direction to de-notify the Applicants under Section 11(2) of the TORT Act 1992 and release of their assets from the attachment and the consequential reliefs. ADDITIONAL AFFIDAVIT OF LRS OF RASILA MEHTA (R1): 20. Rasila S Mehta, the Applicant No.1 passed away during the pendency of the Application. The three sons of Rasila S Mehta, namely, Ashwin, Dr. Hitesh and Sudhir were brought on record as legal representatives of Rasila S Mehta (Applicant No.1). 21. Mr. Ashwin Mehta, the Applicant No. 1(1) has filed an Additional Affidavit reiterating the averments in the Application seeking de- notification. In addition, an endeavour has been made to demonstrate that the Custodian has falsely projected Harshad Mehta Group theory, 9/49
the developments in the intervening period completely demolish the said group theory, the Custodian has illegally stepped into the shoes of the creditor and falsely alleged that the family members of late Harshad Mehta and the corporate entities promoted by them are fronts and benamidars of late Harshad Mehta and thus liable to to be treated as “one entity”. 22. The aforesaid stand of the Custodian is violative of the provisions Income Tax Act 1963, and the fundamental principles of law. The group theory also violates the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of B.O.I. Finance Ltd Vs The Custodian & Ors2 and State Bank of India Through General Manager Vs National Housing Bank & Ors.3 23. Reliance on the judgment in the case of Rasila S. Mehta (Supra) is stated to be misplaced as the said issue was never adjudicated in the said case. It was further affirmed that the Custodian and the Banks resorted to the fraudulent practices to divert the assets of the Applicants by propounding the group theory. The Custodian, according to Mr. Ashwin Mehta, deliberately did not disclose the correct picture of the assets and liabilities of the Applicants. The assets were allegedly understated by several thousand crores and the liabilities overstated by several thousand crores. Cumulatively, no justification exists to continue the notification of the Applicants.
1997 (10) SCC 488.
2013 (16) SCC 538. 10/49
CUSTODIAN’S RESISTANCE: 24. An Affidavit in Reply and Additional Affidavit to deal with the Affidavit filed on behalf of the legal representatives of Rasila S Mehta (Supra) came to be filed on behalf of the Custodian. The substance of the resistance put forth by the Custodian can be summarized as under: 25. At the outset, the Custodian contends, the Applicants have made an endeavour to re-agitate the issues which have been already settled and decided by the various orders passed by the Special Court and the Supreme Court with regard to the notification of the Applicants and the Harshad Mehta group theory. Secondly, since the aspect of legality and validity of the notification of the Applicants attained finality with the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra), it is not open for the Applicants to again assail the matter of notification of the Applications on the self-same grounds. 26. The endeavour of the Applicants to seek de-notification under Section 11(2) of the TORT Act 1992 is a subterfuge. Even otherwise, the de-notification can follow only as a consequence of final distribution of the attached properties under Section11 (2) of the TORT Act 1992. In the instant case, such final distribution must take place in respect of the attached properties of all the persons and entities constituting the Harshad Mehta group. The directions for distribution in Custodian Report No. 14 of 2011 along with Report No. 9 of 2010 have been 11/49
stayed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal no. 2563 of 2012. Moreover, as many as 12 connected Appeals pertaining to Harshad Mehta group were sub judice before the Supreme Court. Thus, at this stage, the Application for de-notification cannot be entertained. 27. The Custodian categorically contends that the repeated challenge to the Harshad Mehta group theory has been repelled by the Special Court as well as the Supreme Court. In SPMA No. 41 of 1999, by an order dated 13th April 2010, the Special Court has, on remand, held that the individual-companies forming part of the Harshad Mehta group were nothing but the fronts of Harshad Mehta and the assets standing in their names were the properties belonging to late Harshad Mehta. 28. The said order was assailed by Jyoti Mehta, the wife of late Harshad Mehta in Civil Appeal No. 6326 of 2010. In the judgment and order dated 2nd May 2017, the Supreme Court has categorically held that the “group issue” is covered against the Appellants by the Supreme Court in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra). 29. The Review Petitions filed by the notified parties forming part of the Harshad Mehta group were also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 20th September 2011. Even an Application for clarification of the order of 6th May 2011 in Civil Appeal No. 2924 of 2008 Rasila S Mehta (Supra) also came to be dismissed. 12/49
Post the aforesaid orders, the Special Court has time and again ruled that the Applicants and other individuals and entities were the members of the Harshad Mehta group. Reference is made to an order dated 9th September 2011 in the Custodian Report No. 14 of 2011 and the order dated 31st January 2013 passed in SPMA No. 62 of 2012 along with the companion Applications. The Custodian thus contends the concluded issues cannot be permitted to be reopened by filing successive Applications. 31. The Custodian has categorically denied the allegations of malafide action and deliberate acts and omissions to the detriment of Harshad Mehta group. 32. As regards the prayers in the Application, the Custodian contends as the Applicants have been held to be the members of the Harshad Mehta group and the attached properties are liable to be utilized to discharge the liabilities of late Harshad Mehta, individual de- notification Applications cannot be entertained. Distribution of the attached assets of all the individuals and entities of the group is required to be done as a whole. The prayers in the Application to declare that the assets are free from attachment and belong to the Applicants cannot be lawfully granted till the liabilities of the entire group has been discharged. 13/49
The Custodian asserts, the Application proceeds on an incorrect premise that the attached assets are absolute properties of the notified parties. The properties were attached with a view to prevent the diversion of the properties by the persons who were involved in the malpractices in the securities and the attachment does not confer any title to the attached properties, on the notified persons. Therefore, the prayers in the Application do not deserve to be entertained. 34. An Affidavit in Rejoinder has been filed by Mr. Ashwin Mehta on behalf of the legal representatives of late Rasila S Mehta, controverting the contentions in the Additional Affidavit filed on behalf of the Custodian. SUBMISSIONS: 35. In the wake of the aforesaid pleadings and facts, I have heard Mr. Ashwin Mehta, Applicant No. 1(1), and Mr. Hormoz Daruwalla, the learned Senior Advocate for the Custodian, at considerable length. 36. The learned Counsel took the Court through the pleadings, documents on record, previous orders passed in the proceedings challenging the notification of the Applicants and the various orders passed by the Supreme Court and the Special Court, particularly with regard to the Harshad Mehta Group theory. 14/49
