ODISHA POWER GENERATION CORPN.LTD. vs. ASST.COMMNR.OF INCOME TAX
What did the High Court hold?
The Special Court held that the Petitioner did not deserve to be de-notified at this stage. The Court rejected the prayers to de-notify the Petitioner and to declare the decree in favour of late Abhay Narrotam as in-executable. The reasoning was multifaceted: the assets in the Custodian's hands were insufficient compared to liabilities (exceeding by approximately Rs.500 Crores); the decretal debt of late Abhay Narrotam, constituting nearly half the liability, was not considered barred by limitation; the recovery of this debt was linked to the liability of Abhay Narrotam's estate to the Income Tax Department, recoverable under Section 11(2)(a); the Custodian needed to realize the Petitioner's assets, including shares, and ascertain the prospects of recovering amounts from decrees in the Petitioner's favour. The Court also directed the Petitioner to seek waiver of interest and penalty from the Income Tax authorities, whose decision would aid the Special Court in exercising its discretion for final distribution. The Court acknowledged the passage of time (33 years) but emphasized the need to draw curtains by resorting to final distribution of assets. The operative directions included the Custodian selling listed shares, monetizing other shares, and ascertaining recovery prospects from decrees in the Petitioner's favour. The Petitioner was directed to apply for waiver of interest and penalty within one month, with authorities to decide within two months. The Custodian was to file a comprehensive report for final distribution within six months.
What were the facts?
Dhanraj Mills Pvt Ltd (Petitioner), a company notified under Section 3(2) of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (TORT Act 1992) in August 1992, sought de-notification. The Petitioner claimed that its initial notification was based on unsustainable claims by Standard Chartered Bank and Canbank Financial Services Limited. While some of its properties were sold by the Custodian (R1) for Rs.13,39,54,113.56, the Petitioner asserted it had no creditors except for a decree in favour of the legal representative of Abhay Narrotam (R2) and Haresh Dalal (R3). The Petitioner also claimed significant ad-hoc payments were made to the Income Tax Department (R4), disputing the demands. The Petitioner further stated it held decrees in its favour aggregating Rs.40,89,11,751/- with interest, amounting to Rs.199,78,68,338.00 as of January 31, 2015. The Custodian resisted the de-notification, arguing it was time-barred and that significant liabilities remained, including interest payable to R2 and R3, and substantial income tax dues.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to be de-notified under Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992, considering the alleged discharge of liabilities and existence of decrees in its favour? (Mixed question of law and fact, turning on Section 3(2) and Section 4(2) of the TORT Act 1992). Assessee's Arguments (Petitioner): The Petitioner argued that its liabilities were either discharged or significantly reduced, and substantial decrees were in its favour, making its continued notification purposeless. It also contended that the decree for interest in favour of Abhay Narrotam's legal representative had become unexecutable due to limitation. The Petitioner sought de-notification to end its status as a notified party. Revenue's Arguments (Custodian and Income Tax Department): The Custodian contended that the petition for de-notification was barred by limitation under Section 4(2) of the TORT Act 1992. It asserted that substantial liabilities, including interest payable to Abhay Narrotam's legal representative and significant income tax dues, remained. The Custodian denied that the decree in favour of Abhay Narrotam's legal representative was time-barred, relying on the TORT Act 1992 and Supreme Court decisions. The Income Tax Department (R4) also contested the Petitioner's claims regarding tax liabilities.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 3(2),Section 4(2),Section 11(2),Section 11(2)(a),Section 11(2)(c)
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Arun Sankpal IN THE SPECIAL COURT AT BOMBAY Constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO. 2 OF 2015 Dhanraj Mills Pvt Ltd A Company incorporated under the Provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 And having its registered office at A-604, 6th Floor, Pranik Chambers, Sakivihar Road, Sakinaka, Andheri (E), Mumbai – 400 072. ...Petitioner Versus 1. The Custodian Appointed under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 and having its Mumbai Office at 10th Floor, Nariman Bhavan, 227, Vinay K Shah Marg, Nariman Point, Mumbai – 400 021. 2. Santosh Abhay Narottam of Mumbai Indian Inhabitant, residing at 186, Narsey Building, 1st Floor, Walkeshwar Road, Opp. Bank of India, Teen Batti, Mumbai 400 006. 3. Haresh Dalal, 1002, Springs I Land City Centre, G.D. Ambedkar Marg, Near Wadala Telephone Exchange, Dadar (East), Mumbai – 400 014. 4. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle (4(4), 19th Floor, Air India Building, Nariman Point, Mumbai 400021. …Respondents 1/56 ARUN RAMCHANDRA SANKPAL Digitally signed by ARUN RAMCHANDRA SANKPAL Date: 2025.06.09 17:28:45 +0530
Ms. Naomi Ting, i/b Kiran Jain & Co, for the Petitioner. Mr. J. Chandran, i/b Ms. Shilpa Bhate, for the Custodian. Mr. Ashwin Mehta, for Notified Party. Mr. B.M. Chatterji Senior Advocate, with Udayen Mukherji, i/b Kavita Singh, for Income Tax Department. CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J. Judge, Special Court JUDGMENT RESERVED ON: 20th DECEMBER 2024 JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 9th JUNE 2025 JUDGMENT: 1. The Petitioner, a party notified under Section 3(2) of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (“TORT Act 1992”), has preferred this Petition to de-notify it. BACKGROUND FACTS: 2. In the wake of the securities scam involving large scale irregularities and malpractices in transactions in both Government and other securities, indulged in by some brokers in collusion with the employees of various banks and financial institutions, resulting in diversion of funds from banks and financial institutions to the individual accounts of certain brokers, the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities), Ordinance 1992 was promulgated, on 6th June 1992. The Ordinance was eventually replaced 2/56
by the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (“TORT Act 1992”). 3. Section 3 of the TORT Act 1992 envisaged the appointment of a Custodian. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 empowered the Custodian to notify any person who has been involved in any offences relating to transactions in securities during the period 1st April 1991 to 6th June 1992 (the statutory/priority period), by a Notification in the Official Gazette. Under sub-Section (3) of Section 3, on and from the date of the Notification under sub-section (2), any property, movable or immovable, or both, belonging to any person notified under the said sub-Section shall stand attached simultaneously with the issuance of the Notification. Sub-Section (4) of Section 3 ordained that, the property attached under sub-Section (3) shall be dealt with by the Custodian in such manner as the Special Court may direct. Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992 deals with the discharge of the liabilities and distribution of the property attached under Section 3. 4. The TORT Act 1992 thus introduced a mechanism of statutory and simultaneous attachment of the property belonging to notified party and its disposal for the discharge of the liabilities, in the order envisaged by sub-Section (2) of Section 11 thereof. 3/56
NOTIFICATION OF THE PETITIONER: 5. The Petitioner is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act 1956. Under a Notification dated 5th August 1992, the Custodian (R1) notified the Petitioner under the provisions of Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992. Simultaneously, all the properties belonging to the Petitioner stood statutorily attached. 6. It would be contextually relevant to note that by invoking the provisions contained in Section 4(2) of the TORT Act 1992, the Petitioner had filed Miscellaneous Petition No. 56 of 1992 for its de- notification. However, as purportedly advised, the Petitioner withdrew the said Petition on 28th September 2002. PETITION FOR DE-NOTIFICATION: 7.1 The Petitioner avers, the initial notification of the Petitioner was on the basis of false claims made by the Standard Chartered Bank and Canbank Financial Services Limited, against the Petitioner. Their claims turned out to be unsustainable. Yet, as a consequence of the Notification, in the intervening period, various attached properties of the Petitioner were sold by the Custodian (R1) for an aggregate sum of Rs.13,39,54,113.56. 7.2 As of the date of the institution of the Petition, the Petitioner claimed, the Petitioner had no creditor, save and except the legal representative of Abhay Narrotam (R2), in whose favour a decree was 4/56
passed against the Petitioner on 26th March 2003, and Haresh Dalal (R3). The claim of R2 so far as the principal decretal amount has already been discharged. A sum of Rs.228.63 crores towards interest on the principal amount was, however, shown due and payable. Likewise, pursuant to the order passed by the Special Court on 11th April 2008, the principal amount of Rs.1,10,28,524.94 was released in favour of Haresh Dalal (R3). Interest on the said principal amount @ 6% p.a. from 5th October 2005 to 2nd June 2008, aggregating to Rs. 9 lakhs only, is outstanding. 7.3 As regards the income tax liability, the Petitioner claims, a huge sum of about Rs. 117 crores has been disbursed as ad-hoc payment to the Income Tax Department (R4), from the attached account of the Petitioner. The Petitioner has disputed the various exaggerated demands raised by the Income Tax Department. Several Appeals were filed. Some of the Appeals have been partly allowed. 7.4 The Petitioner further avers, as against the aforesaid liabilities, there are a number of decrees in favour of the Petitioner aggregating to a sum of Rs.40,89,11,751/- together with interest thereon. As on 31st January 2015, the Petitioner was a Judgment Creditor to the tune of Rs.199,78,68,338.00. 7.5 The Custodian (R1) has not been able to proceed in the matter of the execution of the decrees passed in favour of the Petitioner. 5/56
