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The Tribunal held that the Learned CIT(A) was not justified in dismissing the assessee's appeal for non-prosecution. The Tribunal referred to Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which mandates that the CIT(A) must dispose of an appeal in writing after stating the points for determination and rendering a decision on each point with reasons. The Tribunal also relied on the Bombay High Court's decision in Pr.CIT(Central) Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), which categorically held that the CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of an appeal on merits and does not have the power to dismiss it for non-prosecution. The reasoning is that the CIT(A)'s powers are coterminous with the Assessing Officer, and just as an Assessing Officer cannot refuse to complete an assessment, a CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution. Consequently, the order of the Learned CIT(A) was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Learned CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with an opportunity of hearing. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the delay of approximately 1127-1128 days in filing the appeals for both AYs 2011-12 and 2013-14 was inordinate and did not warrant condonation. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee, the Tribunal noted that inordinate delay requires a stricter approach. The assessee's explanation, as detailed in the affidavit, was found to be vague and lacking in sufficient cause. Specific dates for elections were not provided, and the claim of dependence on counsel was not substantiated with names or specific responsibilities. The Tribunal observed a casual or defiant attitude from the assessee, evidenced by non-compliance with notices from the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A). The reasons provided were not considered sufficient to justify the substantial delay. Therefore, the delay was not condoned, and the appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(vi)(B) was unjustified. It acknowledged that the assessee was required to file the application under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) but inadvertently filed it under Section 12A(1)(ac)(vi)(B) due to a typographical error. Following the co-ordinate bench decisions in Raj Krishan Jain Charitable Trust and Shree Swaminarayan Gadi Trust, the Tribunal found this to be a curable defect. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT, Exemption, Pune, and restored the matter to the CIT's file with a direction to treat the application as filed under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii). The assessee was directed to cooperate with the CIT and respond to notices without seeking adjournments. The issue of approval under Section 80G(5) was also remitted to the CIT as consequential. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the core issue of allowance of deduction under Section 80P(2) of the Income Tax Act to a primary credit cooperative society on interest and dividend income earned from investments with other cooperative banks had been decided by coordinate benches of the Tribunal and the jurisdictional Bombay High Court. Crucially, the Tribunal referred to a Supreme Court decision in the case of Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. CIT, which held that primary agricultural credit societies cannot be termed as Co-operative Banks under the Banking Regulation Act and are therefore entitled to exemption under Section 80P(2). The Supreme Court had dismissed the Revenue's appeal in a similar matter. Following this precedent, the Tribunal held that the issue of allowance of deduction under Section 80P(2) in favour of primary credit cooperative societies had attained finality. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to allow deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income from cooperative banks, restricted to the original deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The grounds of appeal were allowed in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the Learned CIT(A) should have condoned the delay in filing the appeals, as substantial justice is more important than procedural delay, citing the Bombay High Court's decision in Vijay Vishin Meghani vs DCIT. The Tribunal noted that identical issues concerning BSNL employees' VRS compensation had been decided in favour of the assessee by the ITAT Pune Bench, which relied on decisions from other ITAT Benches and the Madras High Court. The Tribunal found that the compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme falls under the provisions of section 10(10B) of the Act and not section 10(10C), and is in the nature of a capital receipt exempt from tax. The Tribunal also addressed the Revenue's contention regarding eligibility for section 10(10B) by referring to the Madras High Court's decision in CIT (TDS) vs. Hindustan Photo Film Workers Welfare Centre, which held that the benefit under section 10(10B) is applicable to all employees covered by the scheme. The impugned findings of the CIT(A) were set aside. The assessee was directed to place a revised computation of income before the respective Jurisdictional Assessing Officers claiming exemption under section 10(10B), after which the Revenue authorities would grant any entitled refund after due verification. The common issue raised in the grounds of appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the Learned CIT(A) was not empowered to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution. Citing the Hon'ble Bombay High Court's decision in Pr.CIT(Central) Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF), the Tribunal emphasized that Section 250(6) of the Act obliges the CIT(A) to dispose of an appeal in writing, stating the points for determination and rendering a decision on each point with reasons. The Hon'ble High Court had categorically held that the CIT(A) must decide the appeal on merit and does not have the power to dismiss it for non-prosecution. Therefore, the order of the Learned CIT(A) was set aside. The case was remanded to the Learned CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee with an opportunity of hearing. