UMANG HIRALAL THAKKAR vs. INCOME TAX SETTLEMENT COMMISSION
What did the High Court hold?
The High Court held that the Settlement Commission's order rejecting the settlement application under Section 245D(2C) was not beyond its scope and was in consonance with the scheme of Section 245D. The Court reasoned that if the Settlement Commission could not reject an application at the Section 245D(2C) stage after passing an order under Section 245D(1), then the provisions of Section 245D(2B) and (2C) would become nugatory. The Court found no procedural lapse or violation of principles of natural justice. It emphasized that the Settlement Commission had considered the report from the Principal Commissioner and given cogent reasons for its finding that there was no true and full disclosure by the applicant, which is a fundamental requirement of Section 245C. The Court also distinguished the cited precedents, noting they involved situations where applications were not declared invalid at earlier stages. The Court found no reason to interfere with the impugned order in its writ jurisdiction.
What were the facts?
The petitioners, Umang Hiralal Thakkar and Dharmadev Infrastructure Limited, filed settlement applications under Section 245C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for assessment years 2008-09 to 2015-16, following a search under Section 132 on October 15, 2013. Umang Thakkar declared additional income of Rs. 9,24,16,911, and Dharmadev Infrastructure Limited declared Rs. 22,37,92,628. The Settlement Commission initially passed an order under Section 245D(1) allowing the applications to proceed. However, after receiving a report from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax objecting to the applications due to lack of true and full disclosure, and after hearing the applicants, the Settlement Commission rejected the settlement applications under Section 245D(2C) on May 27, 2016, deeming them invalid. Rectification applications were subsequently rejected. The petitioners challenged the rejection orders before the High Court.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the Settlement Commission's order rejecting the settlement application under Section 245D(2C) was beyond the scope and ambit of that provision? The petitioners argued that at the stage of Section 245D(2C), only the validity of the application should be considered, not the correctness of the claim or disclosure, which can only be examined at the stage of Section 245D(3) and (4). They contended that since the Settlement Commission had already passed an order under Section 245D(1) allowing the applications to proceed, it could not subsequently reject them at the Section 245D(2C) stage. The revenue contended that the Settlement Commission's order under Section 245D(2C) declaring the application invalid was in consonance with the scheme of Section 245D, as the provisions of Section 245D(2B) and (2C) would otherwise become otiose. They argued that the Settlement Commission correctly considered the report from the Principal Commissioner and the applicants' response, and that the rejection was justified based on the lack of true and full disclosure.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 245C,Section 245D(1),Section 245D(2B),Section 245D(2C),Section 245D(3),Section 245D(4),Section 132,Section 154
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
CAV JUDGMENT (PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.R. SHAH)
As common question of law and facts arise in both these petitions and as such they arise out of the impugned common order passed by the learned Settlement Commission, both these petitions are decided and disposed of together by this common judgment and order.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the learned Settlement Commission dated 27.05.2016 rejecting the settlement application submitted by the respective petitioners original applicants invalid under Section 245D(2C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the petitioners original applicants have preferred present Special Civil Applications.
That for the sake of convenience, facts in Special Civil Application No.4321 of 2017 in the case of the original applicant Umang Thakkar are narrated, as facts in both the cases are common.
The facts leading to the present Special Civil Applications in nutshell are as under:
That the petitioner is Director of Dharmadev Infrastructure Limited petitioner of Special Civil Application No.4322 of 2017 engaged in the business of the Construction and Land Development. That on 15.10.2013, a search under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") was carried out at the residential premises of the petitioner herein original applicant as well as group concerns of "Dharmadev Group". Therefore, on 22.02.2016, the petitioner herein filed an application under Section 245 C of the Act for AY 200809 to AY 201516. That in the case of Umang Hiralal Thakkar, he declared Rs.9,24,16,911/ as additional income and in the case of applicant himself Dharmadev Infrastructure Limited declared Rs.22,37,92,628/as additional income. That the said applications were submitted under Section 245 C(1) of the Act.
