ITAT Surat Judgments — September 2026

The Tribunal noted that the CWT(A) had categorically mentioned that the lands were excluded from the asset list under Section 2(ea)(e)(4) of the Wealth Tax Act as they were held as stock-in-trade for business purposes and the 10-year period had not lapsed. The CWT(A) also considered the subsequent sale of lands as evidence. However, the Tribunal found that the CWT(A) was silent on the treatment of land income as business or capital income and had not called for a remand report from the AO. Therefore, the Tribunal held that these issues needed verification. Regarding the motor car WDV, the Tribunal noted that it was not verified whether the WDV as per income tax was taken. Consequently, the Tribunal decided to remand issues related to lands (Grounds 1 & 2) and motor cars (Ground 3) back to the file of the CWT(A) for calling upon a remand report from the AO and adjudicating the issues accordingly. Grounds 4 & 5 were dismissed as consequential. For AY 2015-16, the issue of land was identical, and the issue of cars was not adjudicated by the CWT(A), hence it was also remanded. The Tribunal's decision was to partly allow the appeals for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation and without jurisdiction. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal (supra) had recorded the Revenue's concession that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, were liable to be dropped. Furthermore, the Gujarat High Court, in cases like Mayurkumar Babubhai Patel and Sorathia Mahesh Veljibhai HUF, following the Supreme Court's decisions in Rajeev Bansal and Deepak Steel & Power Ltd., had ruled that notices issued after April 1, 2021, for AY 2015-16 were time-barred. In the present case, the original notice under Section 148 was issued on June 30, 2021, and a subsequent notice was issued on July 23, 2022. Respectfully following these binding precedents, the Tribunal concluded that the impugned reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation and without jurisdiction. Consequently, the reassessment order passed by the AO was held to be bad in law and quashed. As the reassessment order was quashed, the Tribunal deemed it unnecessary to adjudicate the grounds related to the merit of the addition made by the AO, leaving those issues undecided.

The Tribunal noted that the CWT(A) had categorically mentioned that the lands were excluded from the asset list under Section 2(ea)(e)(4) of the Wealth Tax Act as they were held as stock-in-trade for business purposes and the 10-year period had not lapsed. The CWT(A) also considered the subsequent sale of lands as evidence. However, the Tribunal found that the CWT(A) was silent on the treatment of land income as business or capital income and had not called for a remand report from the AO. Therefore, the Tribunal held that these issues needed verification. Regarding the motor car WDV, the Tribunal noted that it was not verified whether the WDV as per income tax was taken. Consequently, the Tribunal decided to remand issues related to lands (Grounds 1 & 2) and motor cars (Ground 3) back to the file of the CWT(A) for calling upon a remand report from the AO and adjudicating the issues accordingly. Grounds 4 & 5 were dismissed as consequential. For AY 2015-16, the issue of land was identical, and the issue of cars was not adjudicated by the CWT(A), hence it was also remanded. The Tribunal's decision was to partly allow the appeals for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking revisionary action under Section 263 for either of the two issues. Regarding Issue (i), concerning sundry creditors, the Tribunal found that the AO had made inquiries, and the assessee had sufficiently discharged its primary burden by filing replies supported by documentary evidence. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not made any purchases from four of the six creditors during the current year, and in another case, full payment was made during the year, leaving no outstanding balance. Therefore, no addition under Section 68 was warranted. The Tribunal also held that the assessee is not responsible if creditors do not respond to notices under Section 133(6) when the primary documents are provided by the assessee. Regarding Issue (ii), concerning short-deduction of TDS under Section 194Q, the Tribunal found that the AO had made inquiries, and the assessee had filed relevant documents. The Tribunal observed that TDS was deducted as required by law from 01.07.2021, and the PCIT's inference of short-deduction based on the entire financial year's purchases was incorrect. The Tribunal concluded that the short-deduction of TDS was not established, and the AO could not be faulted for not making a disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia). Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the revision order and restored the original assessment order passed by the AO.

