82 orders · Page 1 of 2
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order was ex parte and non-speaking, and that the assessee did not get a sufficient opportunity to present their case. In the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remit the matter back for de novo adjudication, with liberty for the assessee to produce evidence.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 was invalid as the AO's assessment orders were not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue. However, one appeal was partly allowed concerning the late payment of employee PF contribution.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 was invalid as the AO's assessment was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue. The AO had conducted inquiries, and the PCIT could not substitute his own view for a plausible view of the AO.
The Tribunal, considering the reasons provided by the assessee, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the process of seeking legal advice for alternative remedies, condoned the delay of 945 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was invalid for most of the appeals. The Tribunal emphasized that for Section 263 jurisdiction to be invoked, the AO's order must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, which are sine qua non. The Tribunal noted that the AO has the dual role of investigator and adjudicator, and while a lack of inquiry makes an order erroneous, inadequate inquiry does not. If the AO's view is plausible, the PCIT cannot substitute his own view. The Tribunal found that the PCIT had failed to demonstrate that the AO's inquiries were insufficient or that his order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Consequently, the PCIT's orders were quashed as being ab initio void for all appeals except for ITA No. 331/Rjt/2024. In ITA No. 331/Rjt/2024, concerning Dhruv Print Pack Industries, the Tribunal upheld the PCIT's order regarding the disallowance of Rs. 1,41,718/- for late payment of employee's contribution to PF, citing judgments of the jurisdictional Gujarat High Court and the Supreme Court. This appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the delay in filing was due to notices being sent to a wrong email address, and the assessee was unaware of the proceedings. The Tribunal condoned the delay and heard the appeal on merits. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was unaware of the online proceedings before the CIT(A), leading to an ex-parte order without adjudication on merits. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back to the AO for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee with an opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that CBDT Circulars are binding on the Revenue. Since the appeal was filed contrary to the policy decision laid down in the circular, it was dismissed. The revenue is at liberty to move the tribunal for recalling the order if the tax effect is later found to be more than Rs.60 lakhs.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing substantial justice over technicalities. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal decided to remit the issue of employee PF contributions paid within the grace period back to the Assessing Officer for examination of the submitted additional evidence. The addition on account of employee PF not paid within the grace period would be disallowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the ITAT, acknowledging the medical emergency as a sufficient cause. It was held that the Ld. CIT(A) had not adjudicated the appeals on merits and had violated the principles of natural justice by not providing sufficient opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to the assessee's unawareness of online proceedings. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had disposed of the appeal ex-parte without adjudicating on merits. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 was invalid as the AO's assessment was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue. The AO had conducted inquiries, and the PCIT could not substitute his own view for a plausible view of the AO.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 was invalid as the AO's assessment was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue. The AO had conducted inquiries, and the PCIT could not substitute his own view for a plausible view of the AO.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 was invalid as the AO's assessment was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue. The AO had conducted inquiries, and the PCIT could not substitute his own view for a plausible view of the AO.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 was invalid as the AO's assessment was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue. The AO had conducted inquiries, and the PCIT could not substitute his own view for a plausible view of the AO.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the ITAT, acknowledging the medical emergency as a sufficient cause. It was held that the Ld. CIT(A) had not adjudicated the appeals on merits and had violated the principles of natural justice by not providing sufficient opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was invalid for most of the appeals. The Tribunal emphasized that for Section 263 jurisdiction to be invoked, the AO's order must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, which are sine qua non. The Tribunal noted that the AO has the dual role of investigator and adjudicator, and while a lack of inquiry makes an order erroneous, inadequate inquiry does not. If the AO's view is plausible, the PCIT cannot substitute his own view. The Tribunal found that the PCIT had failed to demonstrate that the AO's inquiries were insufficient or that his