Thus, as the Petitioner has no liabilities, save and except the sum of Rs.228.63 Crores to be paid to the legal representative of Abhay Narrotam (R2) and a sum of Rs. 9 lakhs to Haresh Dalal (R3) and there are decrees in favour of the Petitioner, in the sum of Rs. 199 Crores, which are yet to be executed, no useful purpose would be served in keeping the Petitioner as a notified-party. 7.6 By amending the Petition, the Petitioner claimed that the decree in favour of Abhay Narrotam for payment of interest at the rate of 19% p.a. on the sum of Rs.71.75 Crores, with effect from 1st September 1990, has been rendered unexecutable as no execution application came to be filed either by the Custodian (R1) or the legal representative of Abhay Narrotam (R2). Thus, the decretal debt is barred by law of limitation. CUSTODIAN’S RESPONSE: 8.1 The Custodian filed an Affidavit in Reply resisting the prayer for de-notification. At the outset, it was contended that the Application for de-notification was hopelessly barred by the limitation prescribed under Section 4(2) of the TORT Act 1992. The Custodian contends that there is no change in the circumstances since the withdrawal of the SCMP No. 6/56
56 of 1992; which was filed for de-notification by the Petitioner, except the lapse of time. 8.2 On the merits of the matter, the Custodian (R1) asserted that the attached properties belonging to the Petitioner were sold pursuant to the orders of the Court and the monies were released to discharge the liabilities of the two creditors, namely, Abhay Narrotam (R2) and Haresh Dalal (R3), who were also notified parties. There are, however, huge liabilities towards the Income Tax Department, in addition to the due interest payable to the legal representatives of Abhay Narrotam (R2) and Haresh Dalal (R3). 8.3 It was categorically denied that the decree for payment of interest in favour of the legal representatives of Abhay Narrotam (R2) has been rendered time barred. Laying emphasis on the provisions of the TORT Act 1992 and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of L.S. Synthetics Ltd Vs Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd & Anr,1 the Custodian would contend that the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act 1963 does not apply to the proceedings under the TORT Act 1992 and, thus, the contention of the Petitioner that the decree in favour of late Abhay Narottam has been rendered unexecutable is misconceived. 8.4 It was categorically denied that the Custodian (R1) did not diligently pursue the execution of the decrees passed in favour of the
2004 11 SCC 456. 7/56
Petitioner. On the contrary, according to the Custodian, the Petitioner did not render the requisite co-operation in tracing out the Judgment Debtors of the Petitioner so as to facilitate the execution of the decrees. 8.5 Refuting the claim of the Petitioner that, the Petitioner is Judgment Creditor to the tune of Rs. 199,78,68,338/-, the Custodian asserted, such notional claims without a realistic prospect of recovery of the amount under those decrees cannot be pressed into service to seek de-notification. 8.6 The Custodian referred to the claims made by other notified parties, including Jyoti Mehta, against the Petitioner and the alleged wrongful credit of the proceeds of sale of the shares purportedly belonging to the Harshad Mehta Group of notified parties to the attached account of the Petitioner. 8.7 In substance, the Custodian contends, various proceedings were pending involving the Petitioner before the Special Court. There were several unsettled matters qua the Petitioner and ex-facie the liabilities were much in excess of the assets to the credit to the attached accounts of the Petitioner. Therefore, the prayer of de-notification was not tenable. RESPONSE OF R3: 9. R3 contends pursuant to an order dated 21st June 2006 passed by the Special Court in SPMA No. 96 of 2006, the Petitioner was directed 8/56
to pay a sum of Rs.1,10,28,524.94 along with interest @ 6% p.a, from 5th October 2005 till the date of realization to the Custodian (R1), for and on behalf of Haresh Dalal (R3). Accordingly, pursuant to an order dated 11th April 2008 in SPMP No. 96 of 2006, a sum of Rs.1,10,28,524.94 was duly received by the Custodian (R1), on his behalf. The interest on the said amount from 5th October 2005 to 2nd June 2008, is, however, yet to be recovered. THE STAND OF INCOME TAX DEPARTMENT (R4): 10. By an Affidavit in Reply dated 28th March 2023, the Income Tax Department (R4) resisted the prayer for de-notification. It was, inter alia, contended that for the priority period (i.e. Assessment Year 1992- 1993 and Assessment Year 1993-1994), there was no outstanding towards the principal income tax demand qua the Petitioner. However, the Respondent No.4 was a creditor of the Petitioner-Company as large tax demand towards interest and penalty for the priority period (Assessment Year 1992-1993) were still outstanding. As of 31st December 2020, interest component of Rs.817.17 lakhs and the penalty of Rs.93.57 lakhs was due and payable. The total outstanding for interest and penalty for the priority period (Assessment Year 1992- 1993) was Rs.910.74 lakhs. In addition, there was huge outstanding demand for non priority period recoverable under Section 11(2) (c) of 9/56
the TORT Act 1992. Thus, a total amount of Rs.25495.58 lakhs was outstanding towards the income tax demands qua the Petitioner. REJOINDER: 11.1 In an Affidavit in Rejoinder, the Petitioner controverted the contentions on behalf of the Income Tax Department. It was contended that there was material suppression of facts in as much as various orders passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were not disclosed by the Respondent No.4. At any rate, the tax liability of the notified party was restricted to the priority period and the Respondent No.4 cannot use the machinery created under the TORT Act 1992 to recover the tax liability for the non-statutory period. 11.2 For the said purpose, the Petitioner would assert, the Income Tax Department can resort to well-defined machinery under the Income Tax Act. It was contended that the various demands raised by the Income Tax Department were contested by the Petitioner and the Appeals were sub-judice. Thus, the claim of the Income Tax Department that a sum of Rs.25495.58 lakhs was outstanding towards the tax liability was put in contest. 10/56
ADDITIONAL AFFIDAVIT & REPLY THERETO: 12.1 An Additional Affidavit was filed on behalf of the Petitioner to bring on record the fact that on 17th March 2023, the Income Tax Tribunal passed an order in the Appeal preferred by the Petitioner challenging several assessment orders. The Petitioner was in the process of assailing the said order before the High Court. In any event, as against the demand of Rs.264,06,32,000/-, being the total liability, the Income Tax Department had already been paid a sum of Rs. 297,98,36,728/-. Since the amount lying with the Income Tax Department far exceeds the amount supposedly payable by the Petitioner to the Income Tax Department (R4), there was no impediment in ordering the de-notification of the Petitioner. 12.2 The Income Tax Department filed further Reply controverting the contentions in the Additional Affidavit. It was reiterated that the total outstanding demands including interest and penalty under Section 11(2)(c) of the TORT Act 1992 for the priority period, (i.e., Assessment Year 1992-1993) was Rs.910.74 lakhs, excluding interest under Section 220(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1963 (“the Act of 1963”) and total outstanding demand for non- priority period was Rs. 25495.58 lakhs which includes interest and penalty but excludes the interest chargeable under Section 220 (2) of the Act of 1963. 11/56
LATEST POSITION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PETITIONER: 13. Towards the conclusion of the hearing, the Custodian (R1), furnished an updated statement of the assets and liabilities of the Petitioner. According to the Custodian, the total assets were 7.74 Crores including liquid cash of Rs.3.28 Crores and value of the shares then estimated at 4.46 Crores. As against the aforesaid assets, the total liabilities were Rs.506.32 Crores. Thus, the excess of the liabilities was Rs.498.58 Crores. The Custodian has furnished the particulars of the liabilities, and the possible augmentation of the assets contingent upon the adjudication of the cases in favour of the Petitioner. SUBMISSIONS: 14. In the wake of the aforesaid pleadings and material, I have heard Mr. Amrut Joshi, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. J. Chandran, the learned Counsel for the Custodian (R1), Mr. B.M. Chatterji, the learned Senior Advocate for the Commissioner of Income Tax (R4) and Mr. Ashiwin Mehta, the learned Counsel for the notified parties forming part of the Harshad Mehta Group, who opposed the de-notification on the ground that a sum of Rs. 7 crores has been wrongly credited to the account of the Petitioner by way of sale 12/56
proceeds of the securities in the hands of the Petitioner, though those securities belonged to Harshad Mehta group. 15. The learned Counsel for the parties took the Court through the pleadings and voluminous documents on record. Attention of the Court was invited to the orders passed in the proceedings in which the Petitioner is a Decree Holder and Judgment Debtor in support of the implication of those orders on the claim for de-notification. The Petitioner and the Custodian have also tendered written submissions in elaboration of the submissions canvassed across the Bar. 16. Mr. Joshi, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, would urge that the very notification of the Petitioner was in a sense infirm as the alleged claims of Standard Chartered Bank and Canbank Financial Services Limited, on the basis of which, the Petitioner came to be notified, were not substantiated. No claim was lodged by Canbank Financial Services Limited, whereas the Suit instituted by the Standard Chartered Bank was subsequently withdrawn. At any rate, after a passage of more than 30 years, the Petitioner deserves to be de-notified. 17. Amplifying the submission, Mr. Joshi would urge that indubitably the Petitioner does not owe any liabilities under Section 11(2)(a) of the TORT Act 1992. Nor there are any outstanding claims under Clause (b) of Section 11(2) of the TORT Act 1992, against the Petitioner. The Petitioner does not owe any liability towards tax for the priority period. 13/56