The Tribunal upheld the orders of the lower authorities and dismissed the assessee's appeal. Regarding the first two grounds, the judgment does not explicitly record any arguments from the revenue or a specific finding by the Tribunal on these procedural aspects. However, the Tribunal focused on the substantive issue. On the third issue, the Tribunal noted that while Section 44AD is a presumptive scheme where books of account are not required, the assessee failed to produce any evidence before the AO, CIT(A), or the Tribunal to establish the genuineness of the transaction. The Tribunal found that merely stating income was returned under Section 44AD at a higher rate was insufficient. The assessee was required to provide evidence to support the business activity. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee was used for routing accommodation entries and found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order, which had confirmed the AO's addition. The ratio decidendi is that the benefit of presumptive taxation under Section 44AD does not absolve the assessee of the obligation to provide evidence of genuine transactions, especially when accommodation entries are suspected.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s observation that the assessee did not furnish her husband's income proof or bank statements for the loan was contrary to the AO's findings. The AO had noted that the assessee submitted copies of the sale deed, agreement of sale, 26AS, and bank statements in her replies. The Tribunal concluded that there was no basis for the CIT(A)'s observation that the assessee failed to furnish documentary evidence. The Tribunal also noted that the AO had invoked Section 133(6) to call for information from the Sub-Registrar. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had confirmed the addition based on the premise that the assessee failed to provide documentary evidence, which the Tribunal found to be factually incorrect based on the AO's own findings. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order confirming the addition was not sustainable. The Tribunal did not decide on the applicability of Section 56(2)(x) or the other grounds raised by the assessee, as the matter was being remanded.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had submitted confirmations and bank statements from all persons from whom unsecured loans were taken during the period under consideration to the Assessing Officer in the remand proceedings. Copies of ITRs for AY 2010-11 and 2011-12, along with respective balance sheets and Profit & Loss accounts, were also provided. Since all creditors are assessed to income tax, their identity is beyond doubt. Furthermore, all transactions were conducted through banking channels, and details of each transaction, including bank statements showing receipt and payment, were provided for the aggregate amount of ₹16,50,000. Therefore, the identity of the parties and the genuineness of the transactions were established. The creditworthiness of the creditors was also established by their respective income tax returns and financial statements. As all three ingredients of Section 68 – identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction – were established by the assessee, there was no justification to confirm the additions made by the Assessing Officer and upheld by the CIT(A). Consequently, the addition was deleted. The appeal was allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient reasons for the delay. On the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Act, dated 01/03/2023, requiring compliance by 08/03/2023, provided less than the mandatory seven clear days. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in Satish Kumar vs. PCIT, Ranchi, which was followed by a Coordinate Bench in Mantosh Kumar vs. ACIT. The High Court's judgment, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd., held that 'clear seven days' means excluding both the date of issuance and the date of response. Since the notice in the present case provided only five clear days, it was held to be void ab initio. Consequently, all subsequent proceedings, including the assessment, were quashed. The Tribunal noted that the issue of the addition of Rs. 72,88,839/- as unexplained money was not decided as the entire proceedings were nullified.

The Tribunal noted that grounds 1 to 3 were not pressed by the assessee and were dismissed. Regarding grounds 4 and 5, concerning the disallowance of deduction u/s 54 and the re-characterization of capital gain as short-term, the Tribunal observed that the assessee purchased an under-construction property in 2011, received an allotment letter on 08.01.2011, and made substantial payments by 01.07.2013. The conveyance deed was registered on 30.09.2016, and the property was sold on 10.10.2016. The assessee treated the gain as long-term based on the allotment date. The AO treated it as short-term, considering the holding period from the registration date. The Tribunal referred to CBDT Circulars No. 471 and 672, which clarify that for Self-Financing Schemes and similar schemes by co-operative societies, the allotment date can be considered for determining the holding period, and such cases are treated as construction. The Tribunal found that the assessee had acquired a right/interest in the property from the allotment date. The Tribunal held that the capital gain should be treated as long-term, allowing indexation and deduction u/s 54. The addition of Rs. 68,12,137 was deleted. The issue concerning Section 56(2)(vii)(b) was not decided as the appeal was disposed of on the capital gains issue.

