ITAT Visakhapatnam Judgments — April 2021

The Tribunal admitted additional evidence, finding the assessee's reasons for non-response convincing. It held that the lower authorities had not considered the merits of the case and therefore set aside their orders.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing bonafide reasons and the principles of justice. It also remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits, directing the CIT(A) to pass a detailed speaking order after considering all facts and giving the assessee an opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal, while noting the assessee's non-compliance, decided to grant one more opportunity in the interest of justice. The orders of the lower authorities were set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the AO for a fresh assessment.

The Tribunal admitted additional evidence (sale deed) and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits. The CIT(A) is directed to consider the additional evidence submitted by the assessee.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for liberal condonation in the absence of malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide mistake of the accountant and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for liberal condonation in such cases. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A/153C following a search.

The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's failure to appear but noted the CIT(A) did not decide the case on merits. Therefore, for the interest of justice, the case was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and the lack of malafide intention, relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A/153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for liberal condonation in such cases. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the bonafide belief of the assessees and relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that advocate for a liberal approach in condoning delays when there is no malafide intention. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was bad in law, as the assessment should have been made under Section 153A or 153C following a search.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals to be dismissed as withdrawn, as the assessees had availed the Vivad se Vishwas scheme and the Department had issued Form No. 3.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal to be dismissed as withdrawn. The assessee was granted liberty to seek recall of the order in case of unforeseen circumstances.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal to be dismissed as withdrawn, granting liberty to seek recall if unforeseen circumstances arise. This was based on the assessee availing the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal to be dismissed as withdrawn. This was based on the assessee's participation in the Vivad se Vishwas scheme and the issuance of Form No. 3 by the department.

The Tribunal set aside the Commissioner's order, acknowledging the lockdown restrictions that hindered the appellant's participation. The case was remanded for fresh consideration with an opportunity for the appellant to be heard.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals to be dismissed as withdrawn, as the assessees had availed the Vivad se Vishwas scheme and the Department had issued Form No. 3.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals to be dismissed as withdrawn, as the assessees had availed the Vivad se Vishwas scheme and the Department had issued Form No. 3.

The tribunal observed that the tax effect was below the threshold specified by CBDT circulars, making the appeals not maintainable. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.

The tribunal observed that the tax effect was below the threshold specified by CBDT circulars, making the appeals not maintainable. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal to be dismissed as withdrawn, granting liberty to seek recall of the order if unforeseen circumstances arise.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal as the assessee had availed the Vivad se Vishwas scheme.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal to be dismissed as withdrawn. This was permitted because the assessee had availed the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's application to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to seek recall of the order if unforeseen circumstances arise.

The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s order to be cryptic and lacking detailed discussion. Both parties agreed to remit the issue back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits, considering additional evidence.

The Tribunal held that the issue regarding the stock difference needed verification and reconciliation between the bank statement and the books of accounts. Regarding sundry creditors, the Tribunal noted that additions were made without invoking specific sections of the Act and without proper inquiry into the genuineness of purchases.

The Tribunal noted that the issuance of Form No. 3 under the Vivad Se Vishwas Act generally leads to the withdrawal of the appeal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal held that the issue needed to be re-examined by the CIT(A) after verification of the sale deed and payments made to the GPA holder. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.

The Tribunal held that cash payments made to agriculturists residing in a village not served by any bank are covered by the exception under Rule 6DD(g). Consequently, the disallowance related to these payments was deleted.