UMANG HIRALAL THAKKAR vs. INCOME TAX SETTLEMENT COMMISSION

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SCA/4321/2017HC GujaratGJHC24046365201720 July 2018Author: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH,HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.N. KARIA26 pages
AI SummaryDismissed

What did the High Court hold?

The High Court held that the Settlement Commission's order rejecting the settlement application under Section 245D(2C) was not beyond its scope and was in consonance with the scheme of Section 245D. The Court reasoned that if the Settlement Commission could not reject an application at the Section 245D(2C) stage after passing an order under Section 245D(1), then the provisions of Section 245D(2B) and (2C) would become nugatory. The Court found no procedural lapse or violation of principles of natural justice. It emphasized that the Settlement Commission had considered the report from the Principal Commissioner and given cogent reasons for its finding that there was no true and full disclosure by the applicant, which is a fundamental requirement of Section 245C. The Court also distinguished the cited precedents, noting they involved situations where applications were not declared invalid at earlier stages. The Court found no reason to interfere with the impugned order in its writ jurisdiction.

What were the facts?

The petitioners, Umang Hiralal Thakkar and Dharmadev Infrastructure Limited, filed settlement applications under Section 245C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for assessment years 2008-09 to 2015-16, following a search under Section 132 on October 15, 2013. Umang Thakkar declared additional income of Rs. 9,24,16,911, and Dharmadev Infrastructure Limited declared Rs. 22,37,92,628. The Settlement Commission initially passed an order under Section 245D(1) allowing the applications to proceed. However, after receiving a report from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax objecting to the applications due to lack of true and full disclosure, and after hearing the applicants, the Settlement Commission rejected the settlement applications under Section 245D(2C) on May 27, 2016, deeming them invalid. Rectification applications were subsequently rejected. The petitioners challenged the rejection orders before the High Court.

What were the issues?

1. Whether the Settlement Commission's order rejecting the settlement application under Section 245D(2C) was beyond the scope and ambit of that provision? The petitioners argued that at the stage of Section 245D(2C), only the validity of the application should be considered, not the correctness of the claim or disclosure, which can only be examined at the stage of Section 245D(3) and (4). They contended that since the Settlement Commission had already passed an order under Section 245D(1) allowing the applications to proceed, it could not subsequently reject them at the Section 245D(2C) stage. The revenue contended that the Settlement Commission's order under Section 245D(2C) declaring the application invalid was in consonance with the scheme of Section 245D, as the provisions of Section 245D(2B) and (2C) would otherwise become otiose. They argued that the Settlement Commission correctly considered the report from the Principal Commissioner and the applicants' response, and that the rejection was justified based on the lack of true and full disclosure.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 245C,Section 245D(1),Section 245D(2B),Section 245D(2C),Section 245D(3),Section 245D(4),Section 132,Section 154

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
C/SCA/4321/2017 CAV JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO.  4321 of 2017 With  CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1 of 2017 With  R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4322 of 2017   FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:    HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.R. SHAH and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE B.N. KARIA ========================================= 1      Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see  the judgment ? 2      To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3      Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the  judgment ? 4      Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as  to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any  order made thereunder ? ============================================= UMANG HIRALAL THAKKAR Versus INCOME TAX SETTLEMENT COMMISSION ============================================= Appearance: MR. S.N. SOPARKAR, SR. ADV WITH  MR  B S SOPARKAR(6851) for the  PETITIONER(s) No. 1 MR.  M.R.   BHATT,   SR.  ADV   WITH   MRS   MAUNA   M   BHATT(174)  for   the  RESPONDENT(s) No. 2 ============================================= CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.R. SHAH and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE B.N. KARIA  Date : 20/07/2018

CAV JUDGMENT (PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.R. SHAH)

1.0.

As common question of law and facts arise in both these petitions and as such they arise out of the impugned common order passed by the learned Settlement Commission, both these petitions are decided and disposed of together by this common judgment and order.

2.0.

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the learned Settlement Commission dated 27.05.2016 rejecting the settlement  application  submitted  by the  respective petitioners ­ original applicants invalid under Section 245D(2C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the petitioners ­ original applicants have preferred present Special Civil Applications.

