ACC LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD.),MUMBAI vs. ADDLL. CIT ,RG. 1(1), MUMBAI

1. These are cross appeals pertaining to Assessment Year 2012-13 arising from the Appellate Order dated 29th December, 2017 passed by the ld. Commissioner of income Tax (Appeals) – 3 (hereinafter referred to as Ld.CIT(A)) whereby appeal filed by Assessee against the Assessment Order dated 21st March, 2016 passed under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was partly allowed. Aggrieved both Assessee and Revenue are in appeal before us.

ITA.NO. 3246/MUM/2018 (REVENUE APPEAL)

3. In the Ground No.1, Department has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Id. CIT(A) erred in partly deleting the disallowance made u/s. 14A r.w.r. 8D(2) of the l.T. Rules, 1962, when the assessee itself disallowed only direct expenses related to exempt income, especially when the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Maxopp. Investment Ltd. Vs CIT has held that the principle of apportionment of expense is engrained in section 14A of the Act.

4. On identical issue in Assessee’s appeal, in the Ground No.1, following issue is raised:

“1(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Commissioner of Income- tax(Appeals)-3 [hereinafter referred to as Ld. CIT (A)] was not justified rather grossly erred in confirming the action of the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (Large tax payer Unit) [hereinafter referred to as 'AO'] in adding back Rs. 97,00,000/- as notional expenses incurred towards earning exempt dividend income u/s 14A of the income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act') r.w.r 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 ('the Rules'), without appreciating the fact that no expense, other than the amount offered by the appellant in the return of income, were actually incurred by the appellant for earning such income. 1(b). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and without prejudice to GroundNo. 1(a) taken here-in-above, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in applying Rule 8D and disallowing

3 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited amounts representing pro-rata amounts related to expenses which has no direct and proximate nexus to exempt dividend income. 1(c). Without prejudice to ground 1(a) & 1(b), on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) erred in enhancing the disallowance u/s. 14A r.w.r 8D by considering actual expenditure of Rs.36,00,000/- as direct expenditure attributable to exempt income without according the Appellant an opportunity of being heard and thereby, violating the principles of natural justice and accordingly, the addition made is bad in law. 1(d). Without prejudice to Ground No. 1(c) taken herein above, the Ld. CIT(A) has enhanced the disallowance u/s 14A as per Rule 8D by considering actual expenditure of Rs. 36,00,000/- offered by the appellant as direct expenditure attributable to exempt income under rule 8D(i) of the Income Tax Rules without appreciating the fact that the said disallowance was suo-moto made by the Appellant and accordingly, ought to have been reduced while computing disallowance u/s 14A r.w.r 8D.”

5. Similar issue was considered by us in the Department Appeal in Ground No 1 in AY 2008-09 and held as under:

10. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. So far as proportionate interest disallowance u/s 14A is concerned, it is observed that Assessee has sufficient own funds in the form of share capital and reserves and surplus in comparison with investment in shares made by it. On this issue, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of South Indian Bank Ltd [2021] 130 taxmann.com 178 has held as under: “Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income not includible in total income (General) - Assessee-scheduled banks earned income from investments made in tax-free securities - Assessing Officer made proportionate disallowance of interest attributable to funds invested to earn tax free income under section 14A on grounds that separate accounts were not maintained for investment in tax-free securities - Whether since interest free own funds available with assessee exceeded their investments; investments would be presumed to be made out of assessee's own funds and proportionate disallowance was not warranted under section 14A on ground that separate accounts were not maintained by assessee for investments and other expenditure incurred for earning tax-free income - Held, yes [Para 27] [In favour of assessee] 11. Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court has, in the case of PCIT v. ShapoorjiPallonji& Co Ltd [(2020) 117 taxmann.com 625(Mum)] has, inter alia, observed as follows: “6. On thorough consideration we find that the principle of apportionment does not arise in this case as the jurisdictional facts have not been pleaded by the Revenue. In fact Tribunal while affirming the order of the first appellate authority noted that the first appellate authority had deleted the addition made by the assessing officer under section 14-A of the Act by observing that the interest-free fund available with the respondent - assessee was far in excess of the advance given. Tribunal further noted that the Revenue does not dispute the said finding and relying on the decision of this Court in CIT v. Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd. [2009] 178 Taxman 135/313 ITR 340, affirmed the deletion made by the first appellate authority.

4 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 7. We have perused the decision of this Court in Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd. (supra) wherein it has been held that if there are funds available with the assessee, both, interest-free and overdraft and/ or loans taken, then a presumption would arise that investments would be out of the interest-free funds generated or available with the assessee if the interest-free funds were sufficient to meet the investments. In the facts of that case, it was noted that the said presumption was established considering the finding of fact returned by the first appellate authority as affirmed by the Tribunal which is identical in the present case. 7.1 We also note that the said decision of this Court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Reliance Industries Ltd. [2019] 102 taxmann.com 52/261 Taxman 165/410 ITR 466.”

12. Respectfully following the binding decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court referred supra, disallowance u/s 14A made by Assessing Officer in connection with proportionate interest disallowance deleted by the Ld.CIT(A) is sustained.

13. So far as disallowance of other administrative expenditure is considered, it is observed that Hon'ble Delhi ITAT in the case of Vireet Investment Pvt. Ltd. [165 ITD 27] has held as under: “Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 - Expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income not includible in total income - Assessment year 2008-09 - Whether only those investments are to be considered for computing average value of investment which yielded exempt income during year - Held, yes [Para 11.16][Matter remanded]”

14. The above referred decision has been followed by co-ordinate Bench in the case of DCIT v. Shree Global Tradefin Ltd. in ITA No. 1374/Mum/2022 dated 22nd December, 2022 has held as under: “11. Having heard the rival submissions and perused the materials available on record. It is observed that the assessee has made a suo moto disallowance of Rs.1,263/- for which the assessee contends that the A.O. ought not to have applied Rule 8D on the ground that suo moto disallowance has been made by the assessee. The assessee further contends that without prejudice, the disallowance should be restricted only to the investments which have yielded an exempt income for the assessee during the impugned year. It is also pertinent to point out that since the assessee had not borrowed funds during the relevant year, no disallowance as per Rule 8D(2)(i) of the Income Tax Rules was warranted. It is also observed that the A.O. has recorded his satisfaction that the correctness of the assessee's claim of expenses of disallowance was not to the satisfaction of the A.O., thereby entitling the A.O. to invoke the provisions of Rule 8D and the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maxopp Investment Ltd. (supra) holds good in the present case. We are also of the considered opinion that the ld. CIT(A) has rightly held that the assessee has not made bifurcation of the expenses claimed under 'other expenses' and in case of which the A.O. had to invoke Rule 8D of the Income Tax Rules. The suo moto disallowance of the assessee does not disentitle the A.O. from invoking the said provision. In this regard, we find justification in the order of the ld. CIT(A) in upholding the A.O.'s action in invoking the provision of Rule 8D(2)(ii) by rejecting the assessee's contention that suo moto disallowance by the assessee warrants no further disallowances. The assessee's alternate claim is that the disallowance u/s. 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(iii) should be restricted only to those investments on which exempt income was earned by the assessee during the impugned year, by placing reliance on the decision of Vireet Investments Pvt. Ltd. (supra). We also find justification in the order of the ld. CIT(A) in holding that the disallowance u/s. 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(iii) of the 5 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited Act should be invoked for calculation of disallowance pertaining to only investment from which exempt income is earned by the assessee by placing reliance on the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Vireet Investments Pvt. Ltd. (supra). We find no infirmity in the order of the ld. CIT(A).

12. By respectfully following the above mentioned decisions, we uphold the order of the ld. CIT(A) in directing the A.O. to recompute the disallowance only to the investments which have yielded exempt income during the impugned year.”

15. Considering the finding given by Coordinate Bench, the Assessing Officer is directed to re-work disallowance u/s.14A under rule 8D(2)(iii) on investment which has yielded exempt income. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. This ground of appeal is partly allowed.”

6. Respectfully following the above said decision, we partly allow the ground raised by the assessee and revenue.

7. In the Ground No.2, Department has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Id. CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of unutilized CENVAT Credit amounting to Rs. 12,80,36,793/-.

8. Similar issue was considered by us in Department Appeal for AY 2005-06 in Ground no 2 and held as under:

“18. Considered the rival contentions and material placed on record. On this issue, Coordinate bench held in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd [2020] 113 taxmann.com 230 as under: “4. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. We find that as rightly pointed out by the ld. Representative for the assessee, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Diamond Dye Chem Ltd. (supra) has already dealt with the issue whether addition on account of MODVAT credit is warranted or not. The Hon'ble High Court relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. [2003] 130 Taxman 179/261 ITR 275 held that the unutilised credit cannot be directly added to the income of the assessee. The relevant para of the said decision is reproduced hereunder:— "5. We have considered the submissions. It is not disputed that the assessee was liable to excise duty. The assessee got credit in the excise duty already paid on the raw materials purchased by it and utilized in the manufacturing of excisable goods. The assessee was adopting the exclusive method i.e. valuing the raw materials on the purchase price minus (-) the Modvat credit. The same would be permissible. The Apex Court in the case of Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. (supra) while affirming the order of High Court, has observed that the income was not generated to the extent of Modvat credit or unconsumed raw material. Merely because the Modvat credit was irreversible credit offered to manufacturers upon purchase of duty paid raw materials, that would not amount to income which was liable to be taxed under the Act. It is also held that 6 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited whichever method of accounting is adopted, the net result would be the same.

6. Considering the above, the amount of the unutilized Cenvat credit could not have been directly added to the closing stock. The Tribunal has not committed any error." (underlined for emphasis by us) It is evident from the above that irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the assessee, i.e. 'Inclusive method', wherein the taxes are included in the opening stock, purchases, etc. or the 'Exclusive method', the MODVAT credit does not have any impact on the profit of the assessee. Thus, following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. (supra) and followed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Diamond Dye Chem Ltd. (supra), we set-aside the order of the CIT (A) and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the addition made on account of unutilised MODVAT credit. This Ground of appeal

is accordingly allowed.”

19. It is observed that on identical issue, Coordinate bench in Para No. 32 to 34 in the case of Ambuja Cement Limited in ITA No 5883/Mum/2012 & 5927/Mum/2012 (for A.Y. 2005- 06) vide order dated 31/10/2022 has dismissed revenue’s appeal. Respectfully following decisions of Coordinate as discussed herein above, the ground raised in Departmental Appeal is dismissed.

9. Respectfully following the above decision, we dismiss the ground raised by the revenue.

10. In the Ground No.3, Department has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 13,34,92,198/- by holding that premature payment of deferred sales tax at Net Present Value against the total sales tax liability represent capital receipt and could not be a remission or cessation of a trading liability under section 41(1) of the Act, especially when the scheme under consideration, also provides for capital investment subsidy separately and in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Siemens Pub. Communication Network Pvt. Limited, wherein, it has been held that unless, the grant indeed received by the assessee is utilized for acquisition of an asset, the must be understood to be in nature of revenue receipt, except, by way of voluntary contribution received from parent company.

11. On identical issue in Assessee’s appeal, in the Ground No.3, following issue is raised:

“3(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in not excluding sales tax incentive availed by the appellant under various schemes of different states, aggregating to Rs. 22,43,82,308/-, being capital in nature, in computing total income under the normal provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

7 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 3(b). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT (A) was not justified and grossly erred by disallowing Sales Tax Incentives by not following the order of the jurisdictional Bench of ITAT and Order of his precedent in the Appellant's own case without any reason recorded in the order

12. Similar issue was considered by us in Department Appeal for AY 2005-06 in Ground no 5 and held as under:

“32.Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. On this issue, coordinate bench in the case of Ambuja Cement Limited in & 5927/Mum/2012 (A.Y.2005-06) dated 31/10/2022 has held as under: “….. The relevant material facts, so far as necessary for adjudication of these grievances, are as follows. The assessee before us is a company engaged in the business of manufacturing of cement and generation of electricity. The assessee has set up its plants in different parts of the country, and as the location of some of these plants was in backward areas, the assessee had received certain sales tax concessions from the respective State Governments. These concessions were in the nature of exemptions and remissions etc, and were granted under specific schemes announced, under the industrial policies, from time to time. During the relevant previous year, the assessee received amounts aggregating to Rs 169,93,34,752, but all these receipts were treated as tax exempt on account of being in the nature of capital receipts. When income tax return filed by the assessee was subjected to the scrutiny assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had a lodged a claim for exclusion of Rs 169.93 crores, being sales tax exemption/incentives received by it, as capital receipt, and hence not liable to tax. The Assessing Officer declined this claim, primarily on the basis of certain observations in the judgments in the cases of Tamilnadu Sugar Corporation Ltd Vs CIT [(2001) 251 ITR 843 (Mad)], CIT Vs Rajaram Maize Products [(2001) 251 ITR 427 (SC)], CIT Vs S Kumars Tyre Manufacturing Co [(2004) 266 ITR 325 (MP)], and CIT Vs Abhishek Industries Ltd [(2006) 286 ITR 1 (P&H)]. The entire amount of Rs 1169.93 crores was added to income of the assessee. Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A). Learned CIT(A) took note of the fact that these amounts pertained to five different units under four schemes- namely Maharshtra’s Dispersal of Industries Package Scheme of Incentives 1993 (Maratha Unit), Punjab’s Industrial Incentives Code under the Industrial Policy, 1996 (Ropar and Bhatinda Units), Rajasthan’s Sales Tax New Incentives Scheme for Industries, 1989 (Rabriyawas Unit), and Exemptions/ Concessions to Industries Excise & Taxation Department Notification No EXN C(9)2/9- dated 31-1-2-1994 (Himachal Unit). He discussed these schemes in quite a bit of detail-to the extent wordings of the preamble of the schemes are concerned, and concluded that while the amounts aggregating to Rs 130,57,12,796, in respect of Punjab and Maharashtra Schemes, are indeed capital receipts in nature, and exempt from tax as such, the amounts aggregating to Rs 39,36,21,956 are revenue in nature, and to that extent the Assessing Officer was justified in including the same in taxable income. None of the parties is satisfied. While the assessee is aggrieved of the amount of Rs 39,36,21,956 being included in his taxable income, the Assessing Officer is aggrieved of the learned CIT(A)’s granting relief of Rs 130,57,12,796. Both parties are in appeal before us.

8 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 7. We find that the learned CIT(A) has, in his elaborate analysis, primarily followed the Special Bench decision in the case of DCIT Vs Reliance Industries Ltd [(2004) 88 ITD SB 273 (Mum)]. Upon analysis of this decision, he has noted that ‘for deciding the nature of subsidy, whether capital or revenue, what should be seen and examined is the purpose for which the subsidy has been given, and not the timing of the subsidy or the manner in which it has been given to the industry’, as is also held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs Ponni Sugar and Chemicals Ltd [(2008) 306 ITR 392 (SC)]. A large number of judicial precedents have been cited in this context. Learned CIT(A) has then held that so far as the object and purpose for which the subsidy is given, only the subsidy schemes of the Maharashtra and Punjab State specifically state that the subsidies in question are for achieving dispersal of industries outside Mumbai, to attract them to the underdeveloped and developing areas of the State, and to promote the growth of the industry in the State, in the preamble to the scheme. It is on this basis that he has held that so far as the subsidies given by the Maharashtra and Punjab States are concerned, these are required to be treated as capital in nature, whereas, the subsidies received from the State Governments of Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan, in the absence of specific mention to the effect in the preambles of the subsidy schemes that these subsidies are required to be held to be revenue in nature. However, in our considered view, the approach of discerning the purpose of the subsidy, solely from the specific words used in the preamble of the scheme and without examining the overall scheme of the Act- which is admittedly to promote the growth of industry, is incorrect and superficial. The subsidies so received can be said to be revenue in nature unless these subsidies are for augmenting the profits of the assessee, and that is not even the case of the revenue. The CIT(A) is simply swayed by the wording of the preamble of the scheme- something clearly impermissible. These subsidy schemes are materially similar in nature, and there are, by now, a number of decisions of the coordinate benches, as also Hon’ble Courts above, dealing with these schemes. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that the subsidies received by the assessee are in the nature of sales tax subsidies, and dealing with sales tax subsidies, Hon’ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of CIT Vs Nirma Ltd [(2017) 397 ITR 49 (Guj)], has observed as follows: 7. So far as second issued as to Whether the Appellate Tribunal was right in law and on facts in upholding the decision of the CIT (A) and in directing the Assessing Officer to consider the Sales-tax exemption benefit of Rs. 5,45,81,171/- as capital receipts is concerned, Mr.Mehta contended that in view of the decision of the Calcutta and Punjab High Court, the Tribunal has committed an error in reversing the view taken by CIT (Appeals) so far as Tax Appeal No.226 of 2010 is concerned, wherein the CIT (A), after discussing the evidence has held in favour of the department. In this regard, he has relied upon the decision of High Court of Bombay in the case of CIT v. Reliance Industries Ltd. [2010] 8 taxmann.com 218/[2011] 339 ITR 632, wherein it is held that object of subsidy being to set up new units in backward area is a capital receipt and another decision of High Court of Calcutta in the case of CIT v. Chhindwara Fuels [2001] 114 Taxman 707/[2000] 245 ITR 9, wherein it is held that subsidy in the form of refund of sales-tax received after commencement of production cannot be treated as capital receipt.

8. On the other hand, Mr. Soparkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent contended that so far as Tax Appeal No.226 of 2010 is concerned, after discussing the evidence on record, the Tribunal has followed earlier decision and discussed the issue in detail in para 54 and 55 of its decision, which reads as under:-

9 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited "54. Per contra, the learned D.R. Supported the orders passed by the Assessing Officer and the learned CIT (A). Referring to the judgment in Sahney Steel and Press Works Limited v. CIT 228 ITR 253 (SC), he submitted that the impugned sales tax exemption increased the profits of the assessee by eliminating the expenses which the assessee would have had to incur later and therefore the impugned receipts were in the revenue field. He also referred to Explanation (10) to Section 43 (1) of the Income Tax Act inserted in with effect from 01/04/99 to emphasise that the action of the assessee in not reducing the cost of assets by the amount of subsidy for working out the Written Down Value was indicative of the fact that the impugned receipts were not in the nature of capital receipts.

9. He further contended that in view of decisions of this Court in CIT v. Birla VXL Ltd. [2013] 32 taxmann.com 330/215 Taxman 117 (Guj.) and in Dy. CIT v. Munjal Auto Industries Ltd. [2013] 37 taxmann.com 115/218 taxman 135 (Guj.) the issue is squarely covered and the decisions which are sought to be relied upon by learned advocate for the appellant are not applicable in the facts of the present case. In the case of Birla VXL Ltd. (supra), this Court has observed as under:- '12. It can thus be straightaway seen that the benefit, though computed in terms of the Sales Tax liability in the hands of the recipient, the same was not mean to give any benefit on day-to-day functioning of the business, or for making the industry more profitable. The principle aim of the scheme was to cover the capital outlay already made by the assessee in undertaking special modernization of its existing industry.

11 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 8. It is undoubtedly true that such subsidy was computed in terms of sales tax deferment and necessarily therefore, would accrue to an industry only once the commercial production commences. However, this by itself would not be either a sole or concluding factor. In case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. and others v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in 228 ITR 253, the Apex Court held and observed that the character of the subsidy in the hands of the recipient whether revenue or capital will have to be determined, having regard to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. The source of find is quite immaterial. If the purpose is to help the assessee to set up its business or complete a project the monies must be treated as having been received for capital purposes. Such But if monies are given to the assessee for assisting him in carrying out the business operations and given after the satisfaction of the conditions of commencement of production, such subsidy must be treated as assistance for the purpose of the trade."

11. He also submitted that in view of above decisions, these appeals may not be entertained.

8. In the case of JCIT Vs Grasim Industries Limited ( ITA Nos 2155/Mum/2016 and Ors; order date 29th April 2022), a coordinate bench has dealt with these legal issues in considerable detail and observed as follows: 5.3.5. …………. the dominant purpose for which the incentive scheme per se introduced by the respective State Governments was only for the purpose of setting up of industries in the respective areas for industrial development in State and also to accelerate development and absolutely not for augmenting the profits of the assessee. Effectively, the schemes of various State Governments envisaged the rapid industrialisation, growth and new employment generation in the respective areas which would in turn promote the growth of the State. Hence, it could be safely concluded that subsidy / incentive granted is only for setting up of the units based on the fixed percentage of the capital cost and not for running the business of the assessee. Moreover, even this subsidy which is determined based on sales tax assessment orders for 9 years, 6 years etc., are subject to maximum outer limit already fixed under the respective schemes. Though the quantification of the subsidy has been made post commencement of business, the measurement of subsidy is immaterial. In our considered opinion, none of the schemes contemplated to finance the assessee in the form of subsidy / incentive for meeting the working capital requirements of the assessee company post commencement of business. Hence, by applying the purpose test, apparently, the subsidy / incentive received in the instant case would only have to be construed as capital receipts not chargeable to income tax. In this regard, we find that ld. AR placed reliance on the 12 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd., reported in 306 ITR 392, wherein the incentive conferred under that scheme were two fold. First, in the nature of higher free sale sugar quota and second, in allowing the manufacturer to collect Excise duty on sale price on the free sale sugar in excess of the normal quota, but to pay to the Government only the Excise duty payable on the price of levy sugar. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 14 of its decision had held that “character of receipt of subsidy has to be determined with respect to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. The point of time at which the subsidy is paid is not relevant. The source is immaterial. The form of subsidy is immaterial.” In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while rendering this decision had duly considered its earlier decision in the case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd., reported in 228 ITR 253 and had absolutely no quarrel with that judgement. Rather, it concurred with the decision rendered in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd., case. In this regard, it would be relevant to reproduce the operative portion of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd., as under:- 14. The second case is Lincolnshire Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Smart 20 TC 643. In that case it was found that Lincolnshire Sugar Co. Ltd carried on the business of manufacturing sugar from home grown beet. The company was paid various sums under British Sugar Industry (Assistance) Act, 1931, out of monies provided by the Parliament. The question was whether these monies were to be taken into account as trade receipts or not. The object of the grant was that in the year 1981, in view of heavy fall in prices of sugar, sugar industries were in difficulty. The Government decided to give financial assistance to certain industries in respect of sugar manufactured by them from home-grown beet during the relevant period. Lord Macmillan held that- "What to my mind is decisive is that these payments were made to the company in order that the money might be used in their business." He further observed that: "I think that they were supplementary trade receipts bestowed upon the company by the Government and proper to be taken into computation in arriving at the balance of the company's profits and gains for the year in which they were received."

14 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 19. Sahney Steel was distinguished, in para 16 by then stating that this Court found that the assessee was free to use the money in its business entirely as it liked.

20. Finally, it was found that, applying the test of purpose, the Court was satisfied that the payment received by the assessee under the scheme was not in the nature of a helping hand to the trade but was capital in nature.

21. What is important from the ratio of this judgment is the fact that Sahney Steel was followed and the test laid down was the "purpose test". It was specifically held that the point of time at which the subsidy is paid is not relevant; the source of the subsidy is immaterial; the form of subsidy is equally immaterial.

22. Applying the aforesaid test contained in both Sahney Steel as well as Ponni Sugar, we are of the view that the object, as stated in the statement of objects and reasons, of the amendment ordinance was that since the average occupancy in cinema theatres has fallen considerably and hardly any new theatres have been started in the recent past, the concept of a Complete Family Entertainment Centre, more popularly known as Multiplex Theatre Complex, has emerged. These complexes offer various entertainment facilities for the entire family as a whole. It was noticed that these complexes are highly capital intensive and their gestation period is quite long and therefore, they need Government support in the form of incentives qua entertainment duty. It was also added that government with a view to commemorate the birth centenary of late Shri V. Shantaram decided to grant concession in entertainment duty to Multiplex Theatre Complexes to promote construction of new cinema houses in the State. The aforesaid object is clear and unequivocal. The object of the grant of the subsidy was in order that persons come forward to construct Multiplex Theatre Complexes, the idea being that exemption from entertainment duty for a period of three years and partial remission for a period of two years should go towards helping the industry to set up such highly capital intensive entertainment centers. This being the case, it is difficult to accept Mr. Narasimha's argument that it is only the immediate object and not the larger object which must be kept in mind in that the subsidy scheme kicks in only post construction, that is when cinema tickets are actually sold. We hasten to add that the object of the scheme is only one -there is no larger or immediate object. That the object is carried out in a particular manner is irrelevant, as has been held in both Ponni Sugar and Sahney Steel.

24. After setting out both the Supreme Court judgments referred to hereinabove, the High Court found that the concessions were issued in order to achieve the twin objects of acceleration of industrial development in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and generation of employment in the said State. Thus considered, it was obvious that the incentives would have to be held capital and not revenue. Mr. Ganesh, learned Senior Counsel, pointed out that by an order dated 19.04.2016, this Court stated that the issue raised in those appeals was covered, inter alia, by the judgment in Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. case (supra) and the appeals were, therefore, dismissed.

25. We have no hesitation in holding that the finding of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court on the facts of the incentive subsidy contained in that case is absolutely correct. In that once the object of the subsidy was to industrialize the State and to generate employment in the State, the fact that the subsidy took a particular form and the fact that it was granted only after commencement of production would make no difference. 5.3.7. We further find that the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Munjal Auto Industries Ltd., in Tax Appeal No.450 with 451-453 of 2012 dated 28/01/2013 also had an occasion to consider the very same issue in dispute before us. In this case also, the Revenue had taken a specific argument that since subsidy would be received only once unit goes for production, subsidy would be revenue nature. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court referred to the relevant subsidy scheme noted that concession was capped @125% of fixed capital investment and could be availed within 9 years. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court after considering the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court both in the case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd., and Ponni Sugars and Chemicals referred to supra had held as under:- “7. From the provisions of the said scheme, it clearly emerges that the subsidy though computed in terms of sales tax deferment or waiver, in essence it was meant for capital outlay expended by the assessee for set up of the unit in case of a new industrial unit and for expansion and diversification of an existing unit. As noted, such subsidy was available only to a new industrial unit or a unit undertaking expansion or diversification. Fixed capital investment has been defined as to include various investments in land under use, new construction, plant and machinery etc. The entitlement was related to percentage of fixed capital investment.

