COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE vs. M/S HONGO INDIA(P) LTD

Bench: Enactment Of Act 49/2005), With Regard To Application For Reference, The High Court Exercises Its Advisory Jurisdiction In A Case Where The Substantial Question Of Law Of Public Importance Arise, The Said Bench Directed The Matter To Be Heard By Larger Bench. In This Way, All The Above Mentioned Matters Arising From The Judgments Of The Allahabad High Court On Identical Issue Posted Before This Bench For Determining The Question, Namely, “Whether The High Court In The Reference Application Under Section 35H (1) Of The Unamended Act, Has Power Under Section 5 Of 2

7) Unamended Section 35G speaks about Appeal to the High Court. Sub-section 2(a) enables the aggrieved person to file an appeal to the High Court within 180 days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the Commissioner of Central Excise or the other party. There is 4 no provision to condone the delay

COMMR.OF CUSTOMS,CENTRAL EXERCISE,NOIDA vs. M/S PUNJAB FIBRES LTD.,NOIDA

The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances,

7. It is also to be noted that under Section 35-E(3) provision for limitation has been provided. Here again, the outer limit for condonation has been indicated. 8. Recently in M/s Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors. (2007 (14) SCALE 610) the scope for condonation of delay

M/S THAKKER SHIPPING P.LTD. vs. COMMR.OF CUSTOMS(GENERAL)

Bench: The Appellate Authority”. 3. The Facts Leading To The Present Appeal Are These. A Container Was Intercepted By M & P Wing Of Commissioner Of Customs (Preventive), Mumbai On 11.01.2001. It Was Found To Contain Assorted Electrical & Electronic Goods Of Foreign Origin. The Said Goods Were Imported By M/S Qureshi International & The Cargo Was Cleared From Nhava Sheva. The Clearance Of The Goods Was Handled By M/S Thakker Shipping P. Ltd., The

delay. We order accordingly and consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed”. 7. This appeal raises the question, whether it is competent for the Tribunal to invoke Section 129A(5) of the Act where an application under Section 129D(4) has not been made by the Commissioner within the prescribed time and condone

MESSRS MELA RAM & SONS vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,PUNJAB

delay and rejects the appeal, it is one under section 30(2) and not appealable. It has further held that even if the appeal bad been admitted without an order of condonation and dismissed at the hearing on the ground of limitation, it would not be under section 31, because the scheme of the Act contemplated that an order

M/S. SINGH ENTERPRISES vs. COMMNR.OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JAMSHEDPUR&ORS

condone the delay. It is stated that the power in this regard is untrammeled by any statutory provision. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand supported the orders of the Commissioner and the High Court. 6. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of Section 35 of the Act which reads as follows: \02335. APPEALS

M/S DALMIA POWER LTD. vs. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

Appeals are allowed

Bench: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDU MALHOTRA

condonation of delay under Section 6 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read with CBDT Circular No. 9/2015 dated 09.06.2015.  2.13 On   28.12.2018,   the   Department   passed   an Assessment Order u/S. 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, stating that in view of the Scheme of Arrangement and Amalgamation, the notice issued under Section

M/S. ROTORK CONTROLA INDIA (P) LTD. vs. COMMNR. OF INCOME TAX, CHENNAI

Appeals stand allowed in favour of the assessee with no order as to

Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. FACTS IN THE LEAD MATTER Civil Appeal Nos. of 2009 – Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.14178-14182 of 2007 – M/s. Rotork Controls India (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Chennai . 3. In these civil appeals filed by the assessee we are concerned with the assessment years

RAJA MECHANICAL CO.(P) LTD. vs. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, DELHI-I

Appeal is dismissed on

Bench: The Adjudicating Authority/Assessing Authority. However, The Said Declaration Was Not Filed Within The Time Prescribed Under The ‘Central Excise Act, 1944 (For Short ‘The Act’) & The Rules Framed Thereunder. Accordingly, The Adjudicating Authority Had Issued A Show Cause Notice Dated 11.10.1995 To The Assessee, Inter Alia, Directing It To Show Cause As To Why The Modvat Credit To The Tune Of Rs.1,47,000/-, Availed By It, Should Not Be Disallowed & Recovered Under Rule 57G Of The Central Excise Rules, 1944 (For Short ‘The Rules’) Read With Section 11A Of The Act And, Further Directed It To Show Cause As To Why Penalty Under Rule 173Q Of The Rules Should Not Be Imposed. Thereafter, A Corrigendum Dated 23.4.1997 To The Show Cause Notice Was Issued To The Assessee, Inter Alia, Directing It To Show Cause To The Assistant 2