That thereafter, the Settlement Commission passed an order under Section 245 D(1) on 11.4.2016 allowing the application to be proceeded with further. That the report under Section 245D(2B) were received on 13.05.2016. That the Settlement Commission fixed the hearing under Section 245D(2C)on 25.5.2016. At this juncture, it is required to be noted that as such prior thereto, Settlement Commission rejected the petitioner's application under Section 245D(1). That thereafter, on 28.03.2016 the petitioner again filed an application under Section 245 C of the Act and made revised disclosure total amounting to Rs. Rs.9,24,16,911/ in case of applicant Umang Thakkar and Rs.22,37,92,628/ in the case of applicant himself Dharmadev Infrastructure Limited. As observed herein above, thereafter the Settlement Commission passed an order under Section 245 D(1) allowing the application to be proceeded with the further. That on receipt of the report from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 245D(2B) of the Act, the same was furnished to original applicant. The learned Principal CIT objected to the said application and it was stated that there is no true and full disclosure on the part of the applicant. It was stated that there is no explanation regarding seized / impounded papers, source of found and seized jewellery and for source of cash deposits in Benami accounts. It was also submitted that even the application for AY 201516 may not be entertained since no proceedings were pending in both the cases. That the respective applicants replied to the objection raised by the Principal CIT during the course of the hearing. That thereafter, by impugned common order the learned Settlement Commission has rejected the settlement application vide order dated 27.5.2016 on the ground that there was no true and full disclosure on the part of the petitioner. That thereafter, the respective applicants petitioners preferred rectification application under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act against the order dated 27.5.2016. However the said application came to be rejected vide order dated 24.08.2016 on the ground that there is no error apparent on the record. Hence, the respective petitioners original applicants are before this Court challenging impugned common order passed by the Settlement Commission rejecting the settlement application preferred by the respective applicants declaring the same as invalid under Section 245D(2C) of the Income Tax Act.
Shri S.N.Soparkar, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the petitioner and Shri M.R. Bhatt, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the Revenue.
Shri Soparkar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respective petitioners has vehemently submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Settlement Commission is beyond the scope and ambit of Section 245D(2C) of the Act. 6. 1. It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that at the stage of Section 245D(2C) the validity of the application only is required to be considered and nothing further than that.
It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that correctness of the claim / disclosure can be considered at the stage of Section 245D (3) and (4) of the Act.
It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that as such in the present case in the second application submitted on 28.3.2016, the petitioner made higher disclosure of Rs.9.25 crores.
It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that while passing the order under Section 245D(1) of the Act, the Settlement Commission in fact did consider the correctness of the claim and / or issue whether there is true and full disclosure or not. It is submitted that only thereafter having observed and held that true and full disclosure has been made by the applicant thereafter the settlement applications were permitted / allowed to proceed with further. It is submitted that therefore, thereafter the learned Settlement Commission could not have and / or ought not to have rejected the application at the stage of the Section 245D(2C) and therefore, the same is wholly without jurisdiction and beyond the scope of Section 245D(2C).
It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that the correctness of the disclosure and / or whether there is true and full disclosure or not is required to be considered at the stage of Section 245D(4). It is submitted that therefore, if the application is permitted to be proceeded further, no prejudice shall be caused. It is submitted that on the other hand the applicant will not be permitted to proceed further it shall cause prejudice to the petitioner. It is submitted that therefore, Settlement Commission ought to have permitted / allowed the CIT reported in (2010) 326 ITR 642, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is mandatory for the Settlement Commission to record its findings with regard to the issues of full and true disclosure of particulars undisclosed income and the manner in which suhc income was derived by the assessee.
It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that even in a case where the assessee has any doubt with respect to true and full disclosure, the Settlement Commission would have called for the further report under Section 245D(4) of the Act subject to compliance of technical requirements under Section 245D(1) and 245D(2C).
It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that even the impugned order is not sustainable as the same is based on the basis of change of opinion without there being any new material on record.
It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that even while observed that there is no true and full disclosure, the learned Settlement Commission has considered wrong facts. It is submitted that view taken by the Settlement Commission is wrong and even the reasons recorded are also wrong. It is submitted that though it was pointed out in the rectification application, the same has been rejected.