8. It is undoubtedly true that such subsidy was computed in terms of sales tax deferment and necessarily therefore, would accrue to an industry only once the commercial production commences. However, this by itself would not be either a sole or concluding factor. In case of Sahney Steel and Press Works 16 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited Ltd. and others v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in 228 ITR 253, the Apex Court held and observed that the character of the subsidy in the hands of the recipient whether revenue or capital will have to be determined, having regard to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. The source of find is quite immaterial. If the purpose is to help the assessee to set up its business or complete a project the monies must be treated as having been received for capital purposes. Such But if monies are given to the assessee for assisting him in carrying out the business operations and given after the satisfaction of the conditions of commencement of production, such subsidy must be treated as assistance for the purpose of the trade.

9. Such decision was considered in case of Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd.(supra) and the Apex Court held and observed as under : “13. The main controversy arises in these cases because of the reason that the incentives were given through the mechanism of price differential and the duty differential. According to the Department, price and costs are essential items that are basic to the profit making process and that any price related mechanism would normally be presumed to be revenue in nature. In other words, according to the Department, since incentives were given through price and duty differentials, the character of the impugned incentive in this case was revenue and not capital in nature. On the other hand, according to the assessee, what was relevant to decide the character of the incentive is the purpose test and not the mechanism of payment.

14. In our view, the controversy in hand can be resolved if we apply the test laid down in the judgment of this Court in the case of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. (supra). In that case, on behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the subsidy given was up to 10% of the capital investment calculated on the basis of the quantum of investment in capital and, therefore, receipt of such subsidy was on capital account and not on revenue account. It was also urged in that case that subsidy granted on the basis of refund of sales tax on raw materials, machinery and finished goods were also of capital nature as the object of granting refund of sales tax was that the assessee could set up new business or expand his existing business. The contention of the assessee in that case was dismissed by the Tribunal and, therefore, the assessee had come to this Court by way of a special leave petition. It was held by this Court on the facts of that case and on the basis of the analyses of the Scheme therein that the subsidy given was on revenue account because it was given by way of assistance in carrying on of trade or business. On the facts of that case, it was held that the subsidy given was to meet recurring expenses. It was not for acquiring the capital asset. It was not to meet part of the cost. It was not granted for production of or bringing into existence any new asset. The subsidies in that case were granted year after year only after setting up of the new 17 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited industry and only after commencement of production and, therefore, such a subsidy could only be treated as assistance given for the purpose of carrying on the business of the assessee. Consequently, the contentions raised on behalf of the assessee on the facts of that case stood rejected and it was held that the subsidy received by Sahney Steel could not be regarded as anything but a revenue receipt. Accordingly the matter was decided against the assessee. The importance of the judgment of this Court in Sahney Steel case lies in the fact that it has discussed and analysed the entire case law and it has laid down the basic test to be applied in judging the character of a subsidy. That test is that the character of the receipt in the hands of the assessee has to be determined with respect to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. In other words, in such cases, one has to apply the purpose test. The point of time at which the subsidy is paid is not relevant. The source is immaterial. The form of subsidy is immaterial. The main eligibility condition in the scheme with which we are concerned in this case is that the incentive must be utilized for repayment of loans taken by the assessee to set up new units or for substantial expansion of existing units. On this aspect there is no dispute. If the object of the subsidy scheme was to enable the assessee to run the business more profitably then the receipt is on revenue account. On the other hand, if the object of the assistance under the subsidy scheme was to enable the assessee to set up a new unit or to expand the existing unit then the receipt of the subsidy was on capital account. Therefore, it is the object for which the subsidy/assistance is given which determines the nature of the incentive subsidy. The form of the mechanism through which the subsidy is given is irrelevant.”

10. In a recent judgement dated 8.1.2013 in case of DCIT- Circle1(2)-Baroda v. Inox Leisure Ltd., we had an occasion to consider somewhat similar question in the backdrop of entertainment tax waiver scheme of State of Gujarat as well as State of Maharashtra. Even in such a case, the entertainment tax waiver which was granted in terms of sale of tickets was treated as capital in nature when it was found that same was relatable to the capital investment made by the assessee. It was held as under : “10. From the above noted provisions of thescheme it can be clearly seen that the entire purpose of granting tax exemption was for giving the boost to the terrorism sector. This was to be achieved by attracting higher investment in areas with tourism potential. In order to achieve such purpose, exemption from various taxes as may be applicable was granted. It is true that the exemption was to be computed in terms of tax otherwise payable by the industry. However, the purpose of such exemption was to meet with the capital outlay already undertaken by the assessee. This clearly comes out from various provisions of the scheme. For example, the scheme was applicable only to the new project or to a existing project provided investment in fixed capital or capacity was increased atleast by 50%.Thus, the very eligibility for seeking exemption was linked with new investment being made in 18 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited fixed capital. Further though the scheme envisaged a certain period spanning for 5 to 10 years during which such exemption could be availed depending on the category of the unit, such exemption would cease the moment the total incentives touched 100% of the eligible capital investments. In other words, the upper limit of total incentive which the unit could receive from the State Government in the form of tax waiver would not exist 100% of the eligible capital investment regardless of the residue of the period of its exemption eligibility as per the scheme. From the combined reading of salient features of the scheme, we have no doubt in our mind that the incentive was being offered for recouping or covering a capital investment or outlay already made by the assessee.”

19 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited The Hon’ble Tribunal for Asst Years 1984-85 and 1985-86 had held the sales tax exemption to be capital in nature as the same was given for industrial development of the backward districts as well as generation of employment. However, the matter was referred to the Special Bench as it was alleged that the decision for AY 1985-86 was virtually overruled by subsequent decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Bajaj Auto Ltd (ITA No. 49 and 1101 of 1991). The Special Bench held that the decision of Bajaj Auto has not overruled the decision of Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal for AY 1985-86 on the following basis: i) There cannot be any question of overruling the decision of one Bench by another bench of equal strength as it would be contrary to the established norms of judicial system in the country. ii) Even on merits it cannot be said that the Tribunal has laid out more stress on the form of the scheme and not their substance as held in Bajaj Auto as the Tribunal in the order for AY 1985-86 has explained the difference between exemption schemes of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh in detail. iii) Reliance placed by Tribunal in Asst Year 1985-86 on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd. v. CIT (228 ITR 253) cannot be said to be erroneous. The Tribunal did recognise that the object with which subsidy is given is decisive as laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court. If the scheme is for setting up or expansion of industry in a backward area, it will be capital, irrespective of the modality or source of fund. If the scheme is for assisting of carrying out of business operations, it is revenue. Hon’ble Supreme Court demonstrated the principle that the object of the subsidy must be given primary importance over the source of fund. 5.4.1. Ultimately the Special Bench after placing reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sahney Steel and Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. Reported in 260 ITR 605 held that the decision of the Tribunal in Asst Year 1985-86 is correct and observed the following: 37….The observations of the Madras High Court lend support to the view that the purpose and object of the Scheme under which the subsidy is given is of more fundamental importance than the fact that the subsidy was received after the commencement of production or conditional upon it. Therefore, in our view and with respect, the Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. ( supra) had correctly interpreted and understood the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd.’s case (supra).

38. In this view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative.

20 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 5.4.2. The ld. AR vehemently submitted that the department did not challenge the decision of the Special Bench before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court. However, he fairly stated that there was a subsequent decision of the Division Bench of this Tribunal which followed the Special Bench and that Division Bench order was challenged by the Revenue before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court while disposing of the said appeal did not reverse the decision of the Special Bench and accepted the same. When that appeal was further challenged by the Revenue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court remitted the matter back to the Hon’ble Bombay High Court. Accordingly, he argued that the decision of Special Bench was never reversed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as stated by the ld. Special Counsel for the Revenue and accordingly still is a good law and therefore a binding precedent on this Division Bench. In fact, in assessee’s own case for A.Y.2001-02 in ITA No.778 of 2015 dated 18/12/2018 before the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court, wherein the question Nos. c & d was exactly on this point. For the sake of convenience, the question Nos. c & d raised by the Revenue before the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court is reproduced hereunder:- “(c) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was justified in restoring the issue of taxability of the sale tax exemption benefit of Rs.58 crores availed by the assessee to the file of the Assessing Officer for deciding afresh after considering the decision of the Special Bench of the ITAT in the case of DCIT V. Reliance Industries Ltd., 88 ITD 273, which has not been accepted by the Revenue? (d) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was justified in entertaining the additional ground without appreciating that the assessee had treated the amount of sales tax exemption benefit of Rs.58 crores as revenue receipt and had included this amount in the returned income and it had been taxed accordingly and the assessee did not raise this issue before the CIT(A) and the issue had attained finality?” 5.4.3. While disposing of the questions Nos. c & d, the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court categorically held that the decision of the Special Bench of Tribunal had not been reversed or stayed by any higher judicial forum and it holds good as on date. The relevant operative portion of the judgement of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in this regard is reproduced as under:- “3. We will first address the questions no. (c) and (d), which are different elements of the same issue. The respondent assessee had received a subsidy. It is undisputed that up to the level of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the assessee did not raise a contention that such subsidy was towards capital account and, therefore, not taxable. However, before the Tribunal such a contention was raised. The Tribunal by the impugned judgment relied upon its earlier judgment for the Assessment Year 1999-2000 in case of this very assessee and restored the issue back to the Assessing Officer. In the earlier order, the Tribunal had remanded the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer "to decide the issue afresh after considering 21 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited the decision of Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra)". Thus, the Tribunal remanded the issue back to the Assessing Officer to be decided in the light of the Special Bench judgment in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. The Revenue's grievance in this respect is two fold. It was contended that the issue was raised for the first time before the Tribunal and the same should not have been permitted. Secondly, the view of the Tribunal in case of Reliance Industries Ltd. was challenged before the High Court. The High Court in a judgment dated 15.04.2009 in Income Tax Appeal No. 1299 of 2008 had held that no question of law in this respect arises and thereby confirmed the judgment of the Tribunal. It was pointed out that against this judgment of the High Court, the Department had approached the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court had held that a question of law did arise. The Supreme Court framed a question and placed the matter back before the High Court. We are informed that this appeal is still pending.

5. As long as the material exists on record, a contention raised by the assessee for the first time before the Tribunal, cannot be barred. So much is clear from series of judgments of various Courts including of this Court in case of CIT Vs. Pruthvi Brokers and Shareholders P. Ltd. (2012) 349 ITR 336. It is not the case of the Revenue that the assessee in the context of its contention on the nature of the subsidy, desired to produce additional evidence. It is true that the judgment of this Court confirming the order of the Tribunal in case of Reliance Industries Ltd. has been partially reversed by the Supreme Court. A question of law has been framed and placed for consideration of the 4 of High Court. However, this does not mean that the judgment of the Tribunal as on today stands reversed or stayed. In any case, quite apart from the judgment in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. of the Special Bench of the Tribunal, it is always been for the assessee to contend before the Assessing Officer by pointing out the relevant clauses of the subsidy that in law the subsidy cannot be treated to be towards revenue account. It would be equally open for the Revenue to oppose such a contention if so advised. The Assessing Officer and the Revenue authorities would have to take a decision in accordance with law. These questions, therefore, are not considered.” (emphasis applied by us while placing reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court)

22 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 5.4.4. Against this judgement on other issues, the Revenue preferred an SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same was dismissed vide order dated 23/08/2019 in SLP (Civil) Diary No.22929/2019. In other words, the Revenue while preferring SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not even challenge this ground of subsidy and the decision of Special Bench of Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd., Hence, the order of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in assessee’s own case for A.Y.2001-02 had become final on the very same issue. Though the said decision has been rendered for subsequent assessment year as compared to the years under consideration before us, in view of identical facts and the same legal issue, and more especially, in order to address the fact of binding precedent of Special Bench decision in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd., this Bench deems it fit to place reliance on the said decision also of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court. Accordingly, we categorically hold that the decision of the Special Bench still holds the field and is a good law. The entire contentions raised by the ld. Special Counsel for the Revenue in this regard are hereby dismissed. 5.4.5. Further, we find that the Co-ordinate Bench of Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. Genus Electrotech Ltd., reported in 72 taxmann.com 101 had an occasion to consider the fact of Special Bench decision in a more elaborate manner. The relevant operative portion is reproduced hereunder:- “11. We find that so far as the Special Bench decision of this Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra) is concerned, it still holds the field. All that has happened, as a result of Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision dated 9th September 2011, is that Hon'ble Bombay High Court has now admitted the question "whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Tribunal was right in holding that sales tax exemption was a capital receipt" and will, in due course though, adjudicate on this legal issue. To that extent, Hon'ble Bombay High Court's order dated 15th April 2009, to the extent of declining to admit this question, stands reversed. However, the decision of the Special Bench still holds good as the same has not, and at least not yet, even been examined by Hon'ble Bombay High Court. Mere admission of appeal against a decision, as is elementary, does not affect the biding nature of a judicial precedent. The Special Bench decision, in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra), was not reversed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, but was directed to be examined, on merits, by Hon'ble Bombay High Court. That is quite different from disapproving the special bench decision, but it appears that the coordinate bench was led to believe, and there could not have been any other reason for ignoring the special bench decision, that this Special Bench decision is reversed. That is patently incorrect, and when we pointed it out to the learned Commissioner (DR), he did not have much to say except to rely upon the coordinate bench decision which seems to have followed that approach. The coordinate bench, in the case of Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. (supra), did indeed travel much beyond its limited mandate in ignoring a binding judicial precedent simply because appeal against that special bench decision is now pending before Hon'ble Bombay High Court. When posed with a special bench decision and a division bench directly on the 23 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited issue, though touching different chords, we have no difficulty in recognizing our limitations. The wisdom of a division bench, even if superior- as strenuously argued by the learned Commissioner, has to make way for the higher wisdom of a larger bench. It is this faith of judicial hierarchical system that is the strength of our functioning, and we must follow the same. We, therefore, regret our inability to follow the division bench in the case of Jindal Power, no matter how deeply we respect and admire the work of all our colleagues, and we would rather be guided by the special bench decision - which is exactly what another division bench, on the same set of facts as before us, did in the case of Ajanta Manufacturing Ltd. (supra). As for learned Commissioner (DR)'s suggestion that we should follow the jurisdictional High Court decision in the case off Colourman Dyechem Ltd. (supra), we find that Their Lordships, in this case, were dealing with an entirely different type of subsidy which was clearly dealing with an expansion situation. However, we would rather refrain from making any further detailed observations on this issue, as we are alive to the fact that Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court, in Tax Appeal No 358 of 2012, has admitted appeal against the decision of this Tribunal in Ajanta's Manufacturing Ltd. case (supra) and all these issues will now come up for consideration of Their Lordships. The fact that appeal is admitted does not, as we have stated earlier as well, does not affect the binding nature of the judicial precedents. There is no dispute before us that the scheme under which the sales tax and excise duty subsidy are given to this assessee are the same as in the case of Ajanta Manufacturing Ltd. (supra). All the material facts being the same, there is no reason to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by the coordinate bench. We must, therefore, uphold the conclusions arrived at by the Commissioner (Appeals), which are in consonance with the Special Bench decision in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. (supra) and coordinate bench decision in the case of Ajanta Manufacturing Ltd. (supra), and decline to interfere in the matter.” (emphasis supplied by us) 5.4.6. In view of the above, no fault could be attributed on the ld. CIT(A) placing reliance on the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal and granting relief to the assessee in the instant case.

9. In the Special Bench decision in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd (supra), what came up for consideration was specifically the sales tax subsidy, and that decision, as we seen in the elaborate analysis of the coordinate bench- as extracted above still holds good in law. In the case of CIT Vs Chaphalkar Brothers [(2018) 400 ITR 279 (SC)], Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that where the object of respective subsidy schemes of State Governments was to encourage the development of Multiple Theatre Complexes, incentives would be held to be capital in nature and not revenue receipts, and, following the same logic, the sales tax subsidy schemes, which are admittedly to encourage industrial growth in the specific areas and the overall scheme in all 24 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited the sales tax subsidy and exemption schemes unambiguously indicate so, are capital receipts in nature.

10. In view of these discussions, as also bearing in mind the entirety of the case, we uphold the plea of the assessee that the amount of Rs 39,36,21,956 added to the income of the assessee must stand deleted, and reject the grievance of the Assessing Officer against the grant of relief of Rs 130,57,12,796 by the CIT(A).”

9. In grounds nos. 12 and 13, the assessee has raised the following grievances: 12. That on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(Appeals) was not justified and grossly erred in not allowing exclusion of Sales Tax Incentive availed of Rs. 1,69,93,34,752/-, being capital in nature, in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB of the Act.

13. That on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, necessary directions may please be given to the A.O. to exclude of Sales Tax Incentive availed by the appellant amounting to Rs. 1,69,93,34,752/-, being capital in nature, in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB of the Act.

50. Learned representatives fairly agree that the above issues are now covered, in favour of the assessee, by Hon’ble Calcutta High Court’s judgment in the case of PCIT Vs Ankit metal & Power Ltd [(2019) 416 ITR 591 (Cal)], by Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court’s judgment in the case of CIT Vs Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd [ITA No 1132 of 2014, dated 4th January 2017] and by a coordinate bench decision in the case of ACIT Vs JSW Steel Limited [(2019) 112 taxmann.com 55 (Mum)]. Learned Departmental Representative, however, relied upon the stand of the authorities below.

48. We further noted that the ITAT special bench of Kolkata Tribunal, in the case of Sutlej Cotton mills Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [1993] 45 ITD 22 (Cal.) (SB), held that a particular receipt, which is admittedly not an income cannot be brought to tax under the deeming provisions of section 115J of the Act, as it defies the basic intention behind introduction of provisions of section 115JB of the Act. The ITAT Jaipur bench, in case of Shree Cement Ltd. (supra) had considered an identical issue and held that incentives granted to the assessee is capital receipt and hence, cannot be part of book profit computed u/s 115JB of the Act. Similarly, the ITAT Kolkata Bench, in the case of Sipca India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2017] 80 taxmann.com 87 (Trib.) had considered an identical issue and held that when, subsidy in question is not in the nature of income, it cannot be regarded as income even for the purpose of book profit u/s 115JB of the Act, though credited in the profit and loss account and have to be excluded for arriving at the book profit u/s 115JB of the Act.

49. Insofar as, case laws relied upon by the department , we find that all those case laws have been either considered by the Tribunal or High Court and came to conclusion that in those cases the capital receipt is in the nature of income, but by a specific provision, the same has been exempted and hence, the came to the conclusion that, once particular receipt is routed through profit and loss account, then it should be part of book profit and cannot be excluded, while arriving at book profit u/s 115JB of the Act 1961.

33. It is observed that coordinate bench has also decided similar issue in favour of Ambuja Cement Limited, holding company of assessee from A.Y. 2006-07 to 2011-12 as stated supra. It is observed that various observations made by Assessing Officer and arguments made by Ld. DR are already dealt with by various decisions referred supra hence there is no reason to deviate from the finding given by Coordinate Bench referred supra. Thus, sales tax incentives received by assessee are rightly considered as Capital Receipts by Ld.CIT(A) both for the purposes of normal tax as well for the purposes of computation u/s.115JB of the Act and be excluded while computing taxable income.

13. Respectfully following the above decision and similar ground was raised by Assessee in Ground No 2 in AY 2007-08 was also decided in favour of the Assessee. This issue is settled in favour of the Assessee. Hence, the ground raised by the revenue is dismissed.

14. In the Ground No.4, Department has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. erred in allowing the exclusion of Excise duty exemption availed the assessee company aggregating to Rs. 242,40,07,612/- in _ computing total income under normal provisions of the Act as capital in nature, for its cements manufacturing units namely, Gagal Unit-1 & Gdgal Unit-II located in the State of 'Himachal Pradesh, whereas the same is in the nature of revenue incentive, especially when the scheme under consideration, also provides for capital investment subsidy - ''separately and in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Siemens Pub. Communication Network Pvt. Limited, wherein, it has been held that unless, the grant in aid received by the assessee is utilized for acquisition of an asset, the same must be understood to be in nature of revenue receipt, except, by way of voluntary contribution received from parent company.

15. Similar issue was considered by us in Department Appeal for AY 2008-09 in Ground no 4 and held as under:

18. Considered the rival contentions and material placed on record. On this issue, Coordinate bench held in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd [2020] 113 taxmann.com 230 as under: “4. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. We find that as rightly pointed out by the ld. Representative for the assessee, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Diamond Dye Chem Ltd. (supra) has already dealt with the issue whether addition on account of MODVAT credit is warranted or not. The Hon'ble High Court relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. [2003] 130 Taxman 179/261 ITR 275 held that the unutilised credit cannot be directly added to the income of the assessee. The relevant para of the said decision is reproduced hereunder:— 5. We have considered the submissions. It is not disputed that the assessee was liable to excise duty. The assessee got credit in the excise duty already paid on the raw materials purchased by it and utilized in the manufacturing of excisable goods. The assessee was adopting the exclusive method i.e. valuing the raw materials on the purchase price minus (-) the Modvat credit. The same would be permissible. The Apex Court in the case of Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. (supra) while affirming the order of High Court, has observed that the income was not generated to the extent of Modvat credit or unconsumed raw material. Merely because the Modvat credit was irreversible credit offered to manufacturers 27 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited upon purchase of duty paid raw materials, that would not amount to income which was liable to be taxed under the Act. It is also held that whichever method of accounting is adopted, the net result would be the same.

6. Considering the above, the amount of the unutilized Cenvat credit could not have been directly added to the closing stock. The Tribunal has not committed any error." (underlined for emphasis by us) It is evident from the above that irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the assessee, i.e. 'Inclusive method', wherein the taxes are included in the opening stock, purchases, etc. or the 'Exclusive method', the MODVAT credit does not have any impact on the profit of the assessee. Thus, following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. (supra) and followed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Diamond Dye Chem Ltd. (supra), we set-aside the order of the CIT (A) and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the addition made on account of unutilised MODVAT credit. This Ground of appeal

is accordingly allowed.”

19. It is observed that on identical issue, Coordinate bench in Para No. 32 to 34 in the case of Ambuja Cement Limited in ITA No 5883/Mum/2012 & 5927/Mum/2012 (for A.Y. 2005- 06) vide order dated 31/10/2022 has dismissed revenue’s appeal. Respectfully following decisions of Coordinate as discussed herein above, the ground raised in Departmental Appeal is dismissed.

16. Respectfully following the above decision, we dismiss the ground raised by the revenue.

17. In the Ground No.5, Department has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case & in law the Ld. CIT(A) erred in deleting the disallowance of ₹.15,75,01,260/-being pre-operative expenses, when in its books of accounts the assessee itself had claimed the expenses as capital expenses and added them to its capital work in progress /fixed assets and also there is no provision in income-tax Act, permitting the allowance of such expenses.

18. Similar issue was considered by us in the Department Appeal in Ground No 8 in AY 2009-10 and held as under:

73 . Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. It is observed that identical issue was decided by coordinate bench of Mumbai ITAT in the case of holding company of the assessee being Ambuja Cement Limited vide order dated 07.11.2022 in the and 2428/Mum/2019 for A.Y. 2009-10 wherein it was held as under: “99. In ground no.8, the Assessing Officer has raised the following grievance:

Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the pre-operative expenses amounting to Rs. 39,82,07,328/- whereas the assessee itself claimed these expenses as capital 28 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited expenses in the books of accounts adding it to capital work in progress/fixed assets?"

103. Ground no. 8 is thus dismissed.”

19. Respectfully following the above decision, we dismiss the ground raised by the revenue.

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case & in la w the Id. CIT(A) erred in allowing the of claim of additional depreciation of Rs. 472,62,17,832/- u/s 32(l)(iia) of the Act without appreciating the fact that additional depreciation is allowable only on “new machinery’’ i.e. the first year in which it is put to use, especially, when the CIT(A) has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble ITAT in the case of M/s Everest Industries Ltd. Vs CIT, which in fact, is in favour of revenue.

21. Similar issue was considered by us in the assessee appeal in Ground No 5 in AY 2007-08 and held as under:

49. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. The brief facts of the case are that the assessee has claimed the additional depreciation on all the eligible assets acquired on or after 01-04-2005. However in the assessment order the Ld. AO has disallowed such additional depreciation on the assets acquired on or after 01-04-2005 but before 31-03-2006 for the reason that additional depreciation for the assessment year under consideration is allowable only on eligible assets acquired on or after 01-04-2006 meaning thereby the additional depreciation is allowed only for the assets acquired during the year under consideration and not on the assets acquired before the commencement of the year. The assessee has filed an appeal before CIT(A) against such assessment order. Subsequent to which the CIT(A) has decided the issue against the assessee. It is observed that identical issue was decided by coordinate bench of Mumbai in the case of holding company of the assessee being Ambuja Cement Limited vide order dated 07.11.2022 in the and 6405/Mum/2013 for A.Y. 2007-08 wherein it was held as under: “25. So far as this grievance is concerned, the proposition canvassed before is that “looking to the intent of the Act, the machinery acquired after 1-4-2005 but installed in the previous relevant to the assessment year to the assessment year 2007-08 should qualify for claim of depreciation”. This aspect of the matter is no longer res integra. This issue is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of PCIT Vs IDMS Ltd [(2017) 393 ITR 441 (Guj)]. The other aspect of the matter, and that is more relevant in the present context, is whether the additional depreciation is also to be granted in respect of the subsequent year. That aspect of the matter is covered by a coordinate bench decision in the case of DCIT Vs Gloster Jute Mills Limited [(2017) 88 taxmann.com 738 (Kol)], which has been subsequently followed by other benches- including Mumbai benches. The coordinate bench has inter alia observed as follows: “24. Ground No. 3 raised by the revenue reads as follows :- 3. That on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law by allowing assessee's claim of additional depreciation of plant and machinery on original cost in the year subsequent to the year of acquisition and installation and thereby has erred in deleting the addition of Rs.54,21,617/- without appreciating the fact that such additional depreciation is allowable on plant and machinery only in the year of acquisition and installation." 25. This ground of appeal relates to the claim of the Assessee for additional depreciation u/s.32(1)(iia) of the Act. The undisputed facts 30 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited are that the original cost of the new machinery purchased and installed by the Assessee after 31-3-2005 but before 1-4-2006 in the 100% EOU and DTA unit Rs.29,77,470 and Rs.2,41,30,615. The WDV of these machineries as on 1-4-2006 was Rs.24,51,920/- and Rs.1,81,50,266/- respectively. The Assessee availed of additional depreciation @ 20% on the original cost of the machinery at Rs.5,95,494/- and Rs.48,26,123/- respectively in AY 2006-07. In AY 2007-08 also the Assessee claimed additional depreciation at 20% of the original cost viz., Rs.5,95,494 and Rs.48,26,123 respectively in all depreciation totaling Rs.54,21,617/-.