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 3726 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The Tribunal held that the condonation of delay is a matter of discretion and that the acceptability of the explanation is the sole criterion, not the length of the delay, as per *N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy*. The Tribunal emphasized that when 'reasonable cause' exists, the delay may not be relevant, and Section 253(5) allows admission of appeals beyond the limitation period if sufficient cause is shown. Citing *Ramnath Sao vs. Gobardhan Sao and Others*, the Tribunal noted that courts should not adopt a pedantic approach and should condone delay when it is unintentional and caused by reasonable circumstances, prioritizing substantial justice. The Tribunal also referred to *Midas Polymer Compounds Pvt. Ltd.* and *CIT vs. K.S.P. Shanmugavel Nadai and Ors.*, where significant delays were condoned. Given the assessee's explanation, the Tribunal found a 'reasonable cause' for the delay. As there was no adjudication on merits by the lower authorities, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the issue to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was directed to provide updated contact details and remain vigilant.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee, a co-operative credit society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members, from funds deposited with banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal relied on several judicial precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Karnataka State Co-operative Apex Bank, the Andhra Pradesh and Telangana High Court's decision in Vavveru Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd., and the Kerala High Court's decision in Pr.CIT Vs. Sahyadri Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. These decisions established that interest earned by co-operative societies on deposits made from their business income is considered business income and eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a). The Tribunal noted that the facts of the present case were identical to those in the cited judgments. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to delete the addition of Rs. 28,47,095/-. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that coordinate benches of the Tribunal had previously allowed deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) for interest income earned by the assessee from its investments with nationalized banks in the assessee's own cases for Assessment Years 2015-16, 2016-17, and 2018-19. The assessee relied on the decision in its own case for AY 2016-17 and 2018-19 (ITA Nos. 266 & 267/PUN/2024, dated 21.03.2024), which in turn relied on the decision of The Vavveru Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd. vs. Chief Commissioner of Income-tax [2017] 88 taxmann.com 728 (Andhra Pradesh and Telangana). Following these precedents, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the deduction of Rs. 20,59,465/- under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) regarding the interest income earned from investments in nationalized banks. The Tribunal allowed the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee. Issues 2, 3, and 4 were not expressly decided as the primary ground concerning Section 80P(2)(a)(i) was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the delay of approximately 1127-1128 days in filing the appeals for both AYs 2011-12 and 2013-14 was inordinate and did not warrant condonation. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee, the Tribunal noted that inordinate delay requires a stricter approach. The assessee's explanation, as detailed in the affidavit, was found to be vague and lacking in sufficient cause. Specific dates for elections were not provided, and the claim of dependence on counsel was not substantiated with names or specific responsibilities. The Tribunal observed a casual or defiant attitude from the assessee, evidenced by non-compliance with notices from the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A). The reasons provided were not considered sufficient to justify the substantial delay. Therefore, the delay was not condoned, and the appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(vi)(B) was unjustified. It acknowledged that the assessee was required to file the application under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) but inadvertently filed it under Section 12A(1)(ac)(vi)(B) due to a typographical error. Following the co-ordinate bench decisions in Raj Krishan Jain Charitable Trust and Shree Swaminarayan Gadi Trust, the Tribunal found this to be a curable defect. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT, Exemption, Pune, and restored the matter to the CIT's file with a direction to treat the application as filed under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii). The assessee was directed to cooperate with the CIT and respond to notices without seeking adjournments. The issue of approval under Section 80G(5) was also remitted to the CIT as consequential. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the Learned CIT(A) should have condoned the delay in filing the appeals, as substantial justice is more important than procedural delay, citing the Bombay High Court's decision in Vijay Vishin Meghani vs DCIT. The Tribunal noted that identical issues concerning BSNL employees' VRS compensation had been decided in favour of the assessee by the ITAT Pune Bench, which relied on decisions from other ITAT Benches and the Madras High Court. The Tribunal found that the compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme falls under the provisions of section 10(10B) of the Act and not section 10(10C), and is in the nature of a capital receipt exempt from tax. The Tribunal also addressed the Revenue's contention regarding eligibility for section 10(10B) by referring to the Madras High Court's decision in CIT (TDS) vs. Hindustan Photo Film Workers Welfare Centre, which held that the benefit under section 10(10B) is applicable to all employees covered by the scheme. The impugned findings of the CIT(A) were set aside. The assessee was directed to place a revised computation of income before the respective Jurisdictional Assessing Officers claiming exemption under section 10(10B), after which the Revenue authorities would grant any entitled refund after due verification. The common issue raised in the grounds of appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the late fee levied under Section 234E for the period prior to 01.06.2015 is bad-in-law. The Tribunal noted that while there are contrary decisions, it would follow the favorable decision for the assessee in the absence of a jurisdictional High Court ruling, as per the Supreme Court's decision in CIT Vs. Vegetable Products Limited. The Tribunal specifically referred to the Karnataka High Court's decision in Fatheraj Singhvi Vs. Union of India, which held that Section 200A, amended to include computation of fees under Section 234E, has prospective effect from 01.06.2015, making demands for periods prior to that date without legal authority. The Tribunal also noted that the Madras High Court, in a later decision in Lingeswara Creations v. Principal Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, also held that in the absence of Section 200A provisions during the relevant assessment years (2012-2013, 2013-2014), late fees under Section 234E ought not to have been imposed. The Tribunal found that the Karnataka High Court's decision was by a Division Bench, whereas the initial Madras High Court decision relied upon by the CIT(A) was by a Single Member. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the late fee levied under Section 234E. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act on interest income earned from its investment in cooperative banks, which are also cooperative societies. The Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench decision in ITO Ward.-5, Sangli Vs. Shree Ganesh Nagari Sahakari Pat Sanstha Maryadit (ITA No.2375/PUN/2025 & C.O. No.49/PUN/2025), which in turn followed several other coordinate bench decisions and the jurisdictional Bombay High Court decision in Anna saheb Patil Mathadi Kamgar Sahkari Path pedhi Ltd. The Supreme Court's decision in Civil Appeal No.8719 of 2022, approving the Bombay High Court's judgment, was also cited. The Supreme Court held that primary Agricultural Credit Societies cannot be termed as Co-operative Banks under the Banking Regulation Act and are therefore entitled to exemption under Section 80P(2). The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to allow deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income from cooperative banks, subject to the total claim being restricted to the original deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).
The Tribunal held that the additional grounds of appeal, challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings on the grounds of time-barred notices under Section 148, were admissible as they went to the root of the matter. For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal noted that the original notice under Section 148 was issued on 18.06.2021, within the TOLA period ending 30.06.2021, giving a "surviving period" of 12 days. The notice under Section 148A(b) was issued on 24.05.2022, with a reply due by 08.06.2022. Following the Supreme Court's ratio in UOI Vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Assessing Officer was required to issue the final notice under Section 148A(d) and Section 148 by 20.06.2022. However, the notice was issued on 21.07.2022, which was clearly time-barred. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were quashed, and the additions were deleted. The same reasoning was applied mutatis mutandis to AYs 2016-17 and 2017-18, where the notices under Section 148 were also issued on 21.07.2022, beyond the surviving period of 12 days ending on 20.06.2022. The Tribunal quashed these proceedings and deleted the additions. The ratio is that if a Section 148 notice is not issued within the "surviving period" calculated as per the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the context of TOLA and the new reassessment regime, the notice is bad in law, and the Assessing Officer fails to assume jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the additional grounds of appeal, challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings on the grounds of time-barred notices under Section 148, were admissible as they went to the root of the matter. For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal noted that the original notice under Section 148 was issued on 18.06.2021, within the TOLA period ending 30.06.2021, giving a "surviving period" of 12 days. The notice under Section 148A(b) was issued on 24.05.2022, with a reply due by 08.06.2022. Following the Supreme Court's ratio in UOI Vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Assessing Officer was required to issue the final notice under Section 148A(d) and Section 148 by 20.06.2022. However, the notice was issued on 21.07.2022, which was clearly time-barred. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were quashed, and the additions were deleted. The same reasoning was applied mutatis mutandis to AYs 2016-17 and 2017-18, where the notices under Section 148 were also issued on 21.07.2022, beyond the surviving period of 12 days ending on 20.06.2022. The Tribunal quashed these proceedings and deleted the additions. The ratio is that if a Section 148 notice is not issued within the "surviving period" calculated as per the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the context of TOLA and the new reassessment regime, the notice is bad in law, and the Assessing Officer fails to assume jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's additional ground, arguing that no addition could be made under Section 69A because income was declared under Section 44AD, was dismissed. The assessee's contention that they were not required to maintain books of account under Section 44AD was contradicted by their voluntary submission of a cash book before the Learned CIT(A). This submission proved that the assessee had maintained books of account. Therefore, the additional ground was dismissed. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee failed to provide any evidence for opening cash balance or for amounts received from his wife, and an affidavit filed at the appellate stage was rejected as additional evidence due to prejudice to the revenue. The Tribunal confirmed the addition of Rs. 6,61,812/- representing unexplained cash deposits and Rs. 29,870/- representing undeclared interest income. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 228 days in filing the appeal before the learned CIT(A), considering the death of the Director's father as a reasonable cause, and relied on the Apex Court judgments in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. The appeal was admitted for adjudication. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal noted that the assessee claims TDS credit of Rs. 1,75,331/- as per Form 26AS, and according to Section 199 read with Rule 37BA, credit should be granted once TDS is deducted and deposited. The assessee's computation of income showed TDS of Rs. 1,72,056/- deducted by Rungta Mines Limited and Rs. 54,732/- by Power Mech Projects Limited. The Tribunal held that if tax has been deducted at source on receipts disclosed by the assessee, credit for such TDS should be granted. However, this fact required verification. Therefore, the matter was restored to the file of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (AO) for verification of the Income Tax Return, Audited Balance Sheet, Form 26AS, and ledger accounts of the deductors. The AO was directed to allow credit for TDS after due verification and afford the assessee a reasonable opportunity. The effective grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee, a co-operative credit society, from deposits made with the State Bank of India is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal reasoned that the interest income is attributable to the assessee's primary business of providing credit facilities to its members. The Tribunal distinguished the decision in Totgars' Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. by noting that in that case, the income was derived from marketing agricultural produce, and the business activity other than marketing resulted in a net loss, making the interest income not directly attributable to the core business. However, in the present case, the interest income was earned from surplus funds generated from the core business of providing credit. The Tribunal relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT vs. Karnataka State Co-operative Apex Bank, the Hon'ble High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in Vavveru Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd., and Kerala in Pr. CIT Vs. Sahyadri Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., and the Telangana High Court in Ismailia Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. The AO was directed to delete the addition. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. The Tribunal found that the delay was neither deliberate nor intentional, and the assessee had demonstrated a 'reasonable cause' for not filing the appeal within the stipulated time. Since the CIT(A) had not adjudicated the appeal on merits, and in the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to give the assessee one more opportunity. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) dated 16.01.2026 and remitted all issues raised in the appeal back to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to update their correct email and postal addresses on record and at the ITBA portal, be vigilant in tracking proceedings, file all relevant documents promptly, and refrain from seeking adjournments without reasonable cause. The CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate the appeal afresh after granting a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held as follows: 1. **Issue 1 (Sub-contract work addition):** The Tribunal reversed the finding of the CIT(A)/NFAC. It was held that the sub-let contract work pertains to the original contract work allotted to the assessee. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not required to calculate separate profit on the payment made to subcontractors/suppliers. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs.14,77,400/-. The reasoning was that the sub-contract expenses were already part of the gross receipts disclosed by the assessee, and calculating separate profit would amount to double addition. 2. **Issue 2 (Donation disallowance):** The Tribunal dismissed the ground raised by the assessee. It was noted that the assessee debited Rs.92,000/- towards donation expenses but could only furnish receipts for Rs.26,000/-. The AO allowed 50% of Rs.26,000/- (Rs.13,000/-) under section 80G and added back the balance Rs.79,000/-. Even before the Tribunal, the assessee could not provide receipts for Rs.66,000/-. Therefore, there was no error in the CIT(A)'s order confirming the addition of Rs.79,000/-. 3. **Issue 3 (PF damages/interest disallowance):** The Tribunal partly allowed the ground. Following the coordinate bench decision in *Bajaj Energy (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT*, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow deduction for the amount representing interest under section 7Q of the EPF Act and to disallow only that portion which represents damages under section 14B of the EPF provisions. The assessee was directed to produce a bifurcation of interest and damages payments before the AO. This issue was partly allowed for statistical purposes. Operative Directions: Addition of Rs.14,77,400/- deleted; addition of Rs.79,000/- confirmed; disallowance of Rs.30,771/- to be bifurcated and partly allowed/disallowed.