It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that as such no objection was raised by the Commissioner on 12.5% cash of Rs.42.67 crores. It is further submitted that so far as observations made by the Settlement Commission that the income offered at 6% is very low is concerned, Victory Ceratech Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India & Ors reported in 2013 SCC Online Guj 6981. (4). learned counsel for the respondent Revenue. 7. 1. It is vehemently submitted by Shri Bhatt, learned counsel for the Revenue that impugned order passed by the learned Settlement Commission is absolutely in consonance with the provisions of Section 245D(2C) of the Act, which is not required to be interfered with in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
It is further submitted by Shri Bhatt, learned counsel for the Revenue that while passing the impugned order under Section 245D(2C), the learned Settlement Commission has considered the report submitted by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 245D(2B) of the Act as well as relevant documents and evidence so as to come to a conclusion that there is no full and true disclosure by the petitioners. 7.3. t is further submitted by Shri Bhatt, learned counsel for the Revenue that merely because earlier learned Settlement Commission passed an order under Section 245D(1) of the Act admitting the settlement application, it cannot be said that the learned Settlement Commission considered the correctness of the claim and / or issue whether there is true and full disclosure or not. It is submitted that at the stage of Section 245D(1) of the Act, the learned Tribunal is required to consider whether the Settlement application is required to be admitted or not. It is submitted that only thereafter stage of inquiry under Section 245D(2C) will come and / or issue whether there is true and full disclosure or not is required to be considered and thereafter the stage under Section 245D(4) will come. In support of his above submission, Shri Bhatt, learned counsel for the Revenue has relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise vs. True Woods P. Ltd and Ors rendered in W.P(C) 21055 of 2005: 2005(85) DRJ 575 (DB). He has also relied upon the decision of the of principles of natural justice and / or any procedural lapse. It is submitted that therefore, considering the very limited scope of the judicial review against the order passed by the Settlement Commission, the impugned order passed by the learned Settlement Commission is not required to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7.5. t is further submitted by Shri Bhatt, learned counsel for the Revenue that in the present case the Settlement Commission has specifically come to the conclusion and has given finding that there is no true and correct disclosure, considering the report filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 245D(2B) of the Act as well as considering the transaction with Jalaram Finvest Ltd and that the petitioner has offered only 6% p.a on the daily cash balance available in the cash flow of the 41 bank accounts which is very low compared to the prevailing interest rates in FY 200708 to 201415. 7. 6. So far as submission on behalf of the petitioner that Settlement Commission ought to have held that further inquiry and ought to have called for report under Section 245D(3) is concerned, it is submitted that the same is contrary to the scheme of the Settlement cases under Chapter XIX A of the Act. It is submitted that report under Section 245D(3)can be called for by the Settlement Commission only when either an application has not been declared invalid under subSection (2C) or an application referred to subSection (2D) which has been allowed to be further decision but with the decisionmaking process. 9.2. under: "Be that as it may, the fact remains that it is open to the Commission to accept an amount of tax by way of settlement and to prescribe the manner in which the said amount shall be paid. It may condone the defaults and lapses on the part of the assessee and may waive interest, penalties or prosecution, where it thinks appropriate. Indeed, it would be difficult to predicate the reasons and considerations which induce the commission to make a particular order, unless of course the commission itself chooses to, give reasons for its order. Even if it gives reasons in a given case, the scope of enquiry in the appeal remains the same as indicated above viz., whether it is,contrary 956 to any of the provisions of the Act. In this context, it is relevant to note that the principle of natural justice (and alteram partem) has been incorporated in Section 245D itself. The sole overall limitation upon tire Commission thus appears, to be that it should act in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The scope of enquiry, whether by High Court under Article 226 or by this Court under Article 136 is also the same whether the order of the Commission is contrary to any of the provisions of the Act and if so, has it prejudiced the petitioner/appellant apart from ground of bias, fraud & malice which, of course, constitute a separate and independent category. Reference in this behalf may be had to the decision of this Court in Sri Ram Durga Prasad v. Settlement Commission 176 I.T.R. 169, which too was an appeal against the orders of the Settlement Commission. Sabyasachi Mukharji J., speaking for the Bench comprising himself and S.R. Pandian, J. observed that in such a case this Court is " concerned with the legality of procedure followed and not with the validity of the order.' The learned Judge added 'judicial review is concerned not with the decision but with the decisionmaking process." Reliance was placed upon the decision of the House of Lords in Chief Constable of the N.W. Police v. Evans, [1982] 1 W.L.R.1155. Thus, the appellate power under Article 136 was equated to power of judicial review, where the appeal is directed against the orders' of the Settlement Commission. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the only ground upon which this Court can interfere in these appeals is that order of the Commission is contrary to the provisions of the Act and that such contravention has prejudiced the appellant The main controversy in these appeals relates to the interpretation of the settlement deeds though it is true, some contentions of law are also raised. The commission has interpreted the trust deeds in a particular manner, Even if the interpretation placed by the commission the said deeds is not correct, it would not be a ground for interference in these appeals, since a wrong interpretation of a deed of trust cannot be said to be a violation of the provisions of the Income Tax Act. it is equally clear that the interpretation placed upon the said deeds by the Commission does not bind the authorities under the Act in proceedings relating to other assessment years".
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.A. Abraham v. Assistant CIT reported in (2002) 255 ITR 540(2000) has held that Court's power of judicial review on the decision of the Settlement Commission was very restricted. It is observed that while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is not expected to go into facts.
Applying law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision as well as decision of this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the limited scope of judicial review, the impugned order passed by the learned Settlement Commission is required to be considered.
It is the case on behalf of the petitioner that once while passing order under Section 245D(1) of the Act, the applications of the petitioners were allowed to be proceeded with further, thereafter, it would not be open for the Settlement Commission to declare the application invalid under Section 245D (2C) of the Act on the ground that there is not true and full disclosure. It is also the case on behalf of the petitioners that while passing the order under Section 245D)(1) of the Act and allowing the application to be proceeded with further the learned Settlement Commission considered all the material on record and come to the conclusion that there is true and full disclosure and therefore, the impugned order under Section 245D(2C) of the Act declaring the applications invalid on the ground that there is no true and full disclosure, is change of opinion and is not permissible. The aforesaid has no substance. At the outset, it is required to be noted that scope of inquiry at the stage of 245D(1) and inquiry at the stage of 245D(2C) are different and distinct. At this stage, decision of the Division Bench in the case of Vishnubhai Mafatlal Patel (supra) is required to be referred to and considered. In the aforesaid decision, the Division Bench of this Court has considered the scheme of the proceedings before the learned Settlement Commission. In para 6, the Division Bench has considered all relevant provisions of the Act and thereafter the Division Bench has considered the various stages provided under Section 245. In para 6 to 13, the Division Bench has observed and held as under:
"
Having thus heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents on record, we may at the outset take note of statutory provisions applicable. Chapter XIXA which was introduced in the Act in the year 1976, pertains to settlement of cases. Settlement Commission is constituted under Section 245B of the Act. Section 245BA lays down the jurisdiction and powers of Settlement Commission. Section 245C pertains to application for settlement of cases. Subsection(1) thereof permits an assessee, at any stage of a case relating to him, make an application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, and containing a full and true disclosure of his income which has not been disclosed before the Assessing Officer, the manner in which such income has been derived, the additional amount of income tax payable on such income and such other particulars as may be prescribed, to the Settlement Commission to have his case settled. It is further provided that application shall be disposed of in the manner hereinafter provided. Section 245D of the Act pertains to procedure on receipt of an application under section 245C. Relevant portion of section 245D reads as under : 245D. (1) On receipt of an application under section 245C, the Settlement Commission shall, within seven days from the date of receipt of the application, issue a notice to the applicant requiring him to explain as to why the application made by him be allowed to be proceeded with and on hearing the applicant, the Settlement Commission shall, within a period of fourteen days from the date of the application, by an order in writing, reject the application or allow the application to be proceeded with : Provided that where no order has been passed, within the aforesaid period by the Settlement Commission, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded with. (2B) The Settlement Commission shall, (i)in respect of an application which is allowed to be proceeded with under subsection (1), within 30 days from the date on which the application was under; or (ii) in respect of an application referred to in subsection (2A) which is deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded with under that sub section, on or before the 7th day of August, 2007, call for a report from the Commissioner, and the Commissioner shall furnish the report within a period of thirty days of the receipt of communication
from the Settlement Commission. (2C) Where a report of the commissioner called for under subsection (2B) has been furnished within the period specified there in, the Settlement Commission may, on the basis of the report and within the period of fifteen days of the receipt of the report, by an order in writing, declare the application in question as invalid, and shall send the copy of such order to applicant and commissioner : Provided that an application shall not be declared invalid unless an opportunity has been given to the applicant of being heard: Provided further that where the commissioner has not furnished the report within the aforesaid period, the Settlement Commission shall proceed further in the matter without the report of the Commissioner. 3.The Settlement Commission, in respect of- (i) an application which has not been declared invalid under subsection (2C) ; or (ii) an application referred to in subsection (2D) which has been allowed to be further proceeded with under that subsection, may call for the records from the Commissioner and after examination of such records, if the settlement commission is of the opinion that any further enquiry or investigation in the matter is necessary, it may direct the Commissioner to make or cause to be made such further enquiry or investigation and furnish a report on the matters covered by the application and any other matter relating to the case, and the commissioner shall furnish the report within a period of ninety days on the receipt of communication
from the Settlement Commission : Provided that where the commissioner does not furnish the report within the aforesaid period, the Settlement Commission may proceed to pas an order under subsection (4) without such report.