26. According to the AO, the deduction u/s.32(1)(iia) of the Act is granted only to "new" plant and machinery and once depreciation is granted in the 1st year in which the machinery is installed or put to use, the machinery ceases to be a new machinery and therefore additional depreciation cannot be allowed. The plea of the Assessee however was that Section 32(1)(iia) of the Act merely provides that further to the normal depreciation at the prescribed rates, an additional depreciation shall be allowed to the assessee at the rate of 20% on new plant and machinery acquired and installed after 31-03-2005. However, the period the period during which such additional depreciation shall be allowed is not specified in the Act. Thus, one may conclude that the allowance of additional depreciation shall not only be restricted to the initial year but continue to second and subsequent years.

27. The claim for additional depreciation was however rejected by the CIT(A) for the reason that additional depreciation is available only in respect of new plant and machinery acquired and installed after 31-03- 2005. The word 'new' is not defined in the Act. According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary the word 'new' means "not existing before; now made, or brought into existence, for the first time". The AO held that the assets on which additional depreciation was claimed by the assessee is neither "new" nor brought into existence in the hands of the assessee in the relevant previous year. It is already used in earlier years and is already depreciated and, therefore, old in the hands of the assessee in the previous year. He held that the qualification that the asset should be new was basic qualification for entitlement of additional depreciation as laid down in the provisions of Sec.32(1)(iia) of the Act and that conditions was not satisfied in the case of the Assessee. The AO accordingly disallowed the claim of the Assessee for additional depreciation.

28. Before we set out the conclusions of the CIT(A) on this issue, it would be worthwhile to examine the history of scheme of allowance by way of additional depreciation in the Act. 'Sec.32 Depreciation. (1) In respect of depreciation of— (i) buildings, machinery, plant or furniture, being tangible assets; (ii) know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks, licences, franchises or any other business or commercial rights of similar nature, being intangible assets acquired on or after the 1st day of April, 1998, owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business or profession, the following deductions shall be allowed— 31 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited (i) in the case of assets of an undertaking engaged in generation or generation and distribution of power, such percentage on the actual cost thereof to the assessee as may be prescribed; (ii) in the case of any block of assets, such percentage on the written down value thereof as may be prescribed: Section 32(1)(iia) of the Act was originally introduced by the finance (no.2) Act, 1980 w.e.f. 1-4-1981 reads thus (the sub-section existed upto 31-3-1988 and was deleted thereafter): "(iia) in the case of any new machinery or plant (other than ships and aircraft) which has been installed after the 31st day of March, 1980 but before the 1st day of April, 1985, a further sum equal to one-half of the amount admissible under clause (ii) (exclusive of extra allowance for double or multiple shift working of the machinery or plant and the extra allowance in respect of machinery or plant installed in any premises used as a hotel) in respect of the previous year in which such machinery or plant is installed or, if the machinery or plant is first put to use in the immediately succeeding previous year, then in respect of that previous year :" Sec.32(1)(iia) of the Act as reinserted by finance (No.2) Act, 2002 w.e.f. 1-4-2003, reads thus: '(iia) in the case of any new machinery or plant (other than ships and aircraft), which has been acquired and installed after the 31st day of March, 2002, by an assessee engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing, a further sum equal to fifteen per cent of the actual cost of such machinery or plant shall be allowed as deduction under clause (ii): Provided that such further deduction of fifteen per cent shall be allowed to— a new industrial undertaking during any previous year in which such (A) undertaking begins to manufacture or produce any article or thing on or after the 1st day of April, 2002; or any industrial undertaking existing before the 1st day of April, 2002, (B) during any previous year in which it achieves the substantial expansion by way of increase in installed capacity by not less than *[ten per cent ]: "Subs. for "twenty-five per cent" by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, (w.e.f. 1-4-2005)." Sec.32(1)(iia) as substituted by Finance Act, 2005, (w.e.f. 1-4-2006) reads as follows: "(iia) in the case of any new machinery or plant (other than ships and aircraft), which has been acquired and installed after the 31st day of March, 2005, by an assessee engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing, a further sum equal to twenty per cent of the actual cost of such machinery or plant shall be allowed as deduction under clause (ii):"' 29. It can be seen from the provisions of Sec.32(1)(iia) as it existed from 1-4-1981 to 31-3-1988 and reinserted subsequently from 1-4-2003 that the benefit for claiming additional depreciation was restricted only to the initial assessment year. However the provisions of Sec.32(1)(iia) as substituted by the finance Act, 2005 w.e.f. 1-4- 2006, the benefit for claiming additional depreciation was not so restricted to only to the intital assessment year. From AY 1981-82 to 87-88, the claim for additional depreciation was restricted to previous year in which such machinery or plant is installed or, if the machinery or plant is first put to use in the immediately succeeding previous year. From AY 2003-04 till 2005-06, the claim for additional depreciation was restricted to previous 32 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited year in which such undertaking begins to manufacture or produce any article or thing on or after the 1st day of April, 2002; or if any industrial undertaking existed before the 1st day of April, 2002, during any previous year in which it achieves the substantial expansion by way of increase in installed capacity by not less than ten per cent. From AY 2006-07, there is no restriction with regard to the year in which such additional depreciation should be allowed and also there is no restriction with regard to the additional depreciation being allowed only on the written down value and therefore the additional depreciation even in the second and subsequent years have to be allowed on the original cost of the Asset. These are evident from a plain reading and literal construction of the relevant statutory provisions.

30. The CIT(A) after considering the aforesaid scheme and history of the provisions of Sec.32(1)(iia) of the Act, deleted the addition made by AO observing as follows :— "I have considered the submissions of the Ld. A/R and find substance in the contention of the Appellant. On a conjoint reading of the provisions of section 32(1)(iia) inserted by Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980 and reinserted by Finance Act, 2002 it is evident that the said sections specifically restricted the allowability of additional depreciation in the year of installation of P&M. However, in the section 32(1)(iia) amended vide Finance Act, 2005 Legislature had omitted the proviso wherein it was provided that such depreciation could be claimed only in the initial assessment year. This being a specific omission it could be construed that the intent of the Legislature was not to restrict the allowance of additional depreciation to the year in which the assets are installed but also in the second and subsequent years provided that the aggregate depreciation does not exceed the cost of the asset. It is settled law that a fiscal statute has to be interpreted the basis of the language used therein and not interpreted out of context the same as held by Apex Court in the case of Orissa State Warehousing Corporation, Mohammad Ali Khan and Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. (Referred to by the Appellant.) Further, it is also imperative to state that Section 32(1)(iia) is a beneficial provision enacted with the view to provide benefit to the assessee. The same is also evident from the Explanatory Notes to the Finance Act, 2005 wherein it has been clarified that in order to encourage investment the provisions of sec. 32(1)(iia) have been amended. In so far as the language used in the provision in concerned one has to construe the language beneficially and in favour of the assessee as held by the Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Indian Jute There is little merit in the contention of the AO that the asset is not new in the second year. In my view for claiming additional depreciation the assessee has to acquire and install the plant & machinery after 31-03-2005 and the same should be new in the year of installation. There is no requirement that the assets should be new in the year of claim of additional depreciation. For the reasons aforesaid I am of the view that in terms of provisions of Section 32(1)(iia), additional depreciation is available in AY 2006-07 and subsequent years in respect of all new plant & machinery acquired and installed after 31-03-2005 subject to overall 33 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited criteria that total depreciation does not exceed the actual cost. Hence Ground No. 4 is decided in favour of the Appellant."

31. Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A) the revenue has raised ground no.3 before the Tribunal. The ld. DR placed reliance on the order of the AO. The ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that fiscal statute shall be interpreted on the basis of the language used therein and not de hors the same. It was argued that Clause (iia) to Sec. 32(1) was first introduced vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980 w.e.f. 01-04-81 and was applicable till AY 1987-88. The clause was subsequently re-introduced vide Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. 01-04-03. On perusal of clause (iia) to Sec. 32(1) as existed during the aforesaid period, it could be seen that the legislature conferred the benefit of additional depreciation only in the first AY when the asset was installed and first put to use. However vide Finance Act, 2005, clause (iia) to Sec. 32(1) was amended w.e.f. 01-04- 06 wherein the condition of claiming additional depreciation only in the initial AY was deleted. It was submitted that since the specific condition for claim of additional depreciation in one year has been done away with, it should be construed as the intention of the legislature to allow additional depreciation in subsequent years as well. Reliance was placed on the following decisions wherein it has been held that a fiscal statute shall have to be interpreted on the basis of the language used therein and not de hors the same. Even if there is a casus omissus, the defect can be remedied only by legislation and not by judicial interpretation :— - Orissa State Warehousing Corpn. v. CIT [1999] 103 Taxman 623/237 ITR 589 (SC) - Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT [2004] 135 Taxman 327/266 ITR 1 (SC) - Smt. TarulataShyam v. CIT [1977] 108 ITR 345 (SC) - Padmasundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu [2002] 255 ITR 147 (SC)

Apart from the above, it was also pointed out that DTC Bill 2013 has proposed expressly that additional depreciation would be allowed in the FY in which the P&M is used for the first time and those provisions are not made with retrospective effect. It was argued that the legislature has consciously not restricted the allowance of additional depreciation on the original cost for AY 2006-07 till AY 2013-14 to one year only and therefore the additional depreciation should be allowed on the original cost of the asset for the second and subsequent years as well. It was submitted that the condition imposed by the relevant provisions was that Plant and Machinery must be new at the time of installation to be eligible for additional depreciation u/ s 32(1)(iia) and not new in subsequent years.

32. We have given very careful consideration to the rival submissions and are of the view that the provision of section 32(1)(iia) as amended w.e.f. 01-04-2006 by the Finance Act 2005, there is no restriction that the additional depreciation will be allowed only in one year or that it would be allowed only on the written down value. The law as it prevailed prior to the said amendment imposed such a condition that additional depreciation will be allowed only in the year of installation of machinery or plant or the year in which it is first put to use or the year in which the concerned undertaking begins to manufacture or produce any article or thing or achieves substantial expansion by way of increase in installed capacity by 25%. The only 34 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited objection of the AO is that the provisions refer to "new machinery or plant" and therefore the machinery will cease to be a new machinery after the end of the first year in which it is installed or put to use. In our view this stand taken by the revenue is not supported by the language of statutory provision. The condition imposed by the relevant provisions is that Plant and Machinery must be new at the time of installation to be eligible for additional depreciation u/ s 32(1)(iia) and not new in subsequent years. The expression "new machinery" is therefore to be construed as referring to the condition that at the time of acquisition or installation the machinery or plant should be new. Going by the legislative history of the relevant provision, we are of the view that the condition for allowing additional depreciation only in the initial assessment year ceased to exist as and from 01-04-2006. The plain language of the section warrants such an interpretation. We therefore uphold the order of CIT(A) and dismiss ground No.3 raised by the revenue. “ 50 We observe that in decision of ITAT Kolkata in the case of DCIT vs. Gloster Jute mills ltd. in ITA No. 1524/Kol/2013 dated 01.03.2017 has held that additional depreciation would be allowed in subsequent assessment years by observing that the condition imposed by the relevant provisions is that Plant and Machinery must be new at the time of installation to be eligible for additional depreciation u/ s 32(1)(iia) and not new in subsequent years. The expression “new machinery” is therefore to be construed as referring to the condition that at the time of acquisition or installation the machinery or plant should be new. Going by the legislative history of the relevant provision, ITAT held that the condition for allowing additional depreciation only in the initial assessment year ceased to exist as and from 01.04.2006. However, subsequently in the Decision of ITAT Mumbai in the case of Everest Industries Ltd. vs. JCIT [2018] 90 taxmann.com 330. Such decision was also referred by Ld DR in her written submission. In this decision, the decision of ITAT Kolkata in the case of DCIT vs. Gloster Jute Mills Ltd. (supra) was distinguished and the case has been decided against the assessee on the ground that the Kolkatta bench of Tribunal has taken the view in favour of the assessee, on plain reading of the provisions of sec. 32(1)(iia) vis-àvis old provisions, by holding that the additional depreciation prescribed u/s 32(1)(iia) of the Act is allowable every year and further held that the Kolkata bench of Tribunal did not consider the third proviso inserted by Finance Act, 2015. Since the legislative intent in inserting sec.32(1)(iia) has been made clear by the third proviso inserted in sec. 32(1) by Finance Act 2015, hence ITAT Mumbai did not follow the view expressed by the Kolkatta bench of Tribunal in the case of Gloster Jute Mills (supra). It is pertinent to refer to the Decision of Hon’ble ITAT Kolkata in the case of DCIT vs Graphite India Ltd. in ITA No. 472/Kol/2018 dated 22.11.2019 wherein both of the above decisions of ITAT Kolkata as well as ITAT Mumbai has been duly considered and has decided in the favour of the assessee. In this decision, decision of ITAT Mumbai in the case of Everest Industries Limited (supra), was referred in finding of CIT(A). The ITAT has followed Gloster Jute Mills Ltd. (supra) and has decided the issue in assessee’s favour. It is observed that coordinate bench in its later decision in the case of Ambuja Cement Limited(supra), holding company of assessee has allowed similar claim of depreciation. When coordinate bench of ITAT in its latest decision has decided issue in favour of assessee by holding that assessee is entitled for additional depreciation u/s 32(1)(iia), such later decision would prevail over the decision of Everst Industries Limited relied upon by Ld DR. As a result, since this aspect of the matter is no longer res integra, we see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by the coordinate bench in the group concern’s case of the assessee. Respectfully following the same, we uphold the plea 35 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited of the assessee and direct the Assessing Officer to allow depreciation u/s.32(1)(iia) of the Act. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. This ground of appeal is allowed

22. Respectfully following the above decision, we dismiss the ground raised by the revenue.

23. In the Ground No.7, Department has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case & in law the Id. CIT(A) erred in directing the A.O. to allow deduction u/s. 80IA of the I.T. Act, in respect of profit derived from power-generating unit-TG3 located at Wadi.

24. Similar issue was considered by us in the Department Appeal in Ground no 9 in A.Y. 2005-06 and held as under:

60. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. The Assessee has claimed deduction u/s 80IA on two units purchased from Tata Power Limited and such deduction is denied on the ground that assessee has not set up any undertaking and same has been formed by transfer of previously used plant & machinery. It is relevant to refer to provisions of Section 80IA which reads as under: “3) This section applies to an undertaking referred to in [clause (ii) or] clause (iv) of sub-section (4)] which fulfils all the following conditions, namely: (i) it is not formed by splitting up, or the reconstruction, of a business already in existence : Provided that this condition shall not apply in respect of an 52[undertaking] which is formed as a result of the re-establishment, reconstruction or revival by the assessee of the business of any such 52[undertaking] as is referred to in section 33B, in the circumstances and within the period specified in that section; (ii) it is not formed by the transfer to a new business of machinery or plant previously used for any purpose:

61. It is relevant to refer to Oxford dictionary, the term “split up” means to separate of end relationship. It is undisputed fact in present case that assessee has acquired both the units as a whole. It is not the case that assessee has set up two different power plant by purchasing only partial assets which were used by another assessee but entire undertaking itself is purchased as it is in year under consideration which clearly prove that assessee has not split any of its existing business for forming both the units. Hon’ble Bombay High court in CIT v. Gaekwar Foam & Rubber Co. Ltd. [1959] 35 ITR 662 explains that the concept of a reconstruction of a business implies that the original business is not to cease functioning and its identity is not lost. Reconstruction is of a business already in existence implies that there must be a continuation of the activities of business of the same industrial undertaking where the ownership of a business or undertaking changes hands that would not be regarded as reconstruction. This judgment has specifically been approved by the Supreme Court in Textile Machinery Corpn. Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 107 ITR 195. As regards the splitting up of a business, the relevant test is whether an undertaking is formed by splitting up of a business already in existence. Unless the formation of the undertaking takes place 36 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited by the splitting up of a business already in existence, the negative prohibition would not be attracted. In the present case, the entire business of TG-2 and TG-3 power plant was transferred to the assessee. The undertaking of the assessee was not formed by the splitting up of the business. On this issue, Hon’ble Bombay High court in the case of CIT v. Sonata Software Ltd [2012] 21 taxmann.com 23 has held as under:- “Section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Free trade zone - IOCL set up a software division in 1980s - IOCL made an application for setting up an undertaking in a Software Technology Park (STP) for which an approval was obtained on 30-9-1993 - Plant and machinery for said undertaking was imported in July, 1994 and first export was effected in October, 1994 - Thus, manufacturing activities, commenced in STP undertaking after stipulated date of 1-4-1994 as provided in section 10A - Subsequently, in October 1994 itself, IOCL transferred entire software division as a going concern on slump sale basis to assessee - It was apparent from records that ownership of business or undertaking changed hands and, thus, it could not be regarded as a case of reconstruction - It was also undisputed that entire business of software was transferred to assessee, and, thus, assessee-undertaking could not be said to be one formed by splitting up of business - Whether on facts, assessee had fulfilled conditions mentioned in section 10A(2) and, thus, its claim for exemption under section 10A was to be allowed - Held, yes [In favour of assessee] 62. Further, in CIT v. Silical Metallurgic Ltd (324 ITR 29), the facts before Hon’ble Madras High Court were as follows: there were three units at different places being new industrial undertakings eligible for deduction under the applicable provisions. They belonged to different companies assessed separately. The companies were amalgamated into one and the amalgamated company continued to carry on the business of the undertakings. It claimed the deduction of tax holiday for all the eligible undertakings. The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction on the ground that it did not set up the aforesaid units and there was no provision in the Act for granting the benefit of deduction to the amalgamated company. The Ld.CIT(A) and the Tribunal upheld the claim of the taxpayer. The Hon’ble Madras High Court confirmed the decision of the Tribunal and observed as follows: “A reading of the provision of sections 80HH and 80-I of the Act, it is clear that the same has been incorporated to encourage the new industrial undertaking on fulfilment of certain conditions mentioned therein. If the conditions mentioned in the sections are complied with by the assessee, the benefit extended by the provisions has to be granted to the assessee. The amalgamation of one company with the other company cannot be regarded as a splitting up or reconstruction or by a transfer of a new business of the plant and machinery of the old business. With reference to the Companies Act, the amalgamation was also for the benefit of the two companies, i.e., amalgamating and amalgamated company and in the public interest and also in the interest of the shareholders. Viewed from any angle amalgamation cannot be regarded as a splitting up of the company for the purpose of negativing the claim under the Income-tax Act, which has been statutorily conferred on the company, if such companies fulfil the conditions stipulated therein. Hence, we are of the view that the order of the Tribunal granting the benefit of sections 80HH and 80-I to the assessee-company cannot be stated to be illegal or against the statutory provisions. A similar view has been taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Dandeli Ferro Alloys P. Ltd. [1995] ITR 1, in which the Bombay High Court held that the facts on record clearly established that the amalgamated company was already incorporated and formed and had come into existence on March, 1973 and had become an industrial undertaking carrying on industrial and commercial activities on and from June 20, 1973, i.e., prior to the 37 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited amalgamation of the amalgamating company with the amalgamated company, which had become effective from October 31, 1973. The amalgamated company was not formed by the splitting up, or the reconstruction, of a business already in existence. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee company was entitled to relief under sections 80J and 80HH of the Act”.

63. The CBDT had also accepted the above legal position with regard to deduction under section 84 of Income Tax Act, 1922 (Section 80J of Income-tax Act, 1961), way back in 1963 and clarified the matter vide Letter: F No 15/5/63-IT (A-I), dated 13 December 1963, which reads as under:- "The Board agree the benefit of section 84 attaches to the undertaking and not to the owner, thereof. The successor will be entitled to the benefit for the unexpired period of five years provided the undertaking is taken over as a running concern". The Board set out two principles (prima facie, independent of one another or the later dependent on the primary and the first principle): i. The deduction attaches to the undertaking and not to the owner; and ii. A successor would be entitled to the deduction, for the residual period, if the undertaking is transferred as a running concern 64. The aforesaid Board Circular have been relied upon by various Courts and its applicability have been upheld. The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Prisma Electronics [2015] 377 ITR 207 was concerned with deduction under section 80-IB on conversion of proprietorship concern into partnership firm. In this regard, it was held as under: “11. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that Section 84 is more or less the same as provided in Section 80-IB of the Act. The Central Board of Direct Taxes issued a circular F. No.15/5/63-IT(A-1) dated 13th December, 1963 indicating that the benefit of Section 84 is attached to the undertaking and not to the owner thereof and, consequently, the successor would be entitled to the benefit for the unexpired period of 5 years provided the undertaking is taken over as a running concern.

12. The same principle is applicable in the instant case. Admittedly, the undertaking was in existence since 2002. The proprietorship concern changed into a partnership firm. The benefit under Section 80-IB of the Act is available to the partnership firm and the conditions imposed under Section 80-IB(2)(i) does not come in the way.”

65. Thus, the sanctity of the CBDT Circular has been upheld in the context of section 80IB, confirming that the tax holiday moves along with the undertaking and the ownership has no relevance. Similar decision is also rendered by Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Mega Packages [2011] 203 Taxman 236 while considering the eligibility of deduction under section 80-IC on conversion of proprietorship concern into a partnership firm and Hon’ble Madras High court in the case of Heartland KG Information Ltd 359 ITR 1.

66. Thus, the crux of all the above decisions clearly suggest that deduction u/s 80IA is available to undertaking and change in ownership does not mean that unit is established by split up or reconstruction of entire business. Considering ratio laid down by various courts as referred supra, assessee is entitled to deduction u/s 80IA on two units purchased from Tata Power Company Limited.

38 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 67. It is emanating from assessment order and order of Ld.CIT(A) that TG-2 started commercial production from 1st April 1995 and no deduction was claimed till A.Y. 1998-99 as such unit was incurring losses. The assessee was eligible for deduction u/s 80IA for such unit in A.Y. 1999-2000 but no deduction was claimed as there was no positive Gross Total Income of assessee but it is fact that assessee was eligible for deduction was mentioned in notes forming part of return of income. It is undisputed fact that Assessing Officer has not disputed such claim in assessment proceedings. Subsequently, such unit was transferred to Tata Power Company and was again re-purchased by assessee in current year and assessee has claimed deduction u/s 80IA. So far as observation of Ld.CIT(A) that assessee is not entitled for such deduction as 80IA was not claimed by undertaking during the period A.Y.2000-2001 to AY 2004-05, it is observed that Ld.CIT(A) himself has accepted that assessee can claim deduction u/s 80IA for consecutive 10 years out of block of 15 years from commencement of business which does not mean that if in block of 10 years, deduction u/s 80IA was not claimed for one or more reasons, such claim is lapsed for subsequent years. Further it is also a settled position that the deduction u/s 80IA is qua undertaking and not qua entity. Every undertaking will be entitled to avail deduction u/s 80IA for a period of 10 consecutive years from 15 years from the commencement of business. There is substance in the argument of Ld. AR of the assessee that Tata Power Company Limited might not have claimed for deduction u/s 80IA for various reasons and there is nothing on record to prove that said company was not entitled for deduction in respect of 80IA on such power plant. On the other hand, claim of deduction u/s 80IA made by assessee is emanating from notes forming part of return of income for A.Y. 1999-2000 and not disputed by Assessing Officer in assessment proceedings hence there is no reason for not allowing deduction u/s 80IA for TG-2 Wadi. The Hon’ble Bombay High court in the case of Simple Food Products (P.) Ltd. [2017] 84 taxmann.com 239 has held that if deduction u/s. 80-IB was granted for an initial assessment year, same could not be rejected for subsequent assessment years unless relief for initial year was withdrawn. 68 In view of holistic discussion made herein above, assessee is entitled to deduction u/s 80IA on TG-2 and TG-3, Wadi unit. Thus, related ground of appeal in departmental appeal is dismissed and ground of appeal in assessee’s appeal is allowed.

25. Respectfully following the above decision, we dismiss the ground raised by the revenue.

26. In the Ground No.8, Department has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case & in law the Id. CIT(A) erred in directing the assessing officer that auditor’s fee and director’s remuneration (indirect expenses) should not be apportioned for computing deduction u/s 80IA of the Act.