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 explaining the delay in filing the appeal. 6. The first appellate authority, being of the opinion that it has no powers to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period, has rejected the appeal vide its Order dated 1.3.2000. Aggrieved by the same, the assessee had carried the matter by way of Second Appeal

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 14 vs. JASJIT SINGH

The appeals are dismissed in terms of signed

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT

Delay condoned in SLP(C) Dy. No. 30718 of 2023 and all connected petitions. 2. Special leave granted. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the appeals were heard. 3. In this batch of appeals the revenue questions four sets of orders of the Delhi High Court, dismissing its appeals under 1 Digitally signed by NEETA SAPRA

M/S. VIJAY INDUSTRIES vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

Appeals are allowed

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI

Delay condoned. 2) In all these appeals issue relates to the interpretation that is to be accorded to the provisions of Section 80HH of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Section 80HH and other related provisions, as it existed at the relevant time, are to be taken note of. since we are concerned with

INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (GWALIOR) M.P. LTD. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX GWALIOR M.P

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE

condoned the delay and granted the registration certificate as prayed for by the appellant. In clause 3 of the registration certificate, it was mentioned that the certificate is granted without prejudice to the examination on merits of the claim of exemption after the return is filed. 6. On 27.11.2000, the CIT issued a show cause notice to the appellant stating

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-I, KOLHAPUR vs. M/S CHAPHALKAR BROTHERS PUNE

The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN

7 of the aforesaid scheme was set out in para 3 of the judgment as follows:- “The beneficiaries of the incentive scheme shall ensure that the surplus funds generated through sale of the incentive sugar are utilised for the repayment of term loans, if any, outstanding from the Central financial institutions. The sugar factories should submit utilisation certificates annually from

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs. M/S PEPSI FOODS LTD. (NOW PEPSICO INDIA HOLDINGS PVT. LTD.)

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN

condoned. Leave granted. 2. The appeals before us raise an important question as to the constitutional validity of the third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “Income Tax Act”). 3. The facts in Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. v. M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. [now Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd] (Civil

VINUBHAI MOHANLAL DOBARIA vs. CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA

condonation of the said infraction, even if a return is filed in terms of sub- section (4). Accepting such a plea would mean that a person who has not filed a return within the due time as prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 139 would get benefit by filing the return under Section 139(4) much later

THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF COOPERATION FOOD AND CONSUMER PROTECTION vs. A. KINGSTON DAVID

The appeals are disposed of in the above terms

Bench: The High Court. The Review Petition Was Dismissed On 31 January 2019. The Special Leave Petitions Were Filed On 28 March 2019. Hence, Sufficient Cause For Condoning The Delay Has Been Shown. The Delay In Filing The Special Leave Petitions Is Condoned. 2 Leave Granted. Digitally Signed By Chetan Kumar Date: 2021.12.16 16:29:46 Ist Reason: Signature Not Verified

delay in filing the Special Leave Petitions is condoned. 2 Leave granted. Digitally signed by Chetan Kumar Date: 2021.12.16 16:29:46 IST Reason: Signature Not Verified CA 7655-56/2021 2 3 These appeals arise from a judgment of a Division Bench at the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court dated 8 December 2016, and the judgment dated

THE DIR. PRASAR BHARATI vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, THIRUVANANTH

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE

Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. 3. These appeals are directed against the final judgment and order dated 20.11.2009 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Income Tax Appeal No.27 of 2009 and Income Tax Appeal No.62 of 2009 whereby the High Court allowed the appeals preferred by the respondent herein and 1 Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL

M/S D. N. SINGH THROUGH PARTNER DUDHESHWAR NATH SINGH vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH

Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. A. THE FACTS 3. The appellant-assessee carried on business as carriage contractor for bitumen loaded from oil companies namely HPCL, IOCL and BPCL from Haldia. The goods were to be delivered to various divisions of the Road Construction Department of the Government of Bihar. According to the appellant, it has been in the business

ADDL. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA & ANR. vs. M/S. BEST & CO

In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the High

condone the delay and dismissed the appeal. The appellant then filed an application for review and it was then that he for the first time invoked sub-ss. 2 and 3 of S. 12 contending that the time taken in obtaining the copy of the order and of the judgment should be excluded. The Court upheld the contention