After examination of the records and the report of the Commissioner, if any, received under (i) subsection (2B) or subsection (3), or (ii) the provision of subsection (1) as they stood immediately before their amendment by the Finance Act, 2007, and after giving an opportunity to the applicant and to the commissioner to be heard, either in person or through a representative duly authorized in this behalf, and after examining such further evidence as may be placed before it or obtained by it, the Settlement Commission may, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, pass such order as it thinks fit on the matters covered by the application and any other matter relating to the case not covered by the application, but referred to in the report of the commissioner.
From the perusal of the statutory provisions noted above, it can be gathered that an assessee may at any stage of the case relating to him, make an application for settlement to the Commission under subsection(1) of section 245C. Such application has to be made in a prescribed manner and is required to contain a full and true disclosure of the income of the assessee which had not been disclosed before the Assessing Officer and the manner in which such income had been derived besides such other particulars as may be prescribed. When such application is filed, it is to be treated in the manner provided in section 245D. Subsection(1) of section 245D provides that, on receipt of an application, the Settlement Commission shall, within seven days of receipt, issue a notice to the applicant requiring him to explain why such an application made by him be allowed to be proceeded with. On hearing the applicant, the Settlement Commission shall, within fourteen days from the date of the application, by an order in writing either reject the application or allow the application to be proceeded with. Proviso to subsection(1) of section 245D provides that where no order has been passed by the Settlement Commission as aforesaid, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded with.
Under subsection(1) of section 245D thus, the first stage of scrutinising the application of settlement made by an assessee is envisaged. The statute does not provide for grounds on which Settlement Commission may reject such an application or allow the application to be proceeded with. There are however, sufficient indications in the statute itself what would be the purpose and nature of scrutiny of Commission at that stage. As already noted, subsection(1) of section 245C an assessee may make an application for settlement in the prescribed manner containing true and full disclosure of income not previously disclosed before the Assessing Officer and the manner in which such income had been derived as also the additional amount of incometax payable on such income and such other particulars as may be prescribed. At the stage of subsection(1) of section 245D of the Act, therefore, prime scrutiny of the Commission would be whether application of the assessee is in order and in conformity with the requirements of subsection(1) of section 245C which would include filing of an application in the prescribed manner and also making necessary disclosures as required therein. There are also additional requirements of subsection(1) of section 245C such as payment of requisite tax and interest thereon which would have been payable under the provisions of the Act, had the income disclosed in the application been declared by the assessee in the return of income before the Assessing Officer. It would thus be well within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission to examine whether the application for settlement fulfills such requirements or not. Such scrutiny ofcourse would be summary in nature. We may recall that the Settlement Commission upon receipt of such an application within seven days thereof, has to issue notice to the assessee and pass a final order either rejecting the application or allowing the application to be proceeded within fourteen days of the date of application. Proviso to subsection(1) of section 245D makes it further clear that when no such order is passed rejecting the application within the period prescribed, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded with.