27. Similar issue was considered by us in the Department appeal in Ground No 10 in AY 2005-06 and held as under:

“75.Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. We observe that the Assessing Officer has identified indirect expenditure incurred at Head Office i.e Statutory Audit fees, Audit for taxation matter, Director Fees, Cost Auditor expenses, Subscription to CME etc and observed that such expenditure are not allocated to eligible businesses and 39 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited to that extent deduction u/s 80IA is claimed excess. Before Ld.CIT(A), assessee has claimed that cost audit fees and subscription to CMA are in respect of cement manufacturing unit hence no allocation of such expenditure is required to be made. To that extent, Ld.CIT(A) has accepted the plea of assessee and such fact is not controverted by Ld. DR hence finding given by Ld.CIT(A) to that extent is upheld. Further, on this issue, coordinate bench in the case of Ambuja Cement Limited, holding company of assessee in ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019(for A.Y. 2010- 11 to 2012-13) vide order dated 07/11/2022 has held as under: “108. We are unable to see any merits in the stand of the assessee that the head office expenses cannot be allocated to all the units, as deductions and allowance of eligible units are required to be taken into account while treating such units as profit centres, and computing the profits accordingly. The fiction of the eligible units being treated on a standalone basis does not require that the profits of the units are to be computed as if they are independent of each other, and once that fiction sets in, the expenses incurred by someone other than eligible unit, in the interest of the eligible unit, are to be taken into account while computing the profits of the eligible unit. Accordingly, the allocation of expenses, as the learned Assessing Officer rightly contends, must be done. The assessee has further contended that HO expenses are not „derived from‟ or „derived by‟ the eligible undertakings, and, for this reasons, these expenses cannot be allocated to the eligible undertaking. We see no reasons to decline allocation of head office expenses to ensure that the profits of the eligible units are correctly worked out, on the basis of hypothetical independence embedded in the eligible units being treated on a standalone basis. To this extent, we reject the plea of the assessee. However, the basis of allocation as turnover is not really correct and reasonable, nor the relationship between the turnover and expenses always linear; the allocation would be more appropriate based on expenditure incurred by the units vis-à-vis overall expenditure. To this extent, we uphold the plea of the assessee.

109. In view of the above discussions, as also bearing in mind the entirety of the case, we reject the grievance of the assessee against allocation of HO expenses, but we permit the assessee‟s plea to the limited extent that the allocation of HO expenses should be done on the basis of expenditure incurred by the units vis-à- vis overall expenditure”

76. Respectfully following decisions of coordinate bench referred supra, Assessing Officer is directed to allocate Head office expenses (other than auditor fees and CMA expenses) on the basis of expenditure incurred by the units vis-à-vis overall expenditure. Thus, related ground of appeal in departmental appeal is dismissed and ground of appeal in assessee’s appeal is partly allowed as directed herein above.”

28. Respectfully following the above decision, we are dismissing the ground raised by the revenue and partly allow the grounds raised by the assessee.

29. In the Ground No.9, Department has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case & in law the Id. CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of provision for normal gratuity in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB (Rs. 5,64,78,008/-), especially in view of the fact that the assessee itself disallowed the same, in the memo of income on account of same not being ascertained liability.

85. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. On this issue, coordinate bench in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2004-05 in dated 27/05/2022 has decided this issue in its favour. The relevant finding is reproduced herein below: “14.3.3. Revenue is in appeal, challenging the decision of CIT(A) of deletion of INR 5,86,82,751/-. We have heard the rival contentions and perused the record. While the Departmental Representative relied upon the assessment order, the Authorised Representative of the Assessee reiterated the submissions made before the lower authorities and relied upon the decision of the Tribunal in Assessee’s own case for the Assessment Year 1990-91, 2002-03 and 2003-04 wherein the tribunal had granted relief to the Assessee. 14.3.4. We note that in the immediately preceding assessment year (AY 2003-04), identical issue has been decided in favour of the Assessee. The relevant extract of the common order, dated 13.03.2019, passed by the Tribunal in 4242&4988/MUM/2007 for the Assessment Year 2003-04 reads as under:

46. Under this issue the revenue has challenged the allowance of claim of provision for additional gratuity in computing book profit u/s 115JB of the Act amounting to ₹.1,21,90,817/-. The proposition is the same which has been discussed above while deciding the issue no.

15. The finding of the CIT(A) in this regard is hereby reproduced as under.: "38.2 I have considered the submission made on behalf of the appellant. Respectfully following the order of Hon’ble Tribunal for the A.Y. 1990-91 as well as my own orders for AY 1998-99 in appeal no. CIT(A)- I/IT/232/04-05 the addition made by the Assessing Officer is deleted and the ground stands allowed in favour of the appellant."

47. On appraisal of the said finding, we noticed that this issue has been covered by decision of Hon’ble ITAT in the assessee’s own case for the A.Y. 1990-91 in ITA. No.2361/M/1995 & in the A.Y. 2002-03 in ITA. No.4987/M/2007. There is nothing on record to which it can be assumed that the order has been varied or changed in appellate proceeding. Since this issue has been duly adjudicated in favour of the assessee by above mentioned decision of the Hon’ble ITAT, we are of the view that the CIT(A) has decided the matter of controversy judiciously and correctly which is not liable to be interfere with at this appellate stage. Accordingly, this issue is being decided in favour of the assessee against the revenue." 14.3.5. Respectfully following the decision of the co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of the Assessee for the Assessment Year 1990- 91 (ITA No. 2361/Mum/1995), Assessment Year 2002-03 (ITA No. 4987/Mum/2007 & others) and Assessment Year 2003-04 (ITA No. ITA. No. 5259 & 4895/Mum/2007 Assessment Year: 2004-05 4242/Mum/2007), we confirm the order of CIT(A), and hold that provision for Normal/Additional Gratuity of INR 5,86,82,751/- is in the nature of provision for an ascertained liability and is, therefore, not required to be added back while computing Book Profits in terms of Clause (c) of Explanation 1 to Section 115JB(2) of the Act. Accordingly, Ground No. 9 raised by the Revenue is dismissed.”

41 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 86. Respectfully following decision of coordinate bench referred supra, addition of provision for gratuity made while computing book profit u/s 115JB is deleted. Accordingly, this ground of appeal in Departmental Appeal is dismissed.

31. Respectfully following the above decision, we dismiss the ground raised by the revenue.

32. In the Ground No.10, Department has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case & in law the Id. CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of wealth tax provision in computing Book Profit u/s. 115JB of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Rs.20,25,000/-).

33. Similar issue was considered by us in the Department Appeal Ground No 11 in AY 2005-06 and held as under:

80. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. On this issue, coordinate bench in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2004-05 in dated 27/05/2022 has decided issue in its favour. The relevant finding is reproduced herein below: 14.2.3. Revenue is in appeal, challenging the relief granted by CIT(A). We have heard the rival contentions and perused the record. While the Departmental Representative relied upon the assessment order, the Authorised Representative of the Assessee reiterated the submissions made before the lower authorities and relied upon the decision of the Tribunal in Assessee’s own case for the Assessment Year 2002-03 and 2003-04 wherein the Tribunal had granted relief to the Assessee. 14.2.4. We note that the Hon’ble Bombay High Court has, in the case of CIT vs. Echjay Forgings (P) Ltd. (2001) 251 ITR 15 has held as under:

4. The short point which arises for consideration in this appeal is, whether the Assessing Officer was right in disallowing claims for deduction in respect of the five items and ordering addition thereof to the net profit for the purposes of section 115J.

5. The addition of the five items to the net profit is, accordingly, discussed hereinbelow: (I) Addition of wealth-tax paid by the assessee to the net profit 6. Mr. Desai, the learned senior counsel for the department, fairly concedes that the net profit, as shown in the profit and loss account, will not be increased by the amount of wealth-tax paid because under clause (a) of the Explanation to section 115J(1A), what is contemplated is the amount of income-tax paid. Under the said clause, payment of wealth-tax is not contemplated. Therefore, the net profit shall not be increased by the amount of wealth-tax paid by the assessee." (Emphasis Supplied) 14.2.5. In the immediately preceding assessment year (AY 2003-04), identical issue has been decided in favour of the Assessee. The relevant extract of the 42 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited common order, dated 13.03.2019, passed in ITA No. 4242&4988/MUM/2007 for the Assessment Year 2003- 04 reads as under: "44. Issue no. 15 is in connection with the deletion of addition in respect of provision of Wealth Tax in computing book profit u/s 115JB of the Act in sum of ₹.80,00,000/-. Before going further, we deemed it necessary to advert the finding of the CIT(A) on record.: - "37.3 I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant. Respectfully following the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Echjyay Forgings Ltd. (supra) and the Hon’ble Special Bench of Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Usha Martin Industries Ltd. (supra) as well as my own order in appeal no. CIT(A)-I/IT/232/04- 05 for AY 1998-99 stated herein above, the addition made by the Assessing Officer is deleted and this ground of appeal

is allowed." . On appraisal of the said finding, we noticed that the claim of the assessee has been allowed in view of the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Echjay Forgings (P) Ltd. (2001) 251 ITR 15 (Bom) and JCIT Vs. Usha Martin Industries Ltd. (2007) 104 ITD 249 (Kolkata Tribunal) SB. We also noticed that the matter of controversy has been adjudicated by CIT(A) for the A.Y. 1998-99 also and against the said decision, the revenue is not in appeal. It is reiterated that the adjustment can only be made in view of Section 115JB of the Act which has been specified in Explanation to Section 115JB of the Act. In view of the said circumstances, we are of the view that the CIT(A) has decided the matter of controversy judiciously and correctly which is not liable to be interfere with at this appellate stage. Accordingly, this issue is being decided in favour of the assessee against the revenue." (Emphasis Supplied) 14.2.6. In view of the above, we confirm the order of CIT(A) and hold that provision for Wealth-Tax of INR 70,00,000/- is not required to be added back while computing Book Profits under Section 115JB of the Act. Accordingly, Ground No 8 raised by the Revenue is dismissed.”

81. Respectfully following the decision of coordinate bench referred supra, addition of provision for wealth tax made while computing book profit u/s 115JB is deleted. Accordingly, this ground of appeal in Departmental Appeal is dismissed.

34. Respectfully following the above decision, we dismiss the ground raised by the revenue.

35. In the Ground No.11, Department has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case & in law the Id. CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition made u/s 14A of the Act, of interest expenses to earn dividend income in computing Book Profit u/s. 115JB of the Act (Rs 1,23,00,000/

36. Similar issue was considered by us in the Department Appeal in Ground No 21 in AY 2005-06 and held as under:

43 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited “135. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. The Assessing Officer has made disallowance u/s 14A while computing income as per normal provisions of the Act as well as book profit u/s 115JB of the Act. The disallowance made by Assessing Officer u/s 14A is already deleted in proceeding paras hence consequential adjustment made while computing book profit u/s 115JB cannot be made. On this issue, coordinate bench in the case of Ambuja Cement Limited in ITA NO ITA Nos. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 (AY 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012- 13) vide order dated 07/11/2022 held as under: “25. Having heard the rival contentions and having perused the material on record, we are of the considered view that the assessee deserves to succeed in this plea for the reason that, eventually, there is no disallowance under section 14A on the facts of this case, and, in any event, the issue is covered, as regards the question of adjustment of book profits under section 15JB for the 14A disallowance, in favour of the assessee, by a special bench decision in the case of ACIT Vs Vireet Investments Pvt Ltd [(2017) 82 taxmann.com 415 (Del SB)]. The assessee gets relief on this point as well.”

37. Respectfully following the above decision, we dismiss the ground raised by the revenue.

ITA.NO. 3203/MUM/2018 (ASSESSEE APPEAL)

39. We now take up the appeal filed by the assessee in .

40. In the Ground No.2, Assessee has raised the following grievance “2(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in disallowing Club Entrance Fee of Rs. 15,50,500/- as expenditure not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. 2(b). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT (A) has erred in disregarding and not following the order of the Hon'ble Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT') in the Appellant's own case on the same issues.”

41. Similar issue was considered by us in Department Appeal in Ground No 3 in AY 2005-06 and held as under:

44 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited “24.Considered the rival contentions and material placed on record. It is observed that identical issue has been decided in favour of assessee by Coordinate bench assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2004-05 in ITA No 5259/Mum/2027 dated 27/05/2022 wherein it is held as under: “3. We have heard the rival contentions and perused the material on record. We note that the Tribunal has decided identical issue in the favour of the Assessee in Assessee’s own case in ITA No. 647/Mum/1997 (AY 1991-92), ITA No. 2361/Mum/1995 (AY 1990- 91), ITA No. 288/Mum/1993 (AY 1989-90), ITA No. 968/Mum/1992 ITA. No. 5259 & 4895/Mum/2007 Assessment Year: 2004-05 (AY 1988-89), and ITA No. 43/Mum/1991 (AY 1987-88) by following the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Otis Elevator Co (I) Ltd. v. CIT (supra), and American International Banking Corporation v. CIT (supra). The relevant extract of the order of the Tribunal in ITA No. 43/Mum/1991 pertaining to AY 1987-88, followed in subsequent years, reads as under: "8. Ground no. 2 relates to disallowance of payments to clubs. The Assessing Officer made disallowance of Rs. 8,125/- representing payments made by the assessee to clubs. On appeal, it was contended that reimbursement of club fees to employees is an expenditure incurred by the assessee wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business and the expenditure is allowable as deduction u/s 37 of the Act. Reliance was placed on the decision reported in 13 ITD 550. The contention of the assessee was not acceptable to the CIT(A) who confirmed the disallowance observing that no attempt has been made to bifurcate the expenses between those relating to business of the assessee and those involving personal benefit to the employees. We observe that the issue is covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in Otis Elevator Co (I) Ltd. 195 ITR 682 (Bom) wherein their Lordships held that payment of club fees made to promote business interest is an allowable expenditure. Following the decision supra this ground is decided in favour of the assessee." (Emphasis Supplied) 4. Respectfully following the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court and of the Tribunal in Assessee’s own cases specified herein above, we decide this issue in favour of the Assessee. Accordingly, order of CIT(A) to delete the addition of INR 17,45,829/-, consisting of expenditure incurred on club entrance fee of INR 15,00,000/- and subscription fee of INR 2,45,829/-, is confirmed. Ground No. 1 of the Departmental Appeal is dismissed. “ 25. It is further observed that on identical issue, Coordinate bench in Para No. 94 to 96 in the case of Ambuja Cement Limited in ITA No 5883/Mum/2012 & 5927/Mum/2012 (for A.Y. 2005-06) vide order dated 31/10/2022 has dismissed revenue’s appeal. Respectfully following the above said decisions as discussed herein above, this ground in Departmental Appeal is dismissed.”

42. Respectfully following the above decision, we allow the ground raised by the assessee.

43. In the Ground No.4, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

45 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited “4(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and rather grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in reducing the claim for deduction u/s 80-IA on captive power generating units by an amount of Rs. 59,59,11,901/- by modifying the basis of determining the 'market value' of power captively consumed, adopted by the appellant. 4(b). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified rather grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in computing 'market value' of power captively consumed based on average of the purchase price of power in various States across India by Tata Power Trading Company Limited and Power Trading Corporation without appreciating the fact that the same does not represent the market value of the power. 4(c). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of the AO in the adjustment made which was in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice since the document on the basis of which the market value of electricity was computed by the AO was never made available to the appellant. 4(d). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in not accepting the basis followed by the assessee for computing the fair market price of power, generated captively, and used by the Cement Manufacturing Unit, being Annual Average landed Cost (AALC) at which power is purchased by the respective cement manufacturing units from the respective State Electricity Boards, ignoring the fact that such price represents the market value and is well documented. 4(e). Without prejudice to Ground 4(a) to 4(d), on the facts and in circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in enhancing the income of the Appellant by reducing the deduction of section 80IA of the Act without providing an opportunity of being heard to the Appellant and thereby violating the principles of natural justice.”

44. Similar issue was considered by us in the assessee Appeal in Ground No 5 in AY 2011-12 and held as under:-

“60. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. The Assessee has a power generating unit and cement manufacturing units. The power generated by the power generating units, were captively consumed by the cement manufacturing units of the assessee. The Assessee has claimed deduction u/s 80IA for the market value of the power generated. During the course of assessment proceedings as well as in appellate proceedings, Ld AR has submitted that the deduction u/s.80IA for power unit is required to be determined on the basis of the cost of power considering the rate at which the State Electricity Board (‘SEB’) charges the power to the ultimate consumer being respective CMU. In support of the said contention, the Assessee has relied upon certain caselaws including those of the jurisdictional Tribunal and High Court, including, the decision of the coordinate bench in case of Reliance Industries (ITA 4361/M/12, order dated 12/04/2017), which was later approved by the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court [2020] 421 ITR 686 (Bombay).

61. It is important to note here that the case of Reliance Industries (supra) pertains to AY 2009-10 along with other preceding assessment years. Accordingly, it has to be considered that the judicial authorities have taken into consideration all the relevant amendments, 46 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited including 80IA(6). Further, it is relevant to reproduce the relevant portion of the decision from coordinate bench Order, wherein the ITAT has held as under: “17. The assessee had claimed the deduction u/s.80IA on power generation undertaking by adopting price which the industrial consumers paid during the year under consideration for electricity purchased from State Power Distribution Agency. However, the Assessing Officer has restricted the claim of deduction u/s.80IA to Rs.34,23,45,990/- by taking 16% return on capital base as per the parameters prescribed by the Regulatory Authorities i.e. State Electricity Board for procuring the electricity.

18. By the impugned Order CIT(A) allowed assessee's claim of deduction u/s.80IA after having its observation at pages 6.3 of its appellate order. Precise observation is as under:- "6.3 I have considered the facts of the case and submissions of the appellant as against the observation / findings of the AO in his order. The contentions raised by the appellant in respect of the ground of appeal are being discussed and decided as under:- i. This issue also appeared in the assessee's reopened assessment for the A.Y.2006-07. On the identical set of facts, the Ld. CIT(A) in the office while deciding the appellant's case for A.Y.2006-07 has reached the decision as under: "I have considered the facts of the case, the reasons given by the Assessing 'Officer for restricting 'the deduction claimed by the assessee u/s 80IA in respect of its power generating undertakings and the' submissions of the assessee, in my opinion the question which is required, to be answered in respect of the ground of appeal taken by the assessee is whether the action of the AO of restricting the deduction is correct in the present facts and circumstances of the case. To answer the question, it would be pertinent to refer to Sec. 80IA(8) of the Act since the said section is relevant in the present case Sec. 80IA(8)reads as follows: "Where any goods (or services) held for the 'purposes of the eligible business are transferred to any other business carried on by the assessee, or where any goods (or services) held for the purpose of any other business carried on by the assessee or where any goods (or services) held for the purpose of any other business carried on by the assessee are transferred to the eligible business and, in either case the consideration, if any, for such transfer as recorded in the accounts of the eligible business does not correspond to the market value of such goods (or services) as on' the date of the transfer, then for the purposes of the deduction under this' section, the profits and gains of such eligible business shall be computed as if the transfer, in either case had been made at the market value of such goods (or services) as on that date. Provided that where, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, the computation of the profits and gains of the eligible business in the manner hereinbefore specified presents. exceptional difficulties, the Assessing Officer may compute such profits and gains on such reasonable basis as he may deem fit.

47 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited (Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section; "market value ", in relation: to any goods 'or services, 'means the price that such goods or services would ordinarily fetch in the open market.) A perusal of the said section reveals that where transfer of any goods or services by the eligible business to any other business carried on by the assessee is not recorded in the books of accounts of the eligible business at the market value of such goods or services as on date of the transfer, then for "the purposes of the deduction, the profits and gains of such eligible business is required to be computed as if the transfer has been made at the market value of such goods or services as on that date. As per the Explanation,' 'market value' in relation to the goods would mean the price that such-goods would ordinarily fetch in the open market. The proviso to sub-section(8) of section 80IA would come into operation only' when in the opinion of the Assessing Officer; the computation of profits and gains of the eligible business in the manner provided in the main· sub-section presents exceptional difficulty. It is, therefore, clear that the Assessing Officer, in order to invoke the proviso, must form an opinion based on the material on record that the computation in the manner provided presented exceptional difficulties. If he does not form an opinion, he cannot invoke the proviso to determine the profits & gains of the eligible business. It would, therefore, berequired to be seen whether the AO has found based on any material on record, and has brought any evidence or material on record, that the transfer of the goods by the eligible business, i.e. the power generating units, has not been recorded at the market value of such goods. It will also be required to be seen whether the AO has formed any opinion which would justify the invoking of the proviso to Sec, 80lA(B), because it is the proviso that the AO has invoked to work out the deduction available to the assessee u/s. 80lA. Perusal of the facts on record show that the assessee had disclosed that it has sold/transferred electricity to related concerns and, that the said transfer had been done at the fair market value of the goods. In the earlier 'assessment years in the regular assessments, the basis of taking the market value of the goods had been accepted by the Assessing Officer. I find that the Assessing Officer has assumed the power u/s. 80IA(B) without bringing any material on record to show that the price recorded in the books by the eligible business did not correspond to the market value of the goods as on the date of the transfer. It is important to note that for giving a finding that a particular value did not correspond to the market value, the market value has to be found out. Hence, the section pre-supposes that there is another value attached to the said goods which would represent the market value of the goods. I find that there is nothing brought on record to show as to how the price recorded in the Books does not correspond to the market value of goods, when sold in the open market, especially in the light of the reasons given by the 'assessee that such price corresponded to the market value of the goods. I find that the Assessing Officer has rejected the value recorded by the eligible business by merely holding that the market value cannot be the purchase value of electricity but the price of the electricity which the assessee can fetch in the open market. There being no open market for electricity during the period under review, the regulatory bodies fixed the price of electricity. He has further held that the tariff fixed for sale 48 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited by the State. Power Distribution Agency for industrial consumers could not be called as market price as the regulatory fixes the tariff considering the wheeling charges, transmission loss due to leakage, past losses of the distribution agency, etc. In my opinion, the findings of the AO cannot be taken to be correct. Even though there may be 110 open market for the goods, an open market has to be presumed in respect of the goods in question in view of the categorical condition laid down in the provisions itself and the law laid down in this regard by the different Hon'ble Courts of the land and which have/been relied" upon by the assessee in its submissions. The Assessing Officer has not brought any material to show that the price charged was not in consonance with the market value. The AO has also not suggested, leave alone computed as to what the market value of the goods should be. While the assessee has given detailed reasons as to why the price of the goods recorded by it corresponds to till! market value, the Assessing Officer has not given any specific findings to hold as to why such price does not correspond to the market value of the goods and as to what was the market value of such goods. The assessee has contended that the 'rate 'charged to the end user by the State Electricity Board would provide the 'most appropriate basis to arrive at the market value. Since, the eligible unit is, in effect, transferring the goods to another business which is the end consumer, the cost to the end consumer, is required to be considered and not the tariff at which the 'Independent Power Producers' sell to the: 'State Distribution Agency', which in turn sells to the State Electricity Board for further sale to the end users i.e. consumers, at a rate higher than the rate at which the 'State Distribution Agency had procured the electricity, at. 'Another important aspect which is required to be considered is' that the: rate at which the 'Independent Power Producers' sell to the; State -Distribution Agency' under the Electricity Act, 1948 is a regulated rate which is determined ,on the basis' of the normative parameters 'determined by the Government of India under its Notification No, 251 (E) 'dated 30.03.1992. The normative parameters have been fixed by the Government, which is required to be followed by all, and no deviation in fixing the tariff is allowed Hence, even here, the rate cannot be taken to be the "price that such goods would ordinarily fetch in the open 'market" as this is the regulated rate fixed by the Government. It is also seen that the Assessing Officer has taken 16% return on capital base to work out the profits of the eligible business of the. assessee eligible for deduction u/s, 80IA of the IT.Act, 1961. 16% return on capital base in Notification No. 251(E) dt .. 30/3/1992 is only an exercise for fixation, of tariff. It is 'one 'of the parameters 'out of many which is required to be taken into consideration for fixing the tariff in relation' to the' rate at which the Independent Power 'Producers sell their power to the - State Distribution Agency. Hence, 16% return on capital base 'alone' would not be relevant while computing the profits of the eligible business under the Act. To sum up under Sec. 80IA(8), the following conditions are required to be satisfied:- a) Any goods or services held for the purposes of the eligible business are transferred to any other business carried on by the assessee. b) The' consideration if any for such transfer as recorded in the accounts of the eligible business does not correspond to the market value of such goods or services as on the. date of transfer, 49 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited c) It is only when condition (b).is satisfied then the Revenue gets a right to determine profits and gains of such eligible business at the market value of such-goods or services. as on the date of its transfer. The Assessing Officer had considered the rate' charged by the State Distribution Agency as the market value of the goods 'transferred by the eligible business in the original assessment of the assessee, There is nothing on record to show as to how the value of the goods adopted/taken by the assessee do not correspond to the market value of such goods especially in light of the reasons given by the assessee. The Assessing Officer has also not expressed any opinion as to how the computation of profits and gains of the business tn. The manner provided in the main sub-section' presented exceptional difficulties. Hence, proviso to Sec. 80lA could not have been invoked by him. It is also clear that the parameter 'relating to 16% of capital base js only an exercise for fixation of tariff and is only one of the many parameters taken into consideration for fixing the tariff under' the Old Electricity Act of 1948, This parameter is for working 'out the' tariff for sale to Distribution agencies and not for sale to the end' consumers and not for computing the profits and gains of the eligible business. In' view of the aforesaid reasons, the order of the AO of working out the profits eligible for deduction on the basis of 16% return on 'capital base cannot be upheld. As regards the submission relating to Sec, 80A(6), I find that same submissions were made by the assessee before the Assessing Officer during the course of the re-assessment proceedings. I find that the AO has not controverted the submissions of the assessee. I am also of the opinion that since the said Sec, 80(6) has been specifically made retrospective from a specific date i.e. w.e.f. 01.04.2009, the same would apply only with respect to the A.Y. 2009-10 onwards and would not apply to the A.Y. 2006-07 in question. This is also clear from the fact that the Explanation 10 Sec. 80IB(10) was inserted by the Finance (No.2) ct, 2009 and was made operational w.r.e.f 01/04/2001 while sec. 80A(6) was also inserted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009 and was made operational w.r.e.f 01/04/2009. Further, as per the explanation to Sec. 80IA(6), the market value means the price that such goods or services would fetch if these were sold by the undertaking or unit or 'enterprise or eligible business in the open market, subject to statutory or regulatory restrictions, if any. In the present case, the AO has not brought any material on record to show that the goods supplied by the undertaking were at a price higher than what it was required to supply as a result of any statutory or regulatory restrictions or as to what should have been the rate at which it was required to supply the goods as a result of any statutory or regulatory restrictions. In the case of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd (Supra) Hon'ble jurisdictional Mumbai, Tribunal has held that the price that the unit paid to TPC for purchase of power would be the best basis for working out the profits of the business of generation of power even after the order MERC. In this case, the assessee, other than using power generated from its own captive generating units, was also purchasing power from TPC. In the case of Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. reported in 16 SOT 509 (Del), Hon 'ble Tribunal has held as follows 50 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited "Sec: 43A of the Electricity (Supply)Act,1948, lays down rules and conditions for determining the tariff for sale of electricity by a generating company to the State Electricity Boards. A perusal of the same reveals that the tariff is determined on the basis of various parameters contained therein: From the aforesaid, it is evident that on one hand it is only upon granting of specific' consent that a private person call set up a power generating unit having 'restrictions on the use of power generated and at the same time the tariff at which a power generating unit can supply power to the Electricity Board is also liable to 'be determined in accordance with the statutory requirements. In this context it can be safely deduced that determination of tariff between the assessee and the Board can be said to be an exercise between a buyer and seller neither in a competitive environment and nor in the ordinary course of trade and business. It is an environment where one of the players has the compulsive legislative mandate not only in the realm of enforcing buying but also to set the' buying tariff in terms of scenario cannot be, equated with a situation where the price is determined in the normal course of trade and competition. Therefore, the price determined as per the Power Purchase Agreement cannot be equated with market value as understood in common parlance. There is no reason for not holding so for the purposes of. Section 80IA-(8) also, The price at which the power is supplied by the assessee to the Board is determined entirely by the Board in terms of the statutory regulations. Such a price cannot be equated with the market value as understood for the purposes of s.80-IA(8) The price recorded by the assessee Rs. 3.72 per unit can be considered to be the market value-for the purposes of s. 80- IA(8). This is for the reason that the assessee as an industrial consumer is also buying power from the Board and the Board supplies such power at the rate of Rs.3.72 per unit to its- consumers. This is the price at which the consumers are able to procure the power. Thus, under the given circumstances, it would be in the fitness of things to hold that the consideration recorded by the assessee's undertaking generating electric power for transfer power for captive "consumption at' the rate of Rs. 3.72 per unit corresponds to the market value of power. The AO is directed to allow relief to the assessee under s.'80IA as claimed:" It is pertinent to note that the assessee is not supplying electricity to the State Electricity Board or to any other power distribution agency. In the case of West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. reported in 1000 TTJ 833 (Mum), the Hon'ble Tribunal has held as follows: "Having held that the assessee is entitled for the deduction available under s. 80-IA,· the next question is what should be the price attributable to the power generated and consumed by the assesses, The answer to the question is readily available in sub.s(8) of s.80-IA, which reads as below: 80-IA(8) Where any goods held for the purpose of eligible profits are' transferred to any other business carried on by the assessee, or where any goods held for the purposes of any 'other business'. carried on by the assessee are transferred to the eligible business and, in either case, the consideration, if any for such transfer as recorded in the accounts of the eligible business does not correspond to the market value of such goods as on the date of transfer, then for the purposes of the deduction under 51 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited this section, the profits and gains of such eligible business shall be computed as if the transfer in either case, had been made at the market value of such goods as' on that date". The above concept of transfer pricing is also apparent in r. 7 of I T Rules, 1962 provided for determining the income from agricultural produces consumed by the agriculturist-assessee in his business as raw material. The rule provides that in the case' of income which is partially agricultural income and partially income chargeable as business income in determining that part which is chargeable to income-tax, the market value of any agricultural produce which has been raised by the assessee and utilized as a raw material in such business hall be deducted at the prevalent market value. This principle has been considered and upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of ThiruArooran Sugars Ltd. Vs. ClT (1997) -142 CTR (SC) 9; (1997) 227 ITR 432 (SC). Therefore, we direct the assessing authority to work out the profits on the basis of the price of the power generated' by the assessee' at the average of the annual landed cost of electricity 'purchased by the assessee from Karnataka State Electricity Board during the impugned previous year. It may be determined on the basis of 'payment details available from the bills issued by the Karnataka state Electricity Board, during the year under consideration.” During the course of the appellate proceedings, the assessee has submitted that the sale price of electricity by the captive generating units varies from Rs. 4.55 per KWH to,Rs. 4.52 per KWH and for the sake of uniformity, the same had been taken at the average rate of Rs. 4.54 per KWH for computing the claim u/s. 80IA for the power generating units. The working had been done based on the price of electricity charges by Dakshin 'Gujarat .Vij company, a state owned company which was the only supplier of electricity other than the captive power plants. In views of the decisions of Hon'ble Tribunals as. discussed above, the Assessing. Officer will examine whether the submission of the assessee with respect to the rate taken is correct. If it is found that the rate charged by the suppliers is lower than the role adopted for sale by the captive power generating units of the assessee, such rate would be taken by the Assessing Officer for computing the profits of 'the' eligible-business, eligible for deduction u/s. 80IA. However, if the' rate charged. by the suppliers is the same as the rate adopted for sale' by the 'captive power generating units of the assessee, such rate' adopted should be accepted for' the purpose of working out the deduction u/s. 80IA. Subject to the above, this ground of appeal filed by the assessee is allowed. The facts of the case are similar and issue involved is identical. Accordingly in view of the facts of the case and keeping in view the principles of judicial consistency, it -Is directed that. the Assessing Officer will examine correctness of the-rate taken (Rs. 4.799 per unit) and if it is found that the rate charged by the suppliers is lower than the rate adopted for sale by the captive power generating units of the assessee, such rate would be taken by the Assessing Officer for computing the profits of the eligible business, eligible for deduction u/s. 80IA. However, if the rate charged by the suppliers is the same as the rate adopted for sale by the captive power generating units of the assessee, such rate adopted should be accepted for the purpose of working out the deduction u/s.80-lA. Subject to the above, this ground or-appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