A number of judgments were cited by the Counsel for the parties to substantiate their rival contentions; a reference to few of the relevant decisions would be made during the course of this judgment. 38. At the outset, Mr Ashwin Mehta, would submit that the Applicants have no nexus with the alleged transactions by late Harshad Mehta. CBI, the Premier Investigating Agency, has not found anything against the Applicants. No trail of money from late Harshad Mehta to the Applicants could be established, despite investigation by the Income Tax Department and CBI. 39. Premised on the aforesaid submissions, Mr Ashwin Mehta would assail the very Notification of the Applicants, after 15 years of the Notification of late Harshad Mehta and others and his alleged associates and entities. Notwithstanding the fact that the Applicants did not succeed in the challenge to their Notification, Mr Ashwin Mehta would urge, the aforesaid hard facts deserve to be kept in view while considering the prayer for their de-notification, especially after a period of 32 years has elapsed since the attachment of the property of late Harshad Mehta and his associates and entities, which had the consequence of indirect attachment of the properties of the Applicants. 40. Mr Mehta would urge that, the Applicants have suffered drastic consequences of the Notification of late Harshad Mehta and his associates and entities with effect from 8th June 1992 as they were 15/49
holding assets jointly with the others. The Applicants had, according to Mr Mehta, acquired the assets on their own account. It is not the case of the Custodian, or for that matter the CBI and the Income Tax Department, that the Applicants had siphoned off the money from the Banks and Financial institutions. If the Applicants had not diverted the funds from the Banks and Financial Institutions, for the recovery of which the TORT Act 1992 was primarily enacted, the Applicants could not have been notified under Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992, in the first place. 41. The Applicants had indeed purchased large quantity of shares by availing loans through the brokerage firms which came to be notified. However that, by itself, cannot be a ground to implicate the Applicants as the fronts and benamidars of late Harshad Mehta. A bogie of the Applicants being the fronts and benamidars of Late Harshad Mehta was raised by the Custodian with a view to cause prejudice to late Harshad Mehta, in general, and the Applicants, in particular, submitted Mr. Mehta. 42. Mr Mehta would urge, the group theory has no foundation in law. At best, the Custodian could have impugned the transactions between the Applicants and the notified brokerage firms under Section 4(1) of the TORT Act. Instead of resorting to the remedies provided under the TORT Act 1992, the custodian in collusion with the Banks propounded 16/49
‘Harshad Mehta group theory’ sans any legal sanctity. Mr Mehta would urge that the settled principles of law in the matter of interpretation and application of the provisions of the TORT Act 1992 were violated with impunity in propounding the group theory. Without establishing any nexus between the persons who were allegedly involved in the offences in relation to transactions in securities and the Applicants, the Custodian propounded the group theory to the grave prejudice of the Applicants. 43. Reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra) to sustain the alleged group theory, according to Mr Ashwin Mehta, is wholly unsustainable. An endeavour was made by Mr Mehta to demonstrate as to how the decision in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra) does not uphold the group theory, which was allegedly dishonestly propounded by the Custodian and the Banks. Firstly, the group issue was never put forth for adjudication in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra). Secondly, what was under challenge before, and upheld by, the Supreme Court, was the notification of the Applicants under Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992. Thirdly, even the notification of the Applicants was upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis of inadmissible and unproven material, at the behest of the Custodian. Fourthly, the custodian allegedly mislead the Supreme Court in relation to the group theory. Fifthly, the judgment in the case of Rasila S Mehta 17/49
(Supra) was misread by the Supreme Court in the subsequent order dated 2nd May 2017. Sixthly, both the Judgments are per in-curium. Seventhly, at any rate, the Judgment and Order in Civil Appeal No. 6326 of 2010 dated 2nd May 2017 does not bind the Applicants. And, lastly, the said order dated 2nd May 2017 was obtained by the banks and custodian by playing fraud on the Court. 44. To buttress each of the aforesaid submissions, Mr Ashwin Mehta placed reliance on a number of Judgments. 45. As a second limb of the submissions, Mr Ashwin Mehta would urge that there has been a paradigm change in the situation as regards the very liability of late Harshad Mehta. The Applicants do not owe any liability. The Applicants are not required to meet any claim of the Revenue. In contrast, the Applicants are entitled to large refunds. In fact, the refund to which late Harshad Mehta and other notified parties are entitled to, will take care of all the demands. The Applicants would be in the surplus of assets. Mr Ashwin Mehta would further urge that the money which has been disbursed to the Income Tax Department, would be required to be brought back by the Income Tax Department along with interest. In such circumstances, the continued notification of the Applicants is clearly an act of gross violation of the rights of the Applicants to hold the property. No fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the Applicants notified under Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 18/49
1992, when they are not required to discharge any liability, urged Mr. Ashwin Mehta. Reliance was placed on the orders passed by this Court whereby the other notified parties have been de-notified. 46. Per contra, Mr Daruwalla, the learned Senior Advocate for the custodian, canvassed a two-pronged submission. First and foremost, Mr. Daruwalla would urge that the Application for d-notification doesn’t deserve to be entertained as it is the reiteration of the very grounds on which the de-notification was sought by the Applicants and the challenge was repelled by the Supreme Court. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra) conclusively holds that the Applicants were the fronts and entities of late Harshad Mehta and the assets belonging to the Applicants were also liable to be attached and disposed of to discharge the liabilities of late Harshad Mehta group. 47. Mr. Daruwalla urged with a degree of vehemence that repetitive attempts by the Applicants and other members of late Harshad Mehta group to contend that the individual/entities cannot be held liable in the capacity of the members of the group, have been repelled by the Supreme Court and this Court repetitively. Yet, the issue is sought to be raised in one form or the other. 48. Mr. Daruwalla would urge the audacity which which the orders of the Supreme Court are sought to be questioned by the notified parties is 19/49
also a matter of grave concern. The Applicants had filed a Review Petition before the Supreme Court which was dismissed. An endeavour was made to seek clarification before the Supreme Court by filing an Interim Application, which did not succeed. This Court considered the very submissions, which are now sought to be canvassed, in the Miscellaneous Application No. 62 of 2012 and by order dated 31st January 2013 firmly ruled against the Petitioner. An endeavour was again made in the year 2021 to challenge the group theory in Miscellaneous Application No. 4 of 2021; by an order dated 10th June 2022 it was, in terms, observed that it was not open for the notified parties to raise the group issue. Yet the notified parties representing Harshad Mehta group keep on agitating the very same issue on the self- same ground. They do not deserve to be heard again and again, on the point of judicial propriety, apart from the principles of res judicata and issue estoppel, submitted Mr Daruwalla. 49. Refuting the contention of the Applicants that the Applicants do not owe any liability, Mr Daruwalla submitted that Harshad Mehta group owes huge liability. Once it has been authoritatively held that the assets belonging to one member can be used to discharge the liability of the other members of the group, the submission that the Applicants do not owe any liability is of no significance. 20/49