3.0.

That   for   the   sake   of   convenience,   facts   in   Special   Civil Application No.4321 of 2017 in the case of the original applicant ­ Umang   Thakkar   are   narrated,   as   facts   in   both   the   cases   are common.

4.0.

The facts leading to the present Special Civil Applications in nutshell are as under:

4.1.

That the petitioner is Director of Dharmadev Infrastructure Limited ­ petitioner of Special Civil Application No.4322 of 2017 engaged   in   the   business   of   the   Construction   and   Land Development. That on 15.10.2013, a search under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") was carried out at the residential premises of the petitioner herein­ original applicant as well as group concerns of "Dharmadev Group". Therefore, on 22.02.2016, the petitioner herein filed an application under Section 245 C of the Act for AY 2008­09 to AY 2015­16. That in the case of Umang Hiralal Thakkar, he declared Rs.9,24,16,911/­ as   additional   income   and   in   the   case   of   applicant   himself Dharmadev   Infrastructure   Limited   declared   Rs.22,37,92,628/­as additional income. That the said applications were submitted under Section 245 C(1) of the Act.

4.2.

That thereafter, the Settlement Commission passed an order under Section 245 D(1) on 11.4.2016 allowing the application to be proceeded with further. That the report under Section 245D(2B) were   received   on   13.05.2016. That   the   Settlement   Commission fixed the hearing under Section 245D(2C)on 25.5.2016. At this juncture,  it is  required  to be  noted that as such  prior  thereto, Settlement Commission rejected the petitioner's application under Section   245D(1).   That   thereafter,   on   28.03.2016   the   petitioner again filed an application under Section 245 C of the Act and made revised disclosure total amounting to Rs. Rs.9,24,16,911/­ in case of applicant Umang Thakkar and Rs.22,37,92,628/­ in the case of applicant himself Dharmadev Infrastructure Limited. As observed herein   above,   thereafter   the   Settlement   Commission   passed   an order   under   Section   245   D(1)   allowing   the   application   to   be proceeded with the further. That on receipt of the report from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 245D(2B) of the Act,  the same was furnished to original applicant. The learned Principal CIT objected to the said application and it was stated that there is no true and full disclosure on the part of the applicant.  It was   stated   that   there   is   no   explanation   regarding   seized   / impounded papers, source of found and seized jewellery and for source of cash deposits in Benami accounts. It was also submitted that even the application for AY 2015­16 may not be entertained since no proceedings were pending in both the cases. That the respective applicants replied to the objection raised by the Principal CIT during the course of the hearing. That thereafter, by impugned common order the learned Settlement Commission has rejected the settlement application vide order dated 27.5.2016 on the ground that   there   was   no   true   and   full   disclosure   on   the   part   of   the petitioner.   That   thereafter,   the   respective   applicants­   petitioners preferred rectification application under Section 154 of the Income Tax   Act   against   the   order   dated   27.5.2016. However   the   said application came to be rejected vide order dated 24.08.2016 on the ground that there is no error apparent on the record. Hence, the respective petitioners ­ original applicants are before this Court challenging   impugned   common   order   passed   by   the   Settlement Commission rejecting the settlement application preferred by the respective applicants declaring the same as invalid under Section 245D(2C) of the Income Tax Act.

5.0.

Shri S.N.Soparkar, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf   of   the   petitioner   and   Shri   M.R.   Bhatt,   learned   Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the Revenue.

6.0.

Shri Soparkar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respective petitioners has vehemently submitted that the impugned order passed by  the learned Settlement Commission is beyond the scope and ambit of Section 245D(2C) of the Act. 6. 1. It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that at the stage of Section 245D(2C) the validity of the   application   only   is   required   to   be   considered   and   nothing further than that.

6.2.

It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that correctness of the claim / disclosure can be considered at the stage of Section 245D (3) and (4) of the Act.

6.3.

It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the   petitioners   that   as   such   in   the   present   case   in   the   second application submitted on 28.3.2016, the petitioner made higher disclosure of Rs.9.25 crores.

6.4.