52 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 19. We found that exactly similar issue has been considered by the Tribunal in assessee's own case for the assessment year 2006-07 therein issue has been decided in favour of the assessee. As the facts and circumstances during the year under consideration are same, respectfully following the order of the Tribunal in assessee's own case, we do not find any infirmity in the order of CIT(A) for allowing assessee's claim of deduction u/s. 80IA with reference to power generating undertaking and the power so generated being used mainly for captive consumption.

53 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited "Generation is being delicensed and captive generation is being freely permitted. Hydro projects would, however, need approval of the State Government and clearance from the Central Electricity Authority which would go into the issues of dam safety and optimal utilisation of water resources. (Emphasis supplied).

28. It is quite clear that under section 12, a licence is not required for generation of electricity and this is made clear by section 7 which reads as follows: "PART III- GENERA TION OF ELECTRICIT Section 7. (Generating company and requirement for setting up of generating station): Any generating company may establish, operate and maintain a generating station without obtaining a licence under this Act if it complies with the technical standards relating to connectivity with the grid referred to in clause (b) of section 73. Section 8(Hydro Electric generation)" Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7, any generating company intending to set-up a hydrogenating station shall prepare and submit to the Authority for its concurrence, a scheme estimated to involve a capital expenditure exceeding such sum, as may be fixed by the Central Government, from time to time, by notification.

31. The reason for excluding a Captive Generation plant from any of the technical standards for construction of electricity plants relating to connectivity with the grid, is because a person can, without a licence, construct, maintain and operate a Captive Generation plant and use dedicated transmission lines. His generating, transmitting and consuming power within his own jurisdiction neither needs access nor seeks to use the grid and therefore such a Captive Generation Plant is not cabined and cribbed by any regulatory mechanism under the Electricity Act 2003.

55 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 35. The Calcutta High Court in page 11 has held "the rate at which electricity was purchased from Andhra State Electricity Board by the paper unit of the assessee can by no means be the market rate at which the power plant of the assessee could have sold its production in the open market. In the open market the buyer would obviously be a distribution company or a company engaged in generation and distribution. Therefore, the rate which is sold to any such company can only be the market rate contemplated by the section". In other words, according to the Calcutta High Court, the regulated selling price by a third party to the assessee cannot form the selling price by a Captive Generation plant. Whilst this is the absolutely correct and true, it is wholly irrelevant in context of Electricity Act, 2003. In a much as under the Electricity Act 2003, when the Captive Generation plant notionally sells electricity to itself, there is no regulation in respect of market price. In this connection, the decision of Supreme Court in the case of ThiruArooran Sugars Ltd. v. CIT (1997) 227 ITR 432 is material. In that case, the assessee company was a manufacturer of sugar which purchased sugarcane from the market for crushing. It also had its own cane fields where it cultivated sugarcane, which was entirely consumed by its factory. Since the profit made by the assessee from the sale of sugar arose out of agricultural activities as well as manufacturing activities, the income earned by the assessee was required to be divided into two parts. No tax was leviable on agricultural income, but the profit generated from non-agricultural activities was leviable to be taxed under the Act. Therefore the agricultural income had to be determined and for that market value of the sugarcane consumed in its factory had to be determined. The relevant rule 7 of the Income- tax Rules, 1962 read as follows: "Income which is partially agricultural and partially from business - (1) In the case of income which is partially agricultural income as defined in section 2 and partially income chargeable to income-tax under the head 'profits and gains of business', in determining that part which is chargeable to income-tax the market value of any agricultural produce which has been raised by the assessee or received by him as rent-in- kind and which has been utilised as a raw material in such business or the sale receipts of which are included in the accounts of the business shall be deducted, and no further deduction shall be made in respect of any expenditure incurred by the assessee as a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind. "(2) For the purpose of sub-rule (1) 'market value' shall be deemed to be (a) where agricultural produce is ordinarily sold in the market in its raw state, or after application to it of any process ordinarily employed by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind to render it fit to be taken to market, the value calculated according to the average price at which it has been so sold during the relevant previous year; (b) where agricultural produce is not ordinarily sold in the market in its raw state or after application to it of any process aforesaid, the aggregate of- (i) the expenses of cultivation; (ii) the land revenue or rent paid for the area in which it was grown; and (iii) such amount as the Assessing Officer finds, having regard to all the circumstances in each case, to represent a reasonable profit. "

56 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 36. The revenue argued that Rule 7(2)(a) ought to be followed and according to the assessee, Rule 7(2)(b) was the correct rule to be followed. The Supreme Court rejected the argument of the assessee that Rule 7(2)(b) ought to be followed. It held at page 438 as follows: "We are unable to uphold this argument. 'Market' in the context of rule 7 does not mean an open market where buyers and sellers get together for the purpose of purchase and sale of goods. The assessee-company regularly, year after year, in the ordinary course of business bought sugarcane from registered and unregistered ryots. Whether the purchase was at a price controlled by the Sugarcane Control Order or not is quite immaterial. There was a price at which sugarcane could ordinarily be purchased by the assessee for the purpose of its own business. The price paid by the assessee was the market price. It is by now well-settled that market does not have to be one open place of business where buyer and seller congregate (Emphasis Supplied).

37. According to the Supreme Court, it is not necessary that there must be an actual market where buyers and consumers congregate to purchase and sell Goods Where there is no such open market, an estimate of the market price will have to be done on an estimated hypothetical basis. It stated at page 440, para (f) of 227 ITR 432. The principle that value of a property will be the price which it will fetch if sold in the open market is a well-known method of valuation which has been adopted in a large number of statutes in England and also in India. It is well-settled that existence of an open market is not a pre- condition for application of this principle. There may or may not be an actual market where buyers and sellers congregate to purchase and sell goods. Where there is no such open market, an estimate of the market price will have to be done on a hypothetical basis.

38. The Supreme Court also referred to its decision in the case of Ahmed G. H Ariff v. CWT [1970] 761TR 471 (SC), in the following words: In the case of Ahmed G.H. Ariff v. CWT [1970176 ITR 471, explaining the phrase 'if sold in the open market' in section 7(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, it was observed by Grover, J., speaking for the Court that the phrase did not contemplate actual sale or the actual state of the market, but only enjoined that it should be assumed that there was an open market and the property could be sold in such a market and, on that basis, the value had to be found out. It was a hypothetical case which was contemplated and the tax officer must assume that there was an open market in which the asset could be sold. In view of the aforesaid, it is very difficult to uphold the contention of Mr. Nariman that in order to find out the market price there has to be an actual market where there will be 'a concourse of buyers and sellers'.

39. Having discussed these principles, it laid down the following criteria for determining the price at which the sugar cane was said to have been sold to the manufacturing unit of the assessee. It noted that the assessee company actually bought sugarcane from a large number of growers, year after year in the ordinary course of business. The price at which it buys the sugarcane must be the market price and if the price was controlled, the controlled price will be taken as the market price, because it is at this price that a willing buyer and a willing seller are expected to transact business. Applying, this principle of the facts of the assessee's case, there is only a single buyer for the electricity generated by the Captive 57 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited Generation Power which is the assessee himself. Just as in ThiruArooran Sugars Ltd. v. CIT, the sugarcane produced by ThiruArooran Sugars categorically confirms that there was only a single buyer viz. manufacturing unit of ThiruArooran Sugars, the Supreme Court there stated that because manufacturing unit also bought from other growers,the price at which they obtain sugar cane should be adopted as market price. Applying this principle to the facts of the assessee's case, the assessee also buys electricity from other supplier viz Gujarat Electricity Board (GEB). It is not relevant whether that price was controlled or not. If the price at which the GEB supplied as controlled then that would be the market price vis-a- vis the assessee. Accordingly, the price charged by GEB should be adopted as market price. Therefore, the decision of Supreme Court in ThriuArooran Sugars completely covers the situation of the assessee.

40. The Supreme Court at page 441 has stated as under: "These are the principles universally applied to find out the price at which the goods are ordinarily sold in the open market. For determination of market value, there is no pre-requisite that an open market where buyers and sellers congregate to buy and sell goods must exist. In the instant case, the assessee-company actually bought sugarcane from a large number of growers year after year in the ordinary course of business. The price at which it buys sugarcane must/be taken to be the market price. If the price is controlled by Sugarcane Control Order, the controlled price will be taken as the market price because it is at this price that a willing buyer and a willing seller are expected to transact business. As Lord Denning pointed out, it does not make any difference to this position that the assessee was the only buyer in the region where its factory was located".

41. The Calcutta High Court has however stated at page 11: “But in the case before us the electricity generated by the assessee could not be sold to anyone other than a distribution company or a company which is engaged both in generation and distribution."

43. Therefore, the decision of the Calcutta High Court is distinguishable as in that case in the .period before the introduction of the Electricity Act, 2003 a captive generating plant would sell electricity only to a generating or distribution and generating company whereas in the case of the assessee after the enactment of the Electricity Act, 2003 the Assessee would sell to "any licencee" and is not restricted to selling electricity only to a distribution company or a generating and distribution company.

44. It was in these circumstances and for these reasons that the Calcutta High Court concluded that the purchase price would be different from the selling price 58 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited of electricity on account of wheeling and distribution of losses. The Calcutta High Court concluded at page 12 as under: "The rate at which electricity can be supplied to a consumer by the distribution licensee and the rate at which the generating companies can sell electricity to the distribution licensee are governed respectively by Sections 61 and 62 of the Electricity Act 2003. There is tariff regulatory commission which fixes both the rates for sale and purchase of electricity by the distribution licensee. There are provisions in Section 62 so that the generating companies can recover expected revenue on the basis of the tariff fixed by the commission. There are similarly provisions in Section 61 so that the distribution licensee can derive reasonable return. There is thus an in-built mechanism to ensure permissible profit both to the generating companies and the distribution licensees ..... "

47. On perusal of the above, it can be observed that section 62 of the Electricity Act 2003 authorizes commission to determine tariff for (1) Generating company supplying to distribution licensee, (2) Transmission of Electricity (3) Wheeling of electricity (4) Retail sales of electricity.

48. Thus captive power plant and its users are not covered under the four categories mentioned in section 62(1) above. Hence for supply of power by a captive power plant to the captive users or to open access consumers, it is not required to get the tariff approved by the commission as stated in section 86(1 )(a) of the Electricity Act, 2003.

49. Therefore, the decision of the Calcutta High Court cannot be applied to the acts of the assessee in as much as it was delivered in respect of A Y 2002-03 for which the Electricity Act 2003 did not apply and also for the reason that the Honourable Court has not considered the provisions of sections 8, 9, 42 and 2(g) of the Electricity Act, 2003. Further the provisions of section 62 of the Electricity Act, 2003 referred to by the Honourable Court are not applicable to the fact of the assessee's case.

50. The Calcutta High Court has dissented from the decision of three different High Court as follows:

1. 1. The decision of Chattisgarh High Court Bilaspur Bench in the case of ACIT v. Godavari Power & Ispat Ltd. - 223 Taxman 234.

2. CIT v. Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd 35 taxmann.com (Cal). 3. CIT v. Graphite India Ltd ITA No ITA No 733 of 2008 (Cal). 4. Madras High Court decision referred to in page 12 (Citation notavailable). 51. Under these circumstances following two principles involved here.

1. Where there is a conflict of views between High Court, Tribunal may choose to follow what in its opinion is the correct view.

2. When there is a conflict of opinion between two or more High courts, opinion of jurisdictional High Court, which is in favour of the assessee ought to be followed.

60 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 52. If neither of the above two principles are followed, there is a decision of assessee in its own case for the earlier year on identical fats and that ought to be followed.

53. Further there are several decision of Tribunal which have taken the same view, In cases with similar facts viz:-.

1. ACIT, Raipur v. Godavari Power &Ispat Ltd - 133 ITD 502 (Dilaspur ITAT) 2. Eveready Spinning Mills (P) Ltd v. ACIT, Circle-1, Tirupur - 17 Taxmann 254 (AY 2007-08) Chennai ITAT.

6. Shree Cement Ltd v. The Addl. CIT Jaipur-ITA NO.503/JP/2012 (Jaipur ITAT) 54. In any view of the matter, several decision of the Tribunal listed below have taken a view consistent with a view taken by Tribunal in assessee's own case for A Y 2006-07. In the circumstances, except in the case of Calcutta High Court in M/s. ITC Ltd, there are four judgements of other High Court in assessee's favour and six judgements of Tribunal in assessee favour and no contrary decision of Tribunal. In the circumstance, the appropriate course of action to follow would be the decision of Supreme Court in the case of ThiruAroovan Sugar Mills and the decisions of Calcutta High Court which are earlier in point of time and decision of Chattisgarh and Madras High Court and various benches of Tribunals and assessee's own case for the earlier year.

55. Furthermore the Supreme Court has endorsed the view that where there is a conflict between two High Courts the view in favour of the assessee must be adopted. There are several decision which have taken the same view, in cases with similar facts viz:-.

1. CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd - 88 ITR 192 (SC) 2. Pradeep J Mehta v. CIT Ahmedabad - 169 Taxman 454 (SC) 3. CIT v. Naga Hills Tea Co. Ltd - 89 ITR 236 (SC) In view of the above discussion, the Calcutta High Court can have no application to the assessee's case.

6. The Tribunal in the impugned judgment extracted extensively from the order of CIT (Appeals) and independent reasons for confirming the same. In such order CIT (Appeals) had placed reliance on an earlier judgment of the Tribunal in case of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [2011] 9 taxmann.com 186 (Mum. - Trib.). Learned counsel for the assessee had placed on record a copy of the judgment of the Tribunal in case of Reliance Infrastructure limited. In such judgment an identical issue came up for consideration. The Tribunal by detailed judgment had held and observed as under:— "44. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the profits of the business of generation of power worked out by the Assessee on the basis of the price that it paid to TPC for purchase of power continues to be the best basis even after the order of MERC and therefore the same has to be accepted as was done in the past and as approved by the ITAT in Assesssee's case. We therefore dismiss ground No.4 of the revenue."

7. Counsel for the assessee pointed out that the judgment of the Tribunal in case of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) was carried in appeal by the revenue before the High Court in Income Tax Appeal No.2180 of 2011, such appeal was dismissed making following observations:— "6. As far as question (d), namely, the claim relating to purchase price from Tata Power Company is concerned and that was for the deduction under Section 80IA, the ITAT in paragraph 21 onwards has noted the factual findings and also referred to the order of the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Authority (for short "MERC"). Paragraph 36 set outs as to how the claim arose. The claim has been considered in the light of Section 80IA and particularly proviso and explanation thereto. The Tribunal eventually held that till the Assessment Year 2005-2006, the Revenue considered the rate at which the power was purchased by the Assessee from Tata Power Company as market value. There is nothing brought on record as to how the rate determined by the MERC is the true market value. The Assessee gave explanation that the rates determined by the MERC do not reflect the correct market rate. The finding is that the mode of computation and deduction under Section 80IA requires no deviation from the past. The findings of fact and to be found in paragraphs 42 to 50 also reflect that the very issue came up for consideration for the Assessment Year 2003-2004. For the reasons assigned by the ITAT and finding that the attempt is to seek reappreciation and reappraisal of the factual data that we come to a conclusion that even question (d) as framed is not a substantial question of law."

8. Thus, the issue at hand had been examined by this Court on earlier occasion and the view of the Tribunal under similar circumstances was approved.

62 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 9. Additionally, we also notice that similar issue came up for consideration before Chhattisgarh High Court in case of CIT v. Godawari Power &Ispat Ltd. [2014] 42 taxmann.com 551/223 Taxman 234, in which the Court held and observed as under: "31. The market value of the power supplied to the Steel-Division should be computed considering the rate of power to a consumer in the open market and it should not be compared with the rate of power when it is sold to a supplier as this is not the rate for which a consumer or the Steel-Division could have purchased power in the open market. The rate of power to a supplier is not the market rate to a consumer in the open market.

32. In our opinion, the AO committed an illegality in computing the market value by taking into account the rate charged to a supplier: it should have been compared with the market value of power supplied to a consumer."

10. Gujarat High Court in case of Pr. CIT v. Gujarat Alkalies& Chemicals Ltd. [2017] 395 ITR 247/88 taxmann.com 722 also had occasion to examine such an issue. It referred to earlier order in case of Asstt. CIT v. Pragati Glass Works (P.) Ltd. [Tax Appeal No. 1646 of 2010, dated 30-1-2012] in which following observations were made:— "7. To our mind, Tribunal has committed no error. Assessing Officer and CIT (Appeals) while adopting Rs. 4.51 per unit as the value of electricity generated by eligible unit of assessee and supplied through its non eligible unit only worked out cost of such electricity generation. In fact CIT (Appeals) in terms recorded that Rs. 4.51 was computed as the reasonable value of the electricity generated by eligible unit of assessee. This amount included Rs. 4.17 per unit which was the cost of electricity generation and Rs. 0.34 per unit which was duty paid by the assessee to GEB for such power generation. Thus the sum of Rs. 4.51 per unit only represented the cost of electricity generation to the assessee. In Section 80IA(8) of the Act what is required to be ascertained is the market value of the goods transferred by the eligible business, when such transfer is by eligible business to another non eligible business of the same assessee and the consideration recorded in the accounts of the eligible business does not correspond to market value of such goods. Term "Market Value" is further explained in explanation to said sub- section to mean in relation to any goods or services, price that such goods or services will ordinarily fetch in the open market. To our mind sum of Rs. 4.51 per unit of electricity only represented cost of electricity generation to the assessee and not the market value thereof. It is not in dispute that the GEB charged Rs. 5 per unit for supplying electricity to other industries including non eligible unit of the assessee itself. Tribunal therefore, while adopting the said base figure and excluding excise duty therefrom to work out Rs. 4.90 as the market value of the electricity generated by the assessee, to our mind, committed no error. It can be easily seen that if the assessee were to supply such electricity or was allowed to do so in the open market, surely it would not fetch Rs. 4.51 per unit but Rs. 5 per unit as was being charged by GEB. Since the excise duty component thereof would not be retained by the assessee, Tribunal reduced the said figure by the nature of excise duty and came to the figure of Rs. 4.90 to ascertain the market value of electricity generated by the eligible unit and supplied to non eligible 63 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited business of the assessee. No error was committed by the Tribunal. No question of law therefore, arises. Tax Appeal is dismissed."

11. Judgment of Calcutta High Court in case of CIT v. ITC Ltd. [2016] 236 Taxman 612/[2015] 64 taxmann.com 214 was also brought to our notice in which the said High Court has taken a different stand. However, since the issue has already been examined by this Court earlier and in view of the decisions of the Chhattisgarh and Gujarat High Court, we see no reason to entertain this question.”

64. It is observed that similar issue has recently been decided by co-ordinate bench in a group concern of the Assessee, being, Ambuja Cements Limited vide ITA No. 3843/Mum/2019 and 1889/Mum/2018 for AY 2011-12 and AY 2012-13. While deciding the case, the Co-ordinate bench has relied on the decision of Mumbai ITAT in case of West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. vs JCIT (2006) 100 TTJ 833 (Mum) and decision of Bombay High Court in case of Reliance Industries Ltd(Supra). While deciding the mater the Co-ordinate bench has held that the issue as to which market value of the power is to be taken into account in the computation of power for deduction under section 80IA, i.e. the market value to the end consumer or market value in the power trading companies, is no longer res integra. The Co-ordinate bench has concluded that the price to the consumer, and not the intra-power companies trading price which must be taken into account.

45. Respectfully following the above said decision, however, for the year under consideration, the working is already available on the records of the Assessing Officer, we direct the assessing officer to verify the same as per the direction given in the order for AY 2011-12 and accordingly, we allow the ground raised by the assessee for statistical purpose.

