PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER INCOME TAX SURAT 1 vs. SHANKARLAL NEBHUMAL UTTAMCHANDANI

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SCA/13257/2019HC GujaratGJHC24037327201907 January 2020Author: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA,HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA24 pages
AI SummaryDismissed

What did the High Court hold?

The High Court held that the Settlement Commission was justified in accepting the settlement application. The Court noted that the Settlement Commission had thoroughly examined the Rule 9 report submitted by the petitioner (Revenue) and provided proper opportunities for hearing to both parties. The Court found that the additional income of Rs. 12 Crore offered by the assessee during the Section 245D(4) proceedings was considered by the Commission in the spirit of settlement, and that the Commission's determination was just and proper. The Court rejected the Revenue's argument that the High Court should not have interfered with the Settlement Commission's order, especially since the Revenue had conceded the maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court. The Court found no good ground for interference with the Settlement Commission's order and dismissed the petitions.

What were the facts?

The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Surat, filed five petitions challenging a common order dated July 25, 2018, passed by the Settlement Commission. The petitions pertained to assessment years 2012-2013 to 2016-2017. The Revenue alleged that the respondent assessee did not make a true and full disclosure of income. A survey under Section 133A was conducted on July 3, 2015, where the assessee offered additional income of Rs. 2,77,35,875/- and Rs. 4,51,20,308/- for AY 2014-15 and 2015-16 respectively, related to long-term capital gains claimed as exempt. Subsequently, the assessee filed a settlement application offering a total additional income of Rs. 22,09,00,000/- for the five assessment years. The Revenue, through a Rule 9 report, contended that the disclosed income was not true and full, calculating the required income to be Rs. 113,25,78,426/-.

What were the issues?

1. Whether the Settlement Commission was justified in accepting the settlement application of the respondent assessee, despite the Revenue's contention that the assessee did not make a true and full disclosure of income as required under Section 245C(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961? (Question of law and fact). Assessee's Contention: The assessee argued that the Settlement Commission correctly considered the additional income offered during the proceedings under Section 245D(4), which aggregated to Rs. 12,00,00,000/-, and that the Commission's order was just and proper, following the spirit of settlement. They relied on judgments like Commissioner of Income-tax-I v. Income Tax Settlement Commission (supra) and others. The assessee also conceded before the High Court that the maintainability of the writ petition was not pressed. Revenue's Contention: The Revenue contended that the initial disclosure of Rs. 22.09 Crore was not true and full, as evidenced by their Rule 9 report which calculated the required income at Rs. 113,25,78,426/-, indicating a shortfall of Rs. 79,16,78,426/-. They argued that the Settlement Commission erred in accepting the settlement without a full and true disclosure.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 133A,Section 131,Section 10(38),Section 245C(1),Section 245D(4),Section 245C,Section 245D

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
C/SCA/13251/2019 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13251 of 2019 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13252 of 2019 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13255 of 2019 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13256 of 2019 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13257 of 2019 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA ========================================================== 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any order made thereunder ? ========================================================== PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER INCOME TAX SURAT 1 Versus SHANKARLAL NEBHUMAL UTTAMCHANDANI ========================================================== Appearance: MRS KALPANAK RAVAL(1046) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 MR B S SOPARKAR(6851) for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ========================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA Page 1 of 24 C/SCA/13251/2019 JUDGMENT and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA Date : 07/01/2020

ORAL JUDGMENT (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA)

1.

Having regard to the controversy involved in the present case which lies in a very narrow compass, with the consent of   the   learned   advocates   for   the   respective   parties,   the matter is taken up for final hearing.

2.

The petitioner has filed, in all, five petitions for different assessment years i.e. 2012­2013 to 2016­2017 challenging the common order dated 25th  July, 2018 passed by the Settlement Commission ('the Commission' for short)  on the ground that the respondent did not make true and full disclosure and major portion of the income required to be disclosed   for   assessment   was   suppressed   by   the respondent assessee.  Therefore, all the petitions are heard analogously and are disposed of by this common judgment.

3.

For   the   sake   of   convenience,   facts   are   recorded   from Special   Civil   Application   No.13251/2019. Respondent herein has been carrying on the business of purchase and sale of land and trading in textile items of art silk clothes. A survey under section 133A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act of 1961”) was carried out  on 3rd July, 2015 at the office premises of the respondent. 3.1)  During the course of survey operation, various loose documents were found and impounded by the department. In the statement recorded under section 131 of the Act of 1961   on   3rd  July,   2015,   respondent   assessee   offered additional

income

of Rs.2,77,35,875/­

and Rs.4,51,20,308/­ for the assessment years 2014­2015 and 2015­2016   respectively,   aggregating   to   Rs.7,28,56,183/­ which was in relation to long term capital gain claimed as exempt   under   section   10(38)   of   the   Act   on   the   sale   of shares of M/s. Surbhi Chemicals Ltd. 3.2)  The respondent assessee filed Settlement Application under   section   245C(1)   of   the   Act   of   1961   before   the Commission   on   1st  January,   2017   offering   additional income for the assessment years as under : SL. No. Assessment Year Additional   income offered