The second ground which was forcefully canvassed by Mr Daruwalla was that, even if it is held that the Applicants do not owe any liability, yet, the prayers in the Application seeking release of all the attached property in favour of the Applicants absolutely, cannot be granted. Mr Daruwalla would urge in the light of the object of the TORT Act 1992, the circumstances in which the said Act was enacted and the role attributed to late Harshad Mehta, the release of the attached property in favour of the Applicants cannot be an automatic consequence of de-notification. 51. Laying emphasis on the expression “property belonging to” used in Section 3(3) of the TORT Act 1992, Mr Daruwalla would urge that the attachment of the property belonging to the notified party is not the proof of the ownership of the notified party. If the notified party fails to establish that the property which has been attached belongs to him, the property is required to be given back to the Banks and Financial institutions wherefrom the funds were dishonestly diverted. A strenuous effort was made by Mr Daruwalla to draw home the point that the attachment of the property belonging to the notified person was without any adjudication of the ownership. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Daruwalla, if the notified parties failed to establish their title over the attached assets, which is the case in hand, that there 21/49
cannot be automatic release of the attached property in favour of the Applicants. 52. Mr. Ashwin Mehta, joined the issue by canvassing the submissions that the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Daruwalla are de hors the pleadings and the Affidavits and the Reports filed by the Custodian in the instant Application and the various proceedings. Mr. Ashwin Mehta went on to question the authority of Mr. Daruwalla to canvass the aforesaid submissions sans any authorization by the Custodian. Mr Ashwin Mehta would urge the fanciful submissions sought to be canvassed by Mr. Daruwalla are, in effect, self-defeating. If the assets did not belong to the Applicants, they could not have been attached, in the first place. After having failed to establish the nexus between the attached assets and the persons who were allegedly involved in fraudulent transactions in securities, the Custodian, who is an instrumentality of the State, cannot be permitted to turn around and urge that, despite de-notification, the attached assets cannot be returned to the notified party, especially without putting oath behind such assertions. 53. The aforesaid submissions now fall for consideration. 54. What consequences would follow in the event the Court comes to the conclusion that the Applicants deserve to be de-notified, is an aspect of the matter which the Court would be justified in delving into, only 22/49
after the Court finds that the Applicants deserve to be de-notified. Lest, it would assume the character of an academic discourse which this Court is not advised to pursue. SCHEME OF TORT ACT, 1992: 55. Under the scheme of TORT Act, 1992, with the notification of a person under Section 3(2), the entire property belonging to the notified person stands simultaneously and statutorily attached. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 mandates that the property attached sub-section (3) shall be dealt with by the Custodian in such a manner as the Special Court may direct. Section 9(A) vests jurisdiction in the Special Court to examine any matter or claim relating to the property which stands attached under sub-section (3) of Section 3 and arising out of transactions in securities during the stipulated period. 56. Section 11 of the Act empowers the Special Court to direct the Custodian to dispose of the property under attachment. The priority in the matter of discharge of the liabilities is prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section 11. It reads as under: “11. Discharge of liabilities.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code and any other law for the time being in force, the Special Court may make such order as it may deem fit directing the Custodian for the disposal of the property under attachment. (2) The following liabilities shall be paid or discharged in full, as far as may be, in the order as under:— (a) all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the persons notified by the Custodian under sub-section (2) of section 3 to 23/49
the Central Government or any State Government or any local authority; (b) all amounts due from the person so notified by the Custodian to any bank or financial institution or mutual fund; (c)any other liability as may be specified by the Special Court from time to time.” OBJECT OF TORT ACT, 1992: 57. The statement of object and reasons of the TORT Act, 1992 indicates that, when the securities scam broke out, the investigation revealed large scale irregularities and malpractices in transactions in both the government and other securities, indulged in by some brokers in collusion with the employees of various Banks and Financial Institutions. The said irregularities and malpractices led to the diversion of funds from Banks and Financial Institutions to the individual accounts of certain brokers. To deal with the said situation and, in particular, to ensure speedy recovery of the huge amount which was so siphoned off, and to punish the guilty and restore confidence in and maintain the basic integrity and credibility of the Banks and Financial Institutions, the TORT Act, 1992 was enacted. 58. To achieve the aforesaid object, the Parliament considered it appropriate to attach the properties of the persons involved in any offence relating to transactions in securities, during the statutory period,so as to prevent further diversion of the funds and recover the amount diverted from the Banks and Financial Institutions, by investing 24/49
authority in the Custodian to notify such persons. The property attached under the TORT Act, 1992 was thus directed to be applied for the discharge of the liabilities of such Notified Parties, under Section 11 of the said Act. 59. In the case of Harshad Shantilal Mehta Vs Custodian And Others,4 a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court spelled out the legislative intent behind the enactment of the TORT Act 1992, in the following terms: “15. ….. Considering that the Act has been passed because of the diversion of funds from the banks and financial institutions to the individual accounts of certain brokers, the implication of Section 11(2)(b) clearly is, that after the discharge of the liabilities under Section 11(2)(a), the amounts which are paid to the banks would probably be those funds which were diverted from the banks by reason of malpractice in the security transactions. However, before the amounts can be paid to banks or financial institutions under Section 11(2)(b), the liabilities under Section 11(2)(a) are required to be discharged.” 60. In the case of Ashwin Mehta and another vs. The Custodian and another5, the object of enactment of the TORT Act, 1992 was expounded as under: “15. The Act provides for stringent measures. It was enacted for dealing with an extra-ordinary situation in the sense that any
(1998) 5 SCC.