The Tribunal found that the assessee had actually received Rs. 25,00,000 during AY 2018-19 and offered capital gains relatable to this receipt, claiming TDS credit only for Rs. 25,000. The balance TDS was carried forward. The assessee also furnished particulars of further receipts in subsequent AYs (2019-20 to 2022-23) and correspondingly offered relatable capital gains, which were accepted by the Department and not disturbed. The Tribunal noted that the property was jointly owned and other co-owners followed the same method of offering capital gains in respective years of receipt, which was also accepted by tax authorities in their Section 147 assessments. Therefore, the assessee's case was at parity with the co-owners. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the impugned addition of Rs. 2,45,32,692 made by the AO was not sustainable and was deleted. All grounds raised by the assessee were allowed. The issue of reopening validity, transfer under Section 2(47), applicability of Section 45(1) vs 45(5A), real income theory, TDS credit determinacy, and double taxation were implicitly decided in favour of the assessee by deleting the addition based on the factual findings regarding the year of accrual and acceptance by the department in subsequent years and co-owners' cases.

The Tribunal considered the submissions of both parties. The learned Departmental Representative had no objection to the withdrawal of the appeal. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the request for withdrawal.

The Tribunal considered the submissions of both the learned Authorized Representative (AR) for the assessee and the learned Departmental Representative (DR) for the revenue. The assessee had filed an application seeking withdrawal of the present appeal. The Revenue's representative had no objection to this request. In light of the no objection from the Revenue and the assessee's explicit request, the Tribunal allowed the request for withdrawal. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal did not decide on any substantive issues related to the assessment or the original grounds of appeal, as the appeal was disposed of on a procedural basis. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.

