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591 orders · Page 8 of 12
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was not due to deliberate negligence, considering the assessee's affidavit and the tax consultant's acknowledgment of lapse. The additions made by the AO were substantial.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding it not to be intentional and citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v Mst. Katiji And Others. The Tribunal noted that both the assessment order and the first appellate order were passed ex-parte. Regarding the dismissal by the CIT(A) under Section 249(4)(b), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that if no advance tax was legally payable, then the provision would not be applicable. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had passed the impugned order without providing a proper opportunity of hearing, which is against the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal also acknowledged that the assessee claimed to be in a position to substantiate his claims regarding the additions made by the AO if given an opportunity. Considering the totality of facts and the absence of objection from the Revenue for remanding the matter, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored all relevant issues to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication on merits, after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was directed to cooperate in the proceedings and provide necessary documents. The Tribunal did not go into the merits of the case.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 4855 days in filing the appeal. The Tribunal found the assessee's explanation to be fully supported by documentary evidence, including emails demonstrating unawareness of the order even months after its passing and after thirteen years. The revenue did not produce evidence of service of the order. The Tribunal noted the significant delay in giving effect to a favorable ITAT order for AY 2007-08, supporting the assessee's claim of uncommunicated appellate outcomes. The immediate steps taken by the assessee upon learning of the order, such as seeking inspection and filing the appeal promptly, demonstrated diligence. The Tribunal held that the delay was not due to a singular lapse of counsel but a combination of non-service of the order, procedural transitions, and departmental inaction, constituting sufficient cause. The Tribunal also held that the assessee's consistent investment in shares, reflected in balance sheets and supported by dividend income, along with the legislative intent behind Security Transaction Tax (STT) and amendments to Sections 111A and 10(38) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, indicated that the income from share transactions should be treated as capital gains and not business income. The Tribunal deleted the disallowance made under Section 14A, finding that the Assessing Officer invoked Rule 8D without recording the required satisfaction and that the disallowance exceeded the actual expenditure claimed, especially when the assessee had already made a substantial suo motu disallowance.
The Tribunal decided to condone the delay of 492 days in filing the appeal, finding that the delay was not intentional but on account of unavoidable reasons, which constituted 'sufficient cause' as per the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v Mst. Katiji And Others. The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the CIT(E) was passed without a complete appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case, and that all relevant issues had not been adjudicated. Therefore, in the interest of natural justice and fair play, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the entire matter back to the file of the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication. The assessee was granted an opportunity to advance its arguments and submissions before the CIT(E) and provide necessary details. The ratio decidendi is that when an order is passed without proper appreciation of facts and without adjudicating all relevant issues, it should be set aside and remanded for fresh consideration with an opportunity to the assessee to present its case fully. The operative direction was to remand the matter to the CIT(E).
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict additions on purchases to 5% and delete additions for unsecured loans, citing that sales figures were not disturbed and the assessee executed contracts for government agencies. The assessee's cross-objections regarding limitation and lack of incriminating material for unabated years were allowed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict additions on purchases to 5% and delete additions for unsecured loans, citing that sales figures were not disturbed and the assessee executed contracts for government agencies. The assessee's cross-objections regarding limitation and lack of incriminating material for unabated years were allowed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict additions on purchases to 5% and delete additions for unsecured loans, citing that sales figures were not disturbed and the assessee executed contracts for government agencies. The assessee's cross-objections regarding limitation and lack of incriminating material for unabated years were allowed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict additions on purchases to 5% and delete additions for unsecured loans, citing that sales figures were not disturbed and the assessee executed contracts for government agencies. The assessee's cross-objections regarding limitation and lack of incriminating material for unabated years were allowed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict additions on purchases to 5% and delete additions for unsecured loans, citing that sales figures were not disturbed and the assessee executed contracts for government agencies. The assessee's cross-objections regarding limitation and lack of incriminating material for unabated years were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's view in allowing deduction under Section 80G for CSR expenses was a legally sustainable view, supported by various judicial precedents. Therefore, the pre-requisite conditions for exercising jurisdiction under Section 263 were not met.
