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263 orders · Page 2 of 6
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 13 days, citing reasonable cause, and admitted the appeals for adjudication. The issue of registration and approval was remitted to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication, with an opportunity for the appellant to provide necessary details and prove the genuineness of activities.
The Tribunal held that for private discretionary trusts, surcharge must be computed based on the income tax slab rates as prescribed in the Finance Act, not the highest applicable rate. The AO/CPC's levy of 37% surcharge was found to be erroneous.
The Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee. It held that no penalty can be imposed on the legal heirs of a deceased assessee where penalty proceedings were initiated during the lifetime of the assessee but did not culminate into a penalty order before the assessee's death. The Tribunal respectfully followed the judgments of the Madras High Court in CIT vs. S. Gowri and CIT vs. Dr. KCG Verghese (Late), which were passed after the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kalawati Devi vs. ITO. The Tribunal noted that in cases of conflicting views between High Courts, the view favorable to the assessee should be followed. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to delete the penalty imposed under section 158BFA(2) on the legal heir. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC had dismissed the appeals for ITA Nos. 177-178/PUN/2025 and ITA Nos. 386-387/PUN/2025 in limine for not condoning the delay. For ITA No. 388/PUN/2025, the appeal was dismissed on non-appearance. The Tribunal, considering the submissions and case laws, condoned the delay in filing the appeals and restored the matters to the CIT(A)/NFAC for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC had dismissed the appeals for ITA Nos. 177-178/PUN/2025 and ITA Nos. 386-387/PUN/2025 in limine for not condoning the delay. For ITA No. 388/PUN/2025, the appeal was dismissed on non-appearance. The Tribunal, considering the submissions and case laws, condoned the delay in filing the appeals and restored the matters to the CIT(A)/NFAC for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A)/NFAC for quantum appeals in ITA Nos. 177-178/PUN/2025 and penalty appeals under section 270A in ITA Nos. 386-387/PUN/2025, acknowledging that a reasonable cause prevented the assessee from filing within the statutory time limits and that the delay was not intentional. The Tribunal also noted that the appeal for AY 2020-21 regarding penalty under section 271AAC(1) (ITA No. 388/PUN/2025) was dismissed by the CIT(A)/NFAC due to non-appearance, implying the assessee failed to avail the opportunity granted. Since the quantum appeals had not been decided on merits by the CIT(A)/NFAC, the Tribunal restored all five appeals to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC for necessary adjudication. The CIT(A)/NFAC was directed to grant a fair and proper opportunity to the assessee and decide the appeals in accordance with the law as contemplated in section 250(6) of the Act. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the issue regarding the rate of surcharge for private discretionary trusts whose income is chargeable to tax at the Maximum Marginal Rate (MMR) stands decided in favour of the assessee by the Special Bench of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Araadhya Jain Trust (supra). The Tribunal noted that the Special Bench held that in such cases, the surcharge should be computed on the income tax having reference to the slab rates prescribed in the Finance Act under the heading 'Surcharge on Income Tax' appearing in Para A, Part 1, First Schedule, applicable to the relevant assessment year. Furthermore, for income earned by way of dividend, including income referred to under sections 111A, 112, and 112A of the Act, the rate of surcharge shall not exceed 15%. Analyzing the facts, the Tribunal found that the assessee's total income included Rs. 4,77,46,882 on which the maximum surcharge should be 15% (short-term capital gains u/s 111A and dividend income). The balance income of Rs. 8,35,168 also attracted a 15% surcharge as per the Finance Act, 2021. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee's claim and the rectification order passed by the AO/CPC which allowed a 15% surcharge on specific income components. The order of the Ld. Addl./JCIT(A) was set aside. Grounds 1 to 8 of the appeal were allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, holding that the incorrect selection of a sub-section was an inadvertent mistake and not fatal to the application. The CIT(E) was directed to consider the application on its merits after allowing the appellant to rectify the error.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A)/NFAC for quantum appeals in ITA Nos. 177-178/PUN/2025 and penalty appeals under section 270A in ITA Nos. 386-387/PUN/2025, acknowledging that a reasonable cause prevented the assessee from filing within the statutory time limits and that the delay was not intentional. The Tribunal also noted that the appeal for AY 2020-21 regarding penalty under section 271AAC(1) (ITA No. 388/PUN/2025) was dismissed by the CIT(A)/NFAC due to non-appearance, implying the assessee failed to avail the opportunity granted. Since the quantum appeals had not been decided on merits by the CIT(A)/NFAC, the Tribunal restored all five appeals to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC for necessary adjudication. The CIT(A)/NFAC was directed to grant a fair and proper opportunity to the assessee and decide the appeals in accordance with the law as contemplated in section 250(6) of the Act. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that for private discretionary trusts whose income is chargeable at MMR, surcharge should be computed based on slab rates prescribed in the Finance Act. For dividend income and income u/s 111A, the surcharge rate shall not exceed 15%.