All the claims against the Petitioner fall within the ambit of Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992. 18. As regards the liability of the Petitioner under Section 11(2)(c) of the TORT Act 1992, Mr. Joshi canvassed a two-pronged submission. First, the decrees in favour of late Abhay Narrotam and Haresh Dalal (R3) have been satisfied to the extent of the principal amount. What is shown as the liability under the decrees in favour of late Abhay Narrotam and Haresh Dalal (R3) is the interest on the principal amount. Mr. Joshi would urge, the decree infavour of Abhay Narottam, whereunder the Custodian has computed interest liability at Rs. 242.08 crores, is barred by law of limitation and has been rendered inexecutable. So far as the decree in favour of Haresh Dalal (R3) for payment of interest, the outgo would be hardly in the range of Rs. 9 lakhs. Thus, once the decree in favour of Abhay Narottam as regards the liability to pay interest on the decretal sum is held to be inexecutable on account of bar of limitation, the major component of the liability gets wiped out. 19. Mr. Joshi laid emphasis on the fact that this Court, in the case of The Custodian Vs Cifco Properties Private Ltd & Ors,2 in its order dated 5th December 2014, while dismissing an Application for execution of the decree passed in favour of the Petitioner against Cifco Properties Private Ltd, categorically recorded a view that the execution application
MP No. 182 of 2011, order dated 5th December 2014. 14/56
had been filed beyond the period of limitation and no explanation had been given as to why the execution application was not filed from the year 2007 to 2011. The same principle must govern the execution of the decrees against the Petitioner lest the Petitioner would suffer the wrong end of the stick, on both the occasions. Such an approach would also be against the spirit of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, urged Mr. Joshi. 20. With regard to the tax liability, Mr. Joshi strenuously submitted that the Petitioner is shown to be liable to pay interest and penalty for non-statutory period only. Mr Joshi laid emphasis on the fact that the Income Tax Department has been paid a sum of Rs.117 Crores, over a period of time, subject to undertakings that Income Tax Department would bring back the said amount along with interest @ 9% p.a.. The said payout of Rs.117 Crores and the interest that has accrued thereon, would, in fact, subsume the entire liability now sought to be foisted by the Income Tax Department on the Petitioner. 21. Mr Joshi would further urge that, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Harshad Shantilal Mehta Vs Custodian And Others,3 the Special Court has the discretion in the matter of discharge of the liabilities under Section 11(2)(c) of the TORT Act 1992. Secondly, the notified party may seek the wavier of interest and penalty as, on account of the notification, the notified party was, in a
(1998) 5 SCC. 15/56
sense, under a legal disability. Thirdly, Mr. Joshi urged with tenacity that, the Income Tax Department can always resort to appropriate remedies provided under the Income Tax Act 1963 to recover the interest and penalty component, in accordance with law. Therefore, this Court need not retain seisin over the matter in view of the claim of the Income Tax Department which squarely falls under the Clause (c) of Section 11(2) of the TORT Act, 1992. 22. To bolster up this submission Mr. Joshi invited attention of the Court to the orders passed by this Court, in the cases of Jitendra R Shroff Vs Custodian,4 Shyam Sunder Dalmia Vs The Custodian5 and Pravin K. Vakil Vs The Custodian,6 whereby erstwhile notified parties have been de-notified, despite the claim of the Income Tax Department under Section 11(2)(c) of the TORT Act 1992. 23. In opposition to this, Mr. J. Chandran, the learned Counsel for the Custodian, stoutly opposed the prayer for de-notification of the Petitioner. At the outset, it was submitted that the assets of the Petitioner are far disproportionate to the liabilities of the Petitioner. The assets were to the tune of Rs.7.74 Crores only. Whereas the liabilities were to the tune of Rs.506.33 crores. As the liabilities are in excess by
2017 SCC OnLine Bom 836.
MP No. 22 of 2001, order dated 9th October 2002.
MP No. 23 of 2001, order dated 9th January 2003. 16/56
almost Rs.500 crores, the Petitioner cannot legitimately seek de- notification, submitted Mr. Chandran. Mr. Chandran fairly submitted that there are no liabilities under Section 11(2)(a) and (b). However, according to Mr. Chandran, in the peculiar facts of the case, the liabilities under 11(2)(c) are huge and deserve to be enforced as the recovery of the amount from the Petitioner, especially towards the discharge of the liabilities of the other notified parties, namely, late Abhay Narottam and Haresh Dalal (R3), in turn, bears upon the discharge of the liabilities of the later notified parties to the Income Tax Department under Section 11(2)(a) of the TORT Act 1992. 25. Mr. Chandran would urge that the very foundational premise of the Petitioner’s claim that the decree to the extent of payment of interest in favour of late Abhay Narottam, is barred by law of limitation, is flawed. The reliance by Mr. Joshi on the judgment of this Court in the case of Cifco Properties Private Ltd (Supra), according to Mr. Chandran, does not advance the cause of the Petitioner as the said decision was rendered without correctly appreciating the import of the decision in the case of L.S. Synthetics (Supra), where the Supreme Court has, in terms, enunciated that the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act 1963 does not apply to the recovery of the attached assets for their application for the purposes under Section 11 of the 17/56
TORT Act, 1992. To buttress this submission, Mr. Chandran placed reliance on an order dated 25th November 2022 passed by this Court in The Custodian Vs M/s Raviraj Housing Corporation and Ors.7 26. Mr. Chandran further submitted that the assertion that the Custodian had not taken steps to execute the decree passed in favour of late Abhay Narottam (R2) is factually incorrect. Since the decree in favour of late Abhay Narottam (R2), a notified party, was passed against the Petitioner, another notified party, whose assets were under attachment and in the custody of the Custodian, the latter had filed a Distribution Report, in which the principal amount was ordered to be disbursed. As the attached assets were not sufficient to satisfy the order of payment of interest, at that stage, further orders for recovery of interest were not passed. Therefore, it cannot be said that no efforts were made by the Custodian to execute the decree. Moreover, three Appeals are pending before the Supreme Court with regard to the said order of distribution. This factor will also bear upon the prayer of the Petitioner for de-notification, submitted Mr. Chandran. 27. Mr. Chatterji, the learned Senior Advocate for the Income Tax Department (R4), would urge that the Application for de-notification proceeds on an incorrect premise that the tax liabilities of the Petitioner have not been ascertained. With reference to the assertion in the
Execution Application No. 1 of 2019 in SPMP No. 15 of 2000, order dated 25th November 2022. 18/56
Application that the Appeals were preferred by the Petitioner before the ITAT, against the orders passed by the authorities under the Income Tax Act 1963 assessing the liability of the Petitioner, Mr. Chatterji submitted that the Appeals preferred by the Petitioner were dismissed by a judgment and order dated 17th March 2023. Though in the Additional Affidavit filed on 13th July 2023, it was asserted that the Petitioner was in the process of challenging the orders passed by ITAT before the High Court, yet, the Income Tax Department has not been served with any notice of such Appeal filed by the Petitioner. Mr. Chatterji would thus urge, the tax liability of the Petitioner stands crystallized with the dismissal of the Appeals by the ITAT. 28. Mr. Chatterji adverted to the fresh demands raised by the Income Tax Department vide order dated 27th March 2022, with regard to the interest and penalty for the priority period. It was submitted that the contention of the Petitioner that the discharge of the liability under Section 11(2)(c) of the TORT Act 1992 is in the discretion of the Court, looses sight of the fact that the said demand for interest and penalty falls within the ambit of the term “Revenue”, which finds place under Section 11(2)(a) of the TORT Act 1992. Even in the matter of the payment of interest and penalty, according to Mr. Chatterji, the Income Tax Department would have priority. A very strong reliance was placed by Mr. Chatterji on an order 19/56
passed by this Court in The Custodian Vs Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd & Anr,8 wherein, this Court, held that while fixing priority in making payment under Section 11(2)(c) it would be appropriate for the Court to follow the scheme of Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992 itself. The scheme of Section 11 appears to give first priority to the revenue demand. The demand of the Income Tax Department for interest on the amount of the tax due from the notified party for the statutory period, may not be demand for tax but that is definitely a demand for revenue. Therefore, looking to the scheme of Section 11, that demand deserves to rank higher than the other claims, namely, the claims of financial institution for the interest for the non-statutory period. 30. Mr. Mehta, the learned Counsel for the notified parties forming part of the Harshad Mehta group, made an endeavour to canvass a submission that the Petitioner cannot be de-notified till it discharges its liability towards Harshad Mehta group for having dishonestly usurpped the shares which it had sold to Harshad Mehta group entities. Despite such a claim having been made and substantiated by late Harshad Mehta, the said shares were sold at the hands of the Petitioner and the sale proceeds credited to the account of the Petitioner. The de- notification of the Petitioner by applying the said sale proceeds for the
