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641 orders · Page 12 of 13
The Tribunal held that the AO did not properly examine the evidence provided by the assessee and that the return of notices as unserved cannot solely be the basis for deeming loan receipts as not genuine. The assessee had discharged its primary onus by providing identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, holding that the AO had failed to consider commission income from other parties (IDFC First Bank and Hermes I-Ticket Pvt. Ltd.) besides Vodafone M-Pesa Ltd. The Tribunal agreed, finding that once all commission incomes were accounted for, the credits in the bank account were reconciled and explained.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was not justified in not adjudicating the grounds related to the non-receipt of notice under Section 148, as these go to the root of the assessment's validity. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order passed by the AO was not in conformity with the DRP's directions and was therefore bad in law and liable to be quashed. Consequently, the addition made on account of fixed deposits was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the primary onus under section 68 of the Act was not discharged by the assessee. The Tribunal noted that Shri Jagdish Purohit, an ex-Chartered Accountant, had floated numerous companies for providing accommodation entries. His admission of engaging in the business of providing accommodation entries and laundering money, coupled with the fact that his retraction affidavit was not sworn before a magistrate and was filed with unexplained delay, weighed against the assessee. The Tribunal restored the appeal to the AO with directions for the assessee to produce the directors of the share applicant companies for examination. The AO was directed to independently examine the transactions based on section 68 parameters, without being swayed by confessions or retractions. If the assessee successfully discharged the onus, a reasonable commission would be taxed; otherwise, the addition under section 68 would stand affirmed. The Tribunal also directed an inquiry by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India against Shri Mukesh Choksi for alleged professional misconduct and directed investigation by the police and PMLA authorities against Shri Mehul Choksi for fraud, abetting tax evasion, and money laundering. Regarding the rate of commission, the Tribunal held it to be a question of fact and applied 0.15% as decided in its earlier order, reversing the CIT(A)'s direction to adopt 0.37%.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had explained the sources of investment through banking channels and bank statements. However, the lower authorities had not given a finding on merit. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for verification of the source of investment.
The Tribunal held that the appellate order passed by the CIT(A) was non-speaking and lacked independent application of mind, failing to consider the issues, assessment order, assessee's submissions, or grounds of appeal. The CIT(A) had confirmed the additions solely on the ground that the assessee failed to file supporting details before the AO, without adjudicating the merits. This was found to be contrary to the mandate of Section 250(6) of the Act, which requires the order to state the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for the decision. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) did not make further inquiries as permitted under Section 250(4). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the appellate order and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. The assessee was to be provided an adequate opportunity of hearing, to advance arguments, provide details, and submit additional evidence. The Tribunal clarified that this decision did not reflect on the merits of the dispute. It was also noted that the assessee had deceased on 01.07.2025, and the CIT(A) was to bring on record the legal heirs.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was bad-in-law as it was based on borrowed satisfaction and without independent application of mind by the AO. The Tribunal noted that the AO did not provide the assessee with information regarding the alleged counter-party, Rector Investment Private Limited, until the assessment order, and failed to establish any connection or intermediary. No notice under Section 133(6) was issued to Rector Investment Private Limited, nor was any investigation conducted regarding the alleged reversal trading. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) ignored these aspects. Regarding the addition of Rs. 3,86,743/- as commission, the Tribunal held that it was solely based on conjectures, surmises, suspicion, and an unconfronted third-party statement, lacking evidentiary value and violating principles of natural justice, especially since the assessee was not provided with the statement of Shri Arun Shah or an opportunity to cross-examine him. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents from the Delhi, Bombay, and Gujarat High Courts, emphasizing the need for documented cash trails and independent findings. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the deletion of the disallowance of set off of loss of Rs. 1,93,37,131/- and the addition of Rs. 3,86,743/-. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition made under Section 68. The Tribunal also found that the CIT(A) was not justified in considering interest income as business income and deleting expenses when no business activity was carried out.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not eligible for the benefit of the third proviso to section 56(2)(vii)(b) once the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 50C was given. For the unexplained cash deposit issue, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for verification of facts and evidence.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's revisionary power under Section 263 requires both an error in the AO's order and prejudice to the revenue, which must co-exist. In this case, the issues raised by the PCIT were outside the scope of the limited scrutiny. Thus, the revisional order was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that donations made out of CSR funds, after being disallowed under Section 37, are independently eligible for deduction under Section 80G. The PCIT's revisionary order was quashed as the Assessing Officer had taken a plausible view supported by judicial precedent.
The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: Regarding the validity of assessments under section 153C for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2017-18: The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals for AY 2011-12, AY 2012-13, and AY 2017-18. The reasoning for AYs 2011-12 and 2012-13 is that they fall outside the six assessment years preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted. For AY 2017-18, the Tribunal found that the assessment should have been completed under section 153C, not section 143(3). The revenue's appeals for these years were dismissed. Regarding the rejection of books of accounts: The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's ground. It followed a coordinate bench decision in Padmashree D Y Patil University, holding that if there is no evidence to show the collection of capitation fees, the basis for rejecting book results fails. Therefore, the books of accounts of the assessee trust should be accepted in all years under consideration. Regarding disallowance of depreciation: The Tribunal partly allowed the revenue's ground. It directed the AO to allow depreciation on the opening value of assets for AY 2013-14 and 2014-15, as the restriction to claim depreciation on assets treated as application of income was introduced only from AY 2015-16. For other years, the issue was remitted back to the AO to verify and allow depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income, after providing an opportunity to the assessee. The appeals for AY 2013-14 to 2016-17 were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal directed the AO to adopt a net profit rate of 6% on the reported turnover, accepting the assessee's claim for lower profit estimation based on banking channel receipts. The AO was also directed to give full credit for TