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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI ‘G’ BENCH,
Before: SHRI N.K. BILLAIYA, & SHRI KUL BHARAT
PER N.K. BILLAIYA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER:-
The above captioned three appeals by different assessees are
preferred against three separate orders pertaining to Assessment Years
2018-19, 2017-18 and 2019-20 respectively. The appeal of the Revenue
is preferred against the order of the NFAC dated 05.08.2022 pertaining
to Assessment Year 2019-20
Since the underlying facts in the issues are common and the
grievance of the assessees/Revenue are identical in all the four
appeals, all these appeals were heard together and are disposed of by
this common order for the sake of convenience and brevity.
The common grievance in all the appeals by the
assessees/Revenue relates to the additions/disallowances made on
account of delayed deposit of Employees Contribution to ESI/PF and in
Revenue’s appeal, the grievance is similar, though the ld. CIT(A) has
deleted the disallowance whereas in the other appeals, the ld. CIT(A)
has confirmed the disallowance.
The undisputed fact in the captioned appeals is that there was a
delay in depositing the employees’ contribution and the contribution
has been deposited beyond the date stipulated under the relevant
Fund Act.
Though the quarrel is no more res integra, as it has been settled
by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate
Services Pvt Ltd 143 Taxmann.com 178. But, before us, the decision of
the co-ordinate bench at Mumbai has been placed in the case of PR
Packaging Service in ITA No. 2376/MUM/2022 and it has been seriously
argued that the co-ordinate bench has considered the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and yet decided the quarrel in favour of the
assessee and against the Revenue.
Another argument taken before us is that the disallowance made
by the CPC Bengaluru while processing the return u/s 143(1) of the Act
is beyond the scope of provisions of section 143(1(a) of the Act and,
therefore, cannot be sustained.
We have carefully perused the decision of the co-ordinate bench
in the case of M/s P R Packaging Services [supra]. We find that the co-
ordinate bench has not given any independent finding but has simply
relied upon another decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of
Kalpesh Synthetics Pvt Ltd 195 ITD 142 wherein the co-ordinate bench
has based its decision on the interpretation and binding decision of the
Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court. In the case of Kalpesh Synthetics Pvt
Ltd [supra], the Tribunal has held that the CPC Bengaluru cannot
override the binding decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court while
making the impugned disallowance on account of delay in the deposit
of employees’ contribution to PF/ESI.
It would be apt to refer to the relevant part of the decision of
the Tribunal in the case of Kalpesh Synthetics [supra] followed in P R
Packaging Service [supra] wherein it has been held as under:
“8. When the law enacted by the legislature has been construed in a particular manner by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court, it cannot be open to anyone in the jurisdiction of that Hon’ble High Court to read any other manner than as read by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court. The views expressed by the tax auditor in such a situation, cannot be reason enough to disregard the
binding views of the Hon'ble jurisdictional Court. To that extent, the provisions of section 143(1)(a)(iv) must be read down. What essentially follows is the adjustments under section 143(1)(a) in respect of” disallowance of expenditure indicated in the audit report but not taken into account in computing the total income in the return” is to be read as, for example, subject to the rider “except in a situation in which the audit report has taken a stand contrary to the law laid down by Hon'ble Courts above”. That is where the quasi judicial exercise of dealing with the objections of the assessee against proposed adjustments under section 143(1), assumes critical importance in the processing of returns, also important to bear in mind the fact that what constitutes jurisdictional High Court will essentially depend upon the location of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. While dealing with jurisdiction for the appeals, rule 11(1) of the Central Processing of Returns Scheme, 2011 states that “Where a return is processed at the Centre, the appeal proceedings relating to the processing of the return shall lie with Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] having jurisdiction over the jurisdictional Assessing Officer” Then situs of the CPC or the Assessing Office CPC is thus irrelevant for the purpose of ascertaining the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, in the present case, whether the CPC is within the jurisdiction of Hon'ble Bombay High Court or not, as for the regular Assessing Officer of the assessee and the assessee are located in the jurisdiction of Hon'ble
Bombay High Court, the jurisdictional High Court, for all matters pertaining to the assessee, will be Hon'ble Bombay High Court. In our considered view, it cannot be open to the Assessing Officer CPC to take a view contrary to the view taken by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court- more so when his attention was specifically invited to binding judicial precedents in this regard. For this reason also, the inputs in question in the tax audit report cannot be reason enough to make the impugned disallowance. The assessee must succeed for this reason as well.”