Two things therefore, emerge. Firstly, that at the stage of section 245D(1) of the Act, the Commission would have ample powers to examine whether an application of an assessee made under section 245C(1) of the Act fulfills the legal requirements particularly, those provided in section 245C(1) of the Act. Secondly, that such inquiry however, shall have to be summary in nature. The later provisions of sections 245D would also demonstrate that any decision of the Commission to allow the application to be proceeded with would only be prima facie in nature. We would elaborate this aspect a little later. At this stage, therefore, we find that under section 245D(1) of the Act, if the Commission on a summary inquiry comes to the
conclusion that an application filed by the assessee under section 245C(1) of the Act does not fulfill the legal requirements, it would be within the jurisdiction of the Commission to reject the same. However, if it is allowed to be proceeded with, such decision would be tentative in nature. 10.Section 245D(2B) provides that the Settlement Commission in respect of an application, which is allowed to be proceeded with under subsection(1), within thirty days from the date on which the application was made, call for a report from the Commissioner, and the Commissioner shall furnish the report within a period of thirty days of the receipt of communication from the Settlement Commission. Sub section(2C) further provides that where a report of the Commissioner under subsection (2B) has been furnished within the the prescribed period, the Settlement Commission may on the basis of the report within fifteen days of the receipt of the report by an order in writing, declare the application as invalid. Proviso to subsection(2C) provides that no such declaration shall be made unless an opportunity is provided to the assessee of being heard. From such provisions, it thus emerges that an application which has been allowed to be proceeded or deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded under section 245D(1) of the Act, it is still open to scrutiny by the Commission at the stage of subsection(2B) and (2C) of section 245D, this time with the assistance of the report of the Commission if so made within the prescribed time. On the basis of materials contained in such report and after giving an opportunity to the applicant of being heard, if the Commission is so satisfied, can declare the application to be invalid. This is the second stage where the Commission can scrutinise the validity of application for settlement made by the assessee under section 245C(1) of the Act. Thus even if the Commission had previously passed an order under section 245D(1) of the Act, allowing the application to be proceeded with, it would still be open for the Commission if grounds are so available, to declare such an application invalid after obtaining report from the Commissioner and giving an opportunity of being heard to the applicant. 11.If however, no such order is passed declaring an application as invalid, the Commission would in terms of provisions of section 245D of the Act, proceed to decide the same on merits. Subsection(3) thereof envisages calling for the records from the Commissioner and examining such records and carrying out such inquiry or investigation as the Commission thinks it necessary. Subsection(4) empowers the Commission after giving an opportunity to the applicant and to the Commissioner to be heard, pass such order as it thinks fit on the matters covered by the application and any other matter relating to the case not covered by the application, but referred to in the report of the Commissioner. 12.The twin requirements for an assessee making an application for settlement under section 245C(1) of the Act, of containing full and true disclosure of income which has not been disclosed before the Assessing Officer and the manner in which such income has been derived, are thus of considerable importance and would be open for the Settlement Commission to examine the fulfillment thereof at several stages of the settlement proceedings. If therefore, while at the threshold, considering the question whether such application should be allowed to be proceeded with or be rejected, the Commission examined such questions on the basis of disclosure made by the applicants and the supporting material produced along with the applications, we do not see that the Commission committed any legal error. As already noted, it was well within the jurisdiction of the Commission at the stage of subsection(1) of section 245D of the Act to examine whether application for settlement fulfills the statutory requirements contained in subsection(1) of section 245C of the Act. At this stage we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Ajmera Housing Corporation and another(supra). It was a case in which the assessee had made certain disclosures in the initial application under section 245C(1) of the Act. Such disclosures were however, revised and additional income was disclosed in the revised annexures. The Apex Court held that the assessee had no right to revise an application under section 245C(1) of the Act and further that such revised annexure making further disclosure of undisclosed income alone was sufficient to establish that the initial application made by the assessee could not be entertained as it did not contain true and full disclosure of the undisclosed income and the manner in which such income had been derived. 13.It is true that the order that the Settlement Commission has to pass under section 245D(1) of the Act comes with a rigid time frame. The scrutiny or the inquiry at that stage, therefore, necessarily shall have to be summary in nature. This however, does not take away the powers of the Settlement Commission to reject the application for settlement which in its opinion does not satisfy the legal requirements and more particularly, those contained in subsection(1) of section 245C of the Act."
We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench.