in the statement of claim 1 2012­2013 Rs.    1,18,029/­ 2 2013­2014 Rs. 1,67,92,355/­ 3 2014­2015 Rs. 6,67,26,846/­ 4 2015­2016 Rs.13,08,24,444/­ 5 2016­2017 Rs.   64,38,326/­ Total Rs.22,09,00,000/­ 3.3)  Respondent­assessee filed its statement of fact before the Commission,   preparing a statement of sources and application   of   unaccounted   income   to   demonstrate   that investment/application and rotation of unaccounted funds is   covered   by   overall   source   of   unaccounted   funds generated   and   offered   to   tax.   It   was   submitted   that applications thereof   being explained by sources offered, the   same   were   not   separately   liable   to   be   treated   as income.   The   respondent­assessee   submitted   that   during the   course   of   survey,   the   books   of   account   of   the respondent   was   under   finalisation   hence   provisional balance­sheet   as   available   in   computer   system   was submitted to Survey Party. The respondent­assessee also submitted that some accounting entries were pending as on date of survey which were entered in the post survey and there is no major differences in the provisional balance sheet and one which is filed along with return of income. 3.4)  The   petitioner   filed   report   as   per   Rule   9   of   the Income­tax Settlement Commission (Procedure) Rules 1997 (for   short   “the   Rules”)   in   the   course   of   hearing   before Commission.   It   was   submitted   in   the   report   that   on examination of impounded documents, it is found that the quantum of additional income disclosed by the assessee before the Commission was not true and full disclosure and   accordingly   year­wise   unaccounted   income, investment, expenditure, advances, unsecured loans of the respondent assessee were added by the investigation wing based on the detailed examination of impounded material/ document/facts/statement   of   respondent   assessee recorded   in   the   course   of   survey   and   post­survey proceedings worked out at Rs.113,25,78,426/­  for the A.Y. 2012­2013 to 2016­2017 as under : Sr. No. A.Y. Additional Income offered in SOF Further Income disclosed during the course of hearing Income required to be offered as per Rule-9 Report Difference between (5-3- 4)=6 u/s.245D(4)

2012- 13 118029 5000000 161136 4956893 2 2013- 14 16792355 5000000 27327138 (-)5534783 3 2014- 15 66726846 7500000 229615822 (-)155388976 4 2015- 16 130824444 66500000 81781162 115543282 5 2016- 17 6438326 36000000 793693168 (-)751254842 Total 220900000 120000000 1132578426 (-)791678426 3.5)  It was therefore, submitted before the Commission that   respondent   assessee   did   not   make   true   and   full disclosure of Rs.79,16,78,426/­ in the statement of income filed before the Commission. 3.6)  The   respondent   submitted   reply   to   Rule   9   report giving explanation to each of the points therein. Further, the   respondent   assessee   disclosed   additional   income during the course of hearing under section 245D(4) of the Act of 1961 aggregating to Rs.12,00,00,000/­  for the five years from assessment years 2012­2013 to 2016­2017. 3.7)  The Commission by impugned order 25th July, 2018 accepted   the   disclosures   made   by   respondent   assessee after   considering   the   detailed   item­wise   explanation submitted by respondent assessee in respect of income of Rs. 113 Crore  suggested by the petitioner and arrived at the conclusion that all the issues raised by the petitioner are   covered     in   the   additional   income   offered   in   the statement of fact and additional income further disclosed by the respondent assessee amounting to Rs. 12 Crore and accordingly the case of the respondent assessee was settled on the terms and conditions stated in the impugned order in paragraph no. 14 to 18. 4. Heard  learned advocate  Mr. Nikunt  Raval  appearing  for learned advocate Mrs. Kalpana Raval for the petitioner and learned   Senior   Counsel   Mr.   S.N.   Sopakar   with   learned advocate   Mr.   Bandish   Soparkar   for   the   respondent­ assessee.

5.

Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that after making   initial   disclosure   of   Rs.   22.09   Crore,   in   the statement   of   fact   filed   before   the   Commission,   the respondent assessee made further substantial disclosure of Rs.   12   Crore   which   is   more   than   50%   of   the   original declaration.   It   was   therefore,   submitted   that   initial disclosure   made   by   respondent   assessee   before   the Commission was not true and full disclosure. 5.1)  Learned   counsel   for   the   petitioner   placed   reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in case of  Ajmera Housing   Corpn.   v.   Commissioner   of   Income   Tax reported   in (2010) 326 ITR 642 (SC) dated 20th  August, 2010. It   was   submitted   that   it   is   not   open   for   the respondent­assessee   to   revise   its   disclosure   before   the Commission     as   observed   by   the   Apex   Court     in   the aforesaid decision that in an application for settlement, the assessee is required to disclose a full and true disclosure of the   income   which   has   not   been   disclosed   before   the Assessing Officer and the manner in which such income has been derived so as to pay the additional amount of tax payable on such income. 5.2)  Learned   advocate   for   the   petitioner   further   placed reliance   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   case   of Principal   Commissioner   of   Income­tax,   Vadodara   v. Shree   Nilkanth   Developers  reported   in   (2016)   73 taxmann.com   76   (Gujarat)   dated   23rd  August,   2016   in which relying upon the decision of Supreme Court in case of  Ajmera Housing Corpn.  (supra), order of Commission was set aside as it was found in that case that the assessee had at  belated stage, made fresh and further disclosures which   are   substantial   in   nature.   It   was   therefore, submitted   that   additional   disclosures   made   by   the respondent­assessee before the Commission under section 245C(1)     of   the   Act   of   1961   could   not   have   been entertained as it did not contain “true and full disclosures” of its undisclosed income and the “manner” in which such income had been derived. 5.3)  Learned   advocate   therefore,   submitted   that Commission has arrived at the conclusion contrary to law inasmuch   as   the   amount   of   additional   income   offered before   the   Commission   were   insufficient   to   explain   the total   detected   unaccounted   income,   investment, expenditure, advances etc. It was therefore, submitted that in   view   of   the   fact   that   there   was   no   true   and   proper disclosure by respondent assessee, the Commission could not   have   accepted   the   explanation   offered   by   the respondent assessee in absence of any evidence or material provided   by   the   respondent   assessee   as   against   the unaccounted income detected during the course of survey. 5.4)  It was therefore, submitted that the impugned order passed by the Commission is required to be quashed and set aside.

6.

Per   contra,   learned   Senior   Advocate   Mr.   S.N.   Soparkar assisted by learned advocate Mr. Bandish Soparkar for the respondent   assessee   submitted   that   the   facts   of   the present   case   are   different   than   the   facts   before   the Supreme Court in case of Ajmera Housing Corpn. (supra). Reliance was placed upon the decision of Apex Court in case of Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I. Tripathi reported in (1993) 201 ITR 611 (SC) dated 2nd April, 1993 to submit that this Court is required to consider the legality of the procedure followed by the Commission and not the validity of the order. He relied upon the following observations made by the Apex Court in the said decision :

“15. It is true that the finality clause contained in Section 245­I does not and cannot bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under  Article   226  or the jurisdiction of this court under Article 32 or under Article 136, as the case may be. But that does not mean that the jurisdiction of this Court in the appeal preferred directly in this court is any different than what it would be if the assessee had first approached the High Court  under  Article   226  and then come up in appeal to this court under Article 136. A party does not and cannot   gain   any   advantage   by   approaching   this   Court directly under Article 136, instead of approaching the High Court under Article 226. This is not a limitation inherent in Article 136;  it is a limitation which this court imposes on itself having regard to the nature of the function performed by the Commission and keeping in view the principles of judicial review. May be, there is also some force in what Dr. Gauri Shankar says viz., that the order of commission is in the   nature   of   a   package   deal   and   that   it   may   not   be possible, ordinarily speaking, to dissect its order and that the assessee should not be permitted to accept what is favourable   to   him   and   reject   what   is   not.   According   to learned counsel, the Commission is not even required or obligated to pass a reasoned order. Be that as it may, the fact remains that it is open to the Commission to accept an amount of tax by way of settlement and to prescribe the manner in which the said amount shall be paid. It may condone the defaults and lapses on the part of the assessee and may waive interest, penalties or prosecution, where it thinks   appropriate.   Indeed,   it   would   be   difficult   to predicate the reasons and considerations which induce the commission to make a particular order, unless of course the commission itself chooses to, give reasons for its order. Even   if   it   gives   reasons   in   a   given   case,   the   scope   of enquiry in the appeal remains the same as indicated above viz., whether it is,contrary  to any of the provisions of the Act. In this context, it is relevant to note that the principle of   natural   justice   (audi   alteram   parterri)   has   been incorporated   in  Section   245­D  itself.   The   sole   overall limitation upon the Commission thus appears, to be that it should act in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The scope of enquiry, whether by High Court under Article 226  or by this Court under  Article 136  is also the same­ whether the order of the Commission is contrary to any of the provisions of the Act and if so,  apart from ground of bias, fraud & malice which, of course, constitute a separate an   independent   category   has   it   prejudiced   the petitioner/appellant. Reference in this behalf may be had to the decision of this Court in RB Shreeram Durga Prasad &   Fatechand   Nursing   Das   v.   Settlement   Commission (1989) 176 I.T.R. 169, which too was an appeal against the orders of the Settlement Commission. Sabyasachi Mukharji J., speaking for the Bench comprising himself and S.R. Pandian, J. observed that in such a case this Court is " concerned with the legality of procedure followed and not with the validity of the order.' The learned Judge added 'judicial review is concerned not with the decision but with the decision­making process." Reliance was placed upon the decision of the House of Lords in Chief Constable of the N.W.   Police   v.   Evans,   [1982]   1   W.L.R.1155. Thus,   the appellate power under Article 136 was equated to power of judicial review, where the appeal is directed against the orders' of the Settlement Commission. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the only ground upon which   this  Court   can  interfere  in  these  appeals  is  that order of the Commission is contrary to the provisions of the Act   and   that   such   contravention   has   prejudiced   the appellant The main controversy in these appeals relates to the interpretation of the settlement deeds though it is true, some contentions of law are also raised. The commission has interpreted the trust deeds in a particular manner. Even if the interpretation placed by the commission on the said deeds is not correct, it would not be a ground for interference in these appeals, since a wrong interpretation of a deed of trust cannot be said to be a violation of the provisions of the Income Tax Act. it is equally clear that the interpretation   placed   upon   the   said   deeds   by   the Commission does not bind the authorities under the Act in proceedings relating to other assessment years.” 6.1)  Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent assessee further relied upon the decision of this Court in case of Commissioner   of   Income­tax­I   v.   Income   Tax Settlement Commission reported in (2017)  390 ITR 306 (Gujarat) dated 12th  July, 2016, wherein this Court has held as under :