The Tribunal held that the AO travelled beyond the scope of limited scrutiny by making additions not related to the original issue. Following precedent, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the additions made.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 183 days, citing genuine and unavoidable circumstances and a liberal approach towards 'sufficient cause' as per judicial precedents. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee, an educational trust, failed to appear before the lower appellate authority due to lack of proper communication, leading to dismissal. Considering the interest of justice, the issue on merit was restored to the file of the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the filing of the audit report in Form 10B is a procedural requirement and that since it was filed before the due date for filing the return under Section 139(4), the assessee should be granted the benefit of exemption under Section 11. The lower authorities erred in confirming the adjustment made by the CPC.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee submitted an affidavit and supporting documents, including sale deeds and bank statements, that were not presented before the Assessing Officer. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order for denovo adjudication by the Assessing Officer, allowing the assessee to present necessary documents.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, holding that the incorrect selection of a sub-section was an inadvertent mistake and not fatal to the application. The CIT(E) was directed to consider the application on its merits after allowing the appellant to rectify the error.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 13 days, citing reasonable cause, and admitted the appeals for adjudication. The issue of registration and approval was remitted to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication, with an opportunity for the appellant to provide necessary details and prove the genuineness of activities.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC had dismissed the appeals for ITA Nos. 177-178/PUN/2025 and ITA Nos. 386-387/PUN/2025 in limine for not condoning the delay. For ITA No. 388/PUN/2025, the appeal was dismissed on non-appearance. The Tribunal, considering the submissions and case laws, condoned the delay in filing the appeals and restored the matters to the CIT(A)/NFAC for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that for private discretionary trusts, surcharge must be computed based on the income tax slab rates as prescribed in the Finance Act, not the highest applicable rate. The AO/CPC's levy of 37% surcharge was found to be erroneous.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-compliance before the CIT(A) but also found reasonable cause for the same due to a director's illness. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside for de novo adjudication to ensure justice.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order resulted from notices being sent to an incorrect email, violating natural justice. Crucially, the Tribunal observed that the AO's reasons for reopening contained contradictory statements about whether the assessee had filed a Return of Income, demonstrating a non-application of mind by both the AO and the approving authority. Citing Bombay High Court judgments, the Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was bad in law.
The ITAT held that since the GST liability was paid before the due date for filing the return of income, as per the proviso to Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, the payment is allowable as a deduction. Consequently, the Assessing Officer was directed to delete the disallowance of Rs. 7,54,838/-.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessees, adopting a liberal approach based on the 'sufficient cause' principle and citing the Supreme Court's decisions in *Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh* and *Collector of Land Acquisition vs. MST Katiji*. The Tribunal found that the reasons provided by both assessees for the delay were plausible and unintentional, and that rejecting the appeals on technical grounds would defeat the cause of justice. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E, as processed by the TDS-CPC under Section 200A(1) and confirmed by the CIT(A), was without jurisdiction. The Tribunal reasoned that Section 200A(2) limits the scheme's scope to determining 'tax' or 'refund' and does not extend to 'late fees' or 'interest'. Therefore, demands based on justification reports from the TDS-CPC for late fees were quashed. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order was also flawed by confusing financial year with assessment year. The appeals were dismissed on merits, but the demands were set aside due to lack of jurisdiction.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessees, adopting a liberal approach based on the averments made in the affidavits and the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. The Tribunal found that there was a 'reasonable cause' that prevented the assessees from filing within the stipulated time. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E and interest under Section 201(1A) by the TDS-CPC through processing under Section 200A(2) was without jurisdiction. The Tribunal reasoned that Section 200A(2) only permits the formulation of a scheme for processing returns limited to determining 'tax' or 'refund', and does not extend to determining late fees or interest. The distinction between 'tax' and 'interest'/'penalty'/'late fees' was emphasized. Consequently, demands based on justification reports from the TDS-CPC for late fees and interest were deemed illegal and liable to be quashed. The Tribunal dismissed all grounds of appeal raised by the assessee, implying that the substantive grounds were decided in favour of the assessee, leading to the dismissal of the appeals as filed by the revenue.