It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that while passing the order under Section 245D(1) of the Act, the Settlement Commission in fact did consider the correctness of the claim and / or issue whether there is true and full disclosure   or   not.   It   is   submitted   that   only   thereafter   having observed and held that true and full disclosure  has been made by the   applicant   thereafter   the   settlement   applications   were permitted / allowed to proceed with further. It is submitted that therefore, thereafter the learned Settlement Commission could not have and / or ought not to have rejected the application at the stage of the Section 245D(2C) and therefore, the same is wholly without jurisdiction and beyond the scope of Section 245D(2C).

6.5.

It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the   petitioners   that   the   correctness   of   the   disclosure   and   /   or whether there is true and full disclosure or not is required to be considered at the stage of Section 245D(4). It is submitted that therefore, if the application is permitted to be proceeded further, no prejudice shall be caused. It is submitted that on the other hand the applicant will not be permitted to proceed further it shall cause prejudice   to   the   petitioner.   It   is   submitted   that   therefore, Settlement   Commission   ought   to   have   permitted  /  allowed   the CIT reported in (2010) 326 ITR 642, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is mandatory for the Settlement Commission to record   its   findings   with   regard   to   the   issues   of   full   and   true disclosure of particulars undisclosed income and the manner in which suhc income was derived by the assessee.

6.8.

It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that even in a case where the assessee has any doubt with respect to true and full disclosure, the Settlement Commission would have called for the further report under Section 245D(4) of the   Act   subject   to   compliance   of   technical   requirements   under Section 245D(1) and 245D(2C).

6.9.

It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that even the impugned order is not sustainable as the same is based on the basis of change of opinion without there being any new material on record.

6.10.

It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the petitioners that even while observed that there is no true and full disclosure, the learned Settlement Commission has considered wrong facts. It is submitted that view taken by the Settlement Commission   is   wrong   and   even   the   reasons   recorded   are   also wrong.   It   is   submitted   that   though   it   was   pointed   out   in   the rectification application, the same has been rejected.

6.11.

It is further submitted by Shri Soparkar, learned counsel for the   petitioners   that   as   such   no   objection   was   raised   by   the Commissioner   on   12.5%   cash   of   Rs.42.67   crores.   It   is   further submitted that so far as observations made   by the Settlement Commission that the income offered at 6% is very low is concerned, Victory Ceratech Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India & Ors reported in 2013 SCC Online Guj 6981. (4). learned counsel for the respondent­ Revenue. 7. 1. It is vehemently submitted by Shri Bhatt, learned counsel for the Revenue that impugned order passed by the learned Settlement Commission   is   absolutely   in   consonance   with   the   provisions   of Section 245D(2C) of the Act, which is not required to be interfered with in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

7.2.