(2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 385. 25/49
person who was involved in any offence relating to transaction of any security may be notified whereupon, all his properties stand attached. The provision contained in the Act being stringent in nature, the purport and intent thereof must be ascertained having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve. The right of a person notified to file an application or to raise a defence that he is not liable in terms of the provisions of the Act or in any event, the properties attached should not be sold in discharge of the liabilities can be taken at the initial stage by filing an application in terms of Sub-section (2) of
Section 4 of the Act.
But, at the stage when liabilities are required to be discharged, the notified person may inter alia raise a contention inter alia for the purpose of establishing that the properties held and possessed by them are sufficient to meet their liabilities. In terms of the provisions of the Act, the Special Court had been conferred a very wide power.” 61. In the case of Rasila S. Mehta (Supra) , the object of TORT Act, 1992 was declared to be two-fold, as under: “28. The objects of the Act are two fold: (a) to punish the guilty, and (b) to ensure speedy recovery of the huge amount involved. “Amount involved" means the amount of the banks and financial institutions alleged to have been diverted to the accounts of the offenders during the statutory period from 01.04.1991 to 06.06.1992. 29. The attached properties can be dealt with by the Special Court under sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 3, sub-Section 26/49
(2) of Section 4, Sections 9-A and 11 of the Act. Section 3(3) of the Act provides for an automatic attachment of all properties as a consequence of Notification. The object provides the attachment of all properties of the offender with a view to prevent diversion of such properties. The said provision is a preventive provision.” PURPOSE OF ATTACHMENT: 62. The purpose of attachment of the properties is primarily the discharge of the liabilities in the manner ordained by Section 11 of the TORT Act, 1992. Once the property is attached, it can be dealt with only by the order of the Special Court and can be disposed for the purposes enumerated in Section 11. Attachment of the properties of the notified persons, ascertainment of their liabilities and the distribution of the attached assets towards the discharge of the said liabilities, is the statutory device envisaged by the Parliament to address the extraordinary situation, which arose on account of wide-spread securities scam. 63. In the case of Kudremukh Iron Ore Com Vs Fairgrowth Financial Services,6 the Supreme Court enunciated that the foundation for the jurisdiction of the Special Court under Section 11 to deal with any property is that such property should have been a property under attachment. Section 3(3) of the Act provides that attachment of
1994 (4) SCC 246. 27/49
property, whether movable or immovable, or both, belonging to the notified person becomes effective simultaneously with the issue of the notification under Section 3(2) of the Act. It is with respect to this attached property that power under Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992 could be exercised. 64. In the case of L. S. Synthetics Ltd. vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and another7, the purpose of attachment was expounded as under: “25. …. The purpose of the said Act is to discharge the liabilities of the government banks, financial institutions, mutual funds, etc. and for the said purpose, the statute itself provides that all properties belonging to the notified person shall stand attached. Once a statutory attachment comes into force, although the properties in question unlike the provisions of some other Acts do not vest in the Custodian but the same evidently remain under the control of the Special Court. ….. …... 37. We may, however, add that the attachment of the properties of the notified party being for specific purposes, i.e., for the purpose of discharging his liabilities, the Special Court is bound to pass appropriate orders in relation thereto. A property once attached shall remain under attachment till an appropriate order is passed. …..” 65. The aforesaid object of the TORT Act 1992 and the purpose of attachment of the property belonging to the notified party, deserves to be kept in view while considering the prayer for de-notification. 66. Mr. Daruwalla, the learned Senior Advocate for the Custodian would urge that term “de-notification” is a misnomer, especially in the facts like the case at hand. The Applications preferred by the Applicants for their de-notification under Section 4(2) of the TORT Act 1992 were
(2004) 11 Supreme Court Cases 456. 28/49
dismissed by the Special Court, and the Appeal thereagainst failed. Thus, there cannot be a prayer for de-notification which partakes the character of restoring the Applicants to the status-quo ante. In a case of this nature, what can legitimately be done is the disposal of the attached property in the manner envisaged by Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992. However, since the Applicants are the members of the Harshad Mehta group and it has been conclusively and repetitively determined that the property belonging to one member of the group can be applied for the discharge of the liabilities of the group as a whole or other members of the group, there cannot be a piecemeal distribution of the assets of the individual members of the Harshad Mehta group, was the fulcrum of the submission of Mr. Daruwalla. 67. The response thereto, as noted above, was that the group theory was a figment of imagination propounded dishonestly and malafide, to cause grave prejudice to the persons and entities who have been unlawfully and unjustifiably clubbed as members of the Harshad Mehta group, sans any legal basis. IMPLICATIONS OF UNSUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE TO NOTIFICATION: 68. The Custodian in exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of Section 3 notified the Applicants, vide Notification dated 4th January 2007. The Applicants challenged their notification by filing Petition Nos. 1 and 2 of 2007 under Section 4(2) of the Act on multifarious grounds 29/49
including that the Applicants were not “involved in any offence”(the expression used in Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992) and that there was no nexus between the Applicants and late Harshad Mehta and his associates and entities. 69. The Special Court, after adverting to the Audit Report submitted by M/s Vyas and Vyas, the Chartered Accountants appointed by the Special Court, and the ledger accounts of late Rasila S Mehta and Rina S Mehta, in the books of accounts of late Harshad Mehta and his associates and entities, recorded a clear and categorical finding that the Applicants were nothing but fronts/benamidars of late Harshad Mehta. The observations in paragraph 15 of the Order dated 26th February 2008, whereby the challenge to the de-notification came to be dismissed, are material and, hence, extracted below. “15. The Custodian, therefore, in my opinion, with justification, submitted that detailed analysis of the sources and application of funds flow of funds etc. would show that Mrs. Rasila S. Mehta and Mrs. Rina S. Mehta are nothing but front benamidars of Harshad S. Mehta and their asses should be used to discharge his liabilities. The Custodian has also relied on submission made by Mrs. Rasila S. Mehta in an affidavit filed in reply to Misc. Application No. 291 of 2006, where she has admitted that she had advanced loan for purchase shares by three brokerage firms of M/s Harshad S Mehta, M/s Ashwin S. Mehta and M/s J.H. Mehta. It appears that the Petitioners were house wives. They 30/49