The Tribunal noted that the Learned CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal in limine due to a perceived defect in Form No. 35, where the appeal was filed against an order dated 12.09.2023 under Section 147 r.w.s. 144, but the grounds of appeal emanated from an order dated 20.03.2024 under Section 147 r.w.s. 144 r.w.s. 144B. The Learned CIT(A) had issued notices to the appellant to clarify this discrepancy, but no response was received. The Tribunal, after perusing Form No. 35 and the documents filed by the assessee, found that the assessee had filed grounds of appeal and a copy of the assessment order. The Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the Learned CIT(A) to the Learned CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication, directing that an opportunity of hearing be provided to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The ITAT condoned the delay of 192 days in filing the appeal, relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, finding that reasonable cause prevented the assessee from filing within the stipulated time and that the delay was not intentional. Regarding the appeal itself, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided partial details to the Assessing Officer but failed to appear before the CIT(A), leading to a dismissal in limine without adjudication on merits. Considering the prayer of the assessee's counsel and in the larger interest of justice, the ITAT decided to give the assessee one more opportunity. Consequently, without dwelling on the merits, the Tribunal remitted all issues raised in the appeal back to the file of the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside. The assessee was directed to ensure correct contact details are on record, track proceedings via ITBA Portal, file all relevant documents, and refrain from seeking adjournments without reasonable cause. The CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate the appeal afresh after granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order deleting the addition. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s reasoning. While the judgment excerpt provided does not detail the specific reasoning for each issue, it refers to the detailed reasoning of the Ld. CIT(A) in deleting the addition. The Tribunal dismissed the grounds raised by the Revenue. The operative direction was to uphold the deletion of the addition made by the Assessing Officer. The specific amount in dispute, Rs. 1,44,86,70,158/-, was effectively not taxed in the hands of the assessee as per the CIT(A)'s order, which was affirmed by the Tribunal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the appeal of the assessee should be allowed. The Tribunal observed that the assessee had filed the return on 14.09.2025, which was prior to the due date of 16.09.2025. Furthermore, the delay in e-verification was condoned by the ld. PCIT under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act, considering the short period of delay and satisfaction of conditions in CBDT Circular No.11/2024. The Tribunal reasoned that belated e-verification is a procedural lapse and should not defeat substantive justice. The Tribunal also noted that the date of uploading the return, as available in the acknowledgement, should be considered the date of filing. Therefore, the assessee's claim for carry forward of loss of Rs.31,77,117/- was allowed. The grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed an application for admission of additional evidence under Rule 29 of the ITAT Rules, which included affidavits confirming the agricultural use of the land and bills for seeds used in agricultural activities. The Tribunal acknowledged that such evidence plays a vital role in decision-making. Considering the facts, circumstances, and the additional evidence, the Tribunal found that the assessee should not suffer due to non-filing of material information. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the disputed issues along with the evidences to the file of the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was to be provided an adequate opportunity of hearing and was directed to cooperate in submitting information. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
On the issue of including Microland Limited as a comparable for IT support services, the Tribunal held that both the assessee and Microland fall under the same category. The Tribunal found no error in the conclusion drawn by the lower authorities and rejected the assessee's contention for exclusion. The Tribunal reasoned that merely dividing one set (ITeS) into two sub-sets does not make the company non-ITeS, and the assessee also has two ITeS verticals. Therefore, the contention of the assessee that Microland is not a comparable company was rejected, and the TPO was directed to include it. Regarding MAA Business Solutions Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal noted that its financial statements lacked details on functionality or services. However, its website indicated engagement in data cleansing, web research, and CRM. Given these circumstances, the Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer to verify if the company satisfies the filters applied by him and then include it in the comparables. For Games2Win India Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal noted its engagement in online entertainment and gaming, with significant advertising revenue and some game licensing. The Tribunal's decision on this specific comparable is not fully detailed in the provided excerpt, but the arguments suggest a debate over its comparability for IT support services.
The Tribunal held that the additional grounds of appeal, challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings on the grounds of time-barred notices under Section 148, were admissible as they went to the root of the matter. For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal noted that the original notice under Section 148 was issued on 18.06.2021, within the TOLA period ending 30.06.2021, giving a "surviving period" of 12 days. The notice under Section 148A(b) was issued on 24.05.2022, with a reply due by 08.06.2022. Following the Supreme Court's ratio in UOI Vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Assessing Officer was required to issue the final notice under Section 148A(d) and Section 148 by 20.06.2022. However, the notice was issued on 21.07.2022, which was clearly time-barred. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were quashed, and the additions were deleted. The same reasoning was applied mutatis mutandis to AYs 2016-17 and 2017-18, where the notices under Section 148 were also issued on 21.07.2022, beyond the surviving period of 12 days ending on 20.06.2022. The Tribunal quashed these proceedings and deleted the additions. The ratio is that if a Section 148 notice is not issued within the "surviving period" calculated as per the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the context of TOLA and the new reassessment regime, the notice is bad in law, and the Assessing Officer fails to assume jurisdiction.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 703 days in filing the appeal, finding that the delay was not intentional and was due to a reasonable cause, namely, the assessee's dependence on their tax consultant who failed to communicate the passing of the impugned order. The Tribunal relied on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. On the issue of deduction under section 80P(2)(d), the Tribunal held that the assessee, being a Credit Cooperative Society, is entitled to the benefit for interest received on investments held with Cooperative banks, amounting to Rs.33,62,093/-. This finding was based on the judicial precedent set by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in Thorapadi Urban Co-op Credit Society Ltd & Others vs ITO, which followed CIT vs The Salem Agricultural Producers Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. The Tribunal reversed the finding of the ld. CIT(A) on this issue. Regarding the remaining income, the Tribunal held that postage charges, dividend, processing charges, legal charges, and loan form fee, amounting to Rs.5,36,900/-, are directly attributable to the business of providing credit facilities and thus eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Tribunal took note of a coordinate bench decision in the assessee's own case for A.Ys. 2018-19 and 2019-20. The Tribunal reversed the finding of the ld. CIT(A) and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the total claim of Rs.38,98,993/-. All grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the provision for charging late fee under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, which held that the amendments to Section 200A, allowing for the computation and demand of fees under Section 234E, have prospective effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no late fee under Section 234E could be demanded or intimated for TDS deducted for periods prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal applied the ratio of this decision, considering the financial years in question were prior to June 1, 2015, and set aside the orders of the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E. The issue of constitutional validity of Section 234E was left open to be considered by a Division Bench.