It is further submitted by Shri Bhatt, learned counsel for the Revenue that while passing the impugned   order under Section 245D(2C), the learned Settlement Commission has considered the report  submitted by  the  Principal  Commissioner  of Income  Tax under Section 245D(2B) of the Act as well as relevant documents and evidence so as to come to a conclusion that there is no full and true disclosure by the petitioners. 7.3. t is further submitted by Shri Bhatt, learned counsel for the Revenue   that   merely   because   earlier   learned   Settlement Commission passed an order under Section 245D(1) of the Act admitting the settlement application, it cannot be said that the learned Settlement Commission considered the correctness of the claim and / or issue whether there is true and full disclosure or not. It is submitted that at the stage of Section 245D(1) of the Act, the learned Tribunal is required to consider whether the Settlement application is required to be admitted or not. It is submitted that only thereafter stage of inquiry under Section 245D(2C) will come and / or issue whether there is true and full disclosure  or not is required to be considered and thereafter the stage under Section 245D(4) will come.  In support of his above submission, Shri Bhatt, learned counsel for the Revenue has relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise vs. True Woods P. Ltd and Ors rendered in W.P(C) 21055 of 2005: 2005(85) DRJ 575 (DB). He has also relied upon the decision of the of principles of natural justice and / or any procedural lapse. It is submitted that therefore, considering the very limited scope of the judicial   review   against   the   order   passed   by   the   Settlement Commission, the impugned order passed by the learned Settlement Commission is not required to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7.5. t is further submitted by Shri Bhatt, learned counsel for the Revenue that in the present case the Settlement Commission has specifically come to the conclusion  and has given finding that there is no true and correct disclosure, considering the report filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 245D(2B) of the Act as well as considering the transaction with Jalaram Finvest Ltd and that the petitioner has offered only 6% p.a on the daily cash balance available in the cash flow of the 41 bank accounts which is very low compared to the  prevailing interest rates in FY 2007­08 to 2014­15. 7. 6. So   far   as   submission   on   behalf   of   the   petitioner   that Settlement Commission ought to have held that further inquiry and ought   to   have   called   for   report   under   Section   245D(3)   is concerned, it is submitted that the same is contrary to the scheme of the Settlement cases under Chapter XIX ­A of the Act. It is submitted that report under Section 245D(3)can be called for by the Settlement Commission only when either an application has not been declared invalid under sub­Section (2C)   or an application referred to sub­Section (2D) which has been allowed to be further decision but with the decision­making process. 9.2. under: "Be that as it may, the fact remains that it is open to the Commission to accept an amount of tax by way of settlement and to prescribe the manner in which   the   said   amount  shall   be   paid.   It   may condone the defaults and lapses on the part of the assessee   and   may   waive   interest,   penalties   or prosecution, where it thinks appropriate. Indeed, it would be difficult to predicate the reasons and considerations which induce the commission to make   a   particular   order,   unless   of   course   the commission itself chooses to, give reasons for its order. Even if it gives reasons in a given case, the scope of enquiry in the appeal remains the same as   indicated   above   viz.,   whether   it   is,contrary 956 to any of the provisions of the Act. In this context, it is relevant to note that the principle of natural justice (and alteram partem)  has been incorporated   in  Section   245­D  itself.   The   sole overall   limitation   upon   tire   Commission   thus appears, to be that it should act in accordance with   the   provisions   of   the   Act.   The   scope   of enquiry,   whether   by   High   Court   under  Article 226 or by this Court under Article 136 is also the same   whether   the   order   of  the   Commission   is contrary to any of the provisions of the Act and if so,   has   it   prejudiced   the   petitioner/appellant apart from ground of bias, fraud & malice which, of course, constitute a separate and independent category. Reference in this behalf may be had to the   decision   of   this   Court   in  Sri   Ram   Durga Prasad v. Settlement Commission 176 I.T.R. 169, which too was an appeal against the orders of the Settlement Commission. Sabyasachi Mukharji J., speaking for the Bench comprising himself and S.R. Pandian, J. observed that in such a case this Court is " concerned with the legality of procedure followed and not with the validity of the order.' The   learned   Judge   added   'judicial   review   is concerned   not   with   the   decision   but   with   the decision­making   process."   Reliance   was   placed upon the decision of the House of Lords in Chief Constable of the N.W. Police v. Evans, [1982] 1 W.L.R.1155. Thus,   the   appellate   power   under Article   136  was   equated   to   power   of   judicial review, where the appeal is directed against the orders' of the Settlement Commission. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the only ground upon which this Court can interfere in these appeals is that order of the Commission is contrary to the provisions of the Act and that such contravention has prejudiced the appellant The main controversy in these appeals relates to the interpretation of the settlement deeds though it is true, some contentions of law are also raised. The commission has interpreted the trust deeds in a particular manner, Even if the interpretation placed by the commission the said deeds is not correct, it would not be a ground for interference in these appeals, since a wrong interpretation of a deed of trust cannot be said to be a violation of the provisions of the Income Tax Act. it is equally clear that the interpretation placed upon the said deeds   by   the   Commission   does   not   bind   the authorities under the Act in proceedings relating to other assessment years".

9.3.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.A. Abraham v. Assistant CIT reported in (2002) 255 ITR 540(2000) has held that Court's power of judicial review on the decision of the Settlement Commission was very restricted. It is observed that while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is not expected to go into facts.

9.4.

Applying law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision as well as decision of this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the limited scope of judicial review, the impugned order passed by the learned Settlement Commission is required to be considered.

9.5.