Custodian’s Report in MA No. 79 of 2004 in MA No. 222 of 1996, order dated 15th February 2007. 20/56
discharge of its liabilities, would amount to clear unjust enrichment, submitted Mr. Mehta. 31. The aforesaid submission of Mr. Mehta was strongly opposed by Mr. Joshi and Mr. Chandran. 32. Mr. Joshi would urge that the endeavour of Jyoti Mehta, the wife of late Harshad Mehta, and herself a notified party, to intervene in the instant Petition was repelled by this Court by an order dated 17th September 2021 in MA No. 82 of 2016. Therefore, at this stage, it is not open for Mr. Mehta to re-agitate the same issue after the Application for intervention came to be rejected and the said order attained finality. 33. Mr. Chandran, the learned Counsel for the Custodian, submitted that apart from the said endeavour to intervene in the instant Petition, Jyoti Mehta had also filed MA No. 26 of 2014, laying claim over the sale proceeds of the shares, which were allegedly wrongly credited to the account of the Petitioner, contending that the Petitioner did not have any right, title and interest in those shares. By an order dated 24th March 2017, the said MA No. 26 of 2014 came to be rejected recording a categorical finding that Jyoti Mehta failed to establish her ownership over those shares. Thus, the members of the Harshad Mehta group, cannot be permitted to resurrect the very same issue in this Petition, submitted by Mr. Chandran. 21/56
CLAIM OF HARSHAD MEHTA GROUP: 34. Before adverting to deal with the core issue of de-notification of the Petitioner, I deem it expedient to steer clear of the barnacle attached to the hull of the controversy, namely, the claim of Harshad Mehta group for a sum of Rs. 7,10,18,485.50 towards the sale proceeds of the shares which were allegedly wrongly credited to the account of the Petitioner. 35. Mr. Mehta made an endeavour to urge that the assets of one notified party can never be utilized to discharge the liability of another notified party. In the case at hand, the Petitioner claims de-notification though it owes a debt of Rs. 7 crores to the Harshad Mehta group. Therefore, since the estate of late Harshad Mehta stands in the shoes of the creditor qua the Petitioner, the said debt must be satisfied before the claim for de-notification is considered. 36. Suffice to note, these submissions do not merit countenance in the face of two orders passed by this Court in MA No. 26 of 2014 (to which Petitioner was a party-Respondent) and MA No. 82 of 2016 in the instant MP No. 2 of 2015. 37. MA No. 26 of 2014 was filed by Jyoti Mehta, wife of late Harshad Mehta seeking, inter alia, a declaration that late Harshad Mehta and his family member and entities controlled by him, were the owners of the 22/56
shares of the various companies, which were sold in the hands of the Petitioner-Respondent No.1 therein, and the latter had no right, title and interest in the said shares. 38. After an elaborate analysis, by an order dated 24th March 2017, this Court recorded a categorical finding that the letter dated 26th October 1994, addressed by late Harshad Mehta, which constituted the foundation of Jyoti Mehta’s claim, did not entitle the Applicant therein to the declaration as claimed. The Applicant had not established that the ownership of subject shares was vesting in late Harshad Mehta. Nor the Applicant had been able to establish ownership in any of the family member (s), who were not even named in the Application. The prayers in the said Application were incapable of being granted. And that any claim that the Applicant might have to ownership of the said shares must be established by substantive proceedings. Since late Harshad Mehta had not filed an Application in respect of those shares for certification, as was indicated in the letter dated 26th October 1994; the said letter, by itself, cannot sustain title over the subject shares. 39. Even Review Petition (L) No. 1 of 2017, preferred by the Applicant therein, was rejected by this Court by an order dated 14th December 2017. 40. In the face of a clear and categorical finding in a proceeding instituted by Jyoti Mehta, which has attained finality, on first principles, 23/56
the endeavour of Mr. Ashwin Mehta to re-agitate the issue deserves to be repelled at the threshold. The Petitioners cannot be vexed again on the same cause which has been adjudicated and decided against Harshad Mehta group and in favour of the Petitioner. The underlying principles of res judicata operate with full force and vigor. 41. Secondly, this Court, in MA No. 82 of 2016 again rejected the prayer of Jyoti Mehta to implead her as a party in the instant Petition on the self-same grounds. While rejecting the Application for impleadment this Court adverted to the dismissal of MA No. 26 of 2014 by the aforesaid order dated 24th March 2017 and the Review Petition therein as well. 42. It would thus be simply impermissible for Harshad Mehta group to resurrect the issue. SCHEME OF THE TORT ACT 1992: 43. Under the scheme of TORT Act, 1992, with the notification of a person under Section 3(2), the entire property belonging to the notified person stands simultaneously and statutorily attached. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 mandates that the property attached sub-section (3) shall be dealt with by the Custodian in such a manner as the Special Court may direct. Section 9-A vests jurisdiction in the Special Court to examine any matter or claim relating to the property which stands 24/56
attached under sub-section (3) of Section 3 and arising out of transactions in securities during the stipulated period.
Section 11 of the Act empowers the Special Court to direct the Custodian to dispose of the property under attachment. The priority in the matter of discharge of the liabilities is prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section 11. It reads as under: “11. Discharge of liabilities.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code and any other law for the time being in force, the Special Court may make such order as it may deem fit directing the Custodian for the disposal of the property under attachment. (2) The following liabilities shall be paid or discharged in full, as far as may be, in the order as under:— (a) all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the persons notified by the Custodian under sub-section (2) of section 3 to the Central Government or any State Government or any local authority; (b) all amounts due from the person so notified by the Custodian to any bank or financial institution or mutual fund; (c)any other liability as may be specified by the Special Court from time to time.” OBJECT OF TORT ACT, 1992: 45. The statement of object and reasons of the TORT Act, 1992 indicates that, when the securities scam broke out, the investigation revealed large scale irregularities and malpractices in transactions in both the government and other securities, indulged in by some brokers in collusion with the employees of various Banks and Financial Institutions. The said irregularities and malpractices led to the diversion 25/56
of funds from Banks and Financial Institutions to the individual accounts of certain brokers. To deal with the said situation and, in particular, to ensure speedy recovery of the huge amount which was so siphoned off, and to punish the guilty and restore confidence in and maintain the basic integrity and credibility of the Banks and Financial Institutions, the TORT Act, 1992 was enacted. 46. To achieve the aforesaid object, the Parliament considered it appropriate to attach the properties of the persons involved in any offence relating to transactions in securities, during the statutory period,so as to prevent further diversion of the funds and recover the amount diverted from the Banks and Financial Institutions, by investing authority in the Custodian to notify such persons. The property attached under the TORT Act, 1992 was thus directed to be applied for the discharge of the liabilities of such Notified Parties, under Section 11 of the said Act. 47. In the case of Harshad Mehta (supra) a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court spelled out the legislative intent behind the enactment of the TORT Act 1992, in the following terms: “15. ….. Considering that the Act has been passed because of the diversion of funds from the banks and financial institutions to the individual accounts of certain brokers, the implication of Section 11(2)(b) clearly is, that after the discharge of the liabilities under Section 11(2)(a), the amounts which are paid to 26/56
the banks would probably be those funds which were diverted from the banks by reason of malpractice in the security transactions. However, before the amounts can be paid to banks or financial institutions under Section 11(2)(b), the liabilities under Section 11(2)(a) are required to be discharged.” 48. In the case of Ashwin Mehta and another vs. The Custodian and another9, the object of enactment of the TORT Act, 1992 was expounded as under: “15. The Act provides for stringent measures. It was enacted for dealing with an extra-ordinary situation in the sense that any person who was involved in any offence relating to transaction of any security may be notified whereupon, all his properties stand attached. The provision contained in the Act being stringent in nature, the purport and intent thereof must be ascertained having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve. The right of a person notified to file an application or to raise a defence that he is not liable in terms of the provisions of the Act or in any event, the properties attached should not be sold in discharge of the liabilities can be taken at the initial stage by filing an application in terms of Sub-section (2) of
Section 4 of the Act.
