SIEMENS FINANCIAL SERVICES PVT LTD vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CIRCLE - 8(2)(1), MUMBAI AND 3 ORS
What did the High Court hold?
The High Court made the Rule absolute and allowed the petition. The Court held that the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148A(d) of the Act was not properly obtained. Specifically, the sanction ought to have been granted under Section 151(ii) of the Act, and not under Section 151(i). Consequently, the order passed thereunder and the consequent notice issued under Section 148 of the Act were quashed and set aside. The Court also found that the notice to reopen the assessment was issued on the basis of a change of opinion, which is not permissible. Since the petition was disposed of on these grounds, the Court did not consider the other grounds raised by the Petitioner. The ratio decidendi is that procedural requirements, particularly regarding approvals and sanctions under the Income Tax Act, must be strictly adhered to, and reopening based on a change of opinion is invalid.
What were the facts?
The Petitioner, Siemens Financial Services Pvt Ltd., filed its return of income for AY 2016-2017. The assessment was completed under Section 143(3) without adjustments. Subsequently, the Revenue issued a notice under Section 148 on June 25, 2021, alleging escaped income. The Petitioner contended that the notice was issued under pre-amended provisions. The Revenue then issued a notice under Section 148A(b) on May 31, 2022, treating the earlier Section 148 notice as a show cause notice, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India Vs. Ashish Agarwal. The reasons for reopening included a debit of Rs. 6,41,87,931/- on account of software consumables, alleged to be capital expenditure, leading to an underassessment of Rs. 2,56,75,172/-. The Petitioner responded, but the Revenue passed an order under Section 148A(d) on July 31, 2022, rejecting the submissions. The Petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the Section 148A(b) notice, the Section 148A(d) order, and the subsequent Section 148 notice.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was properly obtained, specifically whether sanction ought to have been granted under Section 151(ii) and not Section 151(i) of the Act? (Question of law) 2. Whether the notice to reopen the assessment was issued on the basis of a change of opinion, which is impermissible? (Question of mixed law and fact) Assessee's Contentions: - The impugned notices and order are beyond limitation. - The notices are signed by the wrong specified authority. - The notices lack the "information" required under Section 148. - The reopening is based on a change of opinion. - The proceedings violate Section 147. Revenue's Contentions: - The Revenue relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India Vs. Ashish Agarwal to treat the Section 148 notice as a Section 148A(b) show cause notice. - The Revenue alleged that the Petitioner failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment, justifying reopening under Section 147.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 143(2),Section 142(1),Section 143(3),Section 148,Section 147,Section 148A,Section 151,Section 37,Section 151(ii),Section 151(i)
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Cited by 25 judgments on BharatTax
See all citing judgments →Counted from the text of the judgments hosted here. Most recent first.
- Krishna, Delhi v. ITO Ward 36(1), DelhiDelhi · 2026-02-10
- Sahil Garg, Delhi v. ITO Ward-43(6), DelhiDelhi · 2026-02-09
- Inderjyot Singh, New Delhi v. ITO Ward 44(1), DelhiDelhi · 2026-01-22
- Rohit Goel, Delhi v. DCIT, CC-20, DelhiDelhi · 2026-01-20
- Ajay Nagpal, Delhi v. ITO, Ward-48(1), DelhiDelhi · 2026-01-20
Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
aforementioned judgment.
Without going into any other issues, since the issue of grant of approval by an authority, as prescribed under section 151 of the Act goes to the root of the matter, we wish to deal only with the said issue and hold that even in the present case, the approval ought to have been granted by either the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner and not by the Additional Commissioner of Income tax.