It is the case on behalf of the petitioner that once while passing order under Section 245D(1) of the Act, the applications of the   petitioners   were   allowed   to   be   proceeded   with   further, thereafter, it would not be open for the Settlement Commission to declare the application invalid under Section 245D (2C) of the Act on the ground that there is not true and full disclosure. It is also the case on behalf of the petitioners that while passing the order under Section 245D)(1) of the Act and allowing the application to be proceeded   with   further   the   learned   Settlement   Commission considered all the material on record and come to the conclusion that there is true and full disclosure and therefore, the impugned order under Section 245D(2C) of the Act declaring the applications invalid on the ground that there is no true and full disclosure, is change of opinion and is not permissible. The aforesaid has no substance. At the outset, it is required to be noted that scope of inquiry   at   the   stage   of   245D(1)   and   inquiry   at   the   stage   of 245D(2C) are different and distinct. At this stage, decision of the Division Bench in the case of Vishnubhai Mafatlal Patel (supra) is required to be referred to and considered. In the aforesaid decision, the Division Bench of this Court has considered the scheme of the proceedings before the learned Settlement Commission. In para 6, the Division Bench has considered all relevant provisions of the Act and thereafter the Division Bench has considered the various stages provided under Section 245. In para 6 to 13, the Division Bench has observed and held as under:

"

6.

Having thus heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents on record, we may at   the   outset   take   note   of   statutory   provisions applicable. • Chapter XIXA which was introduced in the Act in the year 1976, pertains to settlement of cases. • Settlement Commission is constituted under Section 245B of the Act. Section 245BA lays down   the   jurisdiction   and   powers   of Settlement Commission. • Section   245C   pertains   to   application   for settlement  of  cases.  Sub­section(1)  thereof permits an assessee, at any stage of a case relating to him, make an application in such form   and   in   such   manner   as   may   be prescribed, and containing a full and true disclosure of his income which has not been disclosed   before   the   Assessing   Officer,   the manner   in   which   such   income   has   been derived, the additional amount of income­ tax payable on such income and such other particulars   as   may   be   prescribed,   to   the Settlement   Commission   to   have   his   case settled.   It   is   further   provided   that application   shall   be   disposed   of   in   the manner hereinafter provided. • Section   245D   of   the   Act   pertains   to procedure on receipt of an application under section   245C.   Relevant   portion   of   section 245D reads as under : 245D.  (1) On receipt of an application under section 245C, the Settlement Commission shall, within seven days from the date of receipt of the application,   issue   a   notice   to   the   applicant requiring   him   to   explain   as   to   why   the application   made   by   him   be   allowed   to   be proceeded with and on hearing the applicant, the   Settlement   Commission   shall,   within   a period of fourteen days from the date of the application, by an order in writing, reject the application   or   allow   the   application   to   be proceeded with : Provided that where no order has been passed, within the aforesaid period by the Settlement Commission, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded with. (2B) The Settlement Commission shall, ­ (i)in respect of an application which is allowed to   be   proceeded   with   under   sub­section   (1), within   30   days   from   the   date   on   which   the application was under; or (ii) in respect of an application referred to in sub­section (2A) which is deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded with under that sub­ section,   on   or   before   the   7th  day   of   August, 2007, call for a report from the Commissioner, and the Commissioner shall furnish the report within a period of thirty days of the receipt of communication

from the Settlement Commission. (2C) Where a report of the commissioner called for under sub­section (2B) has been furnished within   the   period   specified   there   in,   the Settlement Commission may, on the basis of the report and within the period of fifteen days of the receipt of the report, by an order in writing, declare the application in question as invalid, and   shall   send   the   copy   of   such   order   to applicant and commissioner : Provided  that   an   application   shall   not   be declared invalid unless an opportunity has been given to the applicant of being heard: Provided further  that where the commissioner has   not   furnished   the   report   within   the aforesaid   period,   the   Settlement   Commission shall proceed further in the matter without the report of the Commissioner. 3.The Settlement Commission, in respect of- (i) an application which has not been declared invalid under sub­section (2C) ; or (ii)   an   application   referred   to   in   sub­section (2D)   which   has   been   allowed   to   be   further proceeded with under that sub­section, may call for the records from the Commissioner and after examination of such records, if the settlement commission is of the opinion that any further enquiry or investigation in the matter is necessary, it may direct the Commissioner to make or cause to be made such further enquiry or   investigation  and  furnish   a  report   on  the matters   covered   by   the   application   and   any other   matter   relating   to   the   case,   and   the commissioner shall furnish the report within a period   of   ninety   days   on   the   receipt   of communication

from the Settlement Commission : Provided that where the commissioner does not furnish the report within the aforesaid period, the Settlement Commission may proceed to pas an   order   under   sub­section   (4)   without   such report.