But, at the stage when liabilities are required to be discharged, the notified person may inter alia raise a contention inter alia for the purpose of establishing that the properties held and possessed by them are sufficient to meet their liabilities. In terms of the provisions of the Act, the Special Court had been conferred a very wide power.”
(2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 385. 27/56
In the case of Rasila S. Mehta and others vs. Custodian, Nariman Bhavan, Mumbai10, the object of TORT Act, 1992 was declared to be two-fold, as under: “28. The objects of the Act are two fold:
(a) to punish the guilty, and
(b) to ensure speedy recovery of the huge amount involved. “Amount involved" means the amount of the banks and financial institutions alleged to have been diverted to the accounts of the offenders during the statutory period from 01.04.1991 to 06.06.1992. The attached properties can be dealt with by the Special Court under sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 3, sub-Section
(2) of Section 4, Sections 9-A and 11 of the Act. Section 3(3) of the Act provides for an automatic attachment of all properties as a consequence of Notification. The object provides the attachment of all properties of the offender with a view to prevent diversion of such properties. The said provision is a preventive provision.” PURPOSE OF ATTACHMENT : 50. The purpose of attachment of the properties is primarily the discharge of the liabilities in the manner ordained by Section 11 of the TORT Act, 1992. Once the property is attached, it can be dealt with only by the order of the Special Court and can be disposed for the purposes enumerated in Section 11. Attachment of the properties of the notified
(2011) 6 Supreme Court Cases 220. 28/56
persons, ascertainment of their liabilities and the distribution of the attached assets towards the discharge of the said liabilities, is the statutory device envisaged by the Parliament to address the extraordinary situation, which arose on account of wide-spread securities scam. 51. In the case of L. S. Synthetics Ltd. vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and another11, the purpose of attachment was expounded as under: “25. …. The purpose of the said Act is to discharge the liabilities of the government banks, financial institutions, mutual funds, etc. and for the said purpose, the statute itself provides that all properties belonging to the notified person shall stand attached. Once a statutory attachment comes into force, although the properties in question unlike the provisions of some other Acts do not vest in the Custodian but the same evidently remain under the control of the Special Court. ….. …... 37. We may, however, add that the attachment of the properties of the notified party being for specific purposes, i.e., for the purpose of discharging his liabilities, the Special Court is bound to pass appropriate orders in relation thereto. A property once attached shall remain under attachment till an appropriate order is passed. …..” 52. In the light of the aforesaid object of the TORT Act 1992 and the purpose of attachment of property, the prayer for de-notification, or for
(2004) 11 Supreme Court Cases 456. 29/56
that matter final distribution of the attached assets of the Petitioner, deserves to be appreciated. As the priority in discharge of the liabilities is statutorily prescribed, the aspect as to what falls within the ambit of “taxes”, which command the first priority assumes material significance. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES POSITION: 53. In order to properly appreciate the prayer for de-notification laying emphasis on the overall picture of the assets and liabilities of the Petitioner, it may be advantageous to extract the summary of assets and liabilities as of 31st October 2024, as tabulated by the Custodian. It reads as under: “4. Summary of Assets and Liabilities as on 30th October 2024 is tabulated below: I] ASSETS Sl No. Particulars Amount in Crores Remark Rs. Rs. Please See attached Statement Annexure “X”. Item B Assets refers.
(a) Balance in Current/Saving Account 0.01 (b) Balance held in Term/Fixed Deposit 3.27 3.28 3.28 (c) Value of 77936 Registered/Listed Traded Shares held in Demat A/c 4.36 (d) Value of 644 physical (Registered/Unregistered shares) (Traded) 0.10 4.46 4.46 Total Assets 7.74 30/56
II] LIABILITIES Particulars Amount in Crores Remark
Income Tax As per DCIT- CC4(4), Mumbai Letter No. DCIT- CC4(4)/ Demand Dhanraj Mills / 2024-2025 dated 27th November 2024, Please see Annexure (X) Item (A) – Liabilities (I), (II),
(III) & (IV).
(a) Under Section 11(2)(a) NIL
(b) Under Section 11(2)(b) NIL
(i) Non Priority Period Tax 88.98
(ii) Interest on IT Priority Period 8.17
(iii) Penalty Priority period 0.94
(iv) Interest on IT Non priority Period 133.46
(v) Penalty on IT Non Priority Period 32.51 264.06
(c) Under Section 11(2)(c)
(vi) Interest payable on decrees 242.26 2. Total Liabilities 506.32 3. Excess of Liabilities over Assets (Rs.506.32 – 7.74) 498.58 C] Augmentation of Assets, contingent upon adjudication of subjudice cases before Hon’ble Special Court/Hon’ble Supreme Court (4 cases) 15.84 Item (C) – (I) &
(II) of Annexure ‘X’ D] Non-Recoverable Assets from amongst Decretal cases in favour Notified Party-DMPL 30.40 E] Assets (shares) for which value is not determinable
(i) Shares in Demat Non Traded 33275 shares
(ii) Shares Registered in name of DMPL – Non Traded (physical) 20571 shares
(iii) Physical – unregistered Traded shares in name of third party 644 shares
(iv) Physical – Unregistered shares Non-Traded shares in the name of third party 2624176 shares Total 2678666 shares 31/56
To sum up, as on 31st October 2024 2024 total assets available are R.7.74 crs (Liquid cash Rs. 3.28 crores and value of shares Rs.4.46 crores) only to satisfy and discharge the total liabilities of Rs.506.32 crs. leaving a balance of Rs.498.58 Crs outstanding against Liabilities for discharge for want for sufficient assets.” 54. Evidently, the assets are woefully disproportionate to the liabilities. If the normal rule that all the liabilities of the notified party be discharged before the notified party can be legitimately de-notified is applied, the liabilities to the tune of almost of Rs. 500 Crores, would remain undischarged. 55. Mr. Joshi, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, faced with the daunting task, canvassed a two-fold submission. First, the interest payable on decrees amounting to Rs.242.26 crores in favour of late Abhay Narottam and Haresh Dalal (R3), is barred by law of limitation. Second, the liabilities under Section 11(2)(c) of the Income Tax Department are contentious. 56. I propose to deal with these main planks of Mr. Joshi’s submission in seriatim. 32/56
LIMITATION FOR THE RECOVERY OF ATTACHED ASSETS: 57. The thrust of the submission of Mr. Joshi with regard to the non- executability of the decree in favour of late Abhay Narottam was that the order to pay interest @19% p.a. on the principal amount of Rs.71.75 Crores was passed on 26th April 2005. By an order dated 11th April 2008 in the Custodian Report No. 24 of 2006, the principal amount of Rs.71.75 crores was ordered to be released in favour of late Abhay Narottam. However, neither late Abhay Narottam and his legal representative nor the Custodian filed any Application for execution of the decree dated 26th March 2003. Since a period of 12 years has elapsed, the decree for payment of interest became time barred under the provisions of Article 136 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act 1963. 58. A very strong reliance was placed by Mr. Joshi, on an order passed by this Court in the case of Cifco Properties Private Ltd (Supra), Mr. Joshi laid particular stress on the fact that the order in Cifco Properties Private Ltd (Supra) was, in effect, passed against the Petitioner as the decree in the said case was in favour of the Petitioner and the Application taken out by the Custodian to execute the said decree, was dismissed as having been barred by the law of limitation. 33/56
The same dispensation must be extended to the Petitioner in cases where the Petitioner is the Judgment Debtor, submitted Mr. Joshi. 59. I have perused the order in Cifco Properties Private Ltd (Supra). In the said case, the Custodian sought to execute the Consent Decree dated 5th July 1995, by filing the Execution Application in the year 2011. The Special Court was of the view that the Execution Application was ex-facie beyond the period of limitation. When the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of L.S. Synthetics (Supra) was sought to be relied upon by the Custodian to lend support to the submission that to the proceeding before the Special Court the provisions of the Limitation Act would not be applicable, the Special Court observed that it was settled position in law that where the statute does not prescribe the period of limitation then Application has to be filed within a reasonable period. The Special Court professed to draw support to the said view from the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of K.B. Nagur M.D. (Ayurvedic) Vs Union of India12 and Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil Vs Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale & Ors.13 60. Thus, holding that, the Execution Application was filed beyond the period of limitation and there was no explanation as to why the Execution Application was not filed from the year 2007 to 2011, the Execution Application came to be dismissed. In the case of Raviraj
2012 (4) SCC 483.
