376 orders · Page 7 of 8
The Tribunal directed the exclusion of CTR Manufacturing Industries Limited from the list of comparables, finding it functionally dissimilar to the assessee's manufacturing segment. Easun was also directed to be excluded for similar reasons.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the genuineness of the agricultural income. While the initial addition was confirmed by the lower authorities, the Tribunal directed the AO to estimate a lump sum crop yield amount per acre for the assessee's lands.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which is applicable from April 1, 2021, was not applicable to the assessment years in question. Since the assessee paid the employee's contribution before the due date of filing the Income Tax Return, the disallowance was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which is applicable from April 1, 2021, was not applicable to the assessment years in question. Since the assessee paid the employee's contribution before the due date of filing the Income Tax Return, the disallowance was not justified.
The tribunal allowed the appeal on Section 14A disallowance due to the AO's failure to record satisfaction. The disallowance for gifts and presents was upheld due to lack of documentary evidence. The building repair expenses were remanded to the AO for re-adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the expenses were incurred by the land owners in their personal capacity before the assessee firm was formed. The MOU was deemed unreliable due to discrepancies and lack of registration, and the sale deed did not mention any such reimbursement.
The Tribunal held that Management Support fees are not taxable in India, following its previous decisions. For HR and Leadership Seminar fees, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the AO for fresh examination based on additional evidence.
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not cover cases of delayed payment of TDS after deduction.
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not cover cases of delayed payment of TDS after deduction.
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not cover cases of delayed payment of TDS after deduction.
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not cover cases of delayed payment of TDS after deduction.
The Tribunal noted that the appeal was filed significantly beyond the prescribed time limit. In the absence of any valid reason or application explaining the delay, the Tribunal had no option but to dismiss the appeal.
The Tribunal held that a revised return under Section 139(5) is not permissible if the original return was filed belatedly under Section 139(4). Therefore, the claims made in the revised return were not considered valid.
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not cover cases of delayed payment of TDS after deduction.
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not exclude cases of delayed payment of TDS.
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not cover cases of delayed payment of TDS after deduction.
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not cover cases of delayed payment of TDS after deduction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. The assessee was found to be negligent and lacked diligence in pursuing the appeal.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal regarding the disallowance of PRI line charges, following precedent. It also allowed the appeal concerning ESOP expenses by setting aside the disallowance made under Section 37 and directing it to be considered under Section 40(a)(ia).
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not cover cases of delayed payment of TDS after deduction.
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not cover cases of delayed payment of TDS after deduction.
The Tribunal held that the failure to deposit deducted TDS within the due dates makes the assessee liable for interest under Section 201(1A), and this liability is automatic. The proviso to Section 201(1) does not cover cases of delayed payment of TDS after deduction.
The tribunal held that the penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer is not maintainable against the legal heir of the deceased assessee under Section 159 of the Act. Therefore, the impugned penalty was deleted on this ground alone.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was provided with sufficient opportunities for hearing, and their non-appearance led to the ex-parte dismissal. The levy of interest under sections 234A, 234B, 234C, and 220(2) was found to be mandatory and consequential.
The Tribunal found sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), citing various High Court and Supreme Court decisions. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) to decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was provided with sufficient opportunities for hearing, and their non-appearance led to the ex-parte dismissal. The levy of interest under sections 234A, 234B, 234C, and 220(2) was found to be mandatory and consequential.
The assessee sought withdrawal of the appeal as they had obtained relief from the first appellate authority against the consequential assessment order. The Revenue had no objection to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal noted that the source of funds for the FDRs was not clearly indicated in the record. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to decide the eligibility of the interest income for exemption under Section 80P based on the Tribunal's previous decisions.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal found merit in the preliminary issue regarding non-service of notice. Consequently, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the appeal had become academic due to the settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted proper inquiries in line with the Tribunal's previous directions and the PCIT was not justified in exercising revisionary powers under Section 263. Therefore, the PCIT's order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act, along with the mechanism for computing the fee under Section 200A, was introduced prospectively from June 1, 2015. Therefore, late fees under Section 234E could not be levied for periods prior to this date.
The ITAT condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back for fresh consideration. The CIT(A) was directed to consider the assessee's affidavit explaining the delay and the merits of the case.
The tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not consider the issues. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the jurisdictional AO for fresh consideration, allowing the assessee to submit evidence.
The Tribunal held that for the assessment year in question, the disallowance for late deposit of employees' contribution to PF and ESI is not warranted if deposited before the due date of filing the return of income, following established High Court precedents.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A, allowing computation of fees under Section 234E, is prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees under Section 234E cannot be levied for periods prior to this date.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act, along with the mechanism for its computation under Section 200A, has prospective effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, late fees cannot be levied for periods prior to this date.
The Tribunal held that the mechanism for computing and levying fees under Section 234E was introduced prospectively from June 1, 2015, through amendments to Section 200A. Therefore, fees could not be levied for periods prior to this date.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E of the Act could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for computing and demanding the fee under Section 200A was introduced from that date. Therefore, demands for periods prior to June 1, 2015, were without authority of law.