The Tribunal held that the subscription fees received by the assessee are not taxable as Fee for Technical Services (FTS) under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act or under the India-Singapore DTAA. The services provided were considered a standard facility for advertising, not technical services.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict additions on purchases to 5% and delete additions for unsecured loans, citing that sales figures were not disturbed and the assessee executed contracts for government agencies. The assessee's cross-objections regarding limitation and lack of incriminating material for unabated years were allowed.
The Tribunal dismissed grounds 1 and 2 as infructuous, as both the Revenue and the assessee agreed that these grounds did not arise from the impugned orders, given the termination of the agreement with Infomedia 18 Pvt. Ltd. and the absence of any connection with it in the relevant assessment years. Regarding grounds 3 and 4, the Tribunal held that the subscription fees received by the assessee from Indian subscribers through Alibaba India were not taxable as Fee for Technical Services (FTS) under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, nor under Article 12 of the India-Singapore DTAA. The Tribunal reasoned that the services provided were akin to a standard facility, analogous to a digital Yellow Pages, for advertising and displaying products. These services did not involve the rendering of specific technical, managerial, or consultancy services, nor did they make available any technical knowledge or expertise. The Tribunal relied on its own previous decisions and the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court in the assessee's own case, which had established that such standard facilities, made available to the public at large without exclusivity, do not fall within the ambit of 'technical services' as defined in Explanation 2 to Section 9(1)(vii) or under the DTAA. Therefore, the additions made by the AO were deleted by the CIT(A) and upheld by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal dismissed grounds 1 and 2 as infructuous, noting that the agreement with Infomedia 18 Pvt. Ltd. had been terminated prior to the relevant assessment years, and the Revenue conceded these grounds did not arise from the impugned orders. The core issue for AYs 2014-15 to 2016-17 concerned whether subscription fees received from Indian subscribers via Alibaba India constituted Fee for Technical Services (FTS). The Tribunal, referencing its own prior decisions for AYs 2009-10 to 2011-12 and the Hon'ble High Court's judgment in the assessee's case for AY 2011-12, held that the services provided by the assessee constituted a standard facility made available to the public at large, akin to a digital Yellow Pages, and did not involve rendering of technical, managerial, or consultancy services as defined in Section 9(1)(vii) read with Explanation 2 of the Act. The Tribunal found no evidence of constant human endeavor or intervention, nor the making available of technical knowledge or know-how. Therefore, the subscription fees were not taxable as FTS under the Act or the India-Singapore DTAA. The Revenue's grounds were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the delay of 4855 days in filing the appeal is condoned. The reasoning was based on the documentary evidence supporting the assessee's claim of non-service and lack of awareness of the CIT(A)'s order. The Tribunal noted the significant delay in departmental actions, including the delayed implementation of a favorable ITAT order for AY 2007-08, which corroborated the assessee's explanation. The immediate and diligent steps taken by the assessee upon gaining knowledge of the order were also considered. The Tribunal found that the delay was not due to a singular lapse of counsel but a combination of factors constituting sufficient cause. The appeal was admitted for adjudication on merits. On merits, the Tribunal held that the income from delivery-based transactions of sale and purchase of shares should be treated as capital gains, aligning with the legislative intent behind introducing Securities Transaction Tax (STT) and provisions like Section 111A and Section 10(38). The Tribunal noted that the assessee consistently treated such income as capital gains, which was accepted by the department in scrutiny assessments. The Tribunal also deleted the entire disallowance made under Section 14A, finding that the Assessing Officer invoked Rule 8D without the required satisfaction and that the assessee had already made a substantial suo motu disallowance, rendering the further disallowance baseless. The ratio is that substantial justice should prevail when a bona fide explanation for delay is supported by evidence, and that disallowances under Section 14A must be based on proper satisfaction and cannot exceed the actual expenditure incurred or the exempt income.