2009 (9) SCC 352. 34/56
Housing Corporation(supra), this Court had an occasion to consider the question of application of the period of limitation to an Execution Application filed to recover the debt owed to a notified party, 61. After adverting to the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 9A and 11 of the TORT Act 1992, this Court came to the conclusion that no period of limitation applied for the recovery of the attached property and the general principle that the application was required to be filed within a reasonable period where there was no statutory period of limitation, does not apply to the proceedings under the TORT Act 1992 for recovery of the attached assets. 62. The considerations and observations in paragraphs 22 to 35 deal with the very issue sought to be canvassed by Mr. Joshi and, hence, are extracted below. “22. A conjoint reading of the provisions of the Act would indicate that the Custodian has to perform the following functions : (i) To notify a person in the Official Gazette, on being satisfied on information received that he has been involved in any offence relating to transactions in securities during the period specified therefor. (ii) To cancel any contract or agreement relating to the properties of the notified persons which, in his opinion, has been entered into fraudulently or for the purpose of defeating the provisions of the Act. (iii) Deal with the properties in the manner 35/56
as directed by the Special Court. 23. From the text of sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the TORT Act, it becomes abundantly clear that a debt owed to a notified party is capable of being attached thereunder. The said debt owed to a notified party is the property belonging to the notified party and, consequently, the Special Court would have jurisdiction to pass appropriate order in relation thereto in accordance with the provisions of the TORT Act. In this context, a useful reference can be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of L.S.Synthetics Ltd. (supra), under the caption ‘jurisdiction of the Special Court’, which read thus : “18. The jurisdiction of the Special Court is of wide amplitude. Subject to a decision in appeal therefrom, its decision is final. 19. In this case, the notified person himself had disclosed that a sum of Rs.14.25 Lakhs is owing and due to it from the appellant. The debt at the hands of the appellant payable to the respondent being admitted, we have no hesitation to hold that the same would be the subject matter of attachment. 20.
The debt in question is capable of being
attached, being a property belonging to the notified party and upon such attachment the consequences provided therefrom would ensue and in that view of the matter, the Special Court will have jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order in relation thereto by issuing appropriate directions in terms of the provisions of the said Act. As the Special Court had the requisite jurisdiction to deal with the attached property, it is 36/56
immaterial whether the factum of the statutory provisions is brought to its notice by the notified party himself or by the Custodian. The Court has the requisite jurisdiction; nay a duty to apply itself to the said question once the matter is brought to its notice. 21. The jurisdiction of the Special Court, it is not correct to contend, is confined only to illegal transactions in securities and properties acquired by the notified person out of the same. Once the properties are attached under sub-section (3) of Section 3, the Custodian has no other option but to apply the same in such a manner as the Special Court may direct.” 25. Keeping in view the aforesaid nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Special Court and the functions to be performed by the Custodian, the exception to the execution application on the count of bar of limitation is required to be appreciated. As noted above, the debt was incurred by M/s. Raviraj before FairGrowth came to be notified under sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Tort Act. 26. Simultaneously with the said notification, the debt stood statutorily attached. Thereafter, the said attached property can only be dealt with in the manner ordered by the Special Court. From this standpoint, the submission of Mr. Raheja that the Special Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 9A of the Tort Act, retains all the characters of the Civil Court and, therefore, the execution application must be governed by the provisions contained in Limitation Act, does not merit countenance. The fact that the debt owed to the notified party became statutorily attached is of decisive significance and that brings the proceedings in connection therewith within the sole province of the authority of the Special Court. 37/56
On the aspect of limitation, in the case of L.S.Synthetics Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court repelled the contention that the provisions contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 would govern the proceedings before the Special Court. The observations of the Supreme Court in paras 37, 39, 41 and 42 are instructive and, hence, extracted below : “37. We may, however, add that the attachment of the properties of the notified party being for specific purposes i.e. for the purpose of discharging his liabilities, the Special Court is bound to pass appropriate orders in relation thereto. A property once attached shall remain under attachment till an appropriate order is passed. It is, therefore, idle to contend that even in respect thereof the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply. The Court while issuing directions to the Custodian in relation to the attached property for the purpose of discharge of the liability of the notified person must pass an appropriate order. So long the claims or other proceedings initiated before the Special Court as regards discharge of liability of the notified person continue, the attachment remains in force. A proceeding before the Special Court is not a suit for recovery of an amount. The proceedings before the Special Court are extraordinary in nature. Distribution of the assets of a notified person may take a long time but it would bear repetition to state because all the claims filed before the Special Court are disposed of, the property of the notified person stands attached. In other words, the provisions of the Limitation Act, would inter alia apply only when a suit is filed or a proceeding is initiated for recovery of an amount 38/56
and not where a property is required to be applied towards the claim pending before the Tribunal for the purpose of discharge of the liabilities of the notified person in terms of Section 11 of the said Act. 39. In terms of the provisions of the said Act, no period of limitation is prescribed, evidently because Parliament thought it to be wholly unnecessary. Once the statutory operation relating to the attachment of the property belonging to a notified person comes into being, the duties and functions of the Special Court start. In relation to the duties and functions required to be performed by a court of law, no period of limitation need be prescribed. Furthermore, Section 13 of the said Act provides for a non obstante clause which has been used as a device to modify the ambit of the provisions of law mentioned therein or to override the same in the specified circumstances. (see T.R.Thandur V/s. Union of India14, SCC Para 8). The said Act does not provide for any period of limitation, the reasons wherefor have been noticed hereinbefore and in that view of the matter, in our considered opinion, Acticles 19, 28 and 55 providing for period of limitation prescribed would have no application. Section 13 of the said Act provides for a non obstante clause which is of wide amplitude. In a case of conflict between the said Act and any other Act, the provisions of the former shall prevail. 41. A statute of limitation bars a remedy and
(1996) 3 SCC 690 39/56
not a right. Although a remedy is barred, a defence can be raised. In construing a special statute providing for limitation, consideration of plea of hardship is irrelevant. A special statute providing for special or no period of limitation must receive a liberal and broader construction and not a rigid or a narrow one. The intent and purport of Parliament enacting the said Act, furthermore must be given its full effect. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of the Limitation Act, will have no application so far as directions required to be issued by the Special Court relating to the disposal of attached property, are concerned. 42. Only in the event, all the claims as provided for under Section 11 of the siad Act are fully satisfied, the amount belonging to the notified person can be directed to be released in his favour or in favour of any other person.” (underlined and italicized by this Court) 28. Mr. Raheja, learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 endeavoured to impress upon the Court that the declaration by the Supreme Court, in the case of L.S.Synthetics (supra), that the provisions of the Limitation Act have no application in relation to the proceedings under TORT Act, is not all pervasive. On the contrary, it is restricted to the proceedings for the purpose of discharge of the liability of the notified persons in terms of Section 11 of the Act. To this end, attention of the Court was invited to the concluding portions of Paras 37 and 41 (Italicized). To bolster up the aforesaid submission, a strong reliance was placed on the judgment in the case of Fairgrowth Investment Ltd. (supra) wherein, with reference to the decision in the case of L.S.Synthetics Ltd. (supra), the following observations were made : 40/56
“23.
The decision by a larger Bench in L.S.Synthetics
Ltd., holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the Act may not have, by itself, concluded the question formulated by us at the outset. That case was, as has been rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, limited to a consideration of Section 11 of the Act and the proceedings by the Special Court thereunder. It was in that context that the Court had said that the Act had not provided for any period of limitation. But for the reasons already stated by us we concur in the final conclusion reached by the Court in L.S.Synthetics (supra) to the extent that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application in relation to a petition under Section 4(2) of the Act Finally, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act speaks of application of the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 “only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law”. This language, together with our earlier reasoning, particularly with regard to L.S.Synthetics Ltd. (supra) would answer the further question raised by the appellant, namely, whether the question of exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act must be separately considered with reference to different provisions of a special/local Act or in connection with the provisions of the special/local Act, as a whole, by affirmation of the first alternative. We are therefore, not called upon to decide whether claims either preferred for the first time before the Special Court or transferred to the Special Court under Section 9-A(2) would attract the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. It is enough for 41/56
the purpose of this Appeal to hold that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to proceedings under Section 4(2) of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. Since the appellant’s petition of objection had been filed much beyond the period prescribed under that section, the Special Court was right in rejecting the petition in limine. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.