46. In the Ground No.5, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

“5(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified rather grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in not allowing the claim of tax holiday u/s 80-IA on infrastructure facility, being Rail System, developed, operated and maintained by the appellant at various locations. 5(b). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT (A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the 65 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited action of the AO in holding that for the purpose of claim of tax holiday u/s 80IA on infrastructure facility, being Rail System, the same should be a facility for public utility. The Ld. CIT(A) also erred in concluding that the Appellant was not operating rail system merely because sidings were laid from / upto the plant site. 5(c). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in holding that the agreements entered into between the Appellant and the Indian Railways cannot be termed as an agreement for developing, operating and maintaining an infrastructure facility i.e. Rail System for the purpose of claiming tax holiday u/s 80IA. 5(d). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of the AO in holding that the claim of deduction u/s 80IA on Rail System is a false claim without appreciating the fact that the same has been allowed by his predecessors in earlier assessment years on same set of facts after due verification. 5(e). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of the AO in respect of the disallowance which was in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice since the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) - 5 in the case of Ultratech Cements Limited on the basis of which the claim of deduction u/s 801A on Rail System has been treated as a false claim was never made available to the appellant. The Ld. CIT(A) failed to appreciate and ought to have held that since the said decision of the CIT(A) in Ultratech's case has been over-ruled by the ITAT, which was the basis for AO in disallowing the deduction, no longer survives and therefore deduction deserves to be allowed to the Appellant. 5(f). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT (A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of the AO in disallowing the claim of deduction u/s 801A on Rail System on mere conjectures, surmises and preconceived notion. 5(g). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred in not adjudicating the AO's action who himself was in a quandary in suggesting two alternative methods for computing deduction u/s 801A on Rail System and thus was not justified in not quantifying the exact amount of deduction available to the appellant if deduction u/s 80-IA on allowance of deduction in appellate proceedings. 5(i) Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred and not justified in not deciding upon the AO's suggestion that in case the appellant was found to be eligible in appellate proceedings, adjustments on account of allocated HO expenses and "CENVAT" expenses were to be made while determining the claim.”

47. Similar issue was considered by us in the assessee Appeal in Ground No 3 in AY 2009-10 and held as under:

“30. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. It is observed that entire controversy of allowability of deduction u/s 80IA(4) on Rail Infrastructure facility was raised based upon CIT(A)’s order in the case of Ultratech Cement Limited as referred 66 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited in assessment order. This fact is also mentioned by Ld DR in its written submission. The Ld. DR has also stated that on perusal of facts as emanating from the CIT(A)’s order and the ITAT’s order in the case of Ultratech Cement Limited, it can be safely assumed that the agreement between Ultratech Cement Limited and the Railway Authorities and that between assessee and the Rail Authorities are similarly worded. It is relevant to refer to decision of co-ordinate Bench in the case of Ambuja Cement Ltd. in ITA No. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 vide its order dated 07.11.2022 has decided issue in favour of assessee after considering coordinate bench in the case of Ultratech Limited which in turn has reversed the finding of CIT(A) in its case which is relied upon by AO of assessee in assessment order: “87. So far as this grievance of the assessee is concerned, only a few material facts need to be taken note of. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer took note of the fact that the assessee has claimed deduction under section 80IA on rail system comprising of railway sidings, railway tracks, loading and unloading systems, at Ropar, Maratha, Sankrail, Farraka and Bhatapara units. He also the assessee’s contention that these rail systems alongside the cement plants are to enable the transportation of raw material (i.e. coal etc) and finished goods (i.e. cement) to and from the cement plants of the assessee. The assesse’s claim that the rail system meets all the requirements of Section 80IA(4) was also noted. The method adopted for computing the income was being excess of road freight and handling charges payable for transportation of goods by road to the nearest railhead, over the tariff payable for transportation of goods from railway siding to the rais head as per tariff notified by the Indian Railways. This claim, however, did not find favour with the assessee this time, even though the same stand of the assessee was accepted for three consecutive preceding assessment years. After elaborately discussing the things in detail, and extensively referring to investigations carried out in the case of Ultratech Cements Limited, the Assessing Officer concluded that (a) the so called rail system of the assessee company is simply a private rail siding, and is not any infrastructure of public utility; (b) the agreements entered into between the assessee company and the Indian Railways consisting of terms and conditions for private sidings, and could not be viewed as an agreement for building, operating and maintenance of a rail system; (c) the conditions stipulated under section 80IA have not been satisfied; (d) the actual operation of the rail system (i.e. running of the goods train) was being done by the Indian Railways and not the assessee company; (e) all the four cement plant sites were notified as independent booking stations and the freight was charged for the entire distance- including the distance from these private sidings to the railheads; (f) the notional profit computation is incorrect; and (g) the decisions of the Tribunal were not applicable as these critical facts were not placed before the Tribunal. The claim for deduction under section 80IA in respect of the rail system was rejected. Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal but without success. Learned CIT(A) reiterated the same arguments and upheld the stand of the Assessing Officer. The assessee is not satisfied and is in further appeal before us.

67 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 9. During the course of assessment AO disallowed assessee's claim of deduction u/s.80IA in respect of profit of rail systems. The assessee made this claim on the ground that it had earned profit by operating its rail systems at Hirmi [Chhattisgarh], Tadipatri [AP], Arakkonam [Tamil Nadu] and Durgapur [West Bengal]. In the context, during the assessment proceedings it was explained that the assessee had inherited those rail systems [along with cement plants-Hirmi Cement Works, A P Cement Works, Arakkonam Cement Works & West Bengal Cement Works] out of demerger from L&T Ltd. at all those locations; that the rail systems were set-up by L&T Ltd. [and that way by the assessee company as it had inherited the cement plants from L&T Ltd. by way of demerger] to enable the transportation of raw material [coal etc] and finished goods [i.e. cements] at their cement plants through railway wagons, at all the said; four locations. It was explained that prior to putting up those rail systems, the assessee used to transfer the material from the cement plants [at all the four locations] to the nearest railway station and vice versa on road through trucks. Before the AO the claim of deduction was justified by assessee by taking the plea that the various conditions as prescribed u/s 80IA(4) was met with in as much as it had entered into an agreement with the government through department of Railways for developing, maintaining and operating the rail system [infrastructure facility]; and that in pursuance thereof it had developed the integrated rail system in between the plant and the nearest railway track [of Indian Railways] and running it [in between] for movement of the inward and outward material so as to enable it to transport the materials from its plants straightaway to the various destinations and vice versa at all those four locations; and that by way of such operation of rail systems, it has been able to save the expenses for loading [at those plants] into the trucks, road freight and expenses for unloading and loading the same at the site of nearest Indian railways and that resulted into the. profit of such rail systems.

10. However, the AO noted that those agreements were for laying out private sidings and not for any rail system [as referred to in Explanation (a) to the clause (t) of sub-section (4) section 80IA in reference to the infrastructure facility] as claimed by the assessee that railway had laid down those [sidings] partly on the land belonging to the railways and partly belonging to the assessee company so as to facilitate the transportation of raw materials/cement bags through railway wagons [from / to their plant sites]. The AO also noted that the assessee [rather L&T Ltd.] had primarily requested the' railway department to extend the sidings [railway tracks] to the site of cement plants of the company so as to enable it to transport its goods [raw material & cement] from/to their plant sites itself [so that it could avoid transportation through the roads till the nearest railway station and loading and unloading etc]; that on such request the railway authorities conducted survey and laid down sidings and charged the assessee for laying out the railway track and other related infrastructure. The AO also noted that the wagons were actually run on those sidings by the railway authority and not by the assessee company. The AO also took note that railway authorities had posted its staff for weighing raw material/ cement bags loaded/unloaded by the assessee; and that all activities were directly or indirectly being carried out by the railway authorities and the assessee only reimbursed the expenses or charges levied by the railways in r/o siding maintenance etc. as per the agreement. The AO inferred that the so called "rail system" [of the assessee company] is not a self reliant, independent unit; and that it is providing services to the cement plants of the 68 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited assessee company only. The AO also stated that railway department do not allow operation of the railways by any private enterprise and for that reason it [railway department] had formulated a Build-own-lease- transfer (BOLT) scheme whereby the private enterprises could set-up the necessary and crucial components of a railway system and provide that on lease to Indian Railways for maintenance and operation; and in the context referred to the CBDT circular No. 733, dated 03.01.1996 whereby the benefit of Sec. 80IA was also extended to such rail system constructed / developed by the private enterprises as per the said BOLT scheme. By that circular, the Board had also clarified that such concession would be available only to an infrastructure facility meant for development of rail systems and not to any other infrastructural facility including rolling stocks. The AO also observed that the assessee, had not given the said railway system or the crucial component thereof on lease to the railway department [had it been so, the profit by way of lease rent from such rail. system would have qualified for deduction u/s 80lA as per the concession given by the aforesaid circular]. Finally, the AO held that assessee was not eligible to claim the deduction u/s 80lA in r/o such rail systems and disallowed the claim accordingly.

11. In its appellate order CIT(A) noted that the issue has come up first in A.Y. 2004-05. In that year, the assessee had claimed deduction of Rs 15.63 crores in r/o rail system at Hirmi, Raipur District, Chattisgarh. In A.Ys. 2005- 06 & 2006-07, the assessee claimed deduction of Rs.16.30crs. & Rs 20.95 crs. respectively in r/o that rail system at Hirmi. In A.Y. 2007- 08, the claim was made in r/o two more rail systems [one at Tadipatri in Andhra Pradesh & the other at Arakkonam in Tamil Nadu]. The total claim for that year amounted to Rs 52.38 crs. [Rs 21.09 crs. - Hirmi; Rs 25.56 crs. -Tadipatri & Rs 5.73 crs. -Arakkonam]. In A.Y. 2008- 09, the claim extended to one more rail system at Durgapur [West Bengal] and the total claim amounted to Rs 61.56 crs. This claim for AY 2009-10 i.e. for the year under consideration had risen to 73.13 crs.

12. The rail systems at all these four locations viz. Hirmi, Tadipatri, Arakkonam& Durgapur are said to have commenced the operations in AY. 2000-01, AY. 1999-00, AY. 2001-02 ft AY. 2002-03 respectively [refer assessee's reply dated 06.01.2014] It was further observed by CIT(A) that the L&T Ltd. on whose request the private sidings were set up at all these four locations, never claimed any such deduction u/s 80IA(4). The deductions are being claimed by the assessee company since AY. 2004-05, after the various cements plants were transferred to the assessee company [in the year 2003- 04] as per demerger scheme. In AY. 2004-05, claim was made [for the first time] in respect of such Rail System at Hirmi. Then in AY. 2007-08, it started claiming deduction in respect of rails systems at Tadipatri and Arakkonam and then in AY. 2008-09 for Durgapur also. From AY. 2009-10 and onwards the claim pertains to all the four units.

13. The CIT(A) further noted that in Ays. 2004-05 & 2005-06, the Hon'ble ITAT vide its order dated 20.08.2009 in ITA Nos. 7735 & 7736/Mum/2007 had decided this issue in the favour of assessee. Later that decision of the tribunal was followed by the ITAT in its [assessee] case in AY. 2006-07 [ ITA No. 2604/M/09 order dated 31.5.2010] and in AYs 2007-08 & 2008-09 [ITA Nos. 8143/mum/2010 and 1813/Mum12012, order dated 28.02.2014]. The relevant part of the Tribunal's decision in AY. 2004- 05 is reproduced hereunder:

69 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited "13. Regarding the issue in r/o deduction u/s 80lA on profit of Rail system at Hirmi, the AO rejected the claim on the ground that the rail system is not a profit centre but it is a cost centre and that the rail system is not an independent unit but it is 100% depending on the cement unit. Detailed submissions filed by the assessee which are reproduced in the assessment order was not found satisfactorily to the AO. Detailed submissions were again filed before the CIT(A). It was explained that the company had established a cement plant in Hirmi, The nearest available railway siding was at a distance of around 15 km. from the plant. To facilitate inward and outward movement of goods, the assessee developed infrastructure facility of rail system which was made operating in 1999. The assessee company duly entered into an agreement with the railways, which is a part of Government of India. It was submitted that there was option available u/s 80lA with the assessee to claim deduction for any of 10 consecutive years as its own choice. The assessee has opted for claiming the deduction from A.Y. 2004-05 on wards. It was submitted that the income offered for tax by the assessee includes income from rail system and that certificate of M/s Sharp &Tannan, CA in Form No. 10CCB certifying the correctness of the aforesaid claim was duly submitted to the AO. 13.1. It was further submitted that the rail system is a profit centre. The rail system is engaged in business of providing transportation facility to the cement plant, profit of which is embedded in the profit of the assessee company as a whole. It was submitted that by developing this infrastructure facility, there has been saving in transportation cost and overall profits of the company have increased due to such savings. It was such that the mere fact that it does not raise an invoice from its railway unit to its cement unit cannot govern the tax implication of the profits delivered by the rail system. In support of its contention that treatment of a transaction in books of accounts cannot govern the tax statement reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kadernath Jute Manufacturing Company Ltd. 82 ITR 362; in the case of TutcorinAlali Chemicals Ltd. in 227 ITR 172; in the case of Godhra Electricity Company in 91 Taxman 91; in the case of Bokaro Steel Ltd in 263 ITR 315 and in the case of Sutlet Cotton Mills Ltd. in 116 ITR 1 and submitted that it would be totally incorrect to say that an assessee who raises internal invoices would be entitled to benefit of Sec 80IA and an assessee who does not raise internal invoices would not be entitled to such benefit. 13.2. The assessee further submitted that Sec. 80IA(8) itself contemplates a situation where goods or services are transferred by an eligible undertaking to non-eligible undertaking and vice versa. In such cases, deduction is to be allowed based on the market value of such goods or services. It was further submitted that the section itself envisages situation of captive consumption. Reliance was placed on the decision reported in 59 ITR 514 (Guj.) and 254 ITR 17 (Bom).

70 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 13.3. Further reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. in 48 ITR 123 and stated that in that case, the assessee was engaged in the business of extraction of iron ore and manufacturing of iron and steel therefrom. The final product sold by the company was the finished iron and steel. Under some statute, a cess was leviable on the annual net profits derived from the mines. It was contended that since no iron ore extracted is sold to an outsider, no profits could be said to have been derived from the extracting activities. This argument was advanced based on the principle that a person cannot make profits out of himself, The Supreme Court negative this argument and held that despite captive consumption of iron ore certain profits can be regarded as having derived from the extraction activities. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of bifurcating the total profits into two activities viz. the extraction activity and the manufacturing activity. It was therefore submitted that in view of the above, it is not correct to say that the assessee does not earn any profits from its rail system merely because the rail system is used for the captive purposes of the cement plant. 13.4. It was further submitted that the Board Circular No. 733 dated 03.01.1996 states that deduction u/s 80lA is applicable to an infrastructure facility meant for development of rail system. It was contended that the AO has categorically stated in para 5.2.3 of his order that rail system was developed by L&T and was inherited by the assessee out of demerger. It was further submitted that in a demerger all the property of the undertaking is necessarily transferred by the demerged company to the resulting company, therefore it is immaterial whether the rail system was developed by L&T Ltd. or by the resulting company i.e. the assessee. Further it was submitted that the facility of rail system consists of all that is required to carry on the railway activity in an organized and systematic manner. The activity of rail system is real and substantial and it is carried on with said purpose viz transportation of goods from one place to another and thereby augmenting profits of the company as a whole by saving transportation cost which it would have otherwise incurred. It was further submitted that the profits derived from the rail systems are clearly arising out of the business of developing operating and maintaining the rail system. 13.5. It was further submitted that substantial investment has been made in developing the railway system. There is an agreement with the railways for operating and maintaining the rail system. It employs required personnel directly or through the railway authorities and it bearing the salary cost relating thereto. It was submitted that the rail system is developed on the basis of entirely different technology and employs different equipment and machinery from those applied by the cement unit for cement production. It is was further submitted that the rail system is not formed by splitting up or reconstruction of a business already in existence or by the transfer to a new business of machinery previously used for any purpose. It was therefore argued that 71 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited the rail system is not a part of the cement unit but is an, independent unit. It was further submitted' that the conditions specified in Sec. 8OIA(4)(i) in r/o an infrastructure facility are fully satisfied in the present case. The rail system is owned by the assessee company which is a company registered in India. The assessee has entered into an agreement with the Railways for operating and maintaining the new infrastructure facility. It has started operating and maintenance the infrastructure facility after 01.04.1995.

14. After considering the submission and perusing the material on record, the CIT(A) was satisfied with the explanation of the assessee and taking into consideration the various case laws held that the assessee is eligible for deduction us BOIA in rlo profits from rail system. Accordingly, the AO was directed to allow deduction u/s 80IA. Now the department is in appeal here before the Tribunal.

15. The Id. DR on the other hand placed reliance on the order of the AO and on the other hand the Id counsel of the assessee placed reliance on the order of the CIT(A). Attention of the Bench was drawn on para 5.2 of the order of the AO and then on the provision of Sec 8OIA clause 2 and sub- clauses 3&4. It was further explained that the assessee can avail benefit of deduction u/s 80IA in 10 years of his choice out of 15 years period. The provisions are very clear. Attention of the Bench was also drawn on the copy of the agreement placed at page .93 of the paper book. It was further submitted that all the conditions of Sec. 80IA have been fulfilled. Reliance was placed on the decision reported in 40 ITR 123. It was submitted that the ClT(A) has discussed the issue extensively and the findings of the ld. CIT(A) remained uncontroverted. Therefore the order of the CIT(A) is liable to be confirmed in this regard.

16. We have heard the rival submission and considered them carefully: We have also perused the various material placed on record on which our attention was drawn. After taking into consideration we find that the CIT(A) has dealt with the aspect in detail. Contention raised before the ClT(A) on behalf of the assessee were not found incorrect or false. Conditions of Sec. 80IA have been fulfilled by the assessee. Thereafter, the CIT(A) came to the conclusion that the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s 80IA. The findings of the Id. CIT(A) are given in para 3.10 are as under :- 3.10 After perusal of the facts of the case, findings given by the AO and submissions made by the appellant, I find that the only issues in this case is whether the appellant is eligible for deduction u/s. 80IA in r/o profits derived from the rail system. There is no dispute that the appellant (i) is a company (if) has developed the rail system and (iii) it" has entered into an agreement for operation and maintenance of the rail system with the railways i.e the Government. Thus all the 3 conditions required to be fulfilled as per Sec. 80IA(4)(i) have been satisfied by the appellant. Moreover rail system is defined in explanation to sec. 80IA(4)(i) as an infrastructure facility. Further separate books of account are being maintained by the appellant. The mere fact that internal invoices are not raised does not mean that the rail system is not a profit centre. It is also found that all the doubts raised by the AO in the assessment order have been fully explained by the 72 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited appellant the AO has himself stated in the assessment order that the rail system was developed by L&T Ltd which has been inherited by the appellant as a result of the demerger and Circular No. 733 dated 03.01.1996 categorically stated that benefit of sec. 80IA is applicable to development of rail system and there is no gain saying that fact that the appellant has developed the rail system and is operating and maintaining the same. After perusal of the facts as well as the judicial pronouncements quoted above it is therefore held that the appellant is eligible for deduction u/s 80IA in r/o profits from rail system. In view of the same, the AO is directed to allow deduction u/s 80IA of Rs. 15,64,33,576/-17. As stated above neither the findings of the Id CIT(A) could 'be controverted by the Id DR nor any other material was brought on record to establish otherwise. Therefore in view of the uncontroverted reasoning given by the Id. CIT(A) we confirm his order on this issue also."

14. After having all the above observation, the CIT(A) noted that the issue of the allowability of the assessee's claim u/s 80IA(4) in respect of ' Rail Systems' as referred to by the assessee has been examined by him afresh from the point of view of the relevant provisions of the Act and the facts as to whether the 'Rail System' as referred to by the assessee could indeed be treated as the infrastructure facility for which deduction u/s 80lA is intended to by the legislature; and whether the assessee operated that rail system.

15. Replies and justification filed by assessee was not accepted by CIT(A) and he held that the rail system of the assessee do not fall within the definition of the infrastructure facility, as the same could not be treated as a facility of public utility. For this reason the assessee company was held to be not entitled for the deduction u/s.80IA in r/o the profit, from the operation of rail system. Reasons for the same was as under:- 16. The CIT(A) observed that the agreements under reference were not at all any agreements for developing, maintaining and operating any infrastructure facility to which benefit of exemption is intended to be given in Section 80IA. For this reason also the assessee company was held to be not entitled for deduction u/s.80IA in r/o the profit from the operation of rail system.

17. The CIT(A) also observed that L&T Ltd., who have developed the said rail system was also not eligible u/s.80IA on operations of those rail systems under the provisions that existed at the relevant time i.e., prior to 01/04/2002 when such infrastructure facility was said to have become operational.

18. The CIT(A) observed that the L&T Ltd., did not claim exemption on operation of those rail systems. Rather the assessee company has started claiming exemption from AY. 2004-05 after the ownership over the cement plants together with such rail systems were transferred to it following the demerger scheme in FY. 2003-04.

19. The CIT(A) further observed that the provision of railway track, signals, level crossings etc are the essential components of a rail system but that in itself would not give rise to any profit. For that movement of 73 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited traffic [i.e. material] is to be made over those railway tracks. The profit would arise by charging the freight thereon.

20. The CIT(A) further observed that as per' the agreement, the railway track, signals, level crossings etc were laid out on the cost of L&T Ltd. The cost of maintenance was also to be borne by L&T Ltd. [and now by the assessee]. On that only expenses are incurred and there would be no profit element. Then the issue arises of running the wagons onto those tracks. As per the agreement, the assessee was not permitted to run the wagon onto those tracks.

21. As per CIT(A), it is not a case of running of railways [goods train] by L&T Ltd. or the assessee company on those private sidings and as such the assessee did not run any rail system onto those private sidings. Therefore, it cannot be said that the assessee company had operated any rail systems at all. Therefore the deduction u/s 80lA would not be available to it onto the profit, if any, from such rail systems.

22. The CIT(A) also observed that there is very limited profit on operation of such rail system and the claim made by assessee u/s.80IA is exorbitant.

23. In view of the above discussion, the CIT(A) concluded that assessee's claim of deduction u/s.80IA is not allowable. However, by observing that the Tribunal has allowed the claim of assessee in the Ays. 2004-05, 2006-07 to 2008-09, to follow the judicial discipline, he followed the order of Tribunal and allowed assessee's claim in the A.Y.2009-10. However, by stating that new facts have been brought on record in the A.Y. 2010-11, he declined claim of deduction u/s. 80IB(4).

24. With regard to the disallowance, deduction u/s. 80IA(4), Revenue is in appeal before us in the A.Y. 2009-10, whereas assessee is in appeal for the A.Y. 2010-11.

25. It was vehemently argued by learned AR that Revenue authorities have not considered the eligibility requirement u/s.80IA as brought by the Finance Act 2001 wherein Finance Act, 2001 has deleted the requirement of the assessee to transfer the infrastructure facility to the concern Government authorities within prescribed time. He contended that CIT(A) has wrongly applied the provisions of law as applicable prior to 01/04/2002 while considering the assessee's claim for deduction for the Ays.2009-10 and 2010-11 under consideration. Learned A.R threadbare taken us to the objections raised by the CIT(A) and the reply filed by the assessee controverting each and every objection of the CIT(A). Our attention was invited to the amended provisions of Section 80IA(4) which does not require infrastructure facility to be a public facility for allowing deduction u/s. 80IA. Our attention was also invited to the terms and conditions of the agreement entered between the assessee company and the railway department which contained conditions for construction of railway sidings, development of sidings, laying of tracks, signaling system and all the essential components of rail system. The terms of the agreement also provided for its operation and maintenance. He vehemently argued that the rail systems were developed in accordance with the agreements entered with the Indian Railways, wherein assessee was allowed to operate and maintain these sidings under supervision and as per the guidelines of Indian Railway. Our attention was invited to the various clauses particularly Class 2, 6, 74 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 7(a), 17 and 8(b) which stipulate for construction of railway sidings at the cost of the assessee. Construction work was awarded either to railway or third party contractors based on their expertise and the work was undertaken under the supervision of the Railways. Clause 6 is specifically provided for payment in advance to the railway administration, the total estimated cost of the work done by the party and thus by the railway administration. Clause 7(a) stipulate that assessee will provide and deliver at site the permanent way and other materials in accordance with the railway administration standard and specifications. Clause 17 stipulate that assessee shall provide labour for and bear the cost of all Operations on the siding. Clause 9(b) provides for maintenance and other charges for the operation of the sidings at assessee's cost and expense to the satisfaction of railway administration.' 26. Learned AR also argued that all the conditions of Section 80IA(4) was complied with for claiming deductions. Learned AR also invited our attention to the observation of CIT(A) with respect to the freight rate insofar as CIT(A) has wrongly considered the rate for quintals as against per Metric Ton adopted by assessee while computing eligible amount of deduction u/s.80IA (4). It was also contended by learned AR that assessee has started claiming deduction for rail system u/s.80IA only from A.Y.2004-05 since it has satisfied all the conditions as prescribed u/s.80IA (4).

27. With regard to disallowance u/s.14A on account of interest, our attention was invited to the profit earned by the undertaking during the year as well as interest free funds available with the assessee for making investment in tax free securities and it was contended that since investment was out of assessee's own interest free funds, in terms of decision of Jurisdictional High Court in case of CIT v. Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd. [2009] 178 Taxman 135/313 ITR 340 (Bom.) and CIT v. HDFC Bank Ltd., [2014] 49 taxmann.com 335/226 Taxman 132 (Mag.)/366 ITR 505 (Bom.), no disallowance of interest is warranted. With regard to the disallowance made under Rule 8D(2)(iii) he contended that assessee itself has offered the amount attributable for earning the exempt income, therefore, further disallowance made by Revenue authorities was not justified.

29. Learned AR relied on following judicial pronouncements in support of the proposition that benefit allowed in earlier year cannot be denied in subsequent years.

