Section 153(1) of the Income Tax Act

If an issue has been decided by a competent court or bench, and that decision remains undisturbed by a higher court, subsequent appeals on the same issue can be dismissed as being covered by the earlier judgment, underscoring judicial discipline.

An Income-tax Tribunal, operating anywhere in the country, must respect and follow the law laid down by any High Court, even if it is a non-jurisdictional High Court, as long as there is no contrary decision from another High Court on that specific legal point. The law declared by such a High Court is considered the final law of the land for the Tribunal.

The Supreme Court has not reached a majority verdict on whether the time spent in Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) proceedings under Section 144C should be included within the overall limitation period prescribed by Section 153(3). Consequently, the legal position on the interplay between Sections 144C and 153 remains unresolved at the Supreme Court level.

A statute must be read as a whole, construing every clause with reference to its context and other provisions, to determine the legislature's real intention and ensure a consistent enactment. This principle, known as "ex visceribus actus," helps avoid inconsistencies within the law.

The grant of special leave by the Supreme Court signifies that an issue is admitted for final adjudication, and the correctness of the High Court's judgment is under scrutiny. The order granting leave does not affirm the High Court's view nor declare law; consequently, the High Court judgment loses its finality.

Section 144C(4) uses a non-obstante clause to expedite the final assessment order, requiring the Assessing Officer to pass it immediately upon acceptance or lack of objection to the TPO's order, irrespective of broader time limits under Section 153.

Statutory authorities must exercise their suo motu or revisional powers within a reasonable period, even if the governing statute does not prescribe a specific limitation period. What constitutes a 'reasonable period' depends on the nature of the statute, the rights and liabilities involved, and other relevant factors.

Courts must reject interpretations that defeat the plain intention of the legislature, even if language is imprecise. A statute must be read as a whole, construing provisions harmoniously to avoid rendering any part otiose or a dead letter.

The Supreme Court holds that legislative intent must be ascertained by reading the statute as a whole, construing one provision with reference to others to ensure a consistent enactment. Courts must consider the entire statute and its setting, not just the specific clauses, even if the language used has some inexactitude.