The Tribunal held that the issue regarding the validity of notices issued for AY 2015-16 after 01.04.2021 is no longer res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal (supra) recorded the Revenue's concession that all notices issued on or after 01.04.2021 for AY 2015-16 are liable to be dropped. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Mayurkumar Babubhai Patel (supra) and Sorathia Mahesh Veljibhai HUF (supra), following the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Bansal and Deepak Steel & Power Ltd., has held that notices issued after 01.04.2021 for AY 2015-16 are barred by limitation. In the present case, the original notice u/s 148 was issued on 25.06.2021, and the consequential notice after the decision in Ashish Agarwal was issued on 27.07.2022. Respectfully following these binding precedents, the Tribunal held that the impugned reassessment proceedings are barred by limitation and without jurisdiction. Consequently, the reassessment order passed by the AO was held to be bad in law and quashed. The Tribunal noted that since the reassessment order itself was quashed, there was no necessity to adjudicate the remaining grounds concerning the merit of the additions made by the AO, and these were kept open undecided. Ground No. 1, relating to condonation of delay, was allowed as a consequence of quashing the reassessment proceedings.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not press several legal grounds, including those related to the issuance of notice under Section 148 and the validity of the reassessment order for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. The Tribunal also observed that the CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders as the assessee was non-responsive. For AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12, the Tribunal, referencing its decision in similar matters (though not detailed in the provided text), allowed the appeals for statistical purposes, implying a remand for fresh adjudication on the merits of the additions. Similarly, for AY 2017-18, the ground challenging the addition of Rs. 1,76,43,301/- was allowed for statistical purposes, with the adjudication mirroring that for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. Consequently, the penalty appeals for AYs 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13 were remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication, as they emanated from the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal stated that the AO shall take a fresh call in these matters in accordance with facts and law. All quantum appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes, and all penalty appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not press several legal grounds, including those related to the issuance of notice under Section 148 and the validity of the reassessment order for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. The Tribunal also observed that the CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders as the assessee was non-responsive. For AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12, the Tribunal, referencing its decision in similar matters (though not detailed in the provided text), allowed the appeals for statistical purposes, implying a remand for fresh adjudication on the merits of the additions. Similarly, for AY 2017-18, the ground challenging the addition of Rs. 1,76,43,301/- was allowed for statistical purposes, with the adjudication mirroring that for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. Consequently, the penalty appeals for AYs 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13 were remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication, as they emanated from the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal stated that the AO shall take a fresh call in these matters in accordance with facts and law. All quantum appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes, and all penalty appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not press several legal grounds, including those related to the issuance of notice under Section 148 and the validity of the reassessment order for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. The Tribunal also observed that the CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders as the assessee was non-responsive. For AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12, the Tribunal, referencing its decision in similar matters (though not detailed in the provided text), allowed the appeals for statistical purposes, implying a remand for fresh adjudication on the merits of the additions. Similarly, for AY 2017-18, the ground challenging the addition of Rs. 1,76,43,301/- was allowed for statistical purposes, with the adjudication mirroring that for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. Consequently, the penalty appeals for AYs 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13 were remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication, as they emanated from the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal stated that the AO shall take a fresh call in these matters in accordance with facts and law. All quantum appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes, and all penalty appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the impugned period. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the assessee-bank was operating under binding interim directions of the Hon'ble Madras High Court, which had specifically clarified that LFC payments would not constitute income for TDS purposes. Therefore, the assessee was legally bound to comply with these judicial directions, and failure to deduct tax at source could not be considered a default under Section 201(1). Consequently, the interest levied under Section 201(1A) was also not sustainable. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Ahmedabad Bench, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court, and the ITAT Agra Bench. The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the demands raised under Section 201(1) and the interest levied under Section 201(1A). The appeal ITA 326/SRT/2026 was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal held that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the impugned period. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the assessee-bank was operating under binding interim directions of the Hon'ble Madras High Court, which had specifically clarified that LFC payments would not constitute income for TDS purposes. Therefore, the assessee was legally bound to comply with these judicial directions, and failure to deduct tax at source could not be considered a default under Section 201(1). Consequently, the interest levied under Section 201(1A) was also not sustainable. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Ahmedabad Bench, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court, and the ITAT Agra Bench. The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the demands raised under Section 201(1) and the interest levied under Section 201(1A). The appeal ITA 326/SRT/2026 was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not press several legal grounds, including those related to the issuance of notice under Section 148 and the validity of the reassessment order for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. The Tribunal also observed that the CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders as the assessee was non-responsive. For AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12, the Tribunal, referencing its decision in similar matters (though not detailed in the provided text), allowed the appeals for statistical purposes, implying a remand for fresh adjudication on the merits of the additions. Similarly, for AY 2017-18, the ground challenging the addition of Rs. 1,76,43,301/- was allowed for statistical purposes, with the adjudication mirroring that for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. Consequently, the penalty appeals for AYs 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13 were remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication, as they emanated from the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal stated that the AO shall take a fresh call in these matters in accordance with facts and law. All quantum appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes, and all penalty appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the impugned period. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the assessee-bank was operating under binding interim directions of the Hon'ble Madras High Court, which had specifically clarified that LFC payments would not constitute income for TDS purposes. Therefore, the assessee was legally bound to comply with these judicial directions, and failure to deduct tax at source could not be considered a default under Section 201(1). Consequently, the interest levied under Section 201(1A) was also not sustainable. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Ahmedabad Bench, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court, and the ITAT Agra Bench. The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the demands raised under Section 201(1) and the interest levied under Section 201(1A). The appeal ITA 326/SRT/2026 was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal held that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the impugned period. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the assessee-bank was operating under binding interim directions of the Hon'ble Madras High Court, which had specifically clarified that LFC payments would not constitute income for TDS purposes. Therefore, the assessee was legally bound to comply with these judicial directions, and failure to deduct tax at source could not be considered a default under Section 201(1). Consequently, the interest levied under Section 201(1A) was also not sustainable. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Ahmedabad Bench, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court, and the ITAT Agra Bench. The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the demands raised under Section 201(1) and the interest levied under Section 201(1A). The appeal ITA 326/SRT/2026 was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal held that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the impugned period. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the assessee-bank was operating under binding interim directions of the Hon'ble Madras High Court, which had specifically clarified that LFC payments would not constitute income for TDS purposes. Therefore, the assessee was legally bound to comply with these judicial directions, and failure to deduct tax at source could not be considered a default under Section 201(1). Consequently, the interest levied under Section 201(1A) was also not sustainable. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Ahmedabad Bench, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court, and the ITAT Agra Bench. The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the demands raised under Section 201(1) and the interest levied under Section 201(1A). The appeal ITA 326/SRT/2026 was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal held that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the impugned period. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the assessee-bank was operating under binding interim directions of the Hon'ble Madras High Court, which had specifically clarified that LFC payments would not constitute income for TDS purposes. Therefore, the assessee was legally bound to comply with these judicial directions, and failure to deduct tax at source could not be considered a default under Section 201(1). Consequently, the interest levied under Section 201(1A) was also not sustainable. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Ahmedabad Bench, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court, and the ITAT Agra Bench. The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the demands raised under Section 201(1) and the interest levied under Section 201(1A). The appeal ITA 326/SRT/2026 was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not press several legal grounds, including those related to the issuance of notice under Section 148 and the validity of the reassessment order for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. The Tribunal also observed that the CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders as the assessee was non-responsive. For AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12, the Tribunal, referencing its decision in similar matters (though not detailed in the provided text), allowed the appeals for statistical purposes, implying a remand for fresh adjudication on the merits of the additions. Similarly, for AY 2017-18, the ground challenging the addition of Rs. 1,76,43,301/- was allowed for statistical purposes, with the adjudication mirroring that for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. Consequently, the penalty appeals for AYs 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13 were remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication, as they emanated from the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal stated that the AO shall take a fresh call in these matters in accordance with facts and law. All quantum appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes, and all penalty appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the impugned period. The reasoning was that during the relevant assessment years, the assessee-bank was operating under binding interim directions of the Hon'ble Madras High Court, which had specifically clarified that LFC payments would not constitute income for TDS purposes. Therefore, the assessee was legally bound to comply with these judicial directions, and failure to deduct tax at source could not be considered a default under Section 201(1). Consequently, the interest levied under Section 201(1A) was also not sustainable. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of the ITAT Ahmedabad Bench, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court, and the ITAT Agra Bench. The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the demands raised under Section 201(1) and the interest levied under Section 201(1A). The appeal ITA 326/SRT/2026 was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not press several legal grounds, including those related to the issuance of notice under Section 148 and the validity of the reassessment order for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. The Tribunal also observed that the CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders as the assessee was non-responsive. For AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12, the Tribunal, referencing its decision in similar matters (though not detailed in the provided text), allowed the appeals for statistical purposes, implying a remand for fresh adjudication on the merits of the additions. Similarly, for AY 2017-18, the ground challenging the addition of Rs. 1,76,43,301/- was allowed for statistical purposes, with the adjudication mirroring that for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. Consequently, the penalty appeals for AYs 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13 were remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication, as they emanated from the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal stated that the AO shall take a fresh call in these matters in accordance with facts and law. All quantum appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes, and all penalty appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 809 days in filing the appeal, finding the assessee's explanation for the delay due to the previous AR's non-action to be satisfactory. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal noted that while the assessee claimed gifts were received from family members, these were not corroborated with any occasion, and confirmations from the respective family members were not on record. Specifically, the Tijori account, mentioned in the return of income, was not verified, and no explanation was provided by the assessee before the AO. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the matter required proper verification and adjudication. Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the entire issue back to the file of the AO for proper adjudication on merits, in accordance with the Income Tax Act, and directed that the assessee be given an opportunity of hearing following the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. **Ground No. 1 (Sale of Goods Adjustment):** The Tribunal allowed this ground for statistical purposes. While the assessee argued that Relisys Medical Devices Ltd. was a manufacturing company and thus not a comparable for its trading business, the lower authorities had rejected this on the basis that the assessee itself included Relisys in its Transfer Pricing Study Report (TPSR). However, the Tribunal noted that it was not in dispute that Relisys was a manufacturing company and the assessee was a trader. The judgment indicates that the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument regarding the mismatch in business activities, leading to this ground being allowed for statistical purposes, implying a potential re-evaluation of comparables or the adjustment itself. The specific reasoning for allowing it for statistical purposes suggests a procedural or substantive flaw in the lower authorities' approach to the comparability analysis. 2. **Ground No. 2 (Interest on Loan):** The Tribunal allowed this ground and directed the deletion of the addition of Rs. 12,466/-. The Tribunal found the assessee's explanation of commercial expediency for advancing the loan to its Associated Enterprise to be reasonable, especially considering the small amount involved. It respectfully followed the decision in Rubamim Ltd. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax and clarified that its decision was based on the peculiar facts and circumstances and not to be treated as a precedent. 3. **Ground No. 3 (Penalty Proceedings):** The Tribunal dismissed this ground as premature, agreeing with both parties that penalty imposition is a separate proceeding and does not require adjudication at this stage. 4. **Ground No. 4 (143(1) Addition):** The Tribunal allowed this ground for statistical purposes and directed the AO to verify the documents submitted by the assessee. The assessee successfully demonstrated that necessary adjustments were made before filing the return, and the addition in the 143(1) intimation resulted in a double disallowance. The AO was instructed to delete the addition if satisfied after verification. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) on both the legal and factual grounds. Regarding the legal issue (Ground No. 1), the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s categorical findings that the legal grounds raised by the assessee were not sustainable. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order concerning the legal grounds. On the factual aspect (Ground No. 4), the Tribunal noted that the AO made the addition based on a 25% gross profit rate on purchases from the alleged fictitious entity, M/s Iskon Steel Traders, following the decision in Vijay Proteins Ltd. Vs. ACIT. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in the same case, which confirmed the principle of disallowing 25% of the purchase price when goods were not received from the stated parties but from a different source known only to the assessee, and the assessee had inflated expenditure through fictitious invoices. Since the CIT(A) followed this precedent, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere. The appeal was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the Foreign Tax Credit (FTC) amounting to INR 12,11,065/-. The reasoning was based on the principle that the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) provisions override Section 90 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as they are more beneficial to the assessee. The Tribunal respectfully followed decisions of its Coordinate Benches, which have held that assessees are entitled to FTC benefits when DTAA provisions are more beneficial. The issue regarding the levy of interest under Sections 234A, 234B, and 234C was not expressly decided by the Tribunal. The operative direction was to allow the FTC benefit.