The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not in accordance with law. The Tribunal noted that the amendment to Section 153C by the Finance Act, 2015, which replaced 'belongs to' with 'pertain to', was applicable prospectively from June 1, 2015. Since the search was conducted on April 20, 2010, the satisfaction note was dated September 17, 2012, and the notice under Section 153C was also issued on September 17, 2012, all prior to the amendment, the pre-amendment provisions applied. Under the pre-amendment provisions, the seized documents must 'belong to' the other person. The Tribunal found that the seized work order did not belong to the assessee, although it might pertain to it. Therefore, the condition precedent for invoking Section 153C was not satisfied, making it a jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the entire proceedings taken under Section 153C were null and void. The Tribunal quashed the assessment proceedings for all four years. The issue of Section 69C was rendered academic. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessees, adopting a liberal approach based on the affidavits filed and the Supreme Court's pronouncements in cases like Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. The Tribunal found that there was 'reasonable cause' preventing the assessees from filing within the stipulated time, emphasizing that courts lean towards considering appeals on merits when pitted against technical grounds of limitation, especially when plausible causes for delay are shown. The Tribunal noted that the merits of the appeal could also be considered in such cases. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the levy of late fees and interest by the TDS-CPC processing under Section 200A was without jurisdiction. It reasoned that Section 200A(2) only permits the processing of TDS returns for determining 'tax' or 'refund', and does not extend to determining late fees or interest. The Tribunal cited several High Court and ITAT decisions to support the principle that in the absence of an enabling mechanism, the levy fails. Therefore, demands based on justification reports from the TDS-CPC for late fees and interest were liable to be quashed. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A)'s order was non-speaking and needed to be quashed. Consequently, all grounds of appeal raised by the assessees were dismissed in light of the substantive issue being decided in their favour, leading to the quashing of the demands.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessees, adopting a liberal approach as per the Supreme Court's pronouncements in cases like Inder Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. The Tribunal found reasonable cause for the delay in both instances, emphasizing that technicalities should not defeat meritorious claims. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E and consequent interest/additional interest by the TDS-CPC processing under Section 200A was without jurisdiction. The Tribunal reasoned that Section 200A(2) limits the processing to the determination of 'tax' or 'refund' and does not extend to determining late fees or interest. It was held that there is a clear distinction between 'tax' and 'interest'/'penalty'/'late fees', and the scheme for centralized processing does not cover the latter. Therefore, demands based on justification reports from TDS-CPC for late fees and interest were deemed to be issued without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. The Tribunal also noted that Section 234E(3) mandates payment before delivering the TDS statement, implying late fees cannot be recovered later if not deposited at that time. Consequently, the orders of the CIT(A) upholding these demands were quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessees, adopting a liberal approach based on the 'sufficient cause' principle and citing the Supreme Court's decision in Inder Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, emphasizing that meritorious claims should not be rejected on technical grounds. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the levy of late fees, interest, and additional interest under Section 234E by the TDS-CPC through processing under Section 200A(2) was without jurisdiction. The Tribunal reasoned that Section 200A(2) limits the scope of the scheme to determining 'tax' or 'refund', and does not empower the CPC to levy late fees or interest. It was held that the distinction between 'tax' and 'interest'/'penalty'/'late fees' is clear, and in the absence of an enabling mechanism for the CPC to levy these, such levies are illegal. Consequently, the demand notices based on the justification reports from the TDS-CPC were quashed and set aside. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order was also flawed for not properly addressing the grounds raised. The appeals were allowed on merits, quashing the demand for late fees and interest.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessees, adopting a liberal approach as per the Supreme Court's pronouncements in cases like Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. The Tribunal found that there was 'reasonable cause' preventing the assessees from filing within the stipulated time, considering the compassionate situations and unavoidable circumstances presented. The Tribunal noted that when merits are significant, a more liberal approach is warranted. However, the judgment then states that all grounds of appeal raised by the assessee are dismissed, and both bunches of appeals are dismissed. The specific reasoning for dismissing the grounds of appeal, particularly concerning the legality of Section 234E levy, is not detailed in the provided excerpt, beyond a general statement that the decision in Chate Tutorials Pvt. Ltd. would hold good for Shree Bhaskaracharya Pratishthan. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not in accordance with law. The Tribunal noted that the amendment to Section 153C by the Finance Act, 2015, which replaced 'belongs to' with 'pertain to', was applicable prospectively from June 1, 2015. Since the search was conducted on April 20, 2010, the satisfaction note was dated September 17, 2012, and the notice under Section 153C was also issued on September 17, 2012, all prior to the amendment, the pre-amendment provisions applied. Under the pre-amendment provisions, the seized documents must 'belong to' the other person. The Tribunal found that the seized work order did not belong to the assessee, although it might pertain to it. Therefore, the condition precedent for invoking Section 153C was not satisfied, making it a jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the entire proceedings taken under Section 153C were null and void. The Tribunal quashed the assessment proceedings for all four years. The issue of Section 69C was rendered academic. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing the appeals for both assessees, citing a liberal approach towards sufficient cause as per Supreme Court judgments like *Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh*. The Tribunal found that reasonable causes prevented the assessees from filing within the stipulated time. The Tribunal admitted the appeals for adjudication. The judgment then proceeds to discuss the grounds of appeal raised by Chate Tutorials Pvt. Ltd. concerning the jurisdiction of Section 200A for levying late fees. The assessee argued that Section 200A(2) only permits processing for 'tax' or 'refund' and not for 'late fees' or 'interest', thus the TDS-CPC lacks jurisdiction. The Tribunal noted the distinction between 'tax' and 'interest/penalty/late fees' and the assessee's contention that the enabling mechanism for determining late fees was absent. The judgment also mentions the assessee's argument that the CIT(A)'s order was non-speaking and that late fees cannot be demanded after the TDS statement has been delivered. The Tribunal's decision on these substantive grounds is not fully recorded in the provided excerpt.