The Tribunal noted that the Ld. Commissioner dismissed the appeal without considering documents and remand reports. Therefore, the Tribunal inclined to remand the case back to the Ld. Commissioner for a fresh decision, providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict additions on purchases to 5% and delete additions for unsecured loans, citing that sales figures were not disturbed and the assessee executed contracts for government agencies. The assessee's cross-objections regarding limitation and lack of incriminating material for unabated years were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to record the requisite satisfaction with specific and cogent reasons before invoking Rule 8D. The AO's satisfaction was generic and not based on the specific facts of the case, thus violating Section 14A(2).
The Tribunal held that the additions were made solely on the basis of AIR reporting without sharing the primary information with the assessee. This lack of information impaired the assessee's ability to respond, and it would not be fair to sustain the addition without giving the assessee an opportunity to examine the material.
The Tribunal held that the loss arising from the conversion of debt into equity shares, due to a diminution in the market value of the shares, is a genuine business loss or bad debt. This loss is deductible under the Income Tax Act as it arises from the ordinary course of banking operations.
The Tribunal held that the loss arising from the conversion of debt into equity shares, due to a diminution in the market value of the shares, is a genuine business loss or bad debt. This loss is deductible under the Income Tax Act as it arises from the ordinary course of banking operations.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO under Section 68 was not justified. The assessee had discharged the burden by submitting relevant documentary evidence, which the AO failed to rebut.
The Tribunal held that while the Assessing Officer is not empowered to entertain a revised claim without a revised return, appellate authorities have the power to admit fresh claims. Citing Supreme Court and High Court precedents, the Tribunal noted that the assessee can make additional claims before appellate authorities.
The Tribunal held that the property investment occurred in a prior assessment year and was sufficiently explained by borrowed funds. Regarding professional receipts, the matter was set aside to the AO for re-computation of allowable expenses and penalty.
The Tribunal held that section 80P(4) is a proviso to sections 80P(1) and (2) and excludes only cooperative banks functioning as commercial banks. The assessee, being a cooperative society, is eligible for deduction on interest income earned from investments in cooperative banks.
The Tribunal held that the property investment occurred in a prior assessment year and was sufficiently explained by borrowed funds. Regarding professional receipts, the matter was set aside to the AO for re-computation of allowable expenses and penalty.
The Tribunal held that the property investment occurred in a prior assessment year and was sufficiently explained by borrowed funds. Regarding professional receipts, the matter was set aside to the AO for re-computation of allowable expenses and penalty.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given adequate opportunity to respond to the changed basis of addition and that the CIT(A) failed to analyze the additional evidence. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal, by majority view (the Judicial Member and the Third Member), held that the price at which the assessee purchased power from the distribution licensee (GUVNL) at Rs 6.62 per unit can be applied as a valid CUP for determining the arm's length price of the sale or supply of power by the captive power plant to the Rayon Plant. The Third Member found that this price, based on an actual purchase transaction with an independent public utility provider at a regulated tariff, reflects fair market conditions and is an appropriate benchmark for the purpose of Section 80-IA. Consequently, the adjustment made by the Assessing Officer or Transfer Pricing Officer was not sustained. Ground No. 7 was allowed in favour of the assessee, and the deduction under Section 80-IA is to be computed on the basis of Rs 6.62 per unit without any downward modification. The Third Member did not dwell upon remaining questions as they were of academic importance.
