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409 orders · Page 4 of 9
The Tribunal held that bogus purchases could only be restricted to the extent of the Gross Profit (GP) addition. The disallowance was restricted to a 10% GP margin, with a rider that it would not be treated as a precedent.
The Tribunal, in the absence of the assessee and any submissions, decided the appeal on merits based on the available record. The specific decisions on each ground are not detailed in the provided excerpt.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to the non-service of notices. It set aside the Pr.CIT's order and restored the matter to the Pr.CIT for fresh proceedings, emphasizing the need for the assessee to cooperate.
The Tribunal held that since the deposits were made before the due date for filing the return of income, the disallowance was not warranted for the assessment years prior to the amendment by the Finance Act, 2021.
The Tribunal held that Section 50C does not apply to leasehold rights in land, reversing the addition on long-term capital gains. For short-term capital gains on the building, the Tribunal found that a mandatory reference to the DVO was not made by the lower authorities.
The Tribunal held that bogus purchases could only be restricted to the extent of the Gross Profit (GP) addition. The disallowance was restricted to a 10% GP margin, with a rider that it would not be treated as a precedent.
The Tribunal held that since the deposits were made before the due date for filing the return of income, the disallowance was not warranted for the assessment years prior to the amendment by the Finance Act, 2021.
The Tribunal held that for properties where the difference between the sale price and the circle rate was less than 10%, the addition under Section 43CA should be deleted, following a co-ordinate bench decision. For one property where the difference exceeded 10%, the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that MPS Limited, engaged in KPO activities like typesetting and data digitization, cannot be compared with the assessee's ITES segment. Therefore, MPS Limited should be excluded from the list of comparables.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that Section 40(a)(ia) is not applicable to claims for depreciation on capitalized software license payments. The issue of short credit for TDS was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to prove it conducted agricultural operations and merely dealt in seeds, thus the income was business income. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the AO's order was restored.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, there was no enabling provision in Section 200A of the Act for raising a demand in respect of levying fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the intimations levying such fees were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to prove it conducted agricultural operations and merely dealt in seeds, thus the income was business income. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the AO's order was restored.
The Tribunal held that the bank's explanation regarding the delay in obtaining PAN details and familiarizing with new software constituted a reasonable cause. Therefore, the penalty levied was not justified.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following its own consistent view in previous years. It held that retention money should be excluded from income, aligning with the Bombay High Court's decision in Associated Cables (P.) Ltd.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is only required to explain the source of credit, not the source of source, and that the Revenue failed to discharge its burden to prove cessation of liability for Section 41(1).
The Tribunal set aside the issue of bogus purchases to the AO for verification, stating that capitalization needs to be demonstrated. The addition of Rs. 9,00,000 under Section 41(1) was upheld as it was a cessation of liability. The claim for additional depreciation was allowed for statistical purposes, to be verified by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fee under section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was bad in law. The amendment to section 200A empowering the levy of such fees was prospective, and thus, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge these fees for the period in question.
The Tribunal held that making an addition for unexplained expenditure, when the assessee had already offered undisclosed income less than the expenditure, amounts to double taxation. Therefore, the addition was ordered to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is only required to explain the source of credit, not the source of source, and that the Revenue failed to discharge its burden to prove cessation of liability for Section 41(1).
The Tribunal found that the assessee had made a provision for the contribution rather than an actual payment. However, it directed the Assessing Officer to re-examine the issue afresh based on the assessee's evidence and relevant judicial precedents.
The Tribunal held that the failure of the Assessing Officer to specify the limb under which the penalty was being levied in the show-cause notice is fatal to the proceedings. Therefore, the penalty imposed was not sustainable in law.
The Tribunal held that since a coordinate bench had already reversed the CIT's revision directions, the penalties imposed had no basis. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order deleting the penalties was upheld.
The Tribunal held that since a coordinate bench had already reversed the CIT's revision directions, the penalties imposed had no basis. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order deleting the penalties was upheld.
The Tribunal held that since a coordinate bench had already reversed the CIT's revision directions, the penalties imposed had no basis. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order deleting the penalties was upheld.