The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not in accordance with law. The Tribunal noted that the amendment to Section 153C by the Finance Act, 2015, which replaced 'belongs to' with 'pertain to', was applicable prospectively from June 1, 2015. Since the search was conducted on April 20, 2010, the satisfaction note was dated September 17, 2012, and the notice under Section 153C was also issued on September 17, 2012, all prior to the amendment, the pre-amendment provisions applied. Under the pre-amendment provisions, the seized documents must 'belong to' the other person. The Tribunal found that the seized work order did not belong to the assessee, although it might pertain to it. Therefore, the condition precedent for invoking Section 153C was not satisfied, making it a jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the entire proceedings taken under Section 153C were null and void. The Tribunal quashed the assessment proceedings for all four years. The issue of Section 69C was rendered academic. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that in the absence of Form 10B, the income should be calculated on a commercial principle. The CPC's action of taxing entire receipts under section 143(1) solely for non-filing of Form 10B was set aside. The Assessing Officer was directed to tax only the net income after verification.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessees, adopting a liberal approach based on the averments made in the affidavits and judicial pronouncements like *Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh*. The Tribunal noted that when merits are significant, a more liberal approach is warranted to examine the case. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E and interest under Section 201(1A) by the TDS-CPC through processing under Section 200A(2) is without jurisdiction. The Tribunal reasoned that Section 200A(2) only empowers the Centralized Processing Cell (CPC) to determine 'tax' or 'refund', and does not extend to determining 'late fees' or 'interest'. It was held that there is a clear distinction between 'tax' and 'interest'/'penalty'/'late fees', and the scheme formulated under Section 200A(2) is limited to the determination of tax or refund. Consequently, demands based on justification reports from the TDS-CPC for late fees and interest were deemed issued without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. The Tribunal dismissed all grounds of appeal raised by the assessee, implying that the substantive grounds were decided against the assessees, despite the initial discussion on condonation of delay.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence presented by the assessee, as it was crucial for determining the residential status and the taxability of foreign income. Since the CIT(A) had not dealt with the merits of the case with this evidence, the issue was remitted back to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for non-appearance without adjudicating on merits. Citing a High Court judgment, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of appeals on merits even ex-parte.
The Tribunal noted that the affidavit from Viraj Estates Pvt. Ltd. was provided almost two years after the search and was unclear if any on-money was received or added in their hands. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order and remitted the issue back to the Assessing Officer for further investigation.
The Tribunal noted that the substantial issue under dispute had been amicably resolved at the Assessing Officer's level, and the assessee no longer intended to pursue the appeal. The Department had no objection.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessees. For Chate Tutorials Pvt. Ltd., the delay of 160 days was condoned based on the compassionate situation faced by their consultant. For Shree Bhaskaracharya Pratishthan, the delay of 75 days was condoned due to the unavoidable circumstances arising from the demise of their accountant. The Tribunal adopted a liberal approach, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Inder Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, and observed that when the merits of an appeal are significant, a more liberal approach may be adopted. The Tribunal noted that there was a 'reasonable cause' preventing the assessees from filing within the stipulated time. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal dismissed all grounds of appeal raised by the assessees, stating that its decision in the case of Chate Tutorials Pvt. Ltd. would hold good mutatis mutandis for Shree Bhaskaracharya Pratishthan. The specific reasoning for dismissing the substantive grounds is not detailed in the provided excerpt, but the operative part indicates the appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) as the assessee failed to provide details or demonstrate the source of cash deposits. The Tribunal directed the AO to verify tax payments in the 26AS statement and allow credit for taxes paid.