The Tribunal held that the TPO's approach of determining the ALP at NIL was not fully aligned with the OECD framework, especially when the assessee had provided documentation suggesting managerial or coordination services were rendered and costs were allocated consistently. The Tribunal noted that the TPO had accepted part of the management service payment as being at arm's length, implicitly acknowledging that services were rendered and provided a benefit. The Tribunal found that the assessee's AE applied a 5% mark-up on indirect costs, which is consistent with the simplified approach for low value-adding intra-group services under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2020). A supplementary benchmarking study corroborated that this mark-up was within the independent comparable range. Given that the TPO accepted part of the payment and the pricing aligned with the OECD framework, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer/TPO to delete the addition made. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal, following the majority view of the Third Member and the Judicial Member, held that the price at which the assessee purchased power from the State Electricity Board (Rs. 6.62 per unit) is a valid CUP for determining the ALP. The deduction claimed under Section 80IA should be allowed without any downward adjustment.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by not providing an opportunity for a hearing and by failing to independently examine the DVO's valuation. The CIT(A) cannot abdicate its responsibility by merely endorsing the DVO's report.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A should be restricted to the actual expenditure claimed by the assessee. Regarding the addition on account of excess refund of advance, the Tribunal held that it was a capital receipt and not taxable.
The Tribunal held that the netting of exempt income against interest expenditure is not permissible under the statutory scheme. However, it found that the Assessing Officer did not follow the binding ratio of the Special Bench in Vireet Investment Pvt. Ltd. regarding the computation of disallowance.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely on the ground that no addition was made during the scrutiny assessment. The Tribunal stated that if the AO made enquiries into an issue and added an amount, it forms part of the assessment order, and the CIT(A) cannot refuse to decide the issue on its merits, especially when the AO passed a non-speaking order.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued without the approval of the prescribed specified authority, as more than three years had elapsed from the end of the assessment year. Therefore, the notice deserves to be quashed.
The Tribunal held that the AO was empowered to examine cash deposits only during the demonetization period (09.11.2016 to 31.12.2016). The addition made by considering deposits outside this period was incorrect and thus deleted, subject to verification of deposits within the specified period.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as unadmitted due to a substantial delay of over 700 days, finding the assessee's explanation for the delay to be casual and unsupported by evidence. The Tribunal also noted that on merits, the assessee failed to substantiate the grounds of appeal.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue. The Tribunal noted that the issue was identical to those decided in the assessee's own case by the ITAT and the Bombay High Court. Specifically, the Tribunal referred to a previous ITAT order in the assessee's own case for Assessment Years 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-13, which had allowed similar claims. The reasoning in those prior decisions, which was also cited by the CIT(A), was that the foreign exchange forward contracts were entered into by the assessee to safeguard itself against possible future foreign exchange losses on account of export sale proceeds receivable, due to fluctuation in exchange rates. These contracts were backed by confirmed export orders and were incidental to the assessee's business of manufacturing and exporting fruit pulp and allied items. Therefore, they were not speculative transactions. The Tribunal found no change in the facts and circumstances of the present case and therefore saw no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order. The AO was directed to delete the addition.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal ex-parte because no one appeared on behalf of the assessee on multiple hearing dates, and no written submissions were filed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of penalty. It found that the impairment loss was suo-moto disallowed by the assessee, the service tax receivable was correctly treated as an expense, and the advance revenue was properly accounted for as per the mercantile system.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to set off losses against income under Section 115BBE for AY 2012-13, as clarified by the Finance Act, 2016. Therefore, the reassessment order revoking this setoff was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the issue concerning the transfer pricing adjustment on management fees (Grounds 1-12) required detailed factual verification. The Tribunal noted that the DRP had not properly examined the issue of management fees, particularly the assessee's claim that the services were essential and beneficial. The Tribunal found that the DRP's conclusion that no benefit was received and that the services were shareholder or duplicative activities needed further examination. Therefore, the Tribunal restored this issue to the file of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (AO) for de novo adjudication after necessary verification, allowing the assessee to furnish all details. Regarding the addition of INR 16,57,766/- (Grounds 13-16), the Tribunal observed that the DRP had not examined this aspect and proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the addition did not arise from the draft assessment order. The Tribunal found that factual verification of each invoice raised by Lufthansa Cargo AG and recorded in the parties' ledgers was necessary. Consequently, this issue was also restored to the file of the jurisdictional AO for de novo adjudication after necessary verification. The assessee's additional ground regarding the limitation period was admitted but not pressed. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal deleted the addition made by the Assessing Officer. It found that the assessee had established the genuineness of the loans and their repayment through documentary evidence, including sale deeds and audited balance sheets. The Tribunal noted that the transactions were primarily to regularize loan liabilities.