Since the notice was being issued beyond the four years period prescribed under the un-amended provisions of section 151(1) of the Act, it ought to have the satisfaction accorded by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner of Income Tax which is not so in the present case.” (f) Soumya Girdhari Agarwal v. ITO11 – paragraph 4 read as under:
“4. On a reading of Section 151 it is clear that a notice under Section 148 of the Act, 1961 cannot be issued after the expiry of period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner was satisfed, on the reasons recorded by the A.O., that it was a ft case for the issue of such a notice. In the present case, it is clear that assessment year under consideration was 2015-16 and, therefore, the notice impugned dated 29th March, 2021 was admittedly beyond the four years period for 11. (WP No. 3354 of 2022 dated 25-7-2022) Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
27/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc which the approval ought to have been granted by any one of the aforementioned four authorities and not by the Joint Commissioner. It is clear that, the A.O. fell in error in holding that the case at hand fell within the four years period, from the end of the assessment year under consideration, which on the face of it appears to be erroneous.” (g) Voltas Limited v. ACIT12 – paragraphs 6, 19 to 24 read as under: “(6) In the petition, petitioner has also raised an objection that the sanction obtained under section 151 of the Act was not a valid sanction since the proposed reopening is more than 4 years after expiry of relevant assessment year. As provided under sub-section (1) of section 151 of the Act only a Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner could grant the sanction. Since in this case, admittedly, sanction has been granted by an Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, it is not a valid sanction and therefore, notice issued based on an invalid sanction is also not valid and has to be quashed. ************************** (19) It is also petitioner’s case that the approval obtained for issuing notice under section 148 of the Act is not in accordance with the mandate of Section 151 as the said approval is of Additional Commissioner of Income Tax instead of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. It is petitioner’s case that the reasons put up for approval on 26.03.2021, which is after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year 2015-2016 and approval was granted on 30.03.2021. Therefore, Mr. Joshi submitted that as per Section 151 of the Act, as four years have elapsed at the time of reopening, the sanction is required to be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner of Income Tax and since the sanction has not been obtained from any of these four Commissioners of Income Tax, the notice issued is bad in law. (20) Sub-Section 1 of Section 151 of the Act provides that no notice shall be issued under Section 148 by an Assessing Officer, after the expiry of a period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner is satisfied, on the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer, that it is a ft case for the issue of such notice. (21) Admittedly in this case, four years from the end of the relevant assessment year A.Y. 2015-16 has expired before the issuance of notice and the approval also has been obtained from the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax and not Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. In the affidavit-in-reply fled through Yashraj Nain, affirmed on 25.03.2022, these facts have not been disputed but according to respondents, the approval granted by the Additional
(WP No. 1180 of 2022 dated 5-4-2022) Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
28/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc Commissioner of Income Tax was a valid approval. (22) Respondents have relied upon Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (Relaxation Act), limitation to submit, inter alia, under provisions of Section 151(1) and Section 151(2), which were originally expiring on 31 st March 2020 stand extended to 31 st March 2021. According to the Income Tax Officer, the statutory approval for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act for the Assessment Year 2015-2016 may be given by the Range Head as per the said provisions. (23) Even for a moment, we agree with the view expressed by respondents, still it applies to only cases where the limitation was expiring on 31 st March 2020. In the case at hand, the assessment year is 2015-16 and, therefore, the six years limitation will expire only on 31 st March 2022. Certainly, therefore, the Relaxation Act provisions will not be applicable. In any event, the time to issue notice may have been extended but that would not amount to amending the provisions of Section 151 of the Act. (24) In our view, since four years had expired from the end of the relevant assessment year, as provided under Section 151(1) of the Act, it is only the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner who could have accorded the approval and not the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax. On this ground alone, we will have to set aside the notice dated 31.03.2021 issued under Section 148 of the Act, which is impugned in this petition.” Similarly in Johnson and Johnson v. DCIT13, Equitable Financial Consultancy Services Pvt Ltd v. ITO14 and Asian Paints Ltd. v. ACIT15 28 The interpretation placed by the CBDT in paragraph 6.1 of Instruction No. 1 / 2022 dated 11th May 2022 cannot be countenanced as it is not open to them to clarify that the law laid down by the Apex Court means that the extended reassessment notices will travel back in time to their original date when such notices were to be issued and, then, the new section 149 of the Act is to be applied as this is contrary to the judgment of this court in Tata Communications (supra) wherein it is held that TOLA does not envisage traveling back of any notice. However, even assuming that it is held that 13. [WP (L) No. 7733 of 2022 dated 4-5-2022]
(WP No. 43 of 2022 dt. 27-4-2022) 15. [WP (L) No. 6385 of 2022 dated 26-4-2022] Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