The Tribunal decided to address grounds 3, 4, 5, and 6 on merits, leaving grounds 1 and 2 undecided at this juncture. Regarding grounds 3 and 4, the Tribunal found that the assessee had suo motu disallowed the delayed payment of provident fund and ESIC, and interest on late TDS, in its return of income. Therefore, the disallowance by the AO was a duplication. Accordingly, grounds 3 and 4 were allowed. For grounds 5 and 6, concerning the application of the Section 115BAA tax rate and the belated filing of Form 10-IC, the Tribunal noted that the AO had outrightly not considered Form 10-IC filed on March 24, 2023. The Tribunal held that it would be appropriate to restore the matter to the file of the AO to consider the belatedly filed Form 10-IC and allow the Section 115BAA rate after verification of the substantive conditions. The assessee was to be given an opportunity of hearing. Thus, grounds 5 and 6 were partly allowed for statistical purposes. The appeal of the assessee was partly allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the suppressed professional receipts of ₹25,05,000 and the bogus expenses of ₹5,00,000. The assessee's counsel did not present any fresh evidence to support claims that these receipts were accounted for or that the expenses were duly vouched. Therefore, these additions sustained by the CIT(A) were confirmed. Regarding the undisclosed investment in the building, the Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's argument that PWD rates should have been applied instead of CPWD rates, following the precedent of a Coordinate Bench. However, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had already examined this issue and restricted the addition. Finding no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order on this point, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the restricted addition. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the assessee was given sufficient opportunity to be heard but did not appear. The Tribunal found that the assessee had not provided any supporting documents to substantiate its claim that it had not underreported or misreported income by claiming wrong deductions/exemptions. The statement of facts filed by the assessee before the Tribunal did not contain any supporting documents. Consequently, the Tribunal held that there was no merit in the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee and found no infirmity in the order of the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal upheld the order of the Ld. CIT(A). The ratio decidendi is that an assessee must provide supporting evidence to substantiate claims of not underreporting or misreporting income, especially when facing penalty proceedings under Section 270A, and failure to do so leads to dismissal of appeal. The Tribunal did not explicitly leave any issue undecided.