Even otherwise, considering the order passed by the learned Settlement Commission passed under Section 245D(1) allowing the applications to be proceeded with further it can be seen that the learned Settlement Commission has specifically observed that "as regards the issue of true and full disclosure of income, we are of the opinion that, at present there is no material in our possession which warrants the conclusion that true and full disclosure of income have not been made by the applicants." As observed herein above, while considering the application at the stage of 245D(1), Settlement Commission is required to hold a limited inquiry whether applications fulfilled statutory requirement or not and at that stage inquiry would be summary in nature. That thereafter, once the order is passed under Section 245D(1) of the Act thereafter the stage of Section 245D(2B) calling the report from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax shall come and after considering the report of the Commissioner and after giving an opportunity to the applicant, it will be open for the Settlement Commission to declare the application invalid. Therefore, if the submission on behalf of the petitioner is accepted that once the order is passed under Section 245D(1) of the Act thereafter it will not be open for the Settlement Commission to reject the application or declare the same as invalid is accepted, in that case, the provisions of Section 245D(2B) and (2C) would be otiose and / or become nugatory. Therefore, the impugned order passed under Section 245D(2C) declaring the application as invalid is absolutely in consonance with the scheme and provision of Section 245D of the Act.
Now, so far as submission on behalf of the petitioners that leaned Settlement Commission could have called for further explanation and / or could have held the inquiry while exercising the powers under Section 245D(3) is concerned, the same has also no substance. There is no question of further inquiry contemplated. Only in a case where the application is declared invalid under Section 245D(2C) only thereafter further proceedings are required to be taken place and inquiry is required to be conducted as provided under Section 243D(3) and thereafter final order under Section 245D(4) is required to be passed.
Now, so far as submission on behalf of the petitioner on merits is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that the impugned order is passed by the learned Settlement Commission after considering the report submitted by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax and thereafter after giving an opportunity to the petitioner. The cogent reasons have been given by the learned Settlement Commission and considering the material on record, a specific finding is given that there is no true and full disclosure by the applicant. The relevant discussion is para 9.1 to 9. 4. The statutory mandate of Section 245 of the Act is that the application shall "contain a full and true disclosure" of the final order under subSection(4) of Section 245D.
At this stage, it is required to be noted that during the pendency of the present petitions and on declaring the Settlement application invalid, thereafter the assessment proceedings have taken place and same have been finalized, against which, the assessee is before the CIT(A) by way of appeal.
In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and the very limited scope of judicial review of the order passed by the Settlement Commission recorded herein above and considering the impugned order passed by the learned Settlement Commission declaring the Settlement Application as invalid and for the reasons stated above challenge to the impugned order passed under Section 245D(2) fails and present petitions deserve to be dismissed and are
accordingly dismissed. Rule discharged. No costs.
In view of dismissal of Special Civil Application No. 4321 of 2017, Civil Application No.1 of 2017 stands dismissed. sd. (M.R. SHAH, J) sd/ (B.N. KARIA, J) KAUSHIK J. RATHOD
More judgments on Section 245C
- M/S. Accord Distillers & Brewers Private… vs PCIT, Central -2, ChennaiITA 2273/CHNY/2026[2016-17]Status: Disposed14 Oct 2026AY 2016-17
- Thanushkodi Narayanan, Chennai vs DCIT, Central Circle-3(2), ChennaiITA 2577/CHNY/2025[2018-19]Status: Disposed9 Mar 2026AY 2018-19
- Thanushkodi Narayanan, Chennai vs DCIT, Central Circle-3(2), ChennaiITA 2570/CHNY/2025[2011-12]Status: Disposed9 Mar 2026AY 2011-12
- Vijay Krishnaswami @ Krishnaswami… vs The Deputy Director of Income Tax…Crl.A. No.-003777-003779 - 202528 Aug 2025
- Parkash Sachdeva, New Delhi vs ACIT Central Circle 18, New DelhiITA 2889/DEL/2023[2018-19]Status: Disposed5 Aug 2025AY 2018-19
Recent GST High Court judgments
Search GST case law →- M/S. Saraswati Enterprises vs. State Of RajasthanRajasthan · 28 Oct 2026
- Akshaya Consortium vs. The Assistant Commissioner (St)Andhra Pradesh · 28 Oct 2026
- Dipanshu Aggarwal vs. Director General Of GST IntelligenceDelhi · 28 Oct 2026
- Dezinetree Projects PVT. LTD. vs. Spokes Digital Inc And AnrDelhi · 28 Oct 2026
- Jaydeep Jayantilal Hudaka vs. State Of GujaratGujarat · 28 Oct 2026