The Tribunal held that the services provided by the assessee do not fall within the meaning of Fees for Technical Services (FTS) as enunciated in Article 13 of the India-UK Tax Treaty. The Tribunal reasoned that the services, being recurring and provided on a year-on-year basis, did not demonstrate that technical skill and knowledge were 'made available' to the Indian affiliates, enabling them to independently use such technology or techniques. The Tribunal noted that the assessee acts as a procurement entity for telecom connectivity and infrastructure, engaging third-party providers, and that intellectual property rights remain with the provider, not conveyed to customers. Reliance was placed on the Madras High Court decision in Sky Cell Communication Ltd. for the principle that standardized services do not qualify as FTS. Therefore, the addition made by the AO treating the receipt as FTS was deleted. Ground No. 2 was allowed. Ground No. 3 was rendered infructuous as it was a 'without prejudice' ground. Grounds No. 4 and 5 regarding interest under Section 234B were directed to be re-computed by the AO. Ground No. 6 regarding refund was directed to be verified by the AO. Ground No. 7 was not dealt with as premature.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided a satisfactory and bona fide explanation for the delay, citing a change of address and unawareness of proceedings. The Tribunal condoned the delay and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's submission that they were not given a proper opportunity by the CIT(A) to demonstrate the genuineness of expenses. The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the matter to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the re-classification of the loss from non-speculative business loss to speculative loss, without any enhancement in the total income or tax liability for the assessment year, does not constitute "under reporting of income" as defined in section 270A(2). The Tribunal noted that the AO accepted the entire quantum of loss and did not dispute its genuineness, source, or booking. The only change was a "taxonomical rearrangement" within the computation. The Tribunal emphasized that section 270A is a self-contained code requiring the case to fall within specifically enumerated situations. In this case, clauses (a) to (f) of section 270A(2) were not met as there was no increase in assessed income over returned income or basic exemption limit. Clause (g) was also not applicable as the loss was not reduced or converted into positive income in a manner that altered the tax base for the year. Furthermore, even if clause (g) were considered, the assessee would be exonerated under section 270A(6) due to its bona fide explanation and full disclosure of material facts. The penalty was therefore rightly deleted by the NFAC.
The Tribunal held that the reopening under section 147 was proceeded with after due procedure under section 148A. Regarding the addition under section 69, the Tribunal found that the assessee, an NRI working in Dubai since 2001, had no Indian income and his earnings were solely from foreign employment. The extensive documentary evidence, including RAK Bank statements, authorized dealer certificates, remittance proofs, salary records, and UAE visa/employment details, collectively established a complete and credible trail of funds. These funds, amounting to AED 12,00,000 withdrawn and AED 11,65,000 remitted, resulted in INR credits of ₹2,00,52,630 in the assessee's NRE account, from which the property investment was made. The Tribunal noted that the Department failed to rebut this evidence or show any discrepancy. The rejection of evidence by the authorities below was based on unsubstantiated observations and speculation without independent inquiry. The Tribunal reasoned that once the assessee established the foreign source of funds, which were not taxable in India under section 5(2), section 69 could not be invoked. The addition of ₹2,00,00,000 was deleted. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the specific procedural validity of the reopening under section 147, focusing instead on the merits of the addition under section 69.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 22,50,000 was not justified as the loan received was Rs. 10,00,000, which was repaid, and the lender had sufficient capacity. For the addition of Rs. 1,62,50,000, the Tribunal found that it was payment for flats, not a loan, and part of it was also offered to tax in a subsequent AY.