“Section 12(3)”

“Concealment of particulars of income” and “furnishing inaccurate particulars of income” are two distinct offences under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act. A penalty cannot be levied under one limb if the show cause notice or basis for penalty specifies the other, as this constitutes a complete variance in the reasons for assuming jurisdiction.

Depreciation is allowable on assets for which the cost has been fully allowed as an application of income under Section 11 in previous years, when computing the income of a charitable trust. Charitable trusts are also entitled to carry forward their deficit.

If activities for the advancement of general public utility are carried on as a business, income from such activities is not exempt under Section 11, even if the profits are utilized for the main charitable object. The argument that profits from general public utility activities can be ploughed back to charity to maintain exemption is not a good law.

For fees for technical or consultancy services to 'make available' technical knowledge or know-how under a DTAA, the service must transmit such knowledge, allowing the recipient to derive an enduring benefit and utilize it independently in the future.

A charitable institution, whose predominant object is general public utility, can engage in non-charitable activities yielding incidental profits, provided these profits are deployed to achieve the dominant charitable object. A subsidiary object, if ancillary to the primary charitable purpose, does not negate the institution's charitable character.

A cardinal principle of tax law is that the law in force for the relevant assessment year applies unless expressly or necessarily provided otherwise. A retrospective tax provision stated to be 'for the removal of doubts' is not presumed retrospective if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood.

The time limit for the Assessing Officer to pass a final assessment order under Section 144C(13) following directions from the Dispute Resolution Panel is determined by the specific provisions of Section 153, particularly Section 153(2A).

Payments for the use of copyrighted software or reimbursement of data processing costs do not constitute 'royalty' under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act or Article 12(3) of a DTAA where there is no transfer of copyright or rendering of services that "make available" technical knowledge. This position was later upheld by the Supreme Court.