“10. It can thus be seen that on the issue of true and full disclosure,   stage   at   which   such   disclosures   should   be made   and   the   effect   of   making   further   disclosures   by revising initial offers of settlement was examined by the Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of  Ajmera   Housing Corporation (supra). The manner in which the Supreme Court has dealt with such issue and has made elaborate and conclusive observations, it cannot be stated contrary to what was argued before us that the above­noted portion of   the   judgment   should   not   be   seen   as   ration   of   the judgment of the Supreme Court. Ratio of this judgment is that the true and full disclosure of the income must be made at the initial stage and large scale remissions in such disclosure   itself   would   show   that   the   initial   disclosures were not true.

11.

However, the facts of the present case are somewhat different.   The   applicants   had   initially   offered   on   money rotation of Rs. 25 lakhs, Rs. 21 lakhs and Rs. 30 lakhs respectively and income at the rate of 12.5 per cent thereof by   way   of   interest   earned   which   during   the   course   of assessment proceedings was revised to Rs. 50 lakhs, Rs. 50 lakhs and Rs. 75 lakhs respectively with rate of return at 15 per cent. With respect to revised rate of return, even counsel for the Revenue would not be in a position to argue that   the   same   would   form   part   of   declaration   of   two incomes since whether rate of return should be estimated to   12.5   per   cent   or   15   per   cent   would   be   would   be substantially in the realm of estimation of not profit. He would   however,   strenuously   contend   that   revised declaration of on money should be enough to establish that initial disclosures made by the assessees were not full or true disclosures of such income. In this context, we had called for the letter written by the applicants making such revised offers. Copies of such letters dated 6.2.2014 written by the partners of the firm are produced on record. In such letters, it  was  conveyed  that  the  applicants  had  filed a petition   for   settlement   in   which   offered   a   sum   of   Rs. 7,75,000/­ at the rate of 12 per cent on peak balance of funds deployed in money lending activity. It was further stated   that   the   applicant   during   the   course   of   hearing under section 245D(4), in the spirit of settlement, agreed to further   additional   income   of   Rs.   39,12,667/­   which   is computed on the basis stated hereinbelow: a. interest in money lending activity @ 15% p.a.; b.   Amount   deployed   in   money   lending   activity   Rs. 50,00,000/­ c. Income out of on money receipt @ 15%.

12.

Similar declarations were made in the case of other applicants as well. It can thus be seen that these revised offers of tax was in the nature of spirit of settlement and cannot   be   seen   in   strict   sense   of   abandoning   initial disclosures and replacing the same by fresh disclosures on the   basis   of   such   revised   offers.   What   in   essence   the assessee did was to raise their offers marginally to put an end to the entire dispute through settlement or in the spirit of settlement as is referred to in the said letter. This cannot be seen as accepting that original or initial declaration was not true and full disclosure thereby paving way for the application of judgment in the case of  Ajmera Housing Corporation (supra).” 6.2)  Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Court in case of Commissioner of Income­tax­I v. Income Tax Settlement Commission and anr. reported in (2017) 244 Taxman 156 (Gujarat) dated 2nd September, 2016, wherein it is held as under :

“8. In view of the above facts and circumstances, more particularly, in view of the fact that this Court is dealing with   and   examining   the   order   of   said   commission   in exercise of writ jurisdiction keeping in view the scope of judicial review and keeping in view the exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction, this Court is of the opinion that from the   overall   background   of   the   fact   without   said Commission   has   thoroughly   examined   minutely   all   the details related to the issue in question and arrived at a particular finding which this Court found not to substitute the   same.   In   the   background   of   these   facts   and circumstances,   resultantly,   the   petition   deserves   to   be dismissed.” 6.3)  Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in   case   of  Principal   Commissioner   of   Income­tax, Central v. Income Tax Settlement Commission reported in (2017) 249 Taxman 54 (Gujarat) dated 13th June, 2017, wherein it is held as under :