It is imperative to note that in the case of Fairgrowth Investment Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court was confronted with a specific question as to whether the Special Court has power to condone the delay in filing a Petition under Section 4(2) of the Act objecting to the notification of the party under sub-Section 3(2) of the Act by the Custodian. It is in that context, the Supreme Court held that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, does not apply to the proceedings under Section 4(2) of the TORT Act. This becomes evident from the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph No.23 that the decision by a larger Bench in L.S.Synthetics Ltd. (supra), holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act, do not apply to the Tort Act, may not have by itself concluded the question formulated by the Supreme Court at the outset. 31. The question of limitation, in my view, is required to be considered from the perspective of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Special Court. The consequences which flow from the attachment of the property of a notified person are required to be kept in view. Once the property of the notified person stands attached, it is the duty of the Special Court to recover the assets for the purpose of discharge of the obligations of the notified party in the manner ordained by Section 11 of the Act. The fact that the notified party or any other person has not approached the Court for recovery of the debt 42/56
owed to the notified party, in my considered view, neither makes any difference nor dilutes the nature of the duty of the Special Court under the TORT Act. 32. The aforesaid position becomes abundantly clear from the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 35 and 36 in the the case of L.S.Synthetics Ltd. (supra) where the Supreme Court agreed with the following proposition of law expounded by this Court in the case of A.K.Menon, Custodian V/s. M/s. Modern Chemical Corporation and Ors.15 “35. S.N.Variava, J. in A.K.Menon, Custodian (supra) whereupon the learned Special Court has placed reliance, observed : “19. It is thus that the said Act lays down a responsibility on the Court to recover the properties. So far as monies are concerned, undoubtedly the particular coin or particular currency note given to a debtor would no longer be available. That however does not mean that the lender does not have any right to monies. What is payable is the loan i.e. the amount which has been lent. The right which the creditor has is not a ‘right to recover’ the money. The creditor has the title/right in the money itself. An equivalent amount is recoverable by him and the title in any equivalent amount remains with the lender. Thus the property which a notified party would have is not the right to recover but the ‘title in the money itself’. Under Section 3(3) what would stand attached would be the title/right in the money itself. Of course what would be recoverable would be an equivalent of that money. Once the money stands attached then no application is required to be made by any parties for recovery of that money. It is then the duty of the court to
2002 (1) ALL MR 180 43/56
recover the money. No period of limitation can apply to any act to be done by a court. Therefore, in all such applications the only question which remains is whether on the date of the notification the right in the property existed. If the right in the property existed then irrespective of the fact that the right to recover may be barred by limitation there would be a statutory attachment of that property. Once there is a statutory attachment of that property the court is duty-bound to recover it for the purposes of distribution. There can be no period of limitation for acts which a court is bound to perform. In this case since the court is compulsorily bound to recover the money there can be no limitation to such recovery proceedings. To be remembered that Section 3(3) as well as Section 13 provide that provisions of the said Act would prevail over any other law. This would include the Limitation Act.” 36. We respectfully agree with the said view.” 33. The submission on behalf of Respondent Nos.1 and 2 that in the absence of the period of limitation being prescribed for initiating execution proceedings, such proceeding must be initiated within a reasonable period and, therefore, in the backdrop of the manifest delay and latches in taking out the Application for execution for about 16 years after the passing of the decree, the execution application deserves to be dismissed, appears attractive at the first blush. 34. Reliance placed by Mr. Raheja on the orders passed by this Court in the cases Custodian V/s. CIFCO Properties Pvt Ltd. and Ors. (supra) and Custodian V/s. 44/56
Mid East Engineering Co. (Bombay) Ltd. and Ors. (supra), prima facie, support the view of Mr. Raheja. However, in those cases, the non-applicability of the period of limitation from the perspective of the duty of the Special Court to recover the attached property for the purpose of discharging the liability of the notified party, in accordance with Section 11 of the TORT Act, was not elaborately considered. Nor the import of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of L.S.Synthetics Ltd. (supra), was given full effect to. 35. In such a situation to import the general principle that, in the absence of prescription of period of limitation, the proceedings before the Special Court must be initiated within a reasonable period, may run counter to the object of enacting TORT Act. In the event the notified party, or for that matter, the Custodian does not move the Special Court within a reasonable period for recovery of the attached property, the very object of recovery of the attached property for the purpose of discharging liability of the notified party under Section 11 of the TORT Act would be defeated.”
The aforesaid observations would indicate that, after an elaborate analysis, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of L.S. Synthetics (Supra), this Court has in terms recorded that the decisions of the Special Court in the cases of Cifco Properties Private Ltd (Supra) and the Custodian Vs Mild East Engineering Co. (Bombay Ltd) And Ors16 do not command precedential value in view of the non-
(2019) SCC OnLine Bom 156. 45/56
consideration of the aspect of the non-applicability of the period of limitation from the perspective of the duty of the Special Court to recover attached property for the purposes of discharge of the liability of the notified party and the true import of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of L.S. Synthetics (Supra). Thus, I find it rather difficult to accede to the submission of Mr. Joshi that the decrees awarding interest, especially in favour of late Abhay Narottam, towards which the Petitioner owes a huge amount of Rs.242 Crores, have been rendered inexecutable, having been barred by law of limitation. 64. This finding has a significant bearing on the prayer for de- notification. There is material to indicate that late Abhay Narottam also owed huge liabilities. The liabilities of late Abhay Narottam are to the tune of Rs.6339.35 Crores. Out of that, late Abhay Narottam’s estate owes Rs.168.91 Crores towards ‘Tax’ payable under Section 11(2)(a) of the TORT Act 1992. The non recovery of the decretal amount in favour of late Abhay Narottam, thus, in effect, jeopardises the discharge of the liability of late Abhay Narottam to the Income Tax Department under Section 11(2)(a), which commands highest priority and must be paid in full. LIABILITIES TOWARDS THE INCOME TAX DEPARTMENT: 65. Under the provisions of Section 11(2)(a) of the TORT Act 1992, all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the notified parties to the 46/56
Central Government or any State Government or local authority have the highest priority. Thereafter, under clause (b), fall the amounts due from the notified parties to any bank or financial institution or mutual fund. In the case at hand, as noted above, the Petitioner does not owe any liability under either in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the TORT Act 1992. I must hasten to add that, Mr. Chatterji, advanced a submission that the claim for interest and penalty falls within the ambit of term “revenue” covered by Clause (a) of sub- section (2) of Section 11 of TORT Act, 1992. 66. The legal position as regards the discharge of the tax liability under Section 11(2) of the TORT Act 1992 seems to have been well- neigh settled. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Harshad Shantilal Mehta Vs Custodian And Ors17, has settled the issues, to a large extent. Interestingly, both Mr. Joshi and Mr. Chatterji placed reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Harshad Shantilal Mehta (Supra) which, in their estimation, bolster up their respective contentions. 67. In the case of Harshad Shantilal Mehta (Supra), the Supreme Court, inter alia, considered six questions, and enunciated law thereon. The first question was about the import of the phrase “taxes due”. The Supreme Court enunciated that the phrase “taxes due” cannot refer merely to a liability created by charging section to pay the taxes under
(1998) 5 SCC 1. 47/56
the relevant law. It must refer to an ascertained liability for payment of taxes quantified in accordance with law. In other words, taxes as assessed which are presently payable by notified person are taxes which have to be taken into account under Section 11(2)(a) while distributing the property of the notified person. In the context of Section 11(2), therefore, “taxes due” refer to “taxes as finally assessed”. 68. The second question was, “whether the taxes relate to any particular period or they cover all the assessed taxes of the notified person”. Expounding the distinction between the nature of the tax liability for the priority period, i.e., 1st April 1992 to 6th June 1992, and non-priority period, the Supreme Court enunciated that the tax liability for the non-priority period may be discharged either under Section 11(2)(c), by the direction of the Special Court or the taxing authority may recover the same from any subsequently acquired property of a notified person or in any other manner in accordance with law. 69. In the context of the controversy at hand, which primarily pertains to the liability for the non-priority period, it may be expedient to extract the observations in paragraph 26 of the decision in the case of Harshad Shantilal Mehta (Supra). They read as under: “ 26. Every kind of tax liability of the notified person for any other period is not covered by
Section 11(2)(a),
although the liability may continue to be the liability of the notified person. Such tax liability may be discharged either under the directions of the Special Court, under 48/56
Section 11(2)(c) or the taxing authority may recover the same from any subsequently acquired property of a notified person (vide Tejkumar Balakrishna Ruia v. A.K. Menon (1997 (9) SCC 123)) or in any other manner from the notified person in accordance with law. The priority, however, which is given under
Section 11(2)(a) to such
tax liability only covers such liability for the period 1-4- 1991 to 6-6-1992.” 70. The fifth question was, “whether the taxes include penalty or interest?”. The Supreme Court answered the said question in the negative by upholding the view of the Special Court that neither penalty nor interest can be considered as tax under Section 11 (2)(a) of the TORT Act 1992. Since almost entire liability of the Petitioner to the Income Tax Department is in the form of interest and penalty, it may be advantageous to extract the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 37 of the judgment, which read as under: “ 37. One other connected question remains: whether "taxes" under Section 11(2)(a) would include interest or penalty as well? We are concerned in the present case with penalty and interest under the Income Tax Act. Tax, penalty and interest are different concepts under the
Income Tax Act.