were given loans by these three brokerage-firms for purchase and sale of shares. From the material that has been placed on record by the Custodian, it becomes clear that the transaction on record disclose that many assets and shares were diverted to the Petitioner by the said three brokerage firms, which are notified parties, and therefore, it can be definitely said that the Petitioner had nexus and therefore, in my opinion, the notification is not liable to be cancelled.” 70. This Court has, as is evident, on the basis of objective material recorded a finding that there was necessary nexus between the prior notified parties of Harshad Mehta group and the Applicants, and, thus, upheld the notification of the Applicants under Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992. 71. The Applicants carried the matter in Appeal before the Supreme Court in Rasila S. Mehta (Supra). The Supreme Court, after extensively adverting to the reports of the Committees, the reports submitted by the Chartered Accountants, the summary of the accounts produced by M/s Vyas and Vyas, repelled the challenge to the notification of the Applicants on the ground that the aforesaid material and Committee’s report could not have been relied upon. The Supreme Court expressly upheld the finding of the Special Court that the monies and assets were diverted to the Applicants by the brokerage firms, who were the notified parties. 31/49
The concluding observations in paragraphs 71 and 72 of the judgment in the case of Rasila Mehta (Supra) deserve to be extracted. They read as under: “71. After perusing the Report of M/s Vyas & Vyas, the Special Court came to a conclusion that the appellants are only fronts of late Harshad S. Mehta. It further concluded that the appellants are only housewives and were given loan by the brokerage firms for purchase of shares. The Special Court, therefore, rightly held that the money and assets were diverted to the appellants by the brokerage firms who were notified parties. 72. Mr. Syed objected to the order of the Special Court for fully relying on the Auditor's report. We reject his objection for the following reasons. First of all, the issue relates to accounting of several persons. Several volumes of accounts relating to various members of late Harshad Mehta's family have to be scrutinized. The Court and members of the Bar are not conversant with the accounting procedures and in such event assistance from an established Chartered Accountant firm is needed. In fact, even during the course of arguments in respect of questions by the Court, Mr. Syed himself sought the assistance of persons who are conversant with accountancy. In view of complicity in the matter, there is nothing wrong on the part of the Special Court getting report from M/s Vyas and Vyas who are recognized chartered accountants. The order of the Special Court does not suffer from any infirmity and there was sufficient material before the Custodian to arrive at a 32/49
satisfaction that monies had been diverted by late Harshad S. Mehta to the appellants.” GROUP THEORY PROPOUNDED IN OTHER PROCEEDINGS: 73. The issue of the Applicants and other members of the family of late Harshad Mehta and his associates forming part of the group, which had allegedly indulged in fraudulent transactions in securities, was agitated on another front. Vide an order dated 25th July 2008, in MP No. 41 of 1999 and MP No. 4 of 2001, the Special Court had directed the Custodian to sell eight residential flats holding, inter alia, that the members and entities of late Harshad Mehta were part of the Harshad Mehta group. The said order was challenged by Jyoti Mehta before the Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti Harshad Mehta Vs The Custodian.8 74. Indeed the Supreme Court, set aside the order passed by the Special Court on 25th July 2008 and remanded the matter back to the learned Special Judge for consideration thereof afresh in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court. I will advert to the relevant observations in the judgment in the case of Jyoti Harshad Mehta (Supra) a little latter so that the element of continuity is not lost. 75. Post remand, the Special Court, by a judgment dated 30th April 2010 again ordered the sale of the residential flats belonging to the
2009 (10) SCC 564. 33/49
notified parties. With regard to the aspect of the Applicants and other members of the family of late Harshad Mehta being construed as one group, the learned Special Judge concluded in paragraph 36 (iii) as under: “(iii) Various notified parties with whom this petition is concerned, are members of Harshad Mehta group and therefore, the properties of each notified party and entity can be sold for discharge of the liabilities of Harshad Mehta. That they constitute a group, is a finding recorded by the Supreme Court already, firstly in its judgment in Sudhir Mehta’s case and secondly in its judgment in Jyoti Mehta’s case. By referring to the account books maintained and the pattern of the transactions , I have also recorded a finding that all the notified parties and entities with whom this petition is concerned, operated in tandem with Harshad Mehta in conducting the securities transactions as members of one family and therefore, they constitute a group.” 76. Jyoti Mehta again challenged the aforesaid judgment dated 30th April 2010 in Civil Appeal No. 6326 of 2010. By a judgment and order dated 2nd May 2017, the Supreme Court disposed of the said Civil Appeal No. 6326 of 2010, directing the disbursement of the amounts to the Banks subject to the usual Affidavit-cum-Undertaking and, to that extent, the status-quo orders passed by the Supreme Court in Civil 34/49
Appeal Nos. 2579 of 2011, 8437 of 2011 and 2563 of 2012 stood vacated. 77. From the perspective of the controversy at hand, what is of critical significance is the fact that, while directing that no steps including selling of the residential flats shall be taken until final distribution was made by the Custodian, the Supreme Court made the following observations. “6) Insofar as the “group issue” is concerned, we find that it is covered against the appellants by this Court in Rasila S. Mehta and Others Vs Custodian, Nariman Bhavan, Mumbai, (2011) 6 SCC 220.” GROUP THEORY: WHETHER OPEN FOR CONSIDERATION 78. It is the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court; firstly, the judgment in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra), and, secondly, the judgment in the case of Jyoti Mehta (Supra), which according to the Custodian, firmly conclude the issue that the Applicants are the members of the Harshad Mehta group. On a plain reading of the aforesaid judgments, in the light of the context in which they were rendered and the sequence of the proceedings, adverted to above, it would be rather difficult to disagree with the submissions on behalf of the Custodian. 35/49
Mr. Ashwin Mehta made an earnest endeavour to assail the correctness of the aforesaid view by canvassing the submissions, noted above. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the submissions of Mr. Ashwin Mehta, with regard to the import and ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra). 80. The first contention of Mr. Ashwin Mehta that the group issue was never put forth for adjudication in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra), is plainly against the weight of the material on record. As indicated above, in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra), the Supreme Court, adverted to a body of material including the inability of the Applicants to explain the source of their income, the letters addressed by the Applicants and late Harshad Mehta to the Income Tax Department, the declarations made by the Applicants and late Harshad Mehta under Section 132(4) of the Income Tax Act 1963, the reports of the Auditors and even extracted the summary of accounts produced by M/s Vyas and Vyas, and, thereafter, held in clear and explicit terms that the Special Court rightly held that the Applicants were only housewives and were given loan by the brokerage firms for purchase of shares and that the monies and assets were diverted to the Applicants by the brokerage firms, who were the notified parties. 81. The Court cannot loose sight of the fact that the Applicants had questioned the nexus of the Applicants with the prior notified parties of 36/49