“14. It is true that before the Settlement Commission, the assessees indicated that the additional disclosure of Rs.50 lakhs   each   may   be   accounted   for   the   assessment   year 2014­15. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that such   disclosures   were,   as   noted   above,   in   the   spirit   of settlement   and   to   put   an   end   to   the   controversy.   The assessees therefore cannot be pinned down to the effect of such disclosures in the year 2014­15 alone. We cannot fragment   a   larger   picture   and   telescope   the   additional disclosures for a particular year and taking into account the comparable figures for that year decide whether such disclosures would shake the initial disclosures as to apply the   ratio   laid   down   by   the   Supreme   Court   in   case   of Ajmera   Housing  (supra)   and   to   hold   that   the   initial disclosures   themselves   were   untrue   projecting   the additional   disclosures   for   all   years   the   assessees   had sought settlement, we find the Commission committed no error in accepting them and in proceeding to pass final order on such settlement applications.” 6.4)  Reliance was also placed on the recent decision of this Court in case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax,   Central   v.   Income   Tax   Settlement   Commission dated 22nd  October, 2019 in Special Civil Application No. 9883/2019, wherein it is held as under :

“50. In the above backdrop, the decision of the Supreme Court   in   the   case   of  Ajmera   Housing   Corporation   v. Commissioner of Income­tax (supra), on which reliance has been   placed   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioner would, in  the opinion of this court, have no applicability to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, in the facts of the   said   case,   the   assessee   had   filed   application   under section 245C before the Settlement Commission disclosing an amount of Rs.1,94,33,580/­ for the relevant assessment year in addition to the income declared in the return of income submitted by them earlier. During the course of the proceedings   before   the   Settlement   Commission,   the assessee filed a revised settlement application containing confidential   annexures   and   related   papers   declaring therein an additional income of Rs.11.41 crore. Thus, while in the application under section 245C(1) of the IT Act, the disclosure was of Rs.1.94 crores, in the revision application the   additional   income   of   Rs.11.41   crore,   which   was approximately five times the amount originally disclosed, came   to   be   made.   Besides,   in   that   case,   a   revised settlement   application   had   been   made   and   it   is   in   the backdrop   of   such   facts   and   circumstances   that   the Supreme Court held that full and true disclosure of income which had not been previously disclosed by the assessee being a precondition for a valid application under section 245C(1) of the Act. The scheme of Chapter XIXA does not contemplate   revision   of   income   so   disclosed   in   the application against item 11 for the form. The court further held   that   if   an   assessee   is   permitted   to   revise   his disclosure,   in   essence,   he   would   be   making   a   fresh application in relation to the same case by withdrawing the earlier application and that in this regard, section 245C(3) of the Act which prohibits the withdrawal of an application once   made   under  sub­section  (1)  of  the   said   section  is instructive   inasmuch   as   it   manifests   that   an   assessee cannot be permitted to resile from his stand at any stage during the proceedings.

51.

Adverting to the facts of the present case, as noticed earlier, the contesting respondents have not resiled from their stand in the application made under section 245C of the IT Act. The contesting respondents have also not made any   further   disclosure   during   the   course   of   settlement proceedings but have only agreed to pay additional tax on the   basis   of   the   computation   made   by   the   revenue   in respect of the disclosure made by them.” 6.5)  Referring to the aforesaid decisions, it was submitted that in facts of the present case, the respondent­assessee has offered and disclosed  further amount of Rs. 12 Crore in addition to disclosed amount of Rs. 22.09 Crore so as to put   an   end   to   the   controversy   and   in   spirit   of   the settlement   before   the   Commission.   The   respondent   has made overall additional disclosure of Rs. 12 Crore in all five years before the Commission altogether. It was therefore, submitted   that   in   view   of   the   aforesaid   legal pronouncements and settled legal position, considering the facts of the case of the respondent before the Commission, the decision of the Apex Court in case of Ajmera Housing Corpn. (supra), cannot be made applicable to the facts of the   present   case.   It   was   further   submitted   that   the Commission   is   convinced   by   the   item­wise   explanation submitted by the respondent assessee in response to the income of Rs. 113 Crore suggested by the petitioner. It was

therefore submitted that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in case of Jyotendrasinhji   (supra), Commission is not required to give any reason, as the Commission has acted in accordance with the provisions of  the Act of 1961. He further submitted that as the scope of the inquiry is very limited, no interference is required to be made in the impugned order passed by the Commission.

7.

Having considered submissions made by learned counsel for the respective parties and   the order passed by the Commission, only question which arises for consideration in   facts   of   the   present   case   is   that   whether   additional income   disclosed   to   the   tune   of   Rs.   12   Crore   by   the respondent   assessee   during   the   course   of   proceedings before   the   Commission   can   be   said   to   be   fresh   and substantial disclosure or not and to come to conclusion that it is far greater than the initial disclosure made by respondent assessee so as to apply decision of the Apex Court in case of  Ajmera Housing Corpn.  (supra) and in case of Shree Nilkanth Developers (supra) ?

8.