75 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 6. CIT v. Delhi Press Patra Prakashan Ltd. [2013] 34 taxmann.com 3/217 Taxman 288/355 ITR 14 (Delhi) 7. Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1979] 2 Taxman 22/[1980] 123 ITR 669 (GUJARAT) 8. Ace Multi Axes System Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2015] 228 Taxman 98/[2014] 49 taxmann.com 168/367 ITR 266 (Karnataka) 9. ITO v. Smt. Urmila Bhandari [IT Appeal Nos.766, 2593 (Delhi) of 2013, dated 20-10-2014] 10. Dy. CIT v. Selvel Advertising (P.) Ltd. [2015] 58 taxmann.com 196 (Kol.-Trib.) 11. Century Enka Limited v. Dy. CIT [2015] 58 taxmann.com 318/154 ITD 426 (Kol.-Trib.) 12. Janak Dehydration (P.) Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2011] 44 SOT 93 (Ahmedabad) (URO) 13. U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2015] 62 taxmann.com 61/70 SOT 517 (Lucknow - Trib.) 14. Asst. CIT v. Apex Packing Products (P.) Ltd. [IT Appeal Nos. 145 to 150 (PNJ) of 2013, dated 3-1- 2014] 30. On the other hand, it was vehemently argued by learned DR that rail system of the assessee company was simply the profit siding and not any infrastructure facility of public utility, therefore, revenue authorities have correctly declined claim of deduction u/s.80IA(4). She further contended that the agreement entered between assessee company and railway department contained the terms and conditions for construction of private siding which cannot be treated as any agreement for development operation and maintenance of any rail system. She further vehemently argued that assessee has not complied with various conditions given in Section 80IA to arrive at eligibility for deduction. She further invited our attention to the observation made by CIT(A) to the effect that the actual operation of rail system on to the private sidings between the serving railway station and plant premises was being done by the Indian Railways and not by the assessee Company, therefore, assessee was not entitled for 80 IA(4). She further alleged that profit computed by assessee for the rail system was very exorbitant and method adopted for computation was also not correct. Our attention was invited to the computation of profit as per table 'F'of CIT(A)'s order. She further contended that when L&T Ltd., itself was not eligible for deduction u/s.80IA, how assessee company became eligible for the same after demerger and inherited the cement business i.e., cement plants together with the rail systems of the L&T Ltd., She placed reliance on the Circular No.733 dated 03/01/1996 which provided that BOLT scheme of Indian Railway shall be eligible for the benefit u/s.80IA.

32. With regard to disallowance made u/s.14, she relied on the findings recorded by lower authorities.

76 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 34. Grievance of both the assessee and revenue revolves around assessee's eligibility for claim of deduction u/s.80IA (4) of the Income-tax Act. From the record we found that assessee UltraTech Cement Ltd. ('UTCL') has acquired the cement business of Larsen & Toubro Limited (L&T') along with the Rail systems at Hirmi, Tadipatri, Arrokonam and Durgapur in the FY. 2003-04. These Railway systems were developed on or after 01/04/1995 by the L&T. year wise details of the aforesaid rail systems are as follows: Unit I Rail system Year of Initial year of claim Undertakings Commencement of (A.Y.) operations (A. Y.) Rail system at Hirmi in the 2000-01 2004-05 state of Chhattisgarh Rail system at Tadipatri in 1999-00 2007-08 the state of Andhra Pradesh Rail system at Arakkonam 2001-02 2007-08 in the state of Tamil Nadu Rail System at Durgapur in 2002-03 2008-09 the state of West Bengal

(c) Further as mentioned in clause 15 of the agreement, the rail systems developed by the appellant can be made available to any third party with the prior approval of the Indian Railways.

78 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited (a) Clause No. 2, Agreement to Construct Siding - Wherein it is mentioned that "the Railway administration will at the cost and the expenses of the applicant, in all respect, construct the railway sidings " Further kindly be informed that, for construction of the siding under the supervision of the Railways, the contract for construction and supervision has been awarded by the applicant and the entire cost has been borne by the applicant. (b) Clause No. 6 - Payment by Applicant against the total estimated cost - wherein it is mentioned that, "The applicant will pay in advance to the railway administration the total estimated cost of the work consisting of the estimated costs of work done by the party and those by the railway administration " (c) Clause No. 7(a) - Permanent way materials - "The applicant will provide and deliver at site the permanent way and other materials (which includes Girders, Rails, Sleepers, fastenings, points, crossings, fencings, signals and overhead structures and any other things connected therewith for electric tractions and other machinery and equipments necessary for working of the sidings) in accordance with the Railway administration's standards and specifications. All charges incurred in laying and fitting the permanent way materials and all other equipments which may be provided shall entirely be borne by the applicant." (d) Clause No. 17 - Working of the Siding - wherein it is mentioned that " ... the applicant shall provide labour for and bear the cost of all Operations on the siding. The applicant shall be responsible for the strict compliance by himself and his employees and agents of all rules, regulations and standing orders made by the railway administration from time to time for the working of sidings and for all accidents, loss or damage that may be ensured or be caused by reasons of negligence or non- observance of such rules, regulations and orders (e) Clause No. 8(b) - Wherein it is mentioned that, \\ Maintenance and other Charges for the portion of the sidings - The applicant will at their own cost and expenses in all things and to the satisfaction of the railway administration and if required by the railway administration under its supervision maintains in good order and repair the said portion of the siding. Such charges as may be fixed by the railway for the supervision rendered shall be paid by the applicant.

39. These are other various clauses wherein it is evident that the Development, Operation and Maintenance is done by the assessee and the entire cost for the same is borne by the assessee.

40. From the record we also found that the assessee has duly submitted for all the rail systems, Form 10CCB, duly certified and audited by M/s. G.P Kapadia & Co., Chartered Accountants along with Balance Sheet, P&L account, Schedules forming part of Balance sheet and P&L Account.

41. However, the AO did not agree with assessee's contention and held that Rail systems developed by assessee is not eligible for claim of deduction u/s.80IA (4). Now, we deal precisely with the observation made by CIT(A) for declining Assessee's claim of deduction u/s.80IA.

42. With regard to CIT(A)'s observation as to whether rail systems developed by M/s. L&T were in accordance with the Build-Own-Lease-& Transfer (BOLT) scheme of the Indian Railways, we observe that L&T had entered into agreements with the railway authorities to develop, operate & maintain the rail systems, which in fact the company has done from the initial day. The assessee was permitted to setup and even operate & maintain the rail systems so developed. Further, regarding' Circular No. 733 dated 03-01-1996, we found that the Circular clarifies that tax holiday benefit u/s. 80-IA of the Act was also available to private enterprises which only built and leased out the rail system to the Indian Railways. In spite the absence of activities-'operate and maintain' the rail systems, such 'infrastructure facilities' were also declared as eligible to claim deduction under the said section. Further, the circular also states that rail systems 79 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited developed other than under the BOLT scheme were also eligible for benefit u/s 80-IA. In case of the assessee, the clarification of benefits u/s. 80-IA being available to those rail systems who do not 'operate and maintain' the systems clearly establishes that, enterprises who in fact operate and maintain the rail systems were certainly eligible for tax holiday benefits. As the assessee has entered into agreements with the railway authorities to develop, operate & maintain the rail systems, which in fact the company has done from the initial day. There was indeed an 'infrastructure' facility eligible for deduction u/s 80lA. We also found that the Hon'ble ITAT in assessee's own case for AY. 2006-07, has categorically allowed the deduction u/s. 80-IA for its rail system after dealing with the Circular No. 733 dtd 3.1.1996.

44. From the record we found that M/s. L&T had entered into agreements with the Railway authorities to develop, Operate and Maintain the Rail systems which infact the company has done from initial day. This agreement with the Railway Authorities was not under the BOLT Scheme but infact the assessee was permitted to setup and even operate and maintain the rail system so developed in accordance with terms and conditions of the agreements under the supervision and as per guidelines of Indian Railways. As per the relevant provisions of law during relevant period there is no requirement for Rail Infrastructure to be In BOLT scheme, to be eligible for claiming deduction under Section SO-lA (4)(i). Section 80-lA (4)(i) provides the following conditions to be complied with for claiming deductions; (i) ...... (a) it is owned by a company registered in India (b) it has entered into an agreement with the Central Government or a State Government or a local authority or any other statutory body for (i) developing or (ii) operating and maintaining or (iii) developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility; (c) it has started or starts operating and maintaining the infrastructure facility on or after the 1st day of April, 1995: 45. With regard to objection of revenue authorities on applicability of CBDT circular No.733 on BOLT schemes, systems developed under BOLT scheme are also eligible for 80-IA benefit, and in no way restricts the deduction u/s.80-IA to other rail systems. We found that the Hon'ble ITAT in assessee's own case for AY 2006-07, has categorically allowed the deduction u/s. 80-IA for its rail system after dealing with the Circular No. 733 dtd 3.1.1996.

80 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 46. Therefore the agreements as entered into by the assessee with Indian Railways are as envisaged u/s 80- IA(4)(i) and in no case it can be inferred that they are not the required agreements under section 80-IA.

81 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited Further, the appellant carries out all the operations for smooth movement of its goods, viz. Shunting of the Wagons, placing of the wagons at appropriate locations, Loading / Unloading of Wagons within the stipulated time and stipulated methods of Indian Railways through Wagon Loading Machines and Wagon Tipplers, Weighing of Wagons on Motion Weigh Bridges, Maintaining signa ling systems, Wagons, Couplings, Rake formation for dispatch, hauling of Wagons through its own locomotives, etc. Further, in Clause No. 14 - Traffic on Siding - it is mentioned that applicant undertakes to shunt the wagons from such point to his premises and back with his own labour and the railway administration would not be responsible for any delay, loss and damages caused in consequence of the failure of the applicant to arrange for such shunting. " Thus, the rail system is being operated by the appellant and the cost of above operations is borne by appellant. (e) Clause No. 8(b) - Wherein it is mentioned that, Maintenance and other Charges for the portion of the sidings - The applicant will at their own cost and expenses in all things and to the satisfaction of the railway administration and if required by the railway administration under its supervision maintains in good order and repair the said portion of the siding. Such charges as may be fixed by the railway for the supervision rendered shall be paid by the applicant. There are other various clauses wherein it is evident that the Development, Operation and Maintenance is done by the appellant and the entire cost for the same is borne by the appellant.

50. The question of allowability of the deduction u/s. 80IA in respect of rail systems has been settled in earlier years by the Hon'ble ITAT in assessee's own case. The facts and the agreements were also placed before authorities in those years. Therefore, the claim based on same facts needs to be allowed following the principle of Consistency in assessment proceedings. Even though the 'principles of res judicata' do not apply to income tax proceedings and each assessment year being a separate unit, what is decided in one year may not apply in the following year but where a fundamental aspect permeating through the different assessment years has been found as a fact one way or the other and parties have allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the order, it would not be appropriate to allow the position to be changed in a subsequent year. The above principles have been accepted in the undernoted case: ♦ H.A. Shah & Co v. CIT [1956] (30 ITR 618) (Bom.) ♦ Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha AIR 1964 SC 1013 ♦ Cruch of South India Trust Association v. Telugu Church Council [1996] 2 SCC 520 51. From the record we also found that the overall profits of the company have increased due to such commercial benefits and the same should have been treated as the revenue of the rail systems, which is the Fair Market Value of the services provided by the undertaking as per the provisions of Sec. 80IA(8) and the assessee is entitled for benefit u/s 80IA accordingly. However, the basis adopted for calculating the revenue from rail system by the assessee has been conservatively considered as lower of the freight chargeable through Rail and Road freight saved. The rail freight being lower is considered after further discounting it by 50% based on the 82 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited circular of Indian Railways for the freight chargeable upto the nearest railway station. 52. We also found that assessee has furnished all the information with regard to No. of Railway Engines / Locomotives and Railway Wagons owned by the assessee before the lower authorities which are as under:- No. of Rail Systems at No. of Wagons Engines/Locomotives Hirmi 2 49 Tadipatri 2 76 Arakkonam 1 30 Durgapur 2 30

55. We also found that the loading and unloading of goods is being done by the integrated Rail system set up by the assessee and expenses which were incurred earlier for loading and unloading of materials at the plant as well as the nearest Indian Railway station have been avoided and saved and are considered as income of the rail system arising due to setting up of such integrated rail system. The assessee has already submitted for all the Rail Systems form 10CCB duly certified and audited by M/s. GP Kapadia & Co. Chartered Accountants, alongwith Balance Sheet, P&L Account, Schedules forming part of Balance sheet and P&L Account. We have also checked the amount eligible for deduction as furnished in form 10 CCB and found the same as correct.

83 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 56. With regard to CIT(A)'s observation in the A.Y.2010-11 at page 42 to the effect that the so called 'Rail System' of the assessee company are simply a private siding and not any infrastructure facility of Public Utility therefore the infrastructure of such private sidings should be treated as "Private Facility", we observe that Section 80IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not require the infrastructure facility to be a public facility for allowing deduction under section 80IA. The explanation to section 80IA(4) defines the term 'infrastructure facility' to mean a road including toll road, a bridge or a rail system without anything further. We observe that the CIT(A) has been referring to the pre-amended definition of the term 'infrastructure facility' which was applicable till AY. 2001-02. The assessee company began its claim of deduction from AY 2004-05 when the definition was simplified with no indication about 'public facility'. Thus CIT(A) was not correct while declining claim of deduction u/s.80IA(4) on this reasoning.

84 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 59. With regard to CIT(A)s conclusion for the A.Y. 2010-11 at page 42, to the effect that the agreements entered between the assessee Company & Railway Department, contained the terms & conditions for construction of Private Sidings and that cannot be treated as any agreement for development, operation & maintenance of any Rail system, we observe that as per section 80- IA(4)(i)(b), an assessee has to enter into an agreement with the Central Government or a State Government or a Local Authority or any other statutory body for (i) developing or (ii) Operating and Maintaining or (iii) Developing, Operating and Maintaining the infrastructure facility. The Indian Railways, with whom the assessee has entered into an agreement, is the statutory body designated under the Indian Railways with whom the assessee has entered into an agreement, is the statutory body designated under the Indian Railways Act. We found that the agreement does not merely contain the terms and conditions of the construction of railway siding i.e. development of siding (laying of tracks, signal system and all the essential components of Rail Systems) but it also contains the terms and conditions relating to its operation and maintenance as well.

62. With regard to CIT(A)'s conclusion at page 42 of A.Y. 2010-11 to the effect that various conditions given in Section were not met with, we observe as under:- a. Section 80-IA (4)(i) provides the following conditions to be complied with for claiming deductions; (i) any enterprise carrying on the business of (i) developing, (ii) maintaining and operating or (iii) developing, maintaining and operating any infrastructure facility which fulfils all the following conditions, namely :- (a) it is owned by a company registered in India (b) it has entered into an agreement with the Central Government or a State Government or a local authority or any other statutory body for (i) developing or (ii) operating and maintaining or (iii) developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility; (c) it has started or starts operating and maintaining the infrastructure facility on or after the 1st day of April, 1995: 63. As per materials placed on record, all the railway systems are established and owned by the assessee which is a Company as defined 85 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited under the Income-tax Act. This is an undisputed fact and there is no adverse remark by the AO or CIT(A) in this regard.

65. We also observe that the agreements entered into by the assessee are for the development, operation and maintenance of the Railway siding. Thus this fulfils the requirement in clause (b).

67. This also is an undisputed fact and there is no adverse remark by the AO or CIT(A) in this regard. In view of above all the conditions specified in section 80IA(4) has been complied with by the assessee entitling it to claim the tax holiday.

68. With regard to CIT(A)'s observation that the actual operation of Rail System [i.e. running of goods train] onto the private sidings between the serving railway station and plant premises [upto interchange point! exchange yard], was being done by the Indian Railways and not by the assessee Company. 69. We found that the CIT(A) has equated "running of goods train" with the "operation of Rail System". This is the sole basis on which he has arrived at his conclusion that since the assessee is not running the goods train it is not operation of Rail System and hence not eligible for claiming deduction under section 80IA(4). 70. As per our considered view, the operation of Rail System is not simply running of goods train. Operation of Railway Systems comprises of various activities viz. shunting of the wagons, placing of the wagons at appropriate locations, loading/unloading of wagons within the stipulated time and stipulated methods of Indian Railways through Wagon Loading Machines and Wagon Tipplers, weighing of wagons on Motion Weigh Bridges, wagon couplings and de-couplings, rake formation for dispatch, hauling of wagons through its own locomotives within the factory premises, etc.

86 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited Thus, the rail system is being operated by the assessee and the cost of above operations is borne by assessee.

71. With regard to allegation of the CIT(A) that the assessee has never claimed that it is hauling the wagons on the entire siding, we found that hauling of wagons is only one of the activity in the entire operation of the rail system. Under the Railways Act, 1989 nobody other than railway administration is allowed to haul wagons of the railway tracks. As per materials placed on record, all the activities relating to the operation of rail system except hauling of wagons till the interchange point, is done by the assessee and the entire cost for the same is borne by it.

73. Thus the operation of rail is not merely hauling of wagons but comprises of various activities all of which is carried on by the assessee Company.

74. With regard to CIT(A)'s observation that all the four cement plants [having private sidings] were notified as independent booking station and the freight was charged by the railway department for the entire distance including the portion of private sidings [upto interchange point / exchange yard], we observe that this is a fact which is undisputed by the assessee and nothing turns out of it.

76. In this regard, we found that prior to setting up of railway siding, the assessee used to transport its goods through road to the nearest railway station. Only the few components of the cost of road transportation, which the cement division of the assessee was hitherto incurring for transportation of materials to and from the factory premises, is adopted as the basis of calculating the revenue of the railway undertaking. The revenue is, however, computed for the actual services rendered by the railway undertaking to the cement division.

80. We further found that an amount towards loading and unloading charges is added to the above revenue for inward and outward movement of goods which is also carried out by the rail undertaking. The basis, for computing this component of revenue is the loading and unloading cost which the cement division was hitherto incurring during transportation through roadways. The question of reducing the freight payments to the Railways does not arise since this cost is incurred by the cement division and not by the railway undertaking. 81. In view of the above discussion, the explanation given by the CIT(A) and the tabular representation of the computation of revenue of rail system in Table F, has no relevance since it is merely based on his incorrect assumption. 82. Further, we found that observation of CIT(A) with respect to the freight rate is also not correct in so far as for comparison, he has considered the rate per quintal as against per Metric Ton adopted by the assessee which can be observed from the calculation submitted by assessee before the lower authorities. Without any evidence in hands, the CIT(A) has merely stated that crucial facts were not disclosed by the assessee without referring to any specific facts which were not disclosed. Perhaps he is indicating about the operations of railway siding being carried out by the railways and not by the assessee. However, as aforesaid, he is comparing the operation of railway siding with merely hauling of wagons. The operations of railway siding involves various activities other than the hauling of wagons. Mere haulage of wagons cannot be equated with operations of railway siding. We found that assessee has filed reports in Form 10CCB from M/s G.P.Kapadia& Co., Chartered Accountant. The CIT(A) himself has allowed the deduction in 88 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited AY. 2009-10 based on the similar facts available on records but changed his decision merely based on the replies to questionnaire from various Railway Department.

33. These changes, however, would not alter the situation vis-a-vis the impugned amendment. These legislative changes did enlarge the scope of the deduction and in a sense, made 89 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited it available to certain assessees who would not have been, but for the changes eligible for such deduction "

88. In view of the amended provisions of Section 80-IA, the year in which the claim is first made i.e. initial assessment year, must apply for determination of eligibility of the claim. In respect of AY. 2004-05 onwards including assessment years 2009-10 and 2010-11, since the condition relating to transfer of such facility to Central Govt. was no longer a pre- requisite for eligibility of claim u/s 80- IA(4)(b), the assessee has correctly made the claim. 89. In view of the above, we can safely conclude that even if an assessee does not fulfil all the requisite conditions for availing the tax holiday benefit in the year in which the new infrastructure facility is set up or has commenced operation, but in a subsequent year, all the requisite conditions for availing such benefit are fulfilled, the assessee would be entitled to avail the tax holiday benefit in respect of such subsequent assessment year(s). For this purpose reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon'ble ITAT of Jaipur in the case of Asstt. CIT v. Shiv Agrevo Ltd. [2009] 34 SOT 1 (URO). In this case, the assessee-company, whose main object was extraction of seeds for obtaining edible oils and refining thereof, set up a new industrial undertaking for the extraction and refining of edible oil. It claimed to have temporarily commenced the activity on and from 1-1-1997 on a trial run; however, the systematic activity of refining commenced only in the previous year relating to the assessment year 1998-99. After the final completion of the project, the assessee-company applied directly for a permanent registration certificate of its status as a small scale industry (SSI) under section 11-B of the Industrial Development Regulation Act, 1951 (IRDA) to the prescribed authority, who granted the certificate dated 30-3-1998, which was a conclusive and final proof of such a status under the provisions of IRDA. The return of income filed earlier by the assessee for the assessment year 1999-2000 as subsequently revised, wherein a claim of deduction under section 80-IA was made. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the 90 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited assessee, on the ground that the assessee started production from the assessment year 1997-98 itself, the year in which the assessee was not a small scale industry, and, therefore, the assessee did not fulfil the condition of section 80-IA in the initial year. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals), allowed the assessee's claim under section 80-1A. On Revenues appeal, the ITAT held that for claiming deduction under section 80-IA, it has to be determined at end of relevant previous year that as to whether assessee is registered as SSI and there is no condition in Act that an industrial undertaking should fulfil all conditions as laid down under section 80-IA in very initial year itself and not thereafter.

40. Thus as regards the claim for the deduction u/s. 80JA of the Act Per se, the ITAT order can be treated as final in favour of the assessee as the Hon 'ble High Court refused to admit the question raised by the Revenue on the very applicability of the provisions of section 80JA of the Act for the Rail System. Therefore/ respectively following the said decision we hold that the assessee entitled for the deduction u/s. 80JA of the Act in respect of the railway system .

43. Thus, in view of what is discussed above, we hold that the assessee is entitled for deduction u/s. 80IA in respect of the Railway System and water Supply project and therefore we set-aside the orders of the Ld- PCIT passed u/s 263 of the Act for the Assessment Years 2008-09 to 2011-12.

48. Respectfully following the above decision in assessee case, we allow the ground raised by the assessee.

49. In the Ground No.6, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

6. On the facts and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in not adjudicating the Ground of the Appellant in relation to CENVAT Credit availed in relation to section 80IA units. 6(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified rather grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in treating CENVAT credit availed on inputs and capital goods used in the undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 80IA as cost of the eligible undertakings. 6(b). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, assuming without admitting that if it is held that CENVAT credit relating to undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 80IA is required to be reduced from the profits of the eligible undertakings, such adjustment should be made on the basis of the actual Cenvat Credit availed on Inputs and capital goods used in the undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 80IA. 6(c). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified in agreeing with the AO's action of apportioning CENVAT credit on the basis of turnover of the undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 80IA computed in the audited accounts filed along with Form 10CCB instead of turnover of the eligible undertakings recomputed in the order u/ s 143(3). 6(d). Without prejudice to above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, assuming without admitting that if it is held that CENVAT credit relating to undertakings eligible for deduction u/s 80IA is required to be allocated, such allocation should be made on the basis of total cost of the respective eligible undertaking to the total cost (aggregate of cost of cement manufacturing unit and cost of the eligible unit) instead of allocation on the basis of turnover made in the order u/s 143(3).

50. Similar issue was considered by us in the assessee Appeal in Ground No 4 in AY 2009-10 and held as under:

94 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited “38.Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. It is relevant to refer to decision of co-ordinate Bench in the case of Ambuja Cement Ltd. in ITA No. 1889 and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019 vide its order dated 07.11.2022 has decided issue in favour of assessee: “102. We find that Section 80IA(5), which has been heavily relied upon by the assessee, provides that " notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, the profits and gains of an eligible business to which the provisions of sub-section (1) apply shall, for the purposes of determining the quantum of deduction under that sub-section for the assessment year immediately succeeding the initial assessment year or any subsequent assessment year, be computed as if such eligible business were the only source of income of the assessee during the previous year relevant to the initial assessment year and to every subsequent assessment year up to and including the assessment year for which the determination is to be made”. All that this provision does is that it provides for the profits of the eligible unit being treated on a standalone basis, but then in case the Assessing Officer makes an adjustment for the payment which has earned the CENVAT credit, he must also make an adjustment for the corresponding CENVAT credit availed by any other unit of the assessee – other than the eligible unit. If the captive power unit makes a payment of X amount, and in turn, it generates a CENVAT credit of X amount, which is availed by another unit, say Ropar Cement Manufacturing Unit, the hypothetical independence embedded in the profit computation on a standalone basis requires that the Ropar Cement Manufacturing Unit must reimburse the captive power unit for such a CENVAT credit. It cannot be open to the assessee to provide for the expenses which have earned the CENVAT credits, but not to account for the CENVAT credits and the benefits accruing form the same. In any event, the fiction envisages under section 80IA(5) is to enable computation of profits on a standalone basis, rather than to increase the scope of profits itself and allocate notional expenditure to the eligible units. When the eligible units are other units are treated as independent of each other, and the profit computations are on a standalone basis, the eligible unit must get the corresponding credit for the CENVAT credits availed by the other units. Viewed thus, not accounting for the CENVAT credit does not, in our considered view, vitiate the profits of the eligible undertaking, as long as all such credits are fully availed by the other units as is the undisputed position anyway. What the assessee has done is that the expenses are debited net of the CENVAT credit availed. To this extent, we see no infirmity in the stand of the assessee.

39. It is observed that facts of assessee’s case are identical with facts of decisions referred supra. Considering decision of Coordinate Bench referred supra, addition made by Assessing Officer is thus deleted and this ground of appeal is allowed.”

51. Respectfully following the above said decision, we allow the ground raised by the assessee.

52. In the Ground No.7, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

95 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited “7(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified in apportioning a part of the indirect Head Office expenses aggregating to Rs. 342,37,67,717/- and adjusting such allocated amount of Rs 5,19,49,509/- in computing Tax Holiday u/s 80IA for eligible Captive Power Plants, without establishing any nexus between the nature of expenses and such eligible units of the appellant. 7(b) Without prejudice to the above, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified in confirming the action of AO in apportioning a part of the indirect Head Office expenses aggregating to Rs. 348,44,83,383/- (including Rs 6,07,15,666/- being R&D Expenses) and adjusting such allocated amount of Rs 22,85,42,527/- in computing Tax Holiday u/s 80IC for eligible Gagal 1 Cement Manufacturing Unit, without establishing any nexus between the nature of expenses and such eligible units of the appellant. 7(c). Without prejudice to the Ground 7 (b), that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified rather grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in apportioning Research & Development expenses incurred at Thane Technical Service Centre amounting to Rs. 6,07,15,666/- in computing Tax Holiday u/s 80IC. 7(d). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and without prejudice to Ground Nos. 7(a), 7(b) and 7(c) taken here-in-above, in the unlikely event if it is held that indirect Head Office expenses (and R&D expenses as the case may be) is required to be allocated, such allocation should be made on the basis of total cost of the respective eligible undertaking to the total cost of the appellant company instead of allocation on the basis of turnover made in the order u/s 143(3)..”

