452 tribunal orders from the Nagpur bench in 2023.
Showing 40 of 452 orders. Use the months below for the rest.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obliged to decide an appeal on merits and does not have the power to dismiss it for non-prosecution. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance made under Section 143(1)(a)(v) was not sustainable as this provision was inserted with prospective effect from 01.04.2021, while the assessment year in question was 2019-2020. Therefore, the disallowance made by the CPC processing on 29.05.2020 was not legally valid.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was bad in law as it was based on a 'change of opinion' by the AO and lacked any new material or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose facts. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal found that neither the AO nor the assessee had conclusively established the distance of the land from the municipal limits. Therefore, the issue was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after obtaining a remand report.
The Tribunal upheld the addition of cash deposits as undisclosed income, finding the assessee's explanation that the cash belonged to a company and was for business expenditure to be unsubstantiated. For one assessment year, the addition was restricted to the verified amount of cash deposits.
The Tribunal upheld the addition of cash deposits as undisclosed income, finding the assessee's explanation that the cash belonged to a company and was for business expenditure to be unsubstantiated. For one assessment year, the addition was restricted to the verified amount of cash deposits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the appeals on merits as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the appeals on merits as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the appeals on merits as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the appeals on merits as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the appeals on merits as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the appeals on merits as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that since the Section 263 order itself was quashed, a consequential assessment order based on it could not stand. Therefore, the CIT(A) was correct in quashing the consequential assessment order.
The Tribunal held that for claiming deduction under Section 36(1)(va), the employees' share of PF and ESIC must be deposited by the employer before the due date stipulated under the respective Acts. Payment before the due date for filing the return of income under Section 139(1) is not sufficient.
The tribunal noted the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal and the revenue's no objection. Therefore, the tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that deposit of employees' share of PF and ESIC before the statutory due dates is mandatory for claiming deduction under Section 36(1)(va). Payment before the due date for filing the return of income under Section 139(1) is not sufficient compliance.
The tribunal considered the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The Revenue did not object to the withdrawal. Therefore, the tribunal allowed the withdrawal.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the COVID-19 pandemic period and the principle of substantial justice. The matter was set aside for de novo adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by deleting the addition without proper verification and without adhering to the procedural requirements of Section 250(6) of the Act and Rule 46A of the IT Rules. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that Section 154 rectification is only for apparent mistakes and not for detailed inquiries. Since the AO had already considered and received explanations for these expenses before the original assessment, the rectification was not permissible.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient own capital to cover the interest-free advances, creating a presumption that these were made from own funds. Since the AO had made inquiries and taken a legally possible view, the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue.
The CIT(A) erred in admitting additional evidence without proper procedure under Rule 46A and without confronting it to the AO. The matter needs to be re-adjudicated.
The tribunal found that the NFAC's order was not a speaking order as it merely confirmed the AO's addition without independent application of mind or verification. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that since the Income Tax Act is a welfare legislation, the assessee should be given one final opportunity to furnish the required details before the CIT(E). The matter was remitted back to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication.
The ITAT held that the CIT(A) failed to conduct independent verification and provide a speaking order. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after conducting necessary inquiries.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following the Karnataka High Court's ruling that Section 92BA(i) of the Income Tax Act, omitted from 2017, was to be considered as if it never existed.
The assessee requested to withdraw the appeal as the issue was no longer in dispute. The Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeal.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT's order under Section 263, finding the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to revenue. The assessee failed to prove ownership of the land or that the gain was from agricultural land sale.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(Exemption) and dismissed the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal analyzed the assessee's memorandum of objects, noting that while some objects were general, the actual activity performed was solely related to the Franchise Agreement with Tally Education Pvt. Ltd. The Tribunal referred to Supreme Court and High Court decisions, including New Noble Educational Society vs. CCIT, which held that 'education' for Section 2(15) purposes means formal scholastic learning. The Tribunal found that providing Tally courses as a franchise is not 'education' as defined and constitutes a business activity. It also noted that one of the assessee's objects, 'to run industrial and technical institute for business,' is not charitable, and for registration, all objects must be charitable. The Tribunal further stated that the absence of profit does not make a business activity charitable, and the assessee's activities were found to be purely business. Therefore, the assessee was not eligible for registration under section 12AA.
The tribunal decided to correct a typographical error in its previous order. The name of the appellant's counsel, Shri Rajesh V. Loya, has been substituted with Shri Sanjay C. Thakar.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the impugned purchases from hawala dealers. Following the Bombay High Court's decision in Shoreline Hotel P. Ltd. vs. CIT, the Tribunal upheld the order passed under Section 263.
The tribunal decided to correct a typographical error in its previous order. The name of the appellant's counsel, Shri Rajesh V. Loya, has been substituted with Shri Sanjay C. Thakar.
The Tribunal held that since Section 92BA(i) was omitted by the Finance Act, 2017, it was as if it never existed. Therefore, the AO was correct in not referring the specified domestic transactions to the TPO, making the PCIT's order under Section 263 unsustainable.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to provide sufficient working or conclusive proof to demonstrate how the expenses crystallized during the assessment year. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the AO's assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue because the AO failed to consider the mandatory provisions of Section 56(2)(vii) regarding the property purchase. The reliance on a private valuation report was deemed insignificant.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order was invalid and deemed to have never been issued because it failed to state the reasons for issuing a DIN-less communication and obtain the required approval. Therefore, there was no order to appeal against.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to establish any link between the assessee and the seized documents or the alleged money laundering activities of D.P. Sarda. The additions were made without any incriminating material directly connecting the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to establish any link between the assessee and the seized documents or the alleged money laundering activities of D.P. Sarda. The additions were made without any incriminating material directly connecting the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have granted the assessee an adjournment, as a request was filed. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside and remanded for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to establish any link between the assessee and the seized documents or the alleged money laundering activities of D.P. Sarda. The additions were made without any incriminating material directly connecting the assessee.