The Tribunal held that when substantial justice is pitted against technicality like limitation, it is always better to adjudicate on substantial justice. By not condoning the delay, considerable loss could be caused to the assessee, whereas condoning the delay and adjudicating on merits would allow the assessee to understand their mistakes. Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay of 173 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) in the interest of justice. The issues in the appeal were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for readjudication on merits, with a direction to provide the assessee with an adequate opportunity of being heard. The assessee was directed to cooperate and provide all relevant documents and evidence. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the other grounds raised by the assessee, as the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). Regarding the Section 54 exemption, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s finding that the assessee received ownership of five separate residential flats, which contravened the amended Section 54(1) of the Act, disentitling the assessee from claiming the exemption. The Tribunal agreed that non-fulfillment of statutory eligibility conditions disqualifies an assessee from claiming tax benefits. Consequently, the AO's disallowance of Section 54 exemption was confirmed. Concerning the cost of improvement, the Tribunal concurred with the CIT(A) that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proof by not furnishing adequate vouchers, bills, and details of purchases and payments. Mere submission of self-generated or inadequately supported documents was deemed insufficient. The Tribunal distinguished the case of Ranjan Sen Jain v. ITO, stating its finding was based on facts, not legal aspects, and therefore not followed as a rule of consistency. Thus, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order.