the Harshad Mehta and, in that context, the Supreme Court, after adverting to the aforesaid material upheld the finding of the Special Court with regard to the nexus of the Applicants with late Harshad Mehta and other notified parties by expressly observing that the order of the Special Court did not suffer from any infirmity and there was sufficient material before the Custodian to arrive at a satisfaction that monies had been diverted by late Harshad Mehta to the Appellants- Applicants herein. 82. Secondly, it would be naive to urge that in the case of Rasila S Mehta (Supra) the Supreme Court had simply upheld the notification of the Applicants. Indeed, the order rejecting the prayer to de-notify the Applicants was upheld by the Supreme Court. However, the aforesaid determination by the Supreme Court cannot be brushed aside. 83. Thirdly, the endeavour of Mr. Ashwin Mehta to dilute the binding efficacy of the judgment of Rasila S Mehta (Supra) by canvassing a submission that the notification was upheld on the basis of inadmissible and unproven material, is required to be stated to be rejected. Reliance by Mr. Ashwin Mehta on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India Through General Manager Vs National Housing Bank and Ors9 wherein it was, inter alia, enunciated that the report of Jankiraman Committee did not constitute evidence and therefore could not have been relied upon by the Special Court to fasten the liability, is
2013 (16) SCC 538. 37/49
not well-founded. The said decision was rendered in a totally different context. In that case, Jankiraman Committee Report was relied upon to fasten the liability on the Defendant therein. The said judgment has no application where the properties belonging to the persons who were found to be fronts and benamidars of late Harshad Mehta were attached by invoking the power under Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992. 84. At this juncture, the submission on behalf of the Applicants that they were not involved in the offences in connection with the transactions in securities and that no money trail could be established, deserves to be noted. These aspects are inextricably intermingled with the issue of nexus between the Applicants and the prior notified parties of the Harshad Mehta group, and the absence thereof was sought to be pressed into service to seek de-notification. 85. First and foremost, it is imperative to note that the application of the TORT Act and the jurisdiction of the Special Court is not confined only to illegal transactions in securities and the properties acquired by the notified parties therefrom. The statutory window period is only a relevant criteria for application of Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992 and has no bearing on the application of Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992. 86. A useful reference, in this context, can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of L.S. Synthetics (Supra) where the 38/49
three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court exposited the law in clear and explicit terms that the jurisdiction of the Special Court, it is not correct to contend, is confined only to the illegal transactions in securities and properties acquired by notified persons out of the same. Once the properties are attached under sub-section (3) of Section 3, the Custodian has no other option but to apply the same in such a manner as the Special Court may direct. 87. In the case of Jyoti Mehta (Supra), the Supreme Court enunciated in clear and unequivocal terms that Section 3(3) does not provide for any qualification that the properties which are liable to be attached should relate to the illegal transactions in securities in respect of which the Act was enacted. Had the intention of the Parliament been so, it would have clearly mentioned it. 88. The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 45 to 47 and 52 to 55 of the judgment in Jyoti Mehta (Supra) are instructive and, hence, extracted below. “Nexus of the properties with the illegal securities transactions 45. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants Mr Syed that if any of the properties or assets of the notified parties have no nexus with the illegal security transactions, the same can be released from attachment or at least need not be sold. 46. It has further been argued that no evidence has been adduced that loans given by M/s Harshad S Mehta to his 39/49
family members or monies used by Shri Harshad Mehta for purchase of his flat were acquired from the tainted funds. It is submitted by the appellants that unless it can be shown that the properties in question were acquired from the tainted funds they would be liable to be released from attachment. It is argued that the fact that the properties had been purchased much before the securities scam would go on to show that they had no nexus with the funds diverted therefrom. 47. In our opinion the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants need to be rejected at the outset because a plain reading of the sections of the Special Act would clearly point otherwise. In our opinion the attachment of all the properties in terms of sub- section (3) of Section 3 of the Special Act is automatic. The attachment restricts sale of the properties which have been acquired from illegal securities transaction. The sub-section specifically mentions that on and from the date of the notification, `any property, movable or immovable, or both', belonging to any person notified under the Act shall stand attached. The said sub- section does not provide for any qualification that the properties which
are liable to be
attached should relate to the illegal securities transactions in respect of which the Act was enacted. Had the intention of the Parliament been so, it would have clearly mentioned it. … … ... Statutory window period 52. It was contended on behalf of the Appellants, that the properties in question had been purchased much before the statutory window period provided under the Special Act. It is argued that the jurisdiction of the Special 40/49
Court is strictly confined to the period from 01.04.1991 to 06.06.1992 and as such the Court would not have the power to investigate and give any findings pertaining to any transaction entered into prior to the statutory period. The appellants state that, the fact, no claims have been received by the custodian from any bank pertaining to the pre-statutory period, should be conclusive evidence that no monies were siphoned off in that period as falsely alleged. 53. In our opinion the interpretation advanced by the appellants on the provisions would be a clear misreading of the Act. We must in this regard refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Provisions of Section 3(2) should not be read into Section 3(3). Though Section 3(3) is dependent on Section 3(2) for its operation, but once Section 3(2) comes into operation Section 3(3) becomes independent of it and accordingly the qualifications of Section 3(2) cannot be read into Section 3(3). 54. We must place emphasis on a plain reading of the said section. Had it been the intention of the legislature to attach only those properties acquired within the statutory period, it would have clearly said so. The statutory window period is only a relevant criterion for application of Section 3(2) and therefore has no bearing on the application of Section 3(3).