order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Consequently, the PCIT's orders were quashed as being ab initio void for all appeals except for ITA No. 331/Rjt/2024. In ITA No. 331/Rjt/2024, concerning Dhruv Print Pack Industries, the Tribunal upheld the PCIT's order regarding the disallowance of Rs. 1,41,718/- for late payment of employee's contribution to PF, citing judgments of the jurisdictional Gujarat High Court and the Supreme Court. This appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was invalid for most of the appeals. The Tribunal emphasized that for Section 263 jurisdiction to be invoked, the AO's order must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, which are sine qua non. The Tribunal noted that the AO has the dual role of investigator and adjudicator, and while a lack of inquiry makes an order erroneous, inadequate inquiry does not. If the AO's view is plausible, the PCIT cannot substitute his own view. The Tribunal found that the PCIT had failed to demonstrate that the AO's inquiries were insufficient or that his order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Consequently, the PCIT's orders were quashed as being ab initio void for all appeals except for ITA No. 331/Rjt/2024. In ITA No. 331/Rjt/2024, concerning Dhruv Print Pack Industries, the Tribunal upheld the PCIT's order regarding the disallowance of Rs. 1,41,718/- for late payment of employee's contribution to PF, citing judgments of the jurisdictional Gujarat High Court and the Supreme Court. This appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was invalid for most of the appeals. The Tribunal emphasized that for Section 263 jurisdiction to be invoked, the AO's order must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, which are sine qua non. The Tribunal noted that the AO has the dual role of investigator and adjudicator, and while a lack of inquiry makes an order erroneous, inadequate inquiry does not. If the AO's view is plausible, the PCIT cannot substitute his own view. The Tribunal found that the PCIT had failed to demonstrate that the AO's inquiries were insufficient or that his order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Consequently, the PCIT's orders were quashed as being ab initio void for all appeals except for ITA No. 331/Rjt/2024. In ITA No. 331/Rjt/2024, concerning Dhruv Print Pack Industries, the Tribunal upheld the PCIT's order regarding the disallowance of Rs. 1,41,718/- for late payment of employee's contribution to PF, citing judgments of the jurisdictional Gujarat High Court and the Supreme Court. This appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the AO travelled beyond the scope of limited scrutiny by making additions on issues not specified for examination. Consequently, the assessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal determined that the rejection by the CIT(E) was based on a typographical error. Citing similar precedents, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to admit the application under the correct Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) and adjudicate it on merits, allowing the assessee to submit an amended application and relevant documents. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the 1132-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), acknowledging mitigating circumstances and following a liberal approach. It noted that both the assessment order and the CIT(A) order were ex-parte and lacked a proper hearing on merits. Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the entire matter back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo adjudication, after imposing a cost of Rs. 2000/- on the legal heirs, to ensure natural justice and a fresh hearing on merits.
The tribunal condoned a 15-day delay in filing the appeal, finding it not deliberate. It noted that the CIT(A) disposed of the appeal ex-parte without ensuring proper service of notice. To ensure justice, the tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on merits, directing that the assessee be given a due opportunity to present evidence.
The Tribunal noted that the order of the CIT(E) was ex-parte, despite a notice being issued. The assessee had not submitted all required documents. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(E) and remitted the matter back for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the primary objectives of the trust were charitable, and expenses on religious activities, if any, were within the 5% limit as per Section 80G(5B). The Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to verify the percentage of Jivdaya expenses (animal welfare) against the total income and grant approval if it falls below 5%.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee submitted documents at the fag-end of the proceedings and did not comply with other notices. However, principles of natural justice require an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the delay in filing the appeal and non-appearance before the CIT(A) were due to the outdated email address of the tax consultant, which prevented the assessee from being aware of the proceedings. The Tribunal condoned the delay and set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear or file documents before the Ld. CIT(E), leading to the rejection of their application. The assessee's counsel undertook to provide the necessary documents and participate actively in the proceedings. Both parties agreed that the matter should be remitted back for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear or file documents before the Ld. CIT(E), leading to the rejection of their application. The assessee's counsel undertook to provide the necessary documents and participate actively in the proceedings. Both parties agreed that the matter should be remitted back for fresh adjudication.