The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not in accordance with law. The Tribunal noted that the amendment to Section 153C by the Finance Act, 2015, which replaced 'belongs to' with 'pertain to', was applicable prospectively from June 1, 2015. Since the search was conducted on April 20, 2010, the satisfaction note was dated September 17, 2012, and the notice under Section 153C was also issued on September 17, 2012, all prior to the amendment, the pre-amendment provisions applied. Under the pre-amendment provisions, the seized documents must 'belong to' the other person. The Tribunal found that the seized work order did not belong to the assessee, although it might pertain to it. Therefore, the condition precedent for invoking Section 153C was not satisfied, making it a jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the entire proceedings taken under Section 153C were null and void. The Tribunal quashed the assessment proceedings for all four years. The issue of Section 69C was rendered academic. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not in accordance with law. The Tribunal noted that the amendment to Section 153C by the Finance Act, 2015, which replaced 'belongs to' with 'pertain to', was applicable prospectively from June 1, 2015. Since the search was conducted on April 20, 2010, the satisfaction note was dated September 17, 2012, and the notice under Section 153C was also issued on September 17, 2012, all prior to the amendment, the pre-amendment provisions applied. Under the pre-amendment provisions, the seized documents must 'belong to' the other person. The Tribunal found that the seized work order did not belong to the assessee, although it might pertain to it. Therefore, the condition precedent for invoking Section 153C was not satisfied, making it a jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the entire proceedings taken under Section 153C were null and void. The Tribunal quashed the assessment proceedings for all four years. The issue of Section 69C was rendered academic. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by both assessees. The decision in the case of Chate Tutorials Pvt. Ltd. was applied mutatis mutandis to the appeals of Shree Bhaskaracharya Pratishthan.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by both assessees. The decision in the case of Chate Tutorials Pvt. Ltd. was applied mutatis mutandis to the appeals of Shree Bhaskaracharya Pratishthan.
The ITAT found that the principle of natural justice was violated because the CIT(A) issued notices to a wrong email ID not matching the one in Form No. 35. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order for de novo adjudication by the Assessing Officer, granting the assessee an opportunity to furnish all details.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by both assessees. The decision in the case of Chate Tutorials Pvt. Ltd. was applied mutatis mutandis to the appeals of Shree Bhaskaracharya Pratishthan.
The tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by both assessees. The decision in the case of Chate Tutorials Pvt. Ltd. was applied mutatis mutandis to Shree Bhaskaracharya Pratishthan.
The Tribunal held that five specific companies (Cybage Software Pvt. Ltd., Nihilent Ltd., Infobeans Technologies Ltd., E-Infochips Pvt. Ltd., and Ninestars Information Technologies Ltd.) were not functionally comparable to the assessee and directed their exclusion from the list of comparables.
The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not in accordance with law. The Tribunal noted that the amendment to Section 153C by the Finance Act, 2015, which replaced 'belongs to' with 'pertain to', was applicable prospectively from June 1, 2015. Since the search was conducted on April 20, 2010, the satisfaction note was dated September 17, 2012, and the notice under Section 153C was also issued on September 17, 2012, all prior to the amendment, the pre-amendment provisions applied. Under the pre-amendment provisions, the seized documents must 'belong to' the other person. The Tribunal found that the seized work order did not belong to the assessee, although it might pertain to it. Therefore, the condition precedent for invoking Section 153C was not satisfied, making it a jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the entire proceedings taken under Section 153C were null and void. The Tribunal quashed the assessment proceedings for all four years. The issue of Section 69C was rendered academic. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not in accordance with law. The Tribunal noted that the amendment to Section 153C by the Finance Act, 2015, which replaced 'belongs to' with 'pertain to', was applicable prospectively from June 1, 2015. Since the search was conducted on April 20, 2010, the satisfaction note was dated September 17, 2012, and the notice under Section 153C was also issued on September 17, 2012, all prior to the amendment, the pre-amendment provisions applied. Under the pre-amendment provisions, the seized documents must 'belong to' the other person. The Tribunal found that the seized work order did not belong to the assessee, although it might pertain to it. Therefore, the condition precedent for invoking Section 153C was not satisfied, making it a jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the entire proceedings taken under Section 153C were null and void. The Tribunal quashed the assessment proceedings for all four years. The issue of Section 69C was rendered academic. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by both assessees. The decision in the case of Chate Tutorials Pvt. Ltd. was applied mutatis mutandis to the appeals of Shree Bhaskaracharya Pratishthan.