A plain reading of Section
33) would suggest that all properties of the notified persons on the date of the said notification would automatically stand attached irrespective of the fact as to whether they had been acquired before, during or even after the statutory period. 55. A logical corollary of this would be that all income accruing or arising from the said property even after the 41/49
date of attachment would also automatically stand attached. However property acquired by a notified person after the notification under the Special Act cannot be attached. That property does not come within the purview of the Section 3(3). (See Tej Kumar Balakrishna Ruia Vs A.K. Menon, (1997) 9 SCC 123 para 6).” 89. If the aforesaid enunciation of law is considered in the light of the material on the basis of which, the Special Court has repeatedly held that the associates and entities of late Harshad Mehta group are required to be treated as a group, and the properties belonging to each of the members of the Harshad Mehta group are required to be taken into account and applied for the discharge of the liabilities of the group as a whole, the repetitive challenge by notified parties representing the Harshad Mehta group, in one or the other form, does not merit countenance. 90. The first attempt was made by the Applicants and other family members and entities of late Harshad Mehta in MA No. 62 of 2012 and connected matters seeking release of attached assets and allied reliefs. By an elaborate judgment and order dated 31st January 2013, the Special Court, inter alia, considered the question whether
Rasila Mehta
and Rina Mehta
were front and benamidars of late Harshad Mehta
(Paragraph 23). The very submissions which are now sought to be 42/49
canvassed before this Court, were substantially canvassed before the Special Court and repelled by the following concluding observations: “32. Though lot of material has been produced before me to show that as a result of efforts taken by Mr. Ashwin Mehta, revenue liabilities have been reduced the fact remains that as a result of observations of the Apex court that the Applicants are fronts/Benamidars of Harshad Mehta and are to be treated as one group, the principal contention of the Applicants that the individual assets are more than liabilities cannot be accepted. Much grievance also was made regarding the orders of attachment which could be passed under section 3(4) of the Act. The said issue also has been conclusively held and decided in various judgments of the Apex Court. Number of matters of this group are pending before the Apex Court and unless any new directions are given by the Apex Court in those cases, findings and observations made by the Supreme Court even if it is obiter are binding on this Court and position in law is quite well settled on this point and it is not necessary to refer to various judgments on which reliance is sought to be placed by the Applicants appearing in person. The efforts were also made to show that findings given by my brother D.K. Deshmukh, J. (as he then was) have to be treated as obiter and, therefore, are not binding on me. The said submission is also without any substance since detailed reasons have been given by the learned Special Judge in Misc. Petition No. 41 of 1999.” 43/49
The second attempt was made in MA No. 211 of 2003 and connected matters filed by different banks against the Custodian and the notified parties seeking payment of interest on decrees that had been passed against the notified parties. In the said case a specific submission was canvassed on behalf of the notified parties representing the Harshad Mehta group that the group theory never came up for consideration and the observations in the order dated 2nd May 2017 in the case of Jyoti Mehta (Supra) (extracted above) were casual in nature. A strenuous effort was made on behalf of the notified parties to urge that the group issue was still open for consideration and no amount can be paid out of the accounts of the parties against whom no decree was passed. 92. The Special Court rejected the contentions observing that the existence of the group and the concept as such has been recognized and ruled upon by the Supreme Court. The notified parties were attempting to re-open the issue. It was not open for the notified parties to contend that the group issue was unresolved. The observations in paragraph 69 are material and, hence, extracted below. “69. Mr. Naphade also relied on decisions of Mohandas vs. Sattanathan, AIR 1955 Bom 113, Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101, Rasila Mehta vs. Custodian (201) 6 SCC 220, Ashwin Mehta vs. Custodian (2006) 2 SCC 385 and Jyoti Mehta vs. Custodian (2009) 10 SCC 564 in support of 44/49
his contentions inter alia on the group theory and I have already held that the existence of the group and the concept as such is recognised and ruled upon by the Supreme Court. This is an attempt only to reopen the issue. It is not in my view still open to the notified parties to contend that the group issue is unresolved. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Naphade and Mr. Sharma that the observations in the pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the group issue are not binding and are casual observations. The decisions in Rasila Mehta which is the last in the line that has been cited before me and which considers the group issue in no uncertain terms identifies the group and holds the group liable. This is once again recognised by the Supreme Court while releasing the principal sums in its order passed in Civil Appeal No. 6326 on 2nd May, 2017. While it is true that the Act does not refer to any group and refers to a person and not a group of persons, the unique nature of the facts in the present case which led to the enactment of the Special Courts Act could not obviously take into consideration all these aspects and it is concept that has been recognised in the course of events that transpired and has recognised by the Court with the assistance of the Custodians office over a substantial long period of time. The transactions as between notified parties and third parties and the banks and financial institutions have been scrutinized by accountants appointed by the court and this has led to the conclusion of the involvement of all entities in the group theory and which led to the group theory evolving. It has now reached a stage when the process of evolution of the group theory has thus concluded when the Special Court 45/49