29/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc these notices travel back to the date of the original notice issued on 25th June 2021, even then the approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax should be obtained in terms of section 151(ii) of the Act as a period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year ended on 31st March 2020 for AY 2016-17. 29 Further, the CBDT in Instruction no.1/2022 at paragraph 6.2(ii) has wrongly stated that the notices issued under section 148 of the Act for AY 2016-17 are to be considered as having been issued within a period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year and, on that basis, has wrongly mentioned that the approval of the specified authority under section 151(i) should be taken. This conclusion is premised on the basis that these notices travel back to 31 March 2020 which premise is completely erroneous as explained hereinbefore. The notice under section 148 of the Act is issued on 31 July 2022 and, hence, is issued beyond period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year and, accordingly, the approval of the specified authority under section 151(ii) of the Act should be taken. 30 This court in Tata Communications (Supra), has rejected that argument of the Revenue on the issue of travel back. This court in paragraph 37 of Tata Communications (Supra) has held that Section 3(1) of TOLA does not provide that any notice issued under Section 148 of the Act, after 31st March 2021 will relate back to the original date or that the clock is stopped on 31st March, 2021 such that the provision as existing on Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
30/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc such date will be applicable to notices issued relying on the provision of TOLA. The court held that Section 3(1) of TOLA merely extends the limitation provided in the specified Acts including Income-tax Act for doing certain Acts but such Acts must be performed in accordance with the provisions of the specified Acts. The court had also recorded that the Delhi High Court had considered and rejected the contention of the Revenue that the notice issued after 1st April 2021 relates back to an earlier period. The Delhi High Court had considered and rejected the argument of the Revenue that TOLA creates a legal fiction such that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act are deemed to be issued on 31st March, 2021. TOLA only granted power to the Central Government to notify the period during which actions are required to be taken that can fall within the ambit of TOLA, and the power to extend the time limit within which those actions are to be taken. There was no amendment to the provisions of Sections 147 to 151 of the Act. The court also observed that amendments to the substantive provisions of the Act were envisaged under Section 3 of TOLA, which was only a relaxation provision dealing with time limits under various enactments. The Assessing Officer could have assumed jurisdiction while issuing the impugned notices only after complying with the amended Section 147 which has not been done. In Tata Communications (Supra), this court also held that TOLA was not applicable for A.Y.-2015-2016 or any subsequent years. Hence question of applicability of notification issued under TOLA also would not arise. Paragraphs 34 to 49 of Tata Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
31/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc Communications (Supra) read as under: 34 It is well settled that the validity of a notice issued under Section 148 of the Act must be judged on the basis of the law existing on the date on which such notice is issued. Even the Revenue accepts this well settled position. Further, the provisions of Sections 147 to 151 are procedural laws and accordingly, the provisions as existing on the date of the notice would be applicable. Even the revenue accepts this legal position and the CBDT Circular No.549 of 1989, that Mr. Mistri relied upon, explaining the provisions of the Finance Act, 1989 specifically sets out that any notices issued by Revenue after the amendment made by the Finance Act, 1989 must comply with the amended provision of the law. Therefore, any notice issued after 1st April, 2021 must comply with the amended provisions of the Act which was amended with effect from 1st April, 2021. This contention has also been considered and upheld by the Delhi High Court and the Allahabad High Court. 35 We have to also note the well settled proposition that when the Act specifies that something is to be done in a particular manner, then, that thing must be done in that specified manner alone, and any other method/(s) of performance cannot be upheld. Hence, notices issued under Section 148 of the Act after 1st April, 2021 must comply with the amended provisions of law and cannot be sustained on the basis of the erstwhile provision. 36 In order to uphold the arguments of the Revenue in this regard, either a savings clause, or a specific legislative enactment deferring applicability of the amended provisions and the repeal of the old provisions of the Act, would be required. Plainly no such savings clause or enactment is available. 37 Section 3(1) of Relaxation Act does not provide that any notice issued under Section 148 of the Act, after 31st March 2021 will relate back to the original date or that the clock is stopped on 31 st March, 2021 such that the provision as existing on such date will be applicable to notices issued relying on the provision of Relaxation Act. A plain reading of Relaxation Act, as Mr. Mistri rightly submitted, makes it clear that Section 3(1) of Relaxation Act merely extends the limitation provided in the specified Acts (including Income-tax Act) for doing certain Acts but such Acts must be performed in accordance with the provisions of the specified Acts. Therefore, if there is an amendment in the specified Act, the amended provision of the specified Act would apply to such actions of the Revenue. The Delhi High Court has considered and rejected the contention of the Revenue that the notice issued after 1st April 2021 relates back to an earlier period. 38 The Delhi High Court has considered and rejected this argument of the Revenue that Relaxation Act creates a legal fiction such that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act are deemed to be issued on 31st March, 2021. The so-called legal fiction is directly contrary to the Revenue’s own Circular No.549 of 1989, which is binding on them Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