4.

After   examination   of   the   records   and   the report of the Commissioner, if any, received under­ (i) sub­section (2B) or sub­section (3), or (ii)   the   provision   of   sub­section   (1)   as   they stood immediately before their amendment by the   Finance   Act,   2007,   and   after   giving   an opportunity   to   the   applicant   and   to   the commissioner to be heard, either in person or through a representative duly authorized in this behalf,   and   after   examining   such   further evidence as may be placed before it or obtained by   it,   the  Settlement   Commission   may,   in accordance with the provisions of this Act, pass such order as it thinks fit on the matters covered by the application and any other matter relating to the case not covered by the application, but referred to in the report of the commissioner.

7.

From   the   perusal  of  the   statutory   provisions   noted above, it can be gathered that an assessee may at any stage of the case relating to him, make an application for settlement to the Commission under sub­section(1) of section 245C. Such application has to be made in a prescribed manner and is required to contain a full and true disclosure of the income of the assessee which had not been disclosed before the Assessing Officer and the manner in which such income had been derived besides such other particulars as may be prescribed. When such application is filed, it is to be treated in the manner provided in section 245D. Sub­section(1) of section   245D   provides   that,   on   receipt   of   an application, the Settlement Commission shall, within seven days of receipt, issue a notice to the applicant requiring   him   to   explain   why   such   an   application made by him be allowed to be proceeded with. On hearing   the   applicant,   the   Settlement   Commission shall,   within   fourteen   days   from   the   date   of   the application, by an order in writing either reject the application or allow the application to be proceeded with.   Proviso   to   sub­section(1)   of   section   245D provides that where no order has been passed by the Settlement Commission as aforesaid, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded with.

8.

Under sub­section(1) of section 245D thus, the first stage of scrutinising the application of settlement made by   an   assessee   is   envisaged.   The   statute   does   not provide for grounds on which Settlement Commission may reject such an application or allow the application to be proceeded with. There are however, sufficient indications  in the  statute  itself  what would  be  the purpose and nature of scrutiny of Commission at that stage. As already noted, sub­section(1) of section 245C an assessee may make an application for settlement in the   prescribed   manner   containing   true   and   full disclosure of income not previously disclosed before the Assessing   Officer   and   the   manner   in   which   such income   had   been   derived   as   also   the   additional amount of income­tax payable on such income and such other particulars as may be prescribed. At the stage  of sub­section(1) of section 245D of the Act, therefore, prime scrutiny of the Commission would be whether application of the assessee is in order and in conformity with the requirements of sub­section(1) of section   245C   which   would   include   filing   of   an application in the prescribed manner and also making necessary disclosures  as required therein. There are also   additional   requirements   of   sub­section(1)   of section 245C such as payment of requisite tax and interest thereon which would have been payable under the provisions of the Act, had the income disclosed in the application been declared by the assessee in the return of income before the Assessing Officer. It would thus be well within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission to examine whether the application for settlement   fulfills   such   requirements   or   not.   Such scrutiny of­course would be summary in nature. We may   recall   that   the   Settlement   Commission   upon receipt   of   such   an   application   within   seven   days thereof, has to issue notice to the assessee and pass a final order either rejecting the application or allowing the application to be proceeded within fourteen days of the date of application. Proviso to sub­section(1) of section 245D makes it further clear that when no such order is passed rejecting the application within the period prescribed, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded with.

9.