The definition of "tax" under
Section 2(43) does not include
penalty or interest. Similarly, under Section 157, it is provided that when any tax, interest, penalty, fine or any other sum is payable in consequence of any order passed under this Act, the Assessing Officer shall serve upon the assessee a notice of demand as prescribed. Provisions for 49/56
imposition of penalty and interest are distinct from the provisions for imposition of tax. Learned Special Court judge, after examining various authorities in paragraphs 61 to 70 of his judgment, has come to the conclusion that neither penalty nor interest can be considered as tax under Section 11(2)(a). We agree with the reasoning and
conclusion drawn by the Special Court in this connection.” 71. Another aspect of the matter which is of critical salience, in the context of the controversy at hand, is the power of the Special Court to absolve a notified person from payment of penalty or interest for a period subsequent to the date of his notification. The Supreme Court ex- posited the law to the effect that a taxing statute is a Code in itself for imposition of tax, penalty or interest. The remedy of a notified party against whom a demand to pay tax, interest or penalty is made, would be to move the appropriate authority under the taxing statute. And there-upon the concerned authority can take notice of the circumstances which entail the notification of such person under Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992 for the purpose of deciding where the penalty or interest can be imposed. Secondly, the Special Court is required to consider the said question only from the point of distributing any part of the surplus assets in the hands of the Custodian after the discharge of the liability under Section 11(2)(a) and 11(2)(b). In that regard, the Special Court has full discretion. The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 38 are illuminating and, hence, extracted below: 50/56
“38. The Special Court has, in the impugned judgment, also dwelt at some length on the question whether it can absolve a notified person from imposition of penalty or interest after the date of the notification. Since the liabilities covered under Section 11(2)(a) are only liabilities arising during the period 1.4.1991 to 6.6.1992. and do not cover penalty and interest, this question does not really arise. In any case, interest or penalty for any action or default after the date of the notification, are not covered by the Act. However, we must reiterate that a taxing statute is a Code in itself for imposition of tax, penalty or interest. The remedy of a notified person who is assessed to penalty or interest, after the notified period, would be to move the appropriate authority under the taxing statute in that connection. If it is open to him under the relevant taxing statute to contend that he was unable to pay his taxes on account of the attachment of all his properties under the
Special Court Act,
and that there is a valid reason why penalty or interest should not be imposed upon him after the date of notification, the concerned authorities under the Taxing Statute can take notice of these circumstances in accordance with law for the purpose of deciding whether penalty or interest can be imposed on the notified person. The Special Court is required to consider this question only from the point of view of distributing any part of the surplus assets in the hands of the Custodian after the discharge of liabilities under
Section 11(2)(a) and
11(2)(b). The Special Court has
full discretion under
Section 11(2)(c) to decide whether
such claim for penalty or interest should be paid out of any surplus funds in the hands of the Custodian.” 51/56
In the light of the aforesaid exposition of law which has been reiterated in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax vs. State Bank of India and others,18 and consistently followed, re-adverting to the facts of the case, especially the liabilities towards Income Tax Department as computed in the table extracted above, firstly, it becomes evident that what remains to be recovered for the priority period is interest on income tax to the tune of Rs.8.17 Crores and penalty of Rs.0.94 Crores; secondly, the demand of the Income Tax Department towards taxes for the non-priority period is Rs.88.98 Crores; thirdly, interest on income tax for the non-priority period is Rs.133.46 Crores and, fourthly, penalty on income tax for non-priority period is Rs.32.51 Crores. 73. By applying the principles enunciated in the case of Harshad Mehta (Supra), the interest and penalty for both priority and non- priority period do not fall within the ambit of taxes under clause (a) of Section 11(2). Nor the non-priority period taxes are payable under Section 11(2)(a) of the TORT Act 1992. 74. The situation which thus emerges is that, on the one hand, for the waiver of interest and penalty, the Petitioner would be at liberty to approach the authorities under the Income Tax Act 1963 and impress upon the authorities to absolve it of the liability to pay interest or penalty, on account of the situation brought about by its notification
(2009) 2 SCC 451. 52/56
under Section 3(2) of the TORT Act 1992. On the other hand, the Special Court will have discretion in the matter of the discharge of the said liability under Section 11 (2)(c). 75. As indicated in the judgment in the case of Harshad Mehta (Supra), the Special Court would be required to advert to this question from the point of view of distributing the surplus assets of the Petitioner in the hands of the Custodian. The Special Court will have, in such an eventuality, “full discretion” in the matters, like, whether the claim for penalty or interest shall be paid, whether the other claims which fall under Clause (c) shall be considered, what principle should govern the pay out, to the Income Tax Department and the other competing cliamants. When such an eventuality arises, the Special Court may even consider the aspect of priority of revenue, as was sought to be canvassed by Mr. Chatterji. 76. On the consideration of the entire gamut of the circumstances, which bear upon the said determination, which would be essentially an exercise of final distribution of the assets of the Petitioner, in my considered view, the said stage has yet not reached for reasons more than one. Firstly, the assets in the hands of the Custodian are dismal in comparison to the liabilities; the liabilities almost exceed by Rs.500 Crores. Secondly, the decretal debt of the late Abhay Narottam which constitutes almost half of the liability, cannot be said to have been 53/56
barred by law of limitation. Thirdly, the recovery of decretal debts owed to late Abhay Narottam bears upon the liability of the estate of late Abhay Narottam to Income Tax Department, which is recoverable under Section 11(2)(a). Fourthly, the Custodian is required to take steps to realize the assets of the Petitioner by sale of the registered and unregistered shares standing to the account of the Petitioner, ascertain the position as regards the prospect of recovery in the decrees passed in favour of the Petitioner. Fifthly, as regards the discharge of the liability to pay interest and penalty, which constitutes the major component of the tax liability, it would be expedient that the Petitioner take steps to seek waiver and the competent authorities pass orders thereon. Once the authorities under the Income Tax Act 1963, decide the question of waiver, that would equip the Special Court in exercising the discretion in a more judicious manner. Sixthly, a provision would be required to be made for the appropriation of the assets which shall be recovered in future, contingent upon the outcome of the pending proceedings. 77. At the same time, this Court cannot loose sight of the fact that a period of almost 33 years has elapsed since the notification of the Petitioner. The passage of time would take its toll on the possibility of the recovery of the debts due to the notified party and the consequent augmentation of the assets. Conversely, the interest and penalty would continue to mount. It would, therefore, be necessary to draw curtains 54/56
by resorting to the exercise of the final distribution of the assets by following the governing principles of law. 78. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that though the Petitioner does not deserve to be de-notified, at this stage, yet, it is necessary to give directions to the parties so that the exercise of final distribution of the assets can be resorted to and completed, in near future. 79. Hence the following order: (i) The prayers to de-notify the Petitioner and declare that the decree in favour of late Abhay Narottam is in-executable stand rejected. (ii) The Custodian is directed to sell registered/listed/traded shares (described in 1(c) of the Assets) by following the procedure delineated by this Court. (iii) The Custodian shall also take steps to monitise the shares (described in Sr. No. 1(d) of the Assets) and 26,78,666 shares (described under Clause F as non recoverable Assets) (iv) The Petitioner is at liberty to file an Application before an Appropriate Authority under the Income Tax Act 1963 for waiver of the interest and penalty on the taxes for both priority and non- priority period, within a period of one month from today. (v) The concerned Authorities under the Income Tax Act 1963 shall pass an appropriate order in the light of the enunciation of 55/56
law in the case of Harshad Mehta (Supra) within a period of two months from the date of filing of the said Application. (vi) The Custodian shall ascertain the possibility of recovery of the amounts in the decrees in favour of the Petitioner, which have not yet been declared to be non-recoverable, and also recoverability of the money in the pending applications and file a comprehensive report seeking final distribution of the assets of the Petitioner, within a period of six month from today. (vii) The Custodian is also at liberty to seek further directions with regard to compliance of the aforesaid directions. (viii) Subject to the aforesaid directions, Petition stands disposed. (ix) The parties shall bear their respective costs. (x) Pending Application(s), if any, shall stand(s) disposed. [N. J. JAMADAR, J.] 56/56
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