122 orders · Page 2 of 3
The Tribunal held that the penalty was unsustainable because the lower authorities did not specify which limb of Section 270A(9) the assessee's default fell under. This failure vitiates the penalty proceedings.
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal, deleting the addition. The Tribunal upheld this decision, noting that the project completion method was consistently accepted by the department in previous assessment years, and no change in law or facts warranted a deviation.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the cooperative society from deposits in cooperative banks and similar institutions is attributable to its banking and credit facility activities. Therefore, it is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the cooperative society from deposits in cooperative banks and similar institutions is attributable to its banking and credit facility activities. Therefore, it is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).
The ITAT held that the CIT(A) should not have dismissed the appeal as infructuous without deciding the other quantum appeal. The tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after clubbing both appeals.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC's order did not decide the substantive grounds on merits as required by Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the issue to the CIT(A)/NFAC for de novo adjudication. This was due to the assessee's claim of not being informed of hearing notices sent to their consultant's email.
The Tribunal granted permission to the appellant to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC, directing them to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to present its case. The assessee was instructed to submit necessary details without seeking adjournments.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society on fixed deposits with banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, as it partakes the character of business income. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the exemption.
The tribunal found that the NFAC's order did not decide the substantive grounds on merits as required. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal restored the appeal back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication. The NFAC is directed to provide effective opportunities of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, the matter should be remanded to the AO for a fresh assessment. The assessee was granted an opportunity to present their case and lead fresh evidence.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC's order did not adjudicate the substantive grounds on merits as required by law. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society on fixed deposits with banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, as it partakes the character of business income. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the exemption.
The Tribunal restored the appeal back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication. The NFAC is directed to provide at least three effective opportunities for hearing, with the onus on the taxpayer to present and prove all facts.
The ITAT set aside the addition for the provision for standard assets for denovo adjudication, allowing the ground for statistical purposes. The ITAT deleted the addition made under Section 68, holding that the AO failed to prove the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the depositors.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to apply its mind to the facts and legal position, rendering the order not on merits. Therefore, the order was set aside and remanded for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal restored the assessee's appeal back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication. The NFAC was directed to provide at least three effective opportunities for hearing and decide the appeal on merits.
The tribunal found the CIT(A)'s approach unreasonable and unjustified for not adjudicating the appeal on merits. The matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for disposal on merits after affording an opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal restored the issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. This was based on the assessee's submission of additional evidence, including assessment records of the creditor, which were not fully considered due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's claim of not receiving notices due to belonging to a mofussil area and requested an opportunity to present their case with additional evidence. In the interest of justice, the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the transactions were void ab initio, constituting a sham and a fraudulent device to introduce undisclosed income. The principle of fraud vitiating all acts was applied, confirming the addition made by the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that statutory rules cannot override the provisions of the Act. It directed the CPC to rectify its intimation by considering the belatedly filed Form 10B.
The Tribunal held that Section 139(4C) was not applicable for the assessment year in question as the relevant provisions were inserted later. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s reasoning for denying exemption was unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the excess cash found should be presumed to be attributable to the unrecorded sales and the benefit of telescoping should be given. Therefore, the excess cash cannot be treated as unexplained money attracting Section 115BBE.
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities passed ex-parte orders due to the assessee's non-appearance, which was attributed to notices being sent to incorrect email IDs. The Tribunal decided to remand the matter for de novo assessment to provide a fair opportunity.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to independently examine the issue, identify the challenge, conduct inquiries, and provide reasoned findings, thus violating Section 250(6) of the Act. The CIT(A) relied solely on previous years' decisions without considering the specific facts of the current assessment year.
The Tribunal held that the application was filed within the time allowed under the Act, interpreting the statutory provisions to avoid absurdity. The CIT(Exemption)'s order was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the explanation that the deposit represented sale proceeds of petrol/diesel, used for payment to Indian Oil Corporation, was plausible. The Tribunal found no reason to doubt the sales given the large cash deposits made earlier.
The CIT(A) confirmed the AO's addition without considering the explanation submitted by the assessee regarding the source of cash deposits. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) ignored the evidence submitted by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that since the excess income was accepted and credited to the profit and loss account, it could not be treated as unexplained income and assessed under Section 115BBE. The income should be treated as income from business.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision. The assessee was directed to appear and submit documents to substantiate their claims.
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities passed ex-parte orders due to the assessee's non-appearance, which was attributed to notices being sent to incorrect email IDs. The Tribunal decided to remand the matter for de novo assessment to provide a fair opportunity.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC should have considered the merits of the appeal even when dismissing it for non-prosecution. Since the NFAC failed to do so, the matter was remanded for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was due to wrong advice from a previous consultant, which constitutes a reasonable cause. Therefore, the delay should have been condoned.
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities passed ex-parte orders due to the assessee's non-appearance, which was attributed to notices being sent to incorrect email IDs. The Tribunal decided to remand the matter for de novo assessment to provide a fair opportunity.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order did not decide the substantive grounds on merits. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the NFAC for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to file and prove all relevant facts in the consequential proceedings.
The Tribunal granted the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the return was not a rectifiable mistake under Section 154 of the Act and required detailed adjudication. Therefore, the appeal was rejected.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the assessee's grounds on merits as required by Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer cannot make an addition on an issue that was not the basis for the original reopening notice, even with the insertion of Explanation 3 to Section 147, if the original reason for reopening is found to be incorrect or non-existent.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 143(1)(a)(v) allowing such disallowances had prospective effect and could not be applied to the assessment year 2018-2019. The delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was condoned.
The Tribunal condoned the 5-day delay in filing the appeal, finding it to be reasonable. It also allowed the deduction for interest earned on fixed deposits and commission earned from MSEDCL, holding them eligible for deduction under Section 80P.
The Tribunal held that to be considered a legal representative, the appellant must plead and prove that she represents the estate of the deceased assessee. As this was not demonstrated, her claim was rejected.
The Tribunal restored the appeal back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication. The NFAC is directed to provide at least three effective opportunities for hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) did not decide the substantive grounds on merits as required by Section 250(6). Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's explanation regarding non-compliance due to issues with the tax consultant. The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer to grant one more opportunity to the assessee to substantiate their case.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal, following its previous decision for the assessment year 2010-2011 where a similar claim for interest income from PDCC Bank was accepted. The Tribunal found no distinction pointed out by the Revenue in the present case.