32/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc as well as the well settled principle that the validity of a notice is to be judged on the basis of the law that prevails at the time of its issue. 39 Even though Relaxation Act was in existence when the Finance Act, 2021 was passed, the parliament has specifically made the amended provisions of Sections 147 to 151 of the Act as being applicable with effect from 1st April, 2021. Therefore, the intention of the legislature is clear that substituted provisions must apply to notices issued with effect from 1st April, 2021. No savings clause has been provided in the Act for saving the erstwhile provisions of Sections 147 to 151 of the Act, like in Section 297 of the Act where, the Parliament when it intended, has specifically provided the savings clause. 40 On a plain reading of Relaxation Act it is clear that the only powers granted to the Central Government by Relaxation Act is the power to notify the period during which actions are required to be taken that can fall within the ambit of Relaxation Act, and the power to extend the time limit within which those actions are to be taken. A plain reading of the impugned Explanations in Notification Nos.20 of 2021 and 38 of 2021 shows that it purports to “clarify” that the unamended provisions of Sections 147 to 151 of the Act will apply for the purposes of issue of notices under Section 148 of the Act, which is clearly ultra vires Relaxation Act. 41 In our view, the reopening notices issued after 1st April, 2021 are unsustainable and bad in law even if one was to apply the Explanations to the Notification Nos.20 of 2021 and 38 of 2021. The Explanation seeks to extend the applicability of erstwhile Sections 148, 149 and 151. The impugned Explanation does not cover Section 147, which (as amended) empowers the revenue to reopen an assessment subject to Sections 148 to 153, which includes Section 148A. Thus, even if Explanations are valid, the mandatory procedure laid down by Section 148A has not been followed and hence, without anything further, the notices under Section 148 of the Act are invalid and must be struck down for this reason as well. This proposition has also been upheld by the Delhi High Court. 42 As regards Revenue’s arguments that Relaxation Act being a beneficial legislation must be given purposive interpretation’, the purpose of Section 3(1) of Relaxation Act is to extend limitation periods as provided in a specified Act (including the Income-tax Act). The purpose of Section 3(1) of Relaxation Act is not to postpone the applicability of amended provisions of a Specified Act. Though Relaxation Act was in existence when the Finance Act, 2021 was passed, the Parliament has specifically enacted the new, (amended) provisions of Section 147 to 151 of the Act and made them applicable with effect form 1st April, 2021. Therefore, it is clear that amendment is to be applied from 1st April, 2021. Further, when there is no ambiguity on the applicability of the provision, there is no question of resorting to purpose test. 43 As regards liberty granted by the Allahabad High Court, certainly, if the law permits issuance of notices under Section 148 of the Act (as Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
33/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc amended), afresh, then no liberty is required to be granted by the Court, and it would be within the Assessing Officer’s powers to initiate proceedings as per the amended law. The Madras High Court has considered this very plea and granted liberty to initiate reassessment proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the amended Act, “if limitation for it survives”. 44 As submitted by Mr. Mistri, with whom we agree, Chapter II of Relaxation Act provide for – “Relaxation of Certain Provisions of Specified Act”and Section 3 forms part of this Chapter. Further Chapter III provides for amendment to Income Tax Act, 1961 and various Sections of the Act have been amended in Chapter III. From this the following propositions emerge : (a) Wherever the Parliament thought fit, the Parliament has itself amended the provision of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and not left it for the CBDT to make the amendment. Therefore, it is clear that no power is given under Relaxation Act to postpone the applicability of provisions of the Income Tax Act. (b) Chapter II of Relaxation Act is only for ‘Relaxation of Certain Provisions of Specified Act’ and, therefore, there is no question of the Revenue relying on this Chapter and Section 3 to justify the postponement of applicability of certain provisions of the Income Tax Act. If the Parliament wanted to give some right to the CBDT, it would have formed part of Chapter III, however, there is no such provision in Chapter III of the Act. 45 As submitted by Mr. Pardiwalla there are other Sections in the Finance Act, 2021 which have amended other provisions of the Income Tax Act from dates other than 1st April, 2021. Like for example Section 12 of the Finance Act inserted a proviso in Section 43CA. Had the intention of the legislature, while amending Sections 147 to 153, been to give it effect from 1stJuly, 2021, a similar savings clause could have been inserted, which has not been done. We agree with Mr. Pardiwalla because as per Section 1(2)(a) of the Finance Act, 2021, the amendments to Sections 147 to 153 of the Act shall come into force on 1st April, 2021. Similarly, the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2021 clarifies that these amendments will take effect from 1st April, 2021. Section 12 of the Finance Act inserted a proviso in Section 43CA which inter alia provides that the words ‘one hundred and ten percent’ in the first proviso will be substituted by the words ‘one hundred and twenty percent’ if the transfer of residential units takes place during the period beginning from 12th day of November, 2020 and ending on the 30th day of June, 2021. Therefore, had the intention of the legislature, while amending Sections 147 to 153, was to give it effect from 1stJuly, 2021, a similar savings clause could have been inserted, which has not been done. 46 Mr. Pardiwalla submitted that only Section 4 of Relaxation Act which amended the Act and no such amendments to the substantive provisions of the Act were envisaged under Section 3 of Relaxation Act, which was only a relaxation provision dealing with time limits under various enactments. Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