With our utmost respect to the findings of the co-ordinate bench
[supra], we are of the considered view that the co-ordinate bench has
ignored the binding ratio decidendi of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Checkmate Services Pvt Ltd [supra]. It would be pertinent
to refer to the most relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court on the impugned quarrel which read as under:
“32. The scheme of the provisions relating to deductions, such as Sections 32 - 37, on the other hand, deal primarily with business, commercial or professional expenditure, under various heads (including depreciation). Each of these deductions, has its contours, depending upon the expressions used, and the conditions that are to be met. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind that specific enumeration of deductions, dependent upon fulfillment of particular conditions, would qualify as allowable deductions: failure by the assessee to comply with those conditions, would render the claim vulnerable to rejection.
In this scheme the deduction made by employers to approved provident fund schemes, is the subject matter of Section 36 (iv). It is noteworthy, that this provision was part of the original IT Act; it has largely remained unaltered. On the other hand, Section 36(1)(va) was specifically inserted by the Finance Act, 1987, w.e.f. 01-04-1988. Through the same amendment, by Section 3(b), Section 2(24) – which defines various kinds of “income” – inserted clause (x). This is a significant amendment, because Parliament intended that amounts not earned by the assessee, but received by it, - whether in the form of deductions, or otherwise, as receipts, were to be treated as income. The inclusion of a class of receipt, i.e., amounts received (or deducted from the employees) were to be part of the employer/assessee’s income. Since these amounts were not receipts that belonged to the assessee, but were held by it, as trustees, as it were, Section 36(1)(va) was inserted specifically to ensure that if these receipts were deposited in the EPF/ESI accounts of the employees concerned, they could be treated as deductions. Section 36(1)(va) was hedged with the condition that the amounts/receipts had to be deposited by the employer, with the EPF/ESI, on or before the due date. The last expression “due date” was dealt with in the explanation as the date by which such amounts had to be credited by the employer, in the concerned enactments such as EPF/ESI Acts. Importantly, such a condition (i.e., depositing the amount on or before the due date) has not been enacted in relation to the employer’s contribution (i.e., Section 36(1)(iv)).
The significance of this is that Parliament treated contributions under Section 36(1)(va) differently from those under Section 36(1)(iv). The latter (hereinafter, “employers’ contribution”) is described as “sum paid by the assessee as an
employer by way of contribution towards a recognized provident fund”. However, the phraseology of Section 36(1)(va) differs from Section 36(1)(iv). It enacts that “any sum received by the assessee from any of his employees to which the provisions of sub-clause (x) of clause (24) of section 2 apply, if such sum is credited by the assessee to the employee's account in the relevant fund or funds on or before the due date.” The essential character of an employees’ contribution, i.e., that it is part of the employees’ income, held in trust by the employer is underlined by the condition that it has to be deposited on or before the due date.
It is therefore, manifest that the definition of contribution in Section 2 (c) is used in entirely different senses, in the relevant deduction clauses. The differentiation is also evident from the fact that each of these contributions is separately dealt with in different clauses of Section 36 (1). All these establish that Parliament, while introducing Section 36(1)(va) along with Section 2(24)(x), was aware of the distinction between the two types of contributions. There was a statutory classification, under the IT Act, between the two.
It is instructive in this context to note that the Finance Act, 1987, introduced to Section 2(24), the definition clause (x), with effect from 1 April 1988; it also brought in Section 36(1)(va). The memorandum explaining these provisions, in the Finance Bill, 1987, presented to the Parliament, is extracted below:
“Measures of penalising employers mis-utilising contributions to the provident fund or any funds set up under the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, or any other fund for the welfare of employees -
12.1. The existing provisions provide for a deduction in respect of any payment by way of contribution to the provident fund or a superannuation fund or any other fund for welfare of employees in the year in which the liabilities are actually discharged (Section 43B). The effect of the amendment brought about by the Finance act, is that no deduction will be allowed in the assessment of the employer, unless such contribution is paid into the fund on or before the due date. “Due date” means the date by which an employer is required to credit the contribution to the employees account in the relevant fund or under the relevant provisions of any law or term of the contract of service or otherwise.
(Explanation to Section 36 (1) of the Finance Act)
12.2. In addition, contribution of the employees to the various funds which are deducted by the employer from the salaries and wages of the employees will be taxed as income within brackets insertion of new [clause (x) in clause (24) of Section 2] of the employer, if such contribution is not credited by the employer in the account of the employee in the relevant fund by the due date. Where such income is not chargeable to tax under the head “profits and gains of business or profession” it will be assessed under the head “income from other sources.”
