THE KORADACHERY PACCS LTD.,THIRUVARUR vs. ITO, WARD-1,, THIRUVARUR

The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the assessee is a Primary Agricultural Co-operative Society. For the assessment year under consideration, the assessee filed its return of income belatedly on 01.10.2020 declaring its income after claiming deduction of Rs.1,18,55,220/- u/s.80P of the Act.

The return so filed was processed by the CPC u/s.143(1) of the Act vide intimation dated 22.10.2021, whereby the claim of deduction u/s.80P of the Act was denied solely on the ground that the return of income had not been furnished within the time prescribed under the Act. Aggrieved by the aforesaid adjustment made in the intimation passed u/s.143(1) of the Act, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Ld.CIT(A). However, the appeal was presented with a delay of 284 days.

The assessee sought condonation of the said delay by placing reliance upon certain reasons explaining the circumstances which allegedly prevented it from filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. The Ld.CIT(A), after considering the explanation tendered by the assessee, found the same to be unsatisfactory and not constituting sufficient cause within the meaning of law for condoning the delay. Consequently, the Ld.CIT(A), vide impugned order dated 09.01.2024, declined to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal in limine without adjudicating the issues raised on merits.

Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Ld.CIT(A), the assessee preferred the present appeal before this Tribunal. Admittedly, the appeal before the Tribunal has also been filed with a substantial delay of 754 days. In support of its prayer for condonation of delay, the assessee has filed an affidavit stating, inter alia, that it is a Co-operative Society administered by a Board of Committee Members, most of whom are agriculturists by vocation and are not sufficiently conversant with the legal and procedural requirements governing the affairs of

We have carefully considered the affidavit filed by the assessee and the submissions advanced in support of the prayer for condonation of delay. It is well settled that while considering an application for condonation of delay, a liberal and justice-oriented approach ought to be adopted so that substantial justice is not defeated on account of technical considerations. Equally, it is trite law that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be construed in a routine or mechanical manner and the party seeking condonation must establish bona fide reasons explaining the entire period of delay.

There can be no quarrel with the proposition that ordinarily matters should be decided on merits and that procedural prescriptions should not stand in the way of dispensation of substantive justice. However, the principles governing condonation of delay also require the appellate forum to examine whether the party seeking such indulgence has demonstrated a prima facie case warranting consideration on merits, so that a deserving matter is not non-suited merely on account of delay.

In the facts of the present case, it is an admitted position that the assessee had filed its return of income belatedly and the deduction claimed u/s.80P of the Act came to be denied while processing the return u/s.143(1) of the Act. During the course of hearing, it was brought to our notice that the assessee has not approached the competent authority by filing an application u/s.119(2)(b) of the Act seeking condonation of delay in furnishing the return of income and for consequential consideration of its claim for deduction u/s.80P of the Act.

In our considered opinion, in the absence of any such application having been filed and adjudicated upon by the competent authority u/s.119(2)(b) of the

Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the assessee has failed to establish sufficient cause warranting condonation of the inordinate delay of 754 days in filing the present appeal. Furthermore, in the absence of recourse having been taken by the assessee u/s.119(2)(b) of the Act, the appeal does not survive for effective adjudication and continuation of the proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee stands dismissed.