34/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc 47 As noted earlier, it is Revenue’s case that Section 3 of Relaxation Act enabled the Central Government to issue notifications which would permit the Assessing Officers to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act after 1st April, 2021 in terms of the erstwhile provisions of Sections 147 to section 151, even though the said provisions were repealed with effect from 1st April, 2021 by the Finance Act, 2021. It is, however, pertinent to note that Section 3 of Relaxation Act falls in Chapter II of the said Act, which is titled ‘Relaxation of Certain Provisions of Specified Act’. In contradistinction, Section 4 of Relaxation Act which does amend several provisions of the Act falls in Chapter III, which is titled ‘Amendments to the Income Tax Act, 1961’. It will be apposite to notice that the amendments provided for in Section 4 were made by the Legislature itself in terms of the said Section and no such power to amend the Act was delegated to the Central Government. Therefore, we would agree with Mr. Pardiwalla that it is only Section 4 of Relaxation Act which amended the Act and no such amendments to the substantive provisions of the Act were envisaged under Section 3 of Relaxation Act, which was only a relaxation provision dealing with time limits under various enactments. 48 Mr. Pardiwalla submitted that even assuming for a moment that the primary contention of petitioners that the Explanations in the notifications are invalid is not accepted, still the impugned notices will be bad in law as the Explanation only seeks to effectuate the provisions of the erstwhile Sections 148, 149 and 151 of the Act. It does not cover the erstwhile Section 147 of the Act. As rightly submitted by Mr. Pardiwalla, the Assessing Officer could have assumed jurisdiction while issuing the impugned notices only after complying with the amended Section 147. The same has not been done by the Assessing Officers as (a) his assumption of jurisdiction is on the basis of his ‘reason to believe’ that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, a concept, which is no longer recognised in the amended Section 147; and (b) the amended Section 147 is in any event subject to Sections 148 to 153, which would also include the procedure contained in Section 148A, which has not been followed. Therefore, the impugned notices do not even comply with the relevant statutory provisions, even if we do not find fault with the Explanations in the two notifications. Infact the Delhi High Court in paragraph 84 of Mon Mohan Kohli (Supra) has also considered and accepted this aspect of the matter. 49 Some more reasons why the reopening notices must go are : (a) Section 297 of the Act provides a saving clause for applicability of various provisions of the 1922 Act, even though the Act itself had been repealed. In the absence of such a saving clause for applicability of erstwhile Sections 147 to 151 of the Act, the amended provision of the Act would apply from 1st April, 2021. (b) Moreover, the reopening notices issued after 1st April, 2021 are bad in law even if one was to apply the Explanations to the Notification Nos.20 and 38. The Explanations seek to extend the applicability of erstwhile Sections 148, 149 and 151. They do not cover Section 147, which empowers revenue to reopen subject to Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
35/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc Section 148 to 153, which includes Section 148A. Thus, even if Explanation are valid, procedure of Section 148A is not followed and hence, notices are invalid. (c) In any case, Relaxation Act is not applicable for Assessment Years 2015-2016 or any subsequent year and, hence, the question of applicability of the Notification Nos.20 and 38 of 2021 does not arise. The time limit to issue notice under Section 148 of the Act for the Assessment Years 2015-2016 onwards was not expiring within the period for which Section 3(1) of Relaxation Act was applicable and, hence, Relaxation Act could never apply for these assessment years. As a consequence, there can be no question of extending the period of limitation for such assessment years. These findings of the Bombay High Court have not been disturbed by the Apex Court in Ashish Agarwal (Supra). The Apex Court only modified the orders passed by the respective High Courts to the effect that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act which were subject matter of writ petitions before various High Courts shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A(b) of the Act and the Assessing Officer was directed to provide within 30 days to the respective assessee the information and material relied upon by the Revenue so that the assessee could reply to the show cause notices within two weeks thereafter. The Apex Court held that the Assessing Officer shall thereafter pass orders in terms of Section 148A(d) in respect of each of the concerned assessees. Thereafter, after following the procedure as required under Section 148A may issue notice under Section 148 (as substituted). The Apex Court also expressly kept open all contentions which may be available to the assessee including those available under Section 149 of the Act and all rights and contentions which may be available to the concerned assessee and revenue under the Finance Act 2021 and in law, shall be continued to be available. Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