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There is no doubt that in Alom Extrusions, this court did consider the impact of deletion of second proviso to Section 43B, which mandated that unless the amount of employers’ contribution was deposited with the authorities, the deduction otherwise permissible in law, would not be available. This court was of the opinion that the omission was curative, and that as long as the employer deposited the dues, before filing the return of income tax, the deduction was available.
A reading of the judgment in Alom Extrusions, would reveal that this court, did not consider Sections 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va). Furthermore, the separate provisions in Section 36(1) for employers’ contribution and employees’ contribution, too went unnoticed. The court observed inter alia, that:
“15. …It is important to note once again that, by Finance Act, 2003, not only the second proviso is deleted but even the first proviso is sought to be amended by bringing about an uniformity in tax, duty, cess and fee on the one hand vis-a-vis contributions to welfare funds of employee(s) on the other. This is one more reason why we hold that the Finance Act, 2003, is retrospective in operation. Moreover, the judgement in Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra) is delivered by a Bench of three learned Judges, which is binding on us. Accordingly, we hold that Finance Act, 2003 will operate retrospectively with effect from 1st April, 1988 [when the first proviso stood inserted]. Lastly, we may point out the hardship and the invidious discrimination which would be caused to the assessee(s) if the contention of the Department is to be accepted that Finance Act, 2003, 2003, to the above extent, operated prospectively. Take an example - in the present case, the respondents have deposited the
contributions with the R.P.F.C. after 31st March [end of accounting year] but before filing of the Returns under the Income Tax Act and the date of payment falls after the due date under the Employees' Provident Fund Act, they will be denied deduction for all times. In view of the second proviso, which stood on the statute book at the relevant time, each of such assessee(s) would not be entitled to deduction under Section 43B of the Act for all times. They would lose the benefit of deduction even in the year of account in which they pay the contributions to the welfare funds, whereas a defaulter, who fails to pay the contribution to the welfare fund right upto 1st April, 2004, and who pays the contribution after 1st April, 2004, would get the benefit of deduction under Section 43B of the Act. In our view, therefore, Finance Act, 2003, to the extent indicated above, should be read as retrospective. It would, therefore, operate from 1st April, 1988, when the first proviso was introduced. It is true that the Parliament has explicitly stated that Finance Act, 2003, will operate with effect from 1st April, 2004. However, the matter before us involves the principle of construction to be placed on the provisions of Finance Act, 2003”.
XXXX
One of the rules of interpretation of a tax statute is that if a deduction or exemption is available on compliance with certain conditions, the conditions are to be strictly complied with. Eagle Flask Industries Ltd Vs. Commissioner of Central Exercise 2004 Supp (4) SCR 35. This rule is in line with the general principle that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly, and that there is no room for equitable considerations.
That deductions are to be granted only when the conditions which govern them are strictly complied with. This has been laid down in State of Jharkhand v Ambay Cements as follows:
“23…. In our view, the provisions of exemption clause should be strictly construed and if the condition under which the exemption was granted stood changed on account of any subsequent event the exemption would not operate.
In our view, an exception or an exempting provision in a taxing statute should be construed strictly and it is not open to the court to ignore the conditions prescribed in the industrial policy and the exemption notifications.
In our view, the failure to comply with the requirements renders the writ petition filed by the respondent liable to be dismissed. While mandatory rule must be strictly observed, substantial compliance might suffice in the case of a directory rule.
Whenever the statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to severe consequences, such requirement would be mandatory. It is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed. Since the requirement, in the instant case, of obtaining prior permission is
mandatory, therefore, non-compliance with the same must result in cancelling the concession made in favour of the grantee, the respondent herein.”
XXXX
The distinction between an employer’s contribution which is its primary liability under law – in terms of Section 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amounts received by it or deducted by it (Section 36(1)(va)) is, thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers’ income, and the later retains its character as an income (albeit deemed), by virtue of Section 2(24)(x) - unless the conditions spelt by Explanation to Section 36(1)(va) are satisfied i.e., depositing such amount received or deducted from the employee on or before the due date. In other words, there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts – the employer’s liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees’ income and held in trust by the employer.
That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees’ contributions- which are deducted from their income. They are not part of the assessee employer’s income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others’ income, monies, only deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for
the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date.”