Two things therefore, emerge. Firstly, that at the stage of section 245D(1) of the Act, the Commission would have ample powers to examine whether an application of an assessee made under section 245C(1) of the Act fulfills   the   legal   requirements   particularly,   those provided in section 245C(1) of the Act. Secondly, that such inquiry however, shall have to be summary in nature. The later provisions of sections 245D would also demonstrate that any decision of the Commission to allow the application to be proceeded with would only be prima facie in nature. We would elaborate this aspect a little later. At this stage, therefore, we find that   under   section   245D(1)   of   the   Act,   if   the Commission   on   a   summary   inquiry   comes   to   the

conclusion that an application filed by the assessee under section 245C(1) of the Act does not fulfill the legal requirements, it would be within the jurisdiction of the Commission to reject the same. However, if it is allowed to be proceeded with, such decision would be tentative in nature. 10.Section   245D(2B)   provides   that   the   Settlement Commission   in   respect   of   an   application,   which   is allowed to be proceeded with under sub­section(1), within   thirty   days   from   the   date   on   which   the application   was   made,   call   for   a   report   from   the Commissioner, and the Commissioner shall furnish the report within a period of thirty days of the receipt of communication from the Settlement Commission. Sub­ section(2C) further provides that where a report of the Commissioner   under   sub­section   (2B)   has   been furnished   within   the   the   prescribed   period,   the Settlement Commission may on the basis of the report within fifteen days of the receipt of the report by an order in writing, declare the application as invalid. Proviso   to   sub­section(2C)   provides   that   no   such declaration shall be made unless an opportunity is provided to the assessee of being heard. From such provisions, it thus emerges that an application which has been allowed to be proceeded or deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded under section 245D(1) of the Act, it is still open to scrutiny by the Commission at the stage of sub­section(2B) and (2C) of section 245D, this time with the assistance of the report of the Commission if so made within the prescribed time. On the basis of materials contained in such report and after giving an opportunity to the applicant of being heard, if the Commission is so satisfied, can declare the application   to   be   invalid.   This   is   the   second   stage where the Commission can scrutinise the validity of application for settlement made by the assessee under section   245C(1)   of   the   Act.   Thus   even   if   the Commission   had   previously   passed   an   order   under section 245D(1) of the Act, allowing the application to be   proceeded   with,   it   would   still   be   open   for   the Commission  if grounds  are so  available, to declare such an application invalid after obtaining report from the Commissioner and giving an opportunity of being heard to the applicant. 11.If   however,   no   such   order   is   passed   declaring   an application as invalid, the Commission would in terms of provisions of section 245D of the Act, proceed to decide   the   same   on   merits.   Sub­section(3)   thereof envisages   calling   for   the   records   from   the Commissioner   and   examining   such   records   and carrying   out   such   inquiry   or   investigation   as   the Commission   thinks   it   necessary.   Sub­section(4) empowers the Commission after giving an opportunity to the applicant and to the Commissioner to be heard, pass such order as it thinks fit on the matters covered by the application and any other matter relating to the case not covered by the application, but referred to in the report of the Commissioner. 12.The   twin   requirements   for   an   assessee   making   an application for settlement under section 245C(1) of the   Act,   of   containing   full   and   true   disclosure   of income   which   has   not   been   disclosed   before   the Assessing   Officer   and   the   manner   in   which   such income   has   been   derived,   are   thus   of   considerable importance   and   would   be   open   for   the   Settlement Commission   to   examine   the   fulfillment   thereof   at several   stages   of   the   settlement   proceedings.   If therefore,   while   at   the   threshold,   considering   the question whether such application should be allowed to be proceeded with or be rejected, the Commission examined  such   questions   on  the  basis   of  disclosure made by the applicants and the supporting material produced along with the applications, we do not see that the Commission committed any legal error. As already noted, it was well within the jurisdiction of the Commission at the stage of sub­section(1) of section 245D of the Act to examine whether application for settlement fulfills the statutory requirements contained in sub­section(1) of section 245C of the Act. At this stage we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of  Ajmera Housing Corporation and another(supra). It was a case in which the assessee had made certain disclosures in the initial application under  section 245C(1) of the Act. Such  disclosures were   however,   revised   and   additional   income   was disclosed in the revised annexures. The Apex Court held   that   the   assessee   had   no   right   to   revise   an application   under   section   245C(1)   of   the   Act   and further   that   such   revised   annexure   making   further disclosure of undisclosed income alone was sufficient to establish   that   the   initial   application   made   by   the assessee could not be entertained as it did not contain true and full disclosure of the undisclosed income and the manner in which such income had been derived. 13.It   is   true   that   the   order   that   the   Settlement Commission has to pass under section 245D(1) of the Act comes with a rigid time frame. The scrutiny or the inquiry at that stage, therefore, necessarily shall have to be summary in nature. This however, does not take away   the   powers   of   the   Settlement   Commission   to reject   the   application   for   settlement   which   in   its opinion does not satisfy the legal requirements and more particularly, those contained in sub­section(1) of section 245C of the Act."