36/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc 31 Notwithstanding this, the CBDT has issued instruction No.1 of 2022 contary to what the courts have held. Even by the finding of the Apex Court in Ashish Agarwal (Supra), only the original notice issued under Section 148 of the Act was converted into a notice deemed to have been issued under Section 148A(b) of the Act. The Apex Court held that the Assessing Officer shall thereafter pass orders in terms of Section 148A(b) in respect of each of the assessee and after following the procedure as required under Section 148 of the Act. Even judgment in Ashish Agarwal (supra) does not anywhere indicate the notices that could be issued for eternity like in this case, on 31st July 2022, would be sanctioned by the authority other than sanctioning authority defined under the Act. 32 We have to also note that the instructions dated 11th May 2022, on which respondents have relied upon, has no applicability to the facts of this case. These instructions expressly provides that it applies only to the issue of reassessment notice issued by the Assessing Officer during the period beginning 1st April 2020 and ending with 30th June 2021 within the time extended under TOLA and various notifications issued thereunder. Since the impugned notice in this case is dated 31st July 2022, certainly the instructions no.1 of 2022 dated 11th May 2022 shall have no applicability at all. Even for a moment, if we accept Mr. Suresh Kumar’s arguments that Apex Court’s findings in Ashish Agarwal (Supra) read with time extension provided by TOLA will allow extended reassessment notices to travel back to their original date when such notices were issued and then new Section 149 Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
37/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc of the Act is to be applied at that time, the extended reassessment notices are defined under the instructions to be notice issued between 1st April 2021 and ending with 30th June 2021. Therefore, the instructions would not help respondents’ case at all. 33 As held by this court in J. M. Financials (Supra), Sidhmicro Equities (P) Ltd. (Supra) and confirmed by the Apex Court that any notice issued without the sanction of the correct sanctioning authority will be invalid. This court in Godrej Industries Limited v. DCIT16 has held that an assessment can be reopened under section 147 and 148 of the Act only on the jurisdictional preconditions being satisfied strictly. This Court held that sanction of a superior officer to the reasons recorded in terms of section 151 should be obtained before issuing the notice under section 148 of the Act and all jurisdictional requirements are required to be satisfied cumulatively and even if one of the numerous jurisdictional requirements necessary for issuing the notice under section 148 of the Act are not satisfied, the reopening of an assessment would fail. Hence, in the present facts also since the approval of the specified authority in terms of section 151(ii) of the Act is a jurisdictional requirement and in the absence of complying with this requirement, the reopening of assessment would fail. The Calcutta High Court in K K Agarwal and Sons HUF v. ITO17 while dealing with the reopening of the assessment for AY 2016-17 held that the approval granted by the PCIT is not in accordance with section 151(ii) of 16. (2015) 377 ITR 1 (Bom)
(WPA No. 25770 of 2022) Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
38/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc the Act and such approval is not sustainable in law. Hence, the Court held that the show cause notice under section 148A(b) and all subsequent proceedings were not sustainable in law and were quashed. CHANGE OF OPINION :- 34 On the facts of this case, as regards change of opinion, the information made available is the same reason to believe. If one considers it clearly, it indicates change of opinion. Paragraphs 2 to 6 of the information read as under:
“2. Brief details of information collected/ received by AO: On perusal of the records it is noticed that the assessee company has debited an amount of Rs.6,41,87,931/- on account of Software consumables as other expenses to the Profit and Loss account.
Analysis of information collected/received: As per the information gathered from case record, the assessee company has debited an amount of Rs.6,41,87,931/- on account of Software consumables. As the said expenses is a capital expenditure. This attract depreciation at the rate of 60%. Remaining 40% of software consumable, which comes at Rs.2,56,75,172/- should have been disallowed and added back to the business income of the assessee. This has resulted in underassessment of income of Rs.2,56,75,172/-.
Enquiry made by the AO: The assessment records of assessee for year under consideration has been analysed and as per the information gathered from case record the assessee company has debited an amount of Rs.35,90,19,339/- as other expenses. On perusal of details of other expenses, it is noticed that the assessee has claimed the software consumable of Rs.6,41,87,931/-on account of Software consumable. Expenses on acquiring software consumable is a capital expenditure. Section 37(1) provide for deduction for any expenditure (not being expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee), laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession under the head "Profit and gain of business or profession". Hence capital expenditure incurred for acquisition of an intangible asset should have been disallowed and added back the total income after allowing depreciation at the applicable rate of 60%, which resulted into underassessment of income of Rs.2,56,75,172/-.
Finding of the AO: In this case, an amount of Rs.6,41,87,931/- had been debited in P&L A/c. on account of Software consumable. As expenses on acquiring computer software consumable is a capital Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
39/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc expenditure, the same is not allowable as per the provision of section 37 of Income Tax Act, 1961. Hence capital expenditure incurred for acquisition of an intangible asset should have been disallowed and added back the total income after allowing depreciation at the applicable rate of 60%, which resulted into underassessment of income of Rs. 2,56,75,172/-.