In view of the aforesaid observations made by the Apex Court, this Court is required to examine and inquire as to whether the order of Commission is contrary to any of the provisions of the Act or not and if so, apart from grounds of bias,   fraud   and   malice   which   of­course   constitute   a separate and  independent category, has it prejudiced the petitioner   or   not.   In   facts   of   the   present   case,   merely because the respondent assessee has disclosed additional income of Rs. 12 Crore during the course of settlement, it cannot   be   said   that     Commission   has   not   followed   the procedure prescribed under the Act of 1961. 9. The disclosure made during the course of the proceedings before the  Commission is not new disclosure as found by the Apex Court in case of Ajmera Housing Corpn. (supra) as under :

“26. The procedure laid down in  Section 245D  of the Act, contemplates   that   on   receipt   of   the   application   under Section 245C(1)  of the Act, the Settlement Commission is required to forward a copy of the application filed in the prescribed form (No. 34B), containing full details of issues for which application for settlement is made, the nature and   circumstances   of   the   case   and   complexities   of   the investigation   involved,   save   and   except   the   annexures, referred to in item No. 11 of the form and to call for report from the Commissioner. The Commissioner is obliged to furnish such report within a period of 45 days from the date   of   communication   by   the   Settlement   Commission. Thereafter, the Settlement Commission, on the basis of the material contained in the said report and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and/or complexity of the investigation involved therein may by an order, allow the   application   to   be   proceeded   with   or   reject   the application. After an order under Section 245D(1) is made, by the Settlement Commission, Rule 8 of the 1987 Rules mandates that a copy of the annexure to the application, together with a copy of each of the statements and other documents   accompanying   such   annexure   shall   be forwarded to the Commissioner and further report shall be called from the Commissioner. The Settlement Commission can also direct the Commissioner to make further enquiry and investigations in the matter and furnish his report. Thereafter,   after   examining   the   record,   Commissioner's report and such further evidence that may be laid before it or obtained by it, the Settlement Commission is required to pass an order as it thinks fit on the matter covered by the application and in every matter relating to the case not covered by the application and referred to in the report of the Commissioner under sub­section (1) or sub­section (3) of   the   said   Section.   It   bears   repetition   that   as   per   the scheme of the Chapter, in the first instance, the report of the   Commissioner   is   based   on   the   bare   information furnished   by   the   assessee   against   item   No.   10   of   the prescribed form, and the material gathered by the revenue by   way   of   its   own   investigation.   It   is   evident   from   the language of Section 245C(1) of the Act that the report of the Commissioner is primarily on the nature of the case and the complexities of the investigation, as the annexure filed in support of the disclosure of undisclosed income against item No. 11 of the form and the manner in which such income had been derived are treated as confidential and are not supplied to the Commissioner. It is only after the Settlement Commission has decided to proceed with the application   that   a   copy   of   the   annexure   to   the   said application   and   other   statements   and   documents accompanying   such   annexure,   containing   the   aforesaid information   are   required   to   be   furnished   to   the Commissioner. In our opinion even when the Settlement Commission decides to proceed with the application, it will not be denuded of its power to examine as to whether in his   application   under  Section   245C(1)  of   the   Act,   the assessee   has   made   a   full   and   true   disclosure   of   his undisclosed   income.   We   feel   that   the   report(s)   of   the Commissioner and other documents coming on record at different stages of the consideration of the case, before or after the Settlement Commission has decided to proceed with   the   application   would   be   most   germane   to determination   of the said question. It is plain from the language of sub­section (4) of Section 245D of the Act that the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission to pass such orders as it may think fit is confined to the matters covered by the application and it can extend only to such matters which are referred to in the report of the Commissioner under sub­section (1) or sub­section (3) of the said Section. A "full and true" disclosure of income, which had not been previously disclosed by the assessee, being a pre­condition for a valid application under Section 245C(1) of the Act, the scheme of Chapter XIX­A does not contemplate revision of the income so disclosed in the application against item No. 11 of the form. Moreover, if an assessee is permitted to revise his disclosure, in essence, he would be making a fresh   application   in   relation   to   the   same   case   by withdrawing the earlier application. In this regard, Section 245C(3)  of the Act which prohibits the withdrawal of an application once made under sub­section (1) of the said Section is instructive in as much as it manifests that an assessee cannot be permitted to resile from his stand at any stage during the proceedings. Therefore, by revising the application, the applicant would be achieving something indirectly what he cannot otherwise achieve directly and in the process rendering the provision   of sub­section (3) of Section   245C  of   the   Act   otiose   and   meaningless.   In   our opinion, the scheme of said Chapter is clear and admits no ambiguity.

27.

It is trite law that a taxing statute is to be construed strictly. In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is said in the relevant provision. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about   a   tax.   (See:   Cape   Brandy   Syndicate   Vs.   Inland Revenue Commissioners (1921) 1 KB 64 and Federation of A.P. Chambers of Commerce & Industry & Ors. Vs. State of A.P. (2001) 247 ITR 36 (SC) In interpreting a taxing statute, the Court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. Considerations of hardship, injustice and equity are entirely out of place in interpreting a taxing statute.   (Also   see:   Commissioner   of   Sales   Tax,   Uttar

28.

As afore­stated, in the scheme of Chapter XIX­A, there is no stipulation for revision of an application filed under Section 245C(1) of the Act and thus the natural corollary is that   determination   of   income   by   the   Settlement Commission has necessarily to be with reference to the income disclosed in the application filed under the said Section in the prescribed form.