53. Similar issue was considered by us in the assessee Appeal in Ground No 4 in AY 2005-06 and held as under: - “75.Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. We observe that the Assessing Officer has identified indirect expenditure incurred at Head Office i.e Statutory Audit fees, Audit for taxation matter, Director Fees, Cost Auditor expenses, Subscription to CME etc and observed that such expenditure are not allocated to eligible businesses and to that extent deduction u/s 80IA is claimed excess. Before Ld.CIT(A), assessee has claimed that cost audit fees and subscription to CMA are in respect of cement manufacturing unit hence no allocation of such expenditure is required to be made. To that extent, Ld.CIT(A) has accepted the plea of assessee and such fact is not controverted by Ld. DR hence finding given by Ld.CIT(A) to that extent is upheld. Further, on this issue, coordinate bench in the case of Ambuja Cement Limited, holding company of assessee in and 1241/Mum/2018, 2384, 2958, 3475 and 3843/Mum/2019(for A.Y. 2010- 11 to 2012-13) vide order dated 07/11/2022 has held as under: “108. We are unable to see any merits in the stand of the assessee that the head office expenses cannot be allocated to all the units, as deductions and allowance of eligible units are required to be taken into account while treating such units as profit centres, and computing the profits accordingly. The fiction of the eligible units being treated on a standalone basis does not require that the profits of the units are to be computed as if they are independent of each other, and once that fiction sets in, the expenses incurred by someone other than eligible unit, in the interest of the eligible unit, are to be taken into account while computing the profits of the eligible unit. Accordingly, the allocation of expenses, as the learned 96 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited Assessing Officer rightly contends, must be done. The assessee has further contended that HO expenses are not „derived from‟ or „derived by‟ the eligible undertakings, and, for this reasons, these expenses cannot be allocated to the eligible undertaking. We see no reasons to decline allocation of head office expenses to ensure that the profits of the eligible units are correctly worked out, on the basis of hypothetical independence embedded in the eligible units being treated on a standalone basis. To this extent, we reject the plea of the assessee. However, the basis of allocation as turnover is not really correct and reasonable, nor the relationship between the turnover and expenses always linear; the allocation would be more appropriate based on expenditure incurred by the units vis-à-vis overall expenditure. To this extent, we uphold the plea of the assessee.

54. Respectfully following the above decision in assessee case, we partly allow the ground raised by the assessee.

55. In the Ground No.8, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified rather grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in not allowing the claim of leave encashment amounting to Rs. 20,51,00,705/-on provision basis based on actuarial valuation in computing the total income. The Ld CIT(A) failed to record any cogent reason and concluded against the appellant merely because of stay on operation of judgment in case of Exide Industries Ltd Vs UOI (2007) 292 ITR 470 (Cal HC).

56. Similar issue was considered by us in the assessee Appeal in Ground No 13 in AY 2008-09 and held as under:

67. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. On perusal of relevant facts on record, it is observed that Hon'ble supreme court in the case of UOI v. Exide Industries Ltd. [425 ITR 1] has upheld constitutional validity of provision of section 43B(f) for provision for leave encashment liability and considering binding decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court claim cannot be allowed. However, if payment of such provision towards leave encashment is made in subsequent year, deduction may be allowed to assessee in such years if not allowed till date. Therefore, Assessing Officer is directed to verify and the same and allow the same as per our above directions. This ground of appeal is partly allowed.

58. In the Ground No.9, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified rather grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in not allowing deduction for Education Cess levied on Income Tax and Dividend Distribution Tax aggregating to Rs. 11,14,63,106/- as allowable expenditure in computing the total income.

60. In the Ground No.10, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified rather grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in disallowing loss arising on write off of under construction assets amounting to Rs. 74,40,899/- in computing total income.

61. Similar issue was considered by us in the assessee Appeal in Ground No 13 in AY 2011-12 and held as under:

“103 Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. It is observed that the Assessee has written off capital working progress in respect of projects abandoned during the year. On perusal of such expenditure written off as forming part of paper book, it is found that Assessee is having cement manufacturing unit at Bargarh and Kymore units. The Assessee has incurred various expenditure for construction of coal washery and Phosphor Gypsum Plant. It is found that both the lower authorities have denied such claim only after considering nomenclature of such expenditure whereas the fact is that both the construction is integral part of any cement industries. It is observed that Phosphor Gypsum can be used in the production of portland cement to control the hydration reaction rate of cement. Without gypsum cement clinker can condense immediately by mixing with water and release the heat. These facts prove that such plants are integral part of cement manufacturing activity and cannot be considered as new business activity. Similarly, a coal washery can help the supply of clean washed coal for recommended quality to the cement plant so as to avoid disadvantages associated with inferior quality of coal. Each cement industries usually establish such plants which is integral part of cement manufacturing activity. Thus, any abandonment of these project cannot be held to be expenditure incurred for new business but it is only forming part of existing cement business. It is observed that Ld. DR has also argued that in the cases relied by Ld AR in which only revenue expenditure pertaining to abandoned project are allowed. In our considered view, capital work in progress consists of both revenue as well as capital expenditures. Whereas fact is that entire expenditure relating to abandoned project is allowable as revenue expenditure as held by various courts, few of them are discussed herein below.

98 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 104. The Hon’ble Bombay High court in the case of CIT v. Idea Cellular Ltd.[2016] 76 taxmann.com 77 has held as under: “5. During the assessment proceedings, the assessing officer noted that the assessee claimed as a revenue expenditure a sum of Rs.3,94,75,619/- being the amount written off by the assessee in respect of expenses incurred on projects originally set up to put up cell sites, but later abandoned. These expenses were disallowed by the assessing officer as that was spent by the assessee on sites to bring into existence a new asset and new source of income and therefore, such expenditure was in the nature of capital expenditure.

6. Aggrieved by this order/disallowance, an appeal was preferred before the first appellate authority by the assessee. That also came to be dismissed and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) agreed with the assessing officer. Thereafter, the tribunal was approached and Mr. Malhotra would submit that in reversing the concurrent views, the tribunal committed an error of law, which is apparent on the face of the record. It is the tribunal's finding, which is perverse to say the least. It is the stand of the assessee, which was culled out from a letter addressed by the assessee itself. Once that letter and other record was analysed to arrive at the eventual conclusion, then, the tribunal should not have interfered with it. The interference by the tribunal raises substantial questions of law.

8. Mr. Mistri would, therefore, submit that the appeal be dismissed.

10. We do not find that the tribunal has committed any perversity or applied incorrect principles to the given facts and circumstances. When the facts and circumstances are properly analysed and correct test is applied to decide the issue at hand, then, we do not think that questions (a) and (b), as pressed, are substantial questions of law. The appeal is devoid of merits and it is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs.

6. We see from the order of the Tribunal that it had found that the assessee had been engaged in the activity of construction of building, berths etc. for Chennai Container Private Limited in the Madras Port Trust. The assessee was carrying on the business of clearing and forwarding, handling port services, cargo handling, steamer agents etc. and had also made constructions as herein above stated in the Madras Port Trust. The Tribunal found that the assessee had already entered the line of business of constructions in the Ports and hence, submission of a tender for the Vaizag Port was not in the nature of venturing into a new line of business.

100 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 7. In Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. (supra) a pharmaceutical Company had obtained technical know-how from abroad for increasing yield of penicillin in its existing plant, the know-how being utilised for expansion of the existing business. The Supreme Court found that there cannot be a single criterion determinative as to whether a particular outlay is capital or revenue. It was held; the expenditure being 'once for all' is inconclusive to find it as spend for capital and the test of 'enduring benefit' may break down in many instances. " What is relevant is the purpose of the outlay and its intended object and effect, considered in a common- sense way having regard to the business realities"(sic-para14). The Honourable Supreme Court held expense incurred for acquisition of technical know-how for achieving higher production of penicillin was a business expenditure and not in the nature of a capital expenditure especially when the assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of drugs. We reiterate the finding of the Tribunal, which noted that the assessee was engaged in Port related activities and had also carried out constructions in Ports and the submission of tender for a BOT project for the Vaizag Port was a related activity. The project did not take off and as held by the Supreme Court on the facts in this case there was no enduring benefit obtained by the assessee. It broke down when the Government of India cancelled the tender. We do not find any question of law arising, since the facts have been gone into by the Tribunal and held in favour of the assessee. We, hence, find that the Revenue is liable to fail in the appeal and we reject the appeal refusing to answer the question of law upholding the order of the Tribunal on facts. No order as to costs.

62. Respectfully following the above decision, we allow the ground raised by the assessee.

63. In the Ground No.11, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

11 On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in adding provision for leave encashment amounting to Rs.20,51,00,705/-, duly supported by actuarial valuation report, in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB.

64. Similar issue was considered by us in the Department Appeal in Ground No 13 in AY 2005-06 and held as under:

“89.Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. On this issue, coordinate bench in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2004-05 in dated 27/05/2022 has decided this issue in its favour. The relevant finding is reproduced herein below:

101 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited “14.4.4. We have considered the rival contentions and perused the material on record. We note that the CIT(A) has granted relief to the Assessee by following the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers (245 ITR 528), and the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Echjay Forgins (P) Ltd. (2001) 251 ITR 15. We do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the CIT(A) to the extent it holds that provision for Leave Encashment of INR 3,26,00,238/- is in the nature of provision for ascertained liability created on the basis of actuarial valuation and is, therefore, not required to be added back while computing Book Profits in terms of Clause (c) of Explanation 1 to Section 115JB(2) of the Act. Accordingly, order of CIT(A) on this issue is confirmed and Ground No. 10 raised by the Revenue is dismissed.”

90. Respectfully following decision of coordinate bench referred supra, addition of provision for leave encashment made while computing book profit u/s 115JB is deleted. Accordingly, this ground of appeal in Departmental Appeal is dismissed.”

65. Respectfully following the above decision, we allow the ground raised by the assessee.

66. In the Ground No.12, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

12(a). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in denying the appellant's claim of exclusion of Sales Tax Incentive and Excise Duty Exemption benefits availed/received during the year under consideration amounting to Rs. 35,78,74,506/- and Rs. 242,40,07,612/- respectively, being capital in nature, in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB. 12(b). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in not has erred in disregarding and not following the order of the predecessor in the Appellant's own case on the same issue without assigning any cogent reasons. 12(c) Without prejudice to the above, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in denying the appellant's claim of exclusion of Sales Tax Incentive Rs. 13,34,92,198/- in relation to Himachal Pradesh and Excise Duty Exemption benefits Rs. 242,40,07,612/- availed/received during the year under consideration, being capital in nature in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB which has been allowed as capital receipts in the normal computation of Income.

67. Similar issue was considered by us in the assessee Appeal in Ground No 13 in AY 2006-07 and held as under:

“97.Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. On this issue, coordinate bench in the case of Ambuja Cement Limited in (A.Y.2006-07) dated 31/10/2022 has held as under: “17. So far as this grievance of the assessee is concerned, the relevant material facts are like this. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee has availed excise duty exemption, amounting to 102 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited Rs 46,83,11,376, in respect of their Darlaghat Unit, HP, and it was claimed as a capital receipt in nature. It was also noted that in terms of general Exemption No, 51 (Notification No. 50/2003 dated 10th June 2003) the assessee is entitled to 100% excise duty exemption for a period of ten years in respect of its cement manufacturing plant at Darlaaghat. The assessee’s submission was that this exemption was in response to the announcement made by the Hon’ble Prime Minister to the effect that tax and central excise concession are made to attract investments in the industrial sector for special category states, including Uttarakhand. The Assessing Officer noted that “though it is apparent from the excise notification that exemption is granted for only those units which are located in the backward areas and which have undertaken substantial expansion, however incentives are available only post production” and therefore he “finds no difference in sales tax and excise exemption claimed”. Following the stand taken for sales tax exemption etc, he held that the excise exemption receipts are also revenue in nature. Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A). Learned CIT(A) also confirmed the stand of the Assessing Officer on the short ground that the exemption notification does not specifically state the object and purpose of the concession to be promotion of industry in the specified areas etc. The assessee is aggrieved, and is in appeal before us.

will apply mutatis mutandis here as well. That apart, once the Assessing Officer himself also accepts that the object and purpose of the excise exemption scheme are to promote the industry is set up, or being subjected to substantial expansion, in the backward areas, it cannot be open to the revenue even to suggest that the object and purpose of the scheme are to promote industries in backward areas. The Assessing Officer had declined the relief on a technical ground about at what stage the receipts materialize, whether post- production or pre-production. That test, as is the settled legal position now, is no longer a relevant test. What is material is as to what is the purpose of the scheme in question, and a call about the object and purpose of the scheme is to be taken in a holistic manner and on the basis of the scheme on an overall basis. The approach adopted by the learned CIT(A) was not only legally incorrect but wholly superficial. The following observations by Hon‟ble jurisdictional High Court, in the case of PCIT Vs Welspun Steel Limited [(2019) 103 taxmann.com 436 (Bom)] are relevant in this regard

6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties on this question, we notice that, the Government of Gujarat Sales Tax Incentive Scheme was envisaged to promote large scale investments in the Kutch District since on account of devastating earth-quake, development of the district had suffered. The Scheme envisaged that, the same was confined only with the Kutch District. Similar, being the purpose and philosophy of the Government of India, while granting excise duty exemption, we may not separately take note of the back-ground thereof. In view of these facts, the question arises is - whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that Sales Tax and Excise duty exemption enjoyed by the assessee under the said subsidy scheme, was not taxable as revenue receipt. Such and 103 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited similar issue has came up before different High Courts and Supreme Court on the numerous occasions. Reference to all those judgments would be un-necessary. However, the principle that has evolved is that, not the nomenclature of the subsidy or the fact that, the computation of the subsidy benefit is in terms of tax payable, would not be conclusive. What is to be examined in each case is the purpose for granting such subsidy. We may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of CIT v. Chaphalkar Bro. [2017] 88 taxmann.com 178/[2018] 252 Taxman 360/400 ITR 279. It was a case arising out of judgment of this Court in which, the dispute between assessee and the Revenue was with respect to subsidy granted to the multiplex cinema operators in the form of entertainment tax waiver. The subsidy was granted in view of the fact that, industry was highly capital intensive. The Revenue argued that, the subsidy was revenue in nature. This Court after referring to several decisions of the Supreme Court including the case of CIT v. Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. [2008] 306 ITR 392/174 Taxman 87 and Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 94 Taxman 368/228 ITR 253 (SC) held that, subsidy had not been granted for construction but only after setting up of a new industry which was in the nature of assistance given for the purpose of carrying on business.

7. On further appeal by the Revenue, Supreme Court confirmed the decision of this Court. It was noted that, Maharashtra Government's subsidy was not in form of an exemption from payment of entertainment duty to multiplex theater complex. The scheme was introduced to start new cinema houses in the State. The Supreme Court observed that, in such circumstance, the purpose tests for grant of subsidy should be applied. It was concluded as under:— "Applying the aforesaid test contained in both Sahney Steel as well as Ponni Sugars, we are of the view that the object, as stated in the statement of objects and reasons, of the amendment ordinance was that since the average occupancy in cinema theatres has fallen considerably and hardly any new theatres have been started in the recent past, the concept of a complete family entertainment centre, more popularly known as multiplex theatre complex, has emerged. Those complexes offer various entertainment facilitate for the entire family as a whole. It was noticed that these complexes are highly capital intensive and their gestation period is quite long and therefore, they need Government support in the form of incentives qua entertainment duty. It was also added that Government with a view to commemorate the birth centenary of late Shri V. Shantaram decided to grant concession in entertainment duty to multiplex theatre complexes to promote construction of new cinema houses in the State. The aforesaid object is clear and unequivocal. The object of the grant of the subsidy was in order that persons come forward to construct multiplex theatre complexes, the idea being that exemption from entertainment duty for a period of three years and partial remission for a period of two years should go towards helping the industry to set up such highly capital intensive entertainment centres. This being the case, it is difficult to accept Mr. Narasimha's argument that it is only the immediate object and not the larger object which must be kept in mind in that the subsidy scheme kicks in only post construction, that is when cinema tickets are actually sold. We 104 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited hasten to add that the object of the scheme is only one - there is no larger or immediate object. That the object is carried out in a particular manner is irrelevant, as has been held in both Ponni Sugars and Sahney Steel."

9. The second question raised by the Revenue is consequent of the first question, in which, te Revenue argues that, if the subsidy is treated as a capital in nature, the same must bring down assessee's costs of acquisition of plant and machinery. The assessee's claim of depreciation to that extent must shrink. Assessee argues that, the Tribunal correctly held that, the subsidy had not been given in relation to acquisition of plant or machinery and that, therefore, same cannot be adjusted towards cost of acquisition.

11. Similar issue came up for consideration again before the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Swastik Sanitary Works Ltd. [2006] 286 ITR 544. It was a case in which, the Government subsidy was intended as an incentive to encourage entrepreneurs to move to backward areas and establish industries. In such a case, specified percentage of the fixed 106 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited capital cost, which was the basis for determining the subsidy, would be granted. The Court held that, such basis for determining the subsidy was only a measure adopted under the scheme to quantify the financial aid and it was not a payment, directly or indirectly to meet any portion of the actual cost of acquisition of capital asset. It was held and observed as under:— ' In so far as question No.2 is concerned, this court finds that the same is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. P. J. Chemicals Ltd., [1994] 210 ITR 830. In the said case, after review of the law on the point, the Supreme Court has held as under (head note): "Where Government subsidy is intended as an incentive to encourage entrepreneurs to move to backward areas and establish industries, the specified percentage of the fixed capital cost, which is the basis for determining the subsidy, being only a measure adopted under the scheme to quantify the financial aid, is not a payment, directly or indirectly, to meet any portion of the 'actual cost The expression 'actual cost' in section 43(1) of the Income Tax Act,1961, needs to be interpreted liberally. Such a subsidy does not partake of the incidents which attract the conditions for its deductibility from 'actual cost'. The amount of subsidy is not to be deducted from the 'actual cost' under section 43(1) for the purpose of calculation of depreciation etc."

20. In view of these discussions, as also bearing in mind the entirety of the case, we uphold the plea of the assessee. The Assessing Office is, accordingly, directed to delete the impugned addition….

43. In view of the above discussions, as also bearing in mind the entirety of the case, we see no legally sustainable merits in the grievance of the Assessing Officer. The views expressed by the learned CIT(A), being in conformity with our decisions for the preceding assessment years, meet our approval. We, therefore, confirm and approve the relief granted by the CIT(A) and decline to interfere in the matter.

44. Ground no. 3 is thus dismissed.”

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in adding Rs. 76,71,76,687/- being provision for interest on income tax in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB

108. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. It is observed that assessee has made provision for interest u/s.244A and interest u/s.234D in Profit & Loss account but such provision was not added back while computing Book Profit us/.115JB of the Act. So far as provisions for interest u/s.234D is concerned, the Ld. AR has not pressed such issue based upon co- ordinate Bench decision in the case of Ambuja Cement Ltd., hence this issue doesn’t require separate adjudication and action of AO to that extent is upheld.

72. In the Ground No.14, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming the action of AO in adding Rs.97,00,000/- being notionally allocated expenditure allegedly incurred to earn dividend income in computing Book Profit u/s 115JB

129. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. On this issue, coordinate bench in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2002-03 in dated 29/07/2015 has decided issue in favour of assessee. The relevant finding is reproduced herein below: “5. Additional ground no.4 is about exclusion of amount transferred to debenture redemption reserved in computing group profit of provisions of section 115JB of ₹.50 crores. 5.1. During the course of hearing before us, representatives of both the sides agreed that identical issue had been decided in favour of the assessee, by the Tribunal while adjudicating the appeals for AY.s. 1997-98 (ITA/3298/Mum/01), 108 ITA NO.3203 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited 1998-99 (ITA/639/M/03), 1999-00 (ITA/7594/Mum/04), 2000-01 (ITA/9570/Mum/04). We find that the decision of the Tribunal for AY.1998-99 for exclusion debenture redemption reserved had not been challenged by the department before the Hon'ble High Court and thus the order has attained finality. It is also found that the Hon'ble Bombay High Court of Bombay had dismissed the departmental appeal with regard to the issue while deciding the appeal for AY 1999-00. Considering the above facts we decide the last additional ground against the AO.

130 It is matter of fact that department has not challenged the appellate order of A.Y. 1998-99 before Hon’ble High court and matter has attained finality. Hon’ble Bombay High court in the case of Raymond Limited [2012] 21 taxmann.com 60 has held that Amount set apart as a Debenture Redemption Reserve (DRR) is not a reserve within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 115JA. Respectfully following decision of coordinate bench referred supra, we confirm the order of Ld.CIT(A) holding that amount transferred to Debenture Redemption Reserve cannot be added back while computing Book Profits. This ground of appeal in Departmental Appeal is dismissed.

74. Respectfully following the above decision, we allow the ground raised by the assessee.

75. In the Ground No.15, Assessee has raised the following grievance:

On facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was not justified and grossly erred in confirming tire action of AO in not excluding capital profits being profit on sale of investments and profit of sale of fixed assets of Rs 45,88,07,063/- and Rs 2,57,91,950/- respectively in the computation of book profits under Section 115JB

76. Similar issue was considered by us in the assessee Appeal in Ground No 7 in AY 2005-06 and held as under:

“111. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. On this issue, coordinate bench in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2004-05 in dated 27/05/2022 has decided issue in favour of assessee. The relevant finding is reproduced herein below: “19.1. During the relevant previous year the Assessee had credited to the Profit & Loss Account net profits on sale of fixed assets amounting to INR 10,98,70,597/-. In the original return of income, while computing book profit under Section 115JB of the Act, the Assessee omitted to exclude aforesaid profit on sale of fixed assets. However, in the revised return, while computing book profits under Section 115JB of the Act the same were excluded. In response to query raised during the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessee, vide letter dated 16.11.2006, filed detailed submission substantiating the claim. However, the Assessing Officer 109 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited rejected the claim of the Assessee by placing reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Veekay Lal Investments Co. Pvt. Ltd. 249 ITR 597 (Bom) 19.2. Being aggrieved, the Assessee filed before CIT(A) on this issue. 19.4. We note that in the immediately preceding Assessment Year 2003-04, the Tribunal has decided this issue in favour of the Revenue, vide common order 13.03.2019 passed in ITA No. 4242/MUM/2007 and ITA No. 4988/MUM/2007, holding as under: "52. Under this issue the revenue has challenged the deletion of the addition of profit on sale of fixed assets in computation of book profit u/s 115JB of the Act in sum of ₹.5,19,20,846/-. At the time of argument, the Ld. Representative of the assessee has disclosed this fact that this issue has been decided against the assessee in the ITA. No. 5259 & 4895/Mum/2007 Assessment Year: 2004-05 assessee’s own case for the A.Y.2002-03 in ITA. No.4241/M/2007 dated 29.07.2015. Since this issue has been decided against the Assessee in the assessee’s own case (supra), therefore, the finding of the CIT(A) on this issue is hereby ordered to be set aside and we allow the claim of the revenue for the addition of said amount while computing the book profit u/s 115JB of the Act. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the revenue against the assessee." 19.5. Respectfully following the decision of the co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in Assessee’s own case, we set aside the order of CIT(A) and restore the order of the Assessing Officer on this issue. Accordingly, Ground No. 18 raised by the Revenue is allowed. “ 112. However, during the course of the hearing the Ld. AR also referred to the decision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Best Trading and Agencies Limited v. DCIT [119 Taxmann.com 129]. The finding of the said decision at Para No. 13 is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: “………………. 13. section 115JB(5) of the Act reads as under: "(5) Save as otherwise provided in this section, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to every assessee being a company, mentioned in this Section." Thus, by virtue of sub-section (5) of section 115JB, the application of other provisions of the Act are open, except if specifically barred by the section itself. The indexed cost of acquisition is a claim allowed by section 48 of the Act to arrive at the income taxable under the income from capital gains. The difference between the sale consideration and indexed cost of acquisition represents the actual cost of the assessee, which is taxable as per section 45 of the Act at the rates provided under section 112 of the Act. There is no provision in the Act to prevent the assessee from claiming indexed cost of acquisition on the sale of asset in case, 110 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited where the assessee is subjected to section 115JB of the Act. In any case, since, the indexed cost of acquisition is subjected to tax under a specific provision viz., section 112 of the Act, therefore, the provisions of section 115JB of the Act, which is a general provision cannot be made applicable to the case of the assessee. For yet another reason, the assessee has to be given the benefit of indexed cost of acquisition as considering the profits on sale of land without giving the benefit of indexed cost of acquisition results in taxing the income other than actual/real income. In other words, a mere book keeping entry cannot be treated as income. ……………….”

77. Respectfully following the above said decision, we partly allow the ground raised by the assessee.

Additional ground:

78. That on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, outstanding Value Added Tax amounting to ₹.9,91,66,694/- disallowed u/s 43B in A.Y.2008-09 on the basis of Tax Audit Report of that assessment year, be allowed as deduction on payment basis in this Assessment Year.

79. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record, the assessee has raised this issue in the additional ground based on the fact that in AY 2008-09 the value added tax was disallowed u/s 43B, hence the same should be allowed on the payment basis. This issue needs verification and accordingly this issue is admitted and remitted back to the file of assessing officer verify the claim of the assessee as per 111 & 3246/MUM/2018 (A.Y: 2012-13) M/s. ACC Limited law after giving opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Accordingly, the above additional ground is allowed for statistical purpose.

Order pronounced in the open court on 28th February, 2023.