Basis of forming reason to believe and details of escapement of income: In view of the finding of AO (as mentioned in para 5 above), I have a reason to believe that the Income chargeable to tax of Rs. 2,56,75,172/-, has escaped assessment under the meaning of section 147 of the Income tax Act, 1961. The AO has carefully applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The information in possession of the AO gives a substantial basis for the formation of a reason to believe to initiate re-assessment u/s. 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.” 35 During the course of assessment proceedings, notice had been issued to petitioner. In reply to the notice under Section 143(2), petitioner had by its letter dated 6th December 2018 recorded, “……… based upon our
discussion during the course of the hearing ……………...”. The transaction wise summary of the software consumable was made available. This was considered during the assessment proceedings and the assessment order accepting revised return came to be passed. 36 We would agree with the submissions of Mr. Pardiwalla that if change of opinion concept is given a go by, that would result in giving arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessments. It would in effect be giving power to review which he does not possess. The Assessing Officer has only power to reassess not to review. If the concept of change of opinion is removed as contended on behalf of the Revenue, then in the garb of re- opening the assessment, review would take place. The concept of change of opinion is an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
40/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc As held in Dr. Mathew Cherian (Supra), whether under old or new regime of reassessment, it is settled position that the issues decided categorically should not be revisited in the guise of reassessment. That would include issues where query have been raised during the assessment and query have been answered and accepted by the Assessing Officer while passing the assessment order. As held in Aroni Commercials (supra) even if assessment order has not specifically dealt with that issue, once the query is raised it is deemed to have been considered and the explanation accepted by the Assessing officer. It is not necessary that an assessment order should contain reference and/or discussion to disclose his satisfaction in respect of the query raised. The Division Bench of this court in Aroni Commercials Ltd. (supra) held it is not necessary that the assessment order should contain reference and/or discussion to disclose its satisfaction in respect of the query raised. Paragraph 14 of Aroni Commercials Ltd. (supra) read as under:
“14. We are of the view that once a query is raised during the assessment proceedings and the assessee has replied to it, it follows that the query raised was a subject of consideration of the Assessing Officer while completing the assessment. It is not necessary that an assessment order should contain reference and/or discussion to disclose its satisfaction in respect of the query raised. If an Assessing Officer has to record the consideration bestowed by him on all issues raised by him during the assessment proceeding even where he is satisfied then it would be impossible for the Assessing Officer to complete all the assessments which are required to be scrutinized by him under Section 143(3) of the Act. Moreover, one must not forget that the manner in which an assessment order is to be drafted is the sole domain of the Assessing Officer and it is not open to an assessee to insist that the assessment order must record all the questions raised and the satisfaction in respect thereof of the Assessing Officer. The only requirement is that the Assessing Officer ought to have considered the objection now raised in the grounds for issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act, during the original assessment Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
41/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc proceedings. There can be no doubt in the present facts as evidenced by a letter dated 8 September 2012 the very issue of taxability of sale of shares under the head capital gain or the head profits and gains from business was a subject matter of consideration by the Assessing Officer during the original assessment proceedings leading to an order dated 12 October 2010. It would therefore, follow that the reopening of the assessment by impugned notice dated 28 March 2013 is merely on the basis of change of opinion of the Assessing Officer from that held earlier during the course of assessment proceeding leading to the order dated 12 October 2010. This change of opinion does not constitute justification and/or reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.” 37 The Assessing Officer does not have any power to review his own assessment when during the original assessment petitioner provided all the relevant information which was considered by him before passing the assessment order under section 143(3) of the Act dated 23rd December 2018. Petitioner had debited an amount of Rs.6,41,87,931/- on account of software consumables in the profit and loss account and a detailed break-up of the said expenses were submitted before the Assessing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings vide a letter dated 6th December 2018. It is settled law that proceedings under section 148 cannot be initiated to review the earlier stand adopted by the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer cannot initiate reassessment proceedings to have a relook at the documents that were filed and considered by him in the original assessment proceedings as the power to reassess cannot be exercised to review an assessment. In petitioner’s case the Assessing Officer having allowed the amount of software consumables as a revenue expenditure now seeks to treat the same as capital expenditure which is a clear change of opinion. Various judicial precedents have held that reassessment proceedings Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