found in its order that the various entities of the Harshad S Mehta group were all controlled and managed by Harshad S Mehta and as such the funds that were lying in the accounts of all these entities were from one source. Thus I am unable to accept Mr. Naphade’s argument that for want of the reference to a group in the Act would in any manner detract from the intention of the Act and the decisions of the courts do not support him. It is necessary to achieve quietus on this aspect as well and hence I am unable to accept the contentions of the notified parties that the group issue was still open for consideration by this Court. Mr. Naphade’s contention that the status quo is only partially vacated has no substance inasmuch as the issue of payment of interest was not subject matter of the Report nos. 9 of 2010 and 14 of 2011.” 93. In view of the aforesaid consistent view of this Court with regard to the group theory, in the light of the enunciation of law by the Supreme Court in the cases of Rasila S Mehta (Supra), Jyoti Mehta (Supra) and judgment in the case of Jyoti Mehta dated 2nd May 2017 (Supra), it would be simply impermissible for the Applicants to re- agitate the issue that the Applicants cannot be said to be the fronts and benamidars of late Harshad Mehta and the attached assets cannot be utilized for the discharge of the liabilities of the late Harshad Mehta and the group as such. 46/49
Various submission sought to be canvassed on behalf of the Applicants premised on the foundation that the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court do not command precedential value, do not merit countenance, at least by the Special Court. 95. The aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court and the gloss put thereon by the successive orders passed the Special Court, bind this Court and it would be legally impermissible for this Court to take a different view of the matter. Not only the doctrine of stair decisis but even the principles of res judicata apply with full force and vigor and preclude this Court from determining afresh the issue of group theory. Reference to a large number of judgments and the material sought to be pressed into service by Mr. Ashwin Mehta, would be wholly superfluous. 96. The second limb of the submission of the Mr. Ashwin Mehta that the Applicants do not owe any liability, and, in fact, with the refund that would be ordered even the estate of late Harshad Mehta would be rendered surplus and, therefore, the Applicants deserve to be de- notified, need not detain the Court. 97. Once it is held that the Applicants are the members of the Harshad Mehta group and attached assets belonging to the Applicants are also liable to be utilized to discharge the liabilities of the group, as such, under Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992, the aspect of the quantum of the attached assets belonging to the Applicants and the 47/49
individual liabilities of the Applicant, pales in significance. The Court would be required to take a view on the assets and liabilities of the group as a whole and consider the aspect of the distribution of the assets of the group as such. 98. In view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Harshad Mehta (Supra), the date of distribution arrives when the Special Court concludes completion of the examination of the claims under under Section 9A of the TORT Act, 1992. It is on that date, any tax liability for the statutory period is legally assessed, and the assessment is final and binding on the notified person, that liability would be considered for payment under Section 11(2)(a), subject to the enunciation of the law as regards what constitutes the “taxes” and the exclusion of the interest and penalty from expression “taxes” and the discretion vested in the Court in the matter of the discharge of liabilities under Section 11(2)(c) of the Act 1992. That stage would arise when the Court would take up the issue of distribution of the assets of Harshad Mehta group as a whole. 99. In the case of L.S. Synthetics (Supra), the Supreme Court indicated the stage at which the attached assets can be finally released. It was, inter alia, observed that only in the event, all the claims as provided for under Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992 are fully satisfied, 48/49
the amount belonging to the notified person can be directed to be released in his favour or in favour of any other person. 100. The upshot of the aforesaid consideration is that the Applicants do not deserve to be de-notified. Nor the prayers of the Applicants for release of the attached assets belonging to the Applicants can be countenanced. As indicated above, the question as to whether upon de- notification, the attached assets ought to be released in favour of the Applicants does not arise for consideration, at this stage, and, therefore, has not been delved into. The said issue can be determined in an appropriate case where it warrants adjudication for the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto. 101. Hence the following order: (i) Application stands dismissed. (ii) No costs. [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
49/49
More judgments on Section 3(2)
- Ashwin S. Mehta (Legal Heir of Late Rasila… vs ACIT, CC- 4(1), MumbaiITA 295/MUM/2024[2020-21]Status: Disposed13 Dec 2024AY 2020-21
- The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax vs Pallav SethSPMA/19/202215 Aug 2024
- Smt. Meera Pandey Thru. Her Attorney vs Union of India, Ministry of Finance Deptt…WTAX/11/202325 Apr 2024
- Mahesh Nagar vs Deputy Commissioner of Income TaxCWP/7370/202125 Sept 2023
- Andhra Bank Finanial Services Limited vs The Commissioner of Income Tax-IITTA/114/20129 Jun 2023
Latest GST High Court judgments
Search GST case law →- Puran Singh Fartyal vs. Khushal SinghUttarakhand · 18 Nov 2026
- Rama Gupta Construction vs. State Of UttarakhandUttarakhand · 18 Nov 2026
- Abhay Kumar Sharma vs. State Of OdishaOrissa · 18 Nov 2026
- Sunita Pandey vs. State Of UttarakhandUttarakhand · 17 Nov 2026
- Ashutosh Gupta vs. The Commissioner Central Goods And Services TaxUttarakhand · 17 Nov 2026