The Tribunal upheld the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue. The Tribunal found that it was the duty of the Revenue to show evidence that the assessee had actually entered into a transaction with M/s Rajshree Vanijya Udyog. The Tribunal noted that the Revenue had not confronted the assessee with any such information. The Tribunal held that merely stating the assessee was a beneficiary of bogus entries was insufficient to conclude that the assessee was involved in transactions with a bogus entity. Therefore, the Tribunal found no error or infirmity in the Ld. CIT(A)'s order, which was based on the AO's failure to prove the transaction. The addition of Rs. 1,35,01,215/- was deleted. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not press several legal grounds, including those related to the issuance of notice under Section 148 and the validity of the reassessment order for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. The Tribunal also observed that the CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders as the assessee was non-responsive. For AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12, the Tribunal, referencing its decision in similar matters (though not detailed in the provided text), allowed the appeals for statistical purposes, implying a remand for fresh adjudication on the merits of the additions. Similarly, for AY 2017-18, the ground challenging the addition of Rs. 1,76,43,301/- was allowed for statistical purposes, with the adjudication mirroring that for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12. Consequently, the penalty appeals for AYs 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13 were remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication, as they emanated from the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal stated that the AO shall take a fresh call in these matters in accordance with facts and law. All quantum appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes, and all penalty appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the assessee declared business income under Section 44AD and was running a retail business of grains, with most customers being farmers who paid in cash. The Tribunal observed that the AO estimated income without considering the actual income declared in the computation of income. It was highlighted that the cash deposit was generated from the said business. Crucially, the Tribunal found that the facts of the present assessment year (2014-15) were identical to AY 2015-16, which had been decided in the assessee's favour by the Tribunal vide an order dated 16.09.2026. The Revenue's representative did not point out any distinguishing facts. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was not sustained. The operative direction was to delete the addition.