The Tribunal allowed Ground No.2 concerning the transfer pricing adjustment on account of royalty payment, following its decision in a related appeal (ITA No.1786/PUN/2024) where the issue was decided in favor of the assessee. Similarly, Ground No.3, relating to the transfer pricing adjustment for Engineering Design Services, was also allowed, again following the reasoning from the related appeal. Grounds No.4, 5, 6, and 7 were dismissed as 'not pressed' by the assessee. Regarding Ground No.8 (short credit of TDS), the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer with a direction to verify the records and grant the correct TDS credit. For Ground No.9 (levy of interest u/s 234A), the issue was also restored to the Assessing Officer for computation of correct interest. Ground No.10, concerning the initiation of penalty proceedings, was dismissed as premature. The appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that under Section 253(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, it has the power to admit an appeal filed beyond the limitation period if satisfied that there was a sufficient cause for the delay. The Tribunal found that the assessee had made out a case of 'sufficient cause' for the 407-day delay in filing the appeal before the NFAC, relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Consequently, the delay was condoned. The Tribunal noted that the NFAC had not adjudicated the appeal on merits. Therefore, in the interest of substantial justice, the Tribunal restored the issues raised in the appeal to the file of the NFAC for necessary adjudication, after affording the assessee due opportunity. The assessee was directed to provide updated contact details and remain vigilant regarding adjournments. The impugned order of the NFAC was set aside, and the effective grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the provision for charging late fee under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, which held that the amendments to Section 200A, allowing for the computation and demand of fees under Section 234E, have prospective effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no late fee under Section 234E could be demanded or intimated for TDS deducted for periods prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal applied the ratio of this decision, considering the financial years in question were prior to June 1, 2015, and set aside the orders of the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E. The issue of constitutional validity of Section 234E was left open to be considered by a Division Bench.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for weighted capital allowance of Rs. 12,61,831/- (Rs. 6,30,915 x 200%) under Section 35(2AB). The Tribunal noted that the DSIR certificate dated 29.02.2020, covering Assessment Years 2017-18 and 2018-19, approved total eligible business development expenditure of Rs. 1204.12 lakhs, which included capital expenditure of Rs. 6.31 lakhs. The CIT(A) had only considered the recurring expenditure and failed to account for the capital expenditure which was also part of the DSIR approval. Therefore, Ground No. 1 was allowed. Regarding Ground No. 2, concerning deduction under Section 35(1)(iv), the Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) denied it because the issue was not taken up during assessment. However, the Tribunal noted that Section 35(1)(iv) does not require DSIR certification. The assessee's counsel fairly accepted that the claim under Section 35(1)(iv) was included within the claim under Section 35(2AB). The Tribunal directed the jurisdictional AO to examine the issue, verify if the claim appears in the books of account, and ensure it has not been claimed under Section 35(2AB). If found correct, the deduction under Section 35(1)(iv) shall be granted after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Ground No. 2 was allowed for statistical purposes. The appeal of the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the provision for charging late fee under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, which held that the amendments to Section 200A, allowing for the computation and demand of fees under Section 234E, have prospective effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no late fee under Section 234E could be demanded or intimated for TDS deducted for periods prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal applied the ratio of this decision, considering the financial years in question were prior to June 1, 2015, and set aside the orders of the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E. The issue of constitutional validity of Section 234E was left open to be considered by a Division Bench.
The Tribunal held that the provision for charging late fee under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, which held that the amendments to Section 200A, allowing for the computation and demand of fees under Section 234E, have prospective effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no late fee under Section 234E could be demanded or intimated for TDS deducted for periods prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal applied the ratio of this decision, considering the financial years in question were prior to June 1, 2015, and set aside the orders of the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E. The issue of constitutional validity of Section 234E was left open to be considered by a Division Bench.