29.

Having noticed the scheme of Chapter XIX­A of the Act, we shall now advert to the facts at hand and evaluate the rival submissions.

30.

Before addressing the other issues, at the outset, we record our disapproval with the view of the High Court that it would not be proper to set aside the proceedings before the Settlement Commission even though it was convinced that the assessee had not made full and true disclosure of their income while making application under Section 245C of the Act. As stated above, in its earlier order dated 28th July,   2000   while   declaring   order   dated   17th   November, 1994, as ab initio void and setting aside order dated 29th January, 1999, the High Court had remitted the case to the Settlement Commission to decide the entire matter afresh, including the question of maintainability of the application under Section 245C(1) of the Act. The said order of the High Court was put in issue before this Court and was set aside vide   order   dated   11th   July,   2006   and   the   case   was remanded back to the High Court for fresh consideration. Nevertheless, all points raised by the parties, including the plea   of   the   revenue   that   the   application   filed   by   the assessee   before   the   Settlement   Commission   was   not maintainable as the assessee had not made a full and true disclosure of their undisclosed income were kept open. The High Court addressed itself on the said issue and found that the assessee had not made a full and true disclosure of their income while making the application under Section 245C(1) of the Act, yet did not find it proper to set aside the proceedings   on   that   ground.   Having   recorded   the   said adverse finding on the very basic requirement of a valid application   under  Section   245C(1)  of   the   Act,   the   High Court's opinion that it would not be proper to set aside the proceedings is clearly erroneous. The High Court appears to have not appreciated the object and scope of the scheme of   settlement   under  Chapter   XIX­   A   of   the  Act.   At  this extracted below :­ "Given that a document or transaction is genuine, the court cannot   go   behind   it   to   some   supposed   underlying substance.   This   is   the   well­known   principle   of   Inland Revenue Comrs v Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1, [1935] All   ER   Rep   259,   19   Tax   Cas   490. This   is   a   cardinal principle but it must not be overstated or over­extended. While   obliging   the   court   to   accept   documents   or transactions, found to be genuine, as such, it does not compel the court to look at a document or a transaction in blinkers, isolated from  any  context  to  which  it  properly belongs. If it can be seen that a document or transaction was intended to have effect as part of a nexus or series of transactions, or as an ingredient of a wider transaction intended as a whole, there is nothing in the doctrine to prevent it being so regarded; to do so is not to prefer form to substance, or substance to form. It is the task of the court to ascertain the legal nature of any transactions to which it is sought to attach a tax or a tax consequence and if   that   emerges   from   a   series   or   combination   of transactions, intended to operate as such, it is that series or combination which may be regarded."

31.

We   are   convinced   that,   in   the   instant   case,   the disclosure   of   Rs.11.41   crores   as   additional   undisclosed income in the revised annexure, filed on 19th September, 1994 alone was sufficient to establish that the application made   by   the   assessee   on   30th   September,   1993   under Section 245C(1) of the Act could not be entertained as it did not contain a "true and full" disclosure of their undisclosed income and "the manner" in which such income had been derived. However, we say nothing more on this aspect of the matter as the Commissioner, for reasons best known to him, has chosen not to challenge this part of the impugned order.

32.

We   shall   now   deal   with   the   principal   argument   of learned counsel for the assessee that the High Court had failed   to   consider,   in   their   correct   perspective   the   two reports submitted by the Commissioner on 30th August, 1995 and 20th October, 1997, in as much as, in the latter report   the   Commissioner   had   himself   computed   the undisclosed   income   at   Rs.   42.52   crores,   which   was equivalent   to   the   amount   finally   determined   by   the Settlement   Commission.   Therefore,   according   to   the learned counsel, there was no justification for the remand of the case back to the Settlement Commission. At the first blush,   the   argument   appears   to   be   attractive   but   on   a deeper   scrutiny,   it   does   not   merit   acceptance.   In   the impugned   order,   on   a   critical   examination   of   the   order passed by the Settlement Commission with reference to the said   two   reports,   in   particular   the   reconciliation   report submitted by the Commissioner on 20th October, 1997, estimating the undisclosed income at Rs. 187.20 crores, the High Court had found that only that part of the report dated 20th October, 1997, which dealt with "on money" was   highlighted   before   this   Court,   while   other   incomes, investments, receipts or payments were not covered in that part of the statement. The High Court also observed that the manner in which expenses had been shown, created  a serious doubt about the expenditure of Rs.734.02 lakhs. The   High   Court   has   also   noted   that   the   Settlement Commission  had  not  properly  dealt  with  the  amount  of Rs.911.51   lakhs   on   account   of   unexplained   expenses, loans   and   surplus   amount   of   Rs.488.98   lakhs,   while assessing the total income and thus an amount of Rs.14.49 crores had been left out while determining the undisclosed income of the assessee. Besides, the High Court has also commented that having come to the conclusion that the penalty leviable worked out to be Rs. 562.87 lakhs, the Settlement Commission had no reason for levying a token penalty of Rs. 50 lakhs, which was not even 10% of the minimum   leviable   penalty.   Ultimately   the   High   Court observed that : (i) since the Settlement Commission had not supplied   annexure   filed   on   19th   September,   1994, declaring   additional   income   of   Rs.11.41   crores,   due opportunity had not been given to the revenue to place its stand properly; (ii) huge amount of unexplained expenses, unexplained loans and unexplained surplus, total of which was   more   than   Rs.14   crores,   was   not   taken   into consideration   while   passing   the   final   order   and   (iii)   the Settlement   Commission   had   imposed   token   penalty   of Rs.50 lakhs while on its own assessment leviable penalty would have been Rs.562.87 lakhs. Further, if the amount which   had     not   been   taken   into   consideration   while assessing the total undisclosed income was to be taken into account, the amount of leviable penalty would have been much more. In light of these facts, the High Court formed the opinion that it would be in the interest of justice to set aside the final order passed by the Settlement Commission and to remand the case back to it for fresh adjudication on assessee's   application.   Bearing   in   mind   the   afore­stated factual position, as emanating from the material on record, we   find   it   difficult   to   persuade   ourselves   to   agree   with learned   counsel   for   the   assessee   that   there   was   no justification for order of remand by the High Court and that the  order  passed   by  the  Settlement  Commission  should have been affirmed. We are satisfied that under the given scenario, the High Court was correct in making the order of remand and no good ground is made out for interference in exercise   of   our   jurisdiction   under  Article   136  of   the Constitution.