The Tribunal noted that the notice dated 07.03.2024 appeared to have been sent to an incorrect party, suggesting the assessee did not receive the notice of hearing. Consequently, the CIT(A) likely passed an ex-parte order without verifying the details. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for proper verification of the details submitted by the assessee and to adjudicate the contested issues in accordance with the Income Tax Act. The assessee was to be given an opportunity of hearing, following the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the grounds raised by the assessee regarding the validity of reopening, the additions made, or the estimation of profit, as these were to be adjudicated by the CIT(A) upon remand.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed additional evidence before it. However, these additional evidences required verification. Consequently, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for proper verification and adjudication of the issues on merit. The Tribunal emphasized that the assessee must be given an opportunity of hearing, adhering to the principles of natural justice. The specific findings on the additions made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) were not adjudicated on merits by the Tribunal due to the remand. The ratio decidendi is that when additional evidence is filed before the appellate authority and requires verification, and the lower appellate order is ex-parte, a remand to the AO for fresh adjudication after providing an opportunity of hearing is appropriate. The operative direction is to remand the matter to the AO.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided details of tax invoices, payment, and ledger account entries, along with GST paid. The Department had accepted the corresponding sales. While the supplier was declared untraceable, the Tribunal found it appropriate to accept the assessee's alternate plea. The Tribunal directed the AO to estimate a 6% profit on the purchase amount, which was found to be Rs.1,88,800/- based on records, not Rs.2,66,000/- as initially stated. The reasoning was that since the sales were accepted and evidence of purchase was provided, a profit estimation was more appropriate than a full disallowance. The ratio is that where purchase evidence is partially established but the supplier is untraceable, a profit estimation on the purchase amount is a reasonable approach, citing the Gujarat High Court in Surya Impex. The issue of whether Section 69C was correctly invoked was implicitly addressed by moving to a profit estimation approach. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) is not leviable on additions made on an ad-hoc or estimated basis. Following previous decisions of coordinate benches with identical facts, the Tribunal found the penalty unsustainable in law.

The Tribunal restored the penalty appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. This was to be done after the conclusion of the quantum proceedings, ensuring the penalty decision considers the outcome of the additions.

The Tribunal restored the penalty appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. This was to be done after the conclusion of the quantum proceedings, ensuring the penalty decision considers the outcome of the additions.

The Tribunal restored the penalty appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. This was to be done after the conclusion of the quantum proceedings, ensuring the penalty decision considers the outcome of the additions.

The Tribunal found that the assessee had filed details with the application, which the CIT(E) had not considered. Therefore, the matter was remanded back for proper verification and adjudication.

The Tribunal restored the penalty appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. This was to be done after the conclusion of the quantum proceedings, ensuring the penalty decision considers the outcome of the additions.

The Tribunal restored the penalty appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. This was to be done after the conclusion of the quantum proceedings, ensuring the penalty decision considers the outcome of the additions.

The Tribunal restored the penalty appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. This was to be done after the conclusion of the quantum proceedings, ensuring the penalty decision considers the outcome of the additions.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause. It held that the ex-parte dismissal by the CIT(A) without a hearing on merits extinguished the assessee's statutory right of appeal.