We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench.

10.

Even otherwise, considering the order passed by the learned Settlement Commission passed under Section 245D(1) allowing the applications to be proceeded with further it can be seen that the learned Settlement Commission has specifically observed that "as regards the issue of true and full disclosure of income, we are of the opinion that, at present there is no material in our possession which   warrants   the   conclusion   that   true   and   full   disclosure   of income have not been made by the applicants." As observed herein above, while considering the application at the stage of 245D(1), Settlement   Commission   is   required   to   hold   a   limited   inquiry whether applications fulfilled statutory requirement or not and at that stage inquiry would be summary in nature. That thereafter, once   the   order   is   passed   under   Section   245D(1)   of   the   Act thereafter the stage of Section 245D(2B) calling the report from the Principal   Commissioner   of   Income   Tax   shall   come   and   after considering the report of the Commissioner and after giving an opportunity to the applicant, it will be open for the Settlement Commission to declare the application invalid. Therefore, if the submission on behalf of the petitioner is accepted that once the order is passed under Section 245D(1) of the Act thereafter it will not be open for the Settlement Commission to reject the application or   declare   the   same   as   invalid   is   accepted,   in   that   case,   the provisions of Section 245D(2B) and (2C) would be otiose and / or become  nugatory.  Therefore,  the impugned order  passed under Section 245D(2C) declaring the application as invalid is absolutely in consonance with the scheme and provision of Section 245D of the Act.

11.

Now, so far as submission on behalf of the petitioners that leaned   Settlement   Commission   could   have   called   for   further explanation and / or could have held the inquiry while exercising the powers under Section 245D(3) is concerned, the same has also no substance. There is no question of further inquiry contemplated. Only in a case where the application is declared invalid under Section 245D(2C) only thereafter further proceedings are required to   be   taken   place   and   inquiry   is   required   to   be   conducted   as provided under Section 243D(3) and thereafter final order under Section 245D(4) is required to be passed.

12.

Now, so far as submission on behalf of the petitioner on merits is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that the impugned order is passed by the learned Settlement Commission after   considering   the   report   submitted   by   the   Principal Commissioner   of   Income   Tax   and   thereafter   after   giving   an opportunity to the petitioner. The cogent reasons have been given by   the   learned   Settlement   Commission   and   considering   the material on record, a specific finding is given that there is no true and full disclosure by the applicant. The relevant discussion is para 9.1 to 9. 4. The statutory mandate of Section 245 of the Act is that the application shall  "contain a full and true disclosure" of the final order under sub­Section(4) of Section 245D.

14.0.

At   this   stage,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   during   the pendency of the present petitions and on declaring the Settlement application   invalid,   thereafter   the   assessment   proceedings   have taken   place   and   same   have   been   finalized,   against   which,   the assessee is before the CIT(A) by way of appeal.

14.0.

In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and the very limited scope of judicial review of the order passed by the Settlement Commission recorded herein above and considering the impugned   order   passed   by   the   learned   Settlement   Commission declaring the Settlement Application as invalid and for the reasons stated above challenge to the impugned order passed under Section 245D(2) fails and present petitions deserve to be dismissed and are

accordingly dismissed. Rule discharged. No costs.

15.

In view of dismissal of Special Civil Application No. 4321 of 2017, Civil Application No.1 of 2017 stands dismissed. sd.­ (M.R. SHAH, J) sd/­ (B.N. KARIA, J) KAUSHIK J. RATHOD

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