The Tribunal held that the provision for charging late fee under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, which held that the amendments to Section 200A, allowing for the computation and demand of fees under Section 234E, have prospective effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no late fee under Section 234E could be demanded or intimated for TDS deducted for periods prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal applied the ratio of this decision, considering the financial years in question were prior to June 1, 2015, and set aside the orders of the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E. The issue of constitutional validity of Section 234E was left open to be considered by a Division Bench.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E) had made a factual mistake in rejecting the assessee's application for registration under Section 80G(5) of the Act. The primary reason for rejection was the alleged lack of valid registration under Section 12AB of the Act. However, the Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(E) himself had granted registration under Section 12AB read with Section 12A of the Act to the assessee vide his order dated 25.03.2026. This clearly indicated that the assessee possessed the required valid registration under Section 12AB. The Tribunal also observed that the Ld. CIT(E) had not brought on record any infirmity in the documents submitted by the assessee, such as the Trust Deed, earlier registration, and Balance Sheets for the last three years, which were part of Form No. 10AB. Therefore, since the sole ground for rejection was factually incorrect, the assessee was eligible for registration under Section 80G(5). The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(E) to grant registration under Section 80G(5) to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the provision for charging late fee under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, which held that the amendments to Section 200A, allowing for the computation and demand of fees under Section 234E, have prospective effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no late fee under Section 234E could be demanded or intimated for TDS deducted for periods prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal applied the ratio of this decision, considering the financial years in question were prior to June 1, 2015, and set aside the orders of the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E. The issue of constitutional validity of Section 234E was left open to be considered by a Division Bench.
The Tribunal held that the provision for charging late fee under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, which held that the amendments to Section 200A, allowing for the computation and demand of fees under Section 234E, have prospective effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no late fee under Section 234E could be demanded or intimated for TDS deducted for periods prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal applied the ratio of this decision, considering the financial years in question were prior to June 1, 2015, and set aside the orders of the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E. The issue of constitutional validity of Section 234E was left open to be considered by a Division Bench.
The Tribunal allowed Ground No.2 concerning the transfer pricing adjustment on account of royalty payment, following its decision in a related appeal (ITA No.1786/PUN/2024) where the issue was decided in favor of the assessee. Similarly, Ground No.3, relating to the transfer pricing adjustment for Engineering Design Services, was also allowed, again following the reasoning from the related appeal. Grounds No.4, 5, 6, and 7 were dismissed as 'not pressed' by the assessee. Regarding Ground No.8 (short credit of TDS), the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer with a direction to verify the records and grant the correct TDS credit. For Ground No.9 (levy of interest u/s 234A), the issue was also restored to the Assessing Officer for computation of correct interest. Ground No.10, concerning the initiation of penalty proceedings, was dismissed as premature. The appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal considered the prayer made by the assessee's counsel and, in the larger interest of justice, decided to restore the issues raised in the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication as contemplated under Section 250(6) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that there was no strong objection from the Departmental Representative. The CIT(A) was directed to allow a reasonable opportunity to the assessee in the set-aside proceedings. The assessee was also directed to provide updated contact details and remain vigilant, avoiding unnecessary adjournments. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the provision for charging late fee under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is applicable with effect from June 1, 2015. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Fatehraj Singhvi Vs Union of India, which held that the amendments to Section 200A, allowing for the computation and demand of fees under Section 234E, have prospective effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no late fee under Section 234E could be demanded or intimated for TDS deducted for periods prior to June 1, 2015. The Tribunal applied the ratio of this decision, considering the financial years in question were prior to June 1, 2015, and set aside the orders of the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the levy of late fees under Section 234E. The issue of constitutional validity of Section 234E was left open to be considered by a Division Bench.