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal, noting that the Assessing Officer later corrected his interpretation of the V.K. Group software data, acknowledging the entries as accounted. The Tribunal upheld this decision, finding no interference warranted.
The Tribunal held that the addition could not be sustained as the author of the digital data clarified that the entries indicated inward goods and not quantities, and these transactions were recorded in their books. Furthermore, no addition was made in the third party's case based on the same material.
The Tribunal held that the AO's order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue because the AO failed to conduct proper inquiry into the claim of exemption on penny stock transactions. The Tribunal upheld the PCIT's revisionary powers.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition for unaccounted sales, finding no infirmity in the decision to delete it due to the violation of natural justice. The Tribunal also dismissed the assessee's cross-objection regarding the confirmed addition.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee never appeared before the AO during assessment proceedings and did not submit the names and addresses of customers or beneficiaries, nor provided confirmations. The Tribunal held that to be treated as a commission agent, it is mandatory for the assessee to submit such details. Since the Ld. CIT(A) treated the assessee as a commission agent without examining these facts, his order was not acceptable. Given that the assessment order was framed under Section 144 and the assessee did not appear before the AO, the Tribunal decided to remit the matter back to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal found the assessee's case similar to that of Shri Karim K. Makhani and, respectfully following the precedent, restored the appeals to the AO for fresh adjudication. The cross objections filed by the assessee were dismissed as infructuous. The appeals filed by the Revenue were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal consolidated appeals from different assessees due to common issues. The primary dispute revolves around the deletion of additions made by the Assessing Officer on account of unexplained cash deposits, with the Revenue arguing for the application of deeming provisions.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to provide necessary details to be treated as a commission agent. Therefore, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid because the Assessing Officer lacked the proper jurisdiction at the time of issuing the notice and completing the assessment. Consequently, the impugned assessments were quashed.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not provide necessary details to be treated as a commission agent, such as customer names and confirmations. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the depositors for the unexplained cash credits. Therefore, the additions made by the AO were justified.
The ITAT acknowledged that the appeals involved common and identical issues across different assessees and assessment years. The tribunal was to decide on the validity of additions made by the Assessing Officer and the deletions made by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) regarding unexplained cash deposits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the cash deposits. The theory of peak credit was not accepted as the assessee could not establish a nexus between cash deposits and withdrawals.
The Tribunal noted that the assessees claimed the cash deposits were part of their legitimate business activities, such as Angadiya or shroff services. However, the ITAT observed that these activities were often used as a veil for money laundering and hawala transactions, lacking proper documentation and statutory compliance.
The tribunal considered the nature of the assessee's business, specifically whether they operated as an 'Angadiya' or 'Shroff', or were involved in money laundering. The ITAT examined the legal distinction between these activities and their implications for unexplained credits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to prove his contention of being an Angadia/shroff and that the cash deposits represented business turnover. The plea for 'peak credit' was also dismissed due to the assessee's failure to discharge the onus of disclosure.
The ITAT consolidated appeals from different assessees and assessment years, involving common and identical issues. The Tribunal considered the grounds of appeal, including challenges to additions made on account of unexplained cash deposits and the nature of the assessee's business.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had filed the revised return within the time limit prescribed under Section 139(5) of the Act. The AO should have considered the revised return and amended the intimation accordingly. Relying on precedents, the Tribunal found that a genuine claim should not be denied due to technicalities or procedural lapses.
The Tribunal considered the arguments and the material on record. It found that the assessee was a distributor of recharge vouchers and the amounts received and reinvested were reflected in the bank statement and supported by documents. The Tribunal concluded that the lower authorities had not considered the facts and documents properly.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not submit the required documents due to the severe illness of a responsible person. The Tribunal acknowledged the principles of natural justice and fair play, stating that the assessee should be given a sufficient opportunity to present their case. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition, finding that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing sufficient documentary evidence to prove the identity, capacity, and genuineness of the loan transaction. The Assessing Officer's conclusion was based on insufficient investigation.