33.

As regards the argument  of learned counsel for the assessee that the scope of judicial review being limited, the High Court should not have interfered with the order of the Settlement   Commission   in   exercise   of   its   power   under Article   226  of   the   Constitution,   in   our   opinion,   the argument is stated to be rejected. Having conceded before the  High   Court  that   the  assessee   was   not  pressing  the point of maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court, the assessee cannot be now permitted to resile from its earlier stand and raise the same issue before us. Even otherwise,   as   stated   above,   we   have   no   hesitation   in observing that the manner in which assessee's disclosures of additional income at different stages of proceedings were entertained by the Settlement Commission, rubbishing the objection of the Commissioner that the assessee had not made   a   full   and   true   disclosure   of   their   income   in   the application under Section 245C(1) of the Act, leaves much to be desired. 10.Thus the facts before the Apex Court were quite different than the facts of the present case as before the Apex Court revised disclosure was made whereas in the facts of the present case, additional disclosure is made to the tune of Rs.   12   Crore   and   therefore,   judgments   in   case   of Commissioner   of   Income­tax­I   v.   Income   Tax Settlement Commission  (supra)   dated 12th  July, 2016, Commissioner   of   Income­tax­I   v.   Income   Tax Settlement   Commission   and   anr.  (supra)     dated   2nd September,   2016,  Principal   Commissioner   of   Income­ tax,   Central   v.   Income   Tax   Settlement   Commission (supra) dated   13th June,   2017   and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Central v. Income Tax Settlement Commission (supra) dated 22nd October, 2019 would be applicable to the facts of the present case and as such   no   interference   is   called   for   while   exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more particularly, when the Commission has arrived at the

conclusion that further additional income of Rs.12 Crore offered   during   section   245D(4)     proceedings       can   be accepted   with   reference   to   income   disclosed   in   the settlement application. 11.On   perusal   of   the   impugned   order   passed   by   the Commission, it is apparent that the application submitted by   the   respondent   has   been   dealt   with   as   per   the provisions   of   section   245C   and   245D   of   the   Act.   The Commission   has   observed   detailed   procedure   while exercising powers under section 245D(4) of the Act of 1961 by examining thoroughly report submitted by the petitioner under Rule 9 of the Income Tax Settlement Commission (Procedure)   Rules,   1997. The   Commission   has   also provided proper opportunity of hearing to the respective parties   and   therefore   the   amount   which   has   been determined by the Commission is just and proper. In view of   the   aforesaid   decisions   cited   by   the   respondent,   the Commission   was   right   in   considering   the   revised   offer made   by   the   respondent   during   the   course   of   the proceedings in the nature of spirit of settlement. Therefore, the decision of the Apex Court in case of Ajmera Housing Corpn. (supra), would not come into operation in facts of the  case. We are therefore of the opinion that order passed by the Commission does not call for any interference. 12.In   view   of   the   foregoing   reasons   and   facts   and circumstances  and more particularly, in view of exercise of the   powers   by   this   Court   under   Article   226   of   the Constitution of India, the examination of the order of the Commission has to be made keeping in mind the scope of judicial review as per the decision of Apex Court in case of Jyotendrasinhji   (supra). Therefore, keeping in view the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction and in view of the overall background of facts whereby the Commission has thoroughly minutely examined all the details relating to the issue in question and arrived at a particular finding, same cannot be substituted.

13.

In view of the foregoing reasons, petitions fail and

accordingly are dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. (J. B. PARDIWALA, J) (BHARGAV D. KARIA, J) RAGHUNATH R NAIR

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