In our understanding, the aforementioned binding observations of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be brushed aside simply because the
decision was rendered in the context where the assessment was
framed u/s 143(3) and not u/s 143(1)(a) of the Act. In our considered
opinion, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is in the context of
allowability of deposit of PF/ESI after due date specified in the
relevant Act.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the
employees’ contribution deposited after respective due date cannot be
allowed as deduction, and, therefore, it would be incorrect to say that
the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is applicable only in the
case of an assessment farmed u/s 143(3) of the Act. In our considered
view, the ratio decidendi is equally applicable for the intimation
framed u/s 143(1) of the Act.
Now coming to the challenge that the impugned adjustment is
beyond the powers of the CPC Bengaluru u/s 143(1) of the Act is also
not correct. In light of the aforementioned decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court [supra], as mentioned elsewhere, it cannot be stated
that the impugned adjustment u/s 143(1) of the Act is beyond the
powers of the CPC, Bengaluru.
The provisions of section 143(1)(a) read as under:
“143(1) Where a return has been made under section 139, or in response to a notice under sub-section (1) of Section 143, such return shall be processed in the following manner, namely;-
(a) The total income or loss shall be computed after making the following adjustments, namely;-
(i) Any arithmetical error in the return;
(ii) An incorrect claim, if such incorrect claim is apparent from any information in the return;
(iii) Disallowance of loss claimed, if return of the previous year for which set off of loss is claimed was furnished beyond the due date specified under sub-section (1) of section 139;
(iv) Disallowance of expenditure [or increase in income] indicated in the audit report but not taken into account in computing the total income in the return;
(v) Disallowance of deduction claimed under [section 10AA or under any of the provisions of Chapter VI-A under the heading “C.-Deductions in respect of certain income”, if] the return is furnished beyond the due date specified under sub-section (1) of section 139; or
(vi) Addition of income appearing in Form 26AS or Form 16A or Form 16 which has not been included in computing the total income in the return;”
A perusal of the afore-stated provisions show that at every stage
in sub-section (1) of the Act, the return submitted by the assessee
forms the foundation, with respect to which, if any of the
inconsistencies referred to in various sub-clauses are found,
appropriate adjustments are to be made. It is an open secret that
hardly 3 to 5% of the returns are selected for scrutiny assessment, out
of which, more than 50% are because of AIR Information under CASS
and the Assessing Officer cannot go beyond the reasons for scrutiny
selection and such cases are called Limited Scrutiny cases and only the
remaining returns are taken up for complete scrutiny u/s 143(3) of the
Act.
Meaning thereby, that exercise of power under sub-section (2) of
section 143 of the Act leading to the passing of an order under sub-
section (3) thereof, is to be undertaken where it is considered
necessary or expedient to ensure that the assessee has not understated
income or has not computed excessive loss, or has not under paid the
tax in any manner,
If any narrow interpretation is given to the decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services Pvt Ltd
[supra], it would not only defeat the very purpose of the enactment of
the provisions of section 143(1) of the Act but also defeat the very
purpose of the Legislators and the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court would be made redundant because there would be discrimination
and chaos, in as much as, those returns which are processed by the
CPC would go free even if the employees’ contribution is deposited
after the due date and in some cases the employer may not even
deposit the employees’ contribution and those whose returns have
been scrutinized and assessed u/s 143(3) of the Act would have to face
the disallowance.
This can neither be the intention of the Legislators nor the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has to be interpreted in such a
way so as to create such discrimination amongst the tax payers. Such
interpretation amounts to creation of class [tax payer] within the class
[tax payer] meaning thereby that those tax payers who are assessed
u/s 143(3) of the Act would have to face disallowance because of the
delay in deposit of contribution and those tax payers who have been
processed and intimated u/s 143(1) of the Act would go scot- free even
if there is delay in deposit of contribution and even if they do not
deposit the contribution.
We are of the considered view that the ratio decidendi of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court is equally applicable to the intimation u/s
143(1) of the Act and, therefore, the decision of the co-ordinate bench
relied upon by the assessee is distinguishable. Therefore, respectfully
following the binding decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court [supra], all
the three appeals of the assessee are dismissed and that of the
revenue is allowed.
In the result, all the three captioned appeals of the
assessee in ITA Nos. 2249/DEL/2022, 2250/DEL/202 and
2197/DEL/2022 are dismissed whereas the appeal of the Revenue in
ITA No. 2293/DEL/2022 is allowed.
The order is pronounced in the open court on 09.01.2023.
Sd/- Sd/- [KUL BHARAT] [N.K. BILLAIYA] JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
Dated: January, 2023.
VL/