42/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc initiated on the basis of a mere change of opinion are invalid and without jurisdiction. 38 The Apex Court in Kelvinator of India Ltd.(Supra) emphasised on the difference between a power to review and the power to reassess. The Apex Court held that the Assessing Officer has no power to review but has only the power to reassess. The concept of ‘change of opinion’ must be treated as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. The relevant extract of the judgement is reproduced as under:- “…….However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words "reason to believe" failing which, we are afraid, section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to re-open assessments on the basis of "mere change of opinion", which cannot beper sereason to reopen. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to re-assess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to reassess. But reassessment has to be based on fulfilment of certain pre-condition and if the concept of "change of opinion" is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of re- opening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of "change of opinion" as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1-4-1989 , Assessing Officer has power to reopen, provided there is "tangible material" to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 , Parliament not only deleted the words "reason to believe" but also inserted the word "opinion" in section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the Companies against omission of the words "reason to believe", Parliament re-introduced the said expression and deleted the word "opinion" on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer………….” 39 The Delhi High Court in Seema Gupta v. ITO18 held that the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 of the Act should be set aside when the reassessment was initiated on a change of opinion where the 18. (2022) 288 Taxman 519 (Del) Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
43/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc law fails to catch him on account of the legislature’s failure to express itself clearly. (c) It is axiomatic that taxation statute has to be interpreted strictly because the State cannot at their whims and fancies burden the citizens without authority of law. (d) In the matter of interpretation of charging section of a taxation statute, strict Rule of interpretation is mandatory and if there are two views possible in the matter of interpretation of a charging section, the one favourable to the assessee need to be applied. Paragraph 31(i) of Sudesh Taneja (supra) reads as under:
“31. We may now attempt to answer these questions ourselves with the aid of statutory provisions and law laid down in various decisions cited before us we may summarise certain principles applicable in the field of taxation and which principles would be invoked in the course of the judgment:- (i) A taxing statute must be interpreted strictly. Equity has no place in 19. 442 ITR 289 Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
44/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc statute has to be interpreted in light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statute so as to supply any deficiency. Before taxing any person it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of charging section by clear words used in the section and if the words are ambiguous and open to two interpretations, the benefit of interpretation is given to the subject. There is nothing unjust in the tax payer escaping if the letter of the law fails to catch him on account of the legislature's failure to express itself clearly. normally imposed, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "
We may, here itself notice that the distinction in interpreting a taxing provision (charging provision) and in the matter of interpretation of exemption (98 of 113) [CW-969/2022] notification is too obvious to require any elaboration. Nonetheless, in a nutshell, we may mention that, as observed in Surendra Cotton Oil Mills Case, in the matter of interpretation of charging Section of a taxation statute, strict Rule of interpretation is mandatory and if there are two views possible in the matter of interpretation of a charging section, the one favourable to the Assessee need to be applied. There is, however, confusion in the matter of interpretation of exemption notification published under taxation statutes and in this area also, the decisions are galore.
In construing penal statutes and taxation statutes, the Court has to apply strict Rule of interpretation. The penal statute which tends to deprive a person of right to life and liberty has to be given strict interpretation or else many innocent might become victims of discretionary decision making. Insofar as taxation statutes are concerned, Article 265 of the Constitution prohibits the State from extracting tax from the citizens without authority of law. It is axiomatic that taxation statute has to be interpreted strictly because the State cannot at their whims and fancies burden the citizens without authority of law. In other words, when the competent Legislature mandates taxing certain persons/certain objects in certain circumstances, it cannot be expanded/interpreted to include those, which were not intended by the legislature." 41 In the circumstances, we make the Rule absolute and allow the Meera Jadhav Uploaded on - 07/09/2023 Downloaded on - 27/10/2026 22:43:58
45/45 902-wp-4888-22.doc petition for the following reasons: (a) that approval for issuance of notice under Section 148A(d) of the Act has not been properly obtained and hence the order passed thereunder and consequent notice issued under Section 148 of the Act have to be quashed and set aside. The sanction ought to have been granted under Section 151(ii) and not under Section 151(i) of the Act. (b) The notice to reopen has also been issued on the basis of change of opinion which is not permissible. 42 Since we have disposed the petition on these grounds, we have not considered the other grounds which can be considered in some other matter at the appropriate stage. 43 No order as to costs.
(Dr. N. K. GOKHALE, J.) (K.R. SHRIRAM, J.)
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More judgments on Section 142(1)
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- Hemal Paresh Madeka, Rajkot vs Asst.Commissioner of Income Tax…ITA 955/RJT/2026[2020-21]Status: Disposed19 Oct 2026AY 2020-21
- Venish Vinodray Lalani, Rajkot vs Income Tax Officer, MorbiITA 197/RJT/2026[2019-20]Status: Disposed19 Oct 2026AY 2019-20
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