The Tribunal noted that the core issue was whether the agricultural land was a capital asset, hinging on its distance from municipal limits and the village population. The assessee argued that the distance should be calculated as of 06 January 1994, citing Notification No. 9447, and that the village population was below 10,000. The AO and CIT(A) had relied on distances calculated as of later dates (2018) and used routes/bridges not existing in 1994. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not considered the assessee's reliance on the 06 January 1994 notification and had not made specific findings on it. Observing that principles of natural justice were not fully adhered to, the Tribunal decided to provide the assessee with another opportunity to substantiate their claim. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the issue was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication. The AO was directed to examine and verify the assessee's claim, calculate the distance as per the specified notification, and provide the assessee with an adequate opportunity of hearing. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment under section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not valid. The Tribunal observed that the assessee had not filed a return of income for the assessment year 2018-19. The reopening was initiated based on information about the purchase of an immovable property worth Rs. 1.51 crore. However, the Tribunal found that the assessee had not been provided with the material that formed the basis of the reopening, specifically the information received from the Sub-Registrar's office. This lack of disclosure of the reasons for reopening and the supporting material violated the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the assessment order passed under section 147 read with section 144 was quashed. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the income escaping assessment, as the primary issue was the validity of the reopening process. The operative direction was to quash the assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 14,74,000 was not sustainable. The Tribunal noted that the letter from the ADIT (Investigation) itself stated that the date of cash payment was not mentioned in the documents. Crucially, neither the AO nor the CIT(A) referred to any specific impounded document that evidenced the alleged cash payment. The AO had not confronted the assessee with any such document. The addition appeared to be based merely on the ADIT's letter and was made on conjectures, not on any concrete evidence. The Tribunal relied on the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.P. VARGHESE vs ITO (1981 AIR 1922) that the onus of establishing the conditions of taxability is always on the Revenue. Since the assessee had denied the cash payment, the onus was on the AO to prove it, which he failed to do. The Tribunal also referred to the ITAT Mumbai Bench decision in Heeena Dashrath Jhanglani vs ITO, ITA 1665/Mum/2018, where similar additions were deleted in the absence of corroborative evidence. Accordingly, the addition of Rs. 14,74,000 was directed to be deleted. Grounds 3 and 4 were allowed. Other grounds became academic.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 is in the nature of retrenchment compensation and falls under the provisions of Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, making it a capital receipt exempt from tax. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of its Coordinate Benches in similar cases, such as 'Rajendra Himmatrao Patil vs. ITO' and 'Sanjay Bajarang Todali and others'. The reasoning was that the compensation is for forced retirement under a revival plan and is akin to retrenchment compensation. The Tribunal also noted that the benefit of Section 10(10B) is applicable to all employees covered by such schemes, not restricted to 'workmen'. The impugned orders of the Ld. Addl./JCIT(A) were set aside. The assessees were directed to submit revised computations of income to their respective Jurisdictional Assessing Officers to claim the exemption under Section 10(10B), after which the revenue authorities would verify and grant any refund due. The common issue raised in the grounds of appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 is in the nature of retrenchment compensation and falls under the provisions of Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, making it a capital receipt exempt from tax. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of its Coordinate Benches in similar cases, such as 'Rajendra Himmatrao Patil vs. ITO' and 'Sanjay Bajarang Todali and others'. The reasoning was that the compensation is for forced retirement under a revival plan and is akin to retrenchment compensation. The Tribunal also noted that the benefit of Section 10(10B) is applicable to all employees covered by such schemes, not restricted to 'workmen'. The impugned orders of the Ld. Addl./JCIT(A) were set aside. The assessees were directed to submit revised computations of income to their respective Jurisdictional Assessing Officers to claim the exemption under Section 10(10B), after which the revenue authorities would verify and grant any refund due. The common issue raised in the grounds of appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 is in the nature of retrenchment compensation and falls under the provisions of Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, making it a capital receipt exempt from tax. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of its Coordinate Benches in similar cases, such as 'Rajendra Himmatrao Patil vs. ITO' and 'Sanjay Bajarang Todali and others'. The reasoning was that the compensation is for forced retirement under a revival plan and is akin to retrenchment compensation. The Tribunal also noted that the benefit of Section 10(10B) is applicable to all employees covered by such schemes, not restricted to 'workmen'. The impugned orders of the Ld. Addl./JCIT(A) were set aside. The assessees were directed to submit revised computations of income to their respective Jurisdictional Assessing Officers to claim the exemption under Section 10(10B), after which the revenue authorities would verify and grant any refund due. The common issue raised in the grounds of appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 is in the nature of retrenchment compensation and falls under the provisions of Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, making it a capital receipt exempt from tax. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of its Coordinate Benches in similar cases, such as 'Rajendra Himmatrao Patil vs. ITO' and 'Sanjay Bajarang Todali and others'. The reasoning was that the compensation is for forced retirement under a revival plan and is akin to retrenchment compensation. The Tribunal also noted that the benefit of Section 10(10B) is applicable to all employees covered by such schemes, not restricted to 'workmen'. The impugned orders of the Ld. Addl./JCIT(A) were set aside. The assessees were directed to submit revised computations of income to their respective Jurisdictional Assessing Officers to claim the exemption under Section 10(10B), after which the revenue authorities would verify and grant any refund due. The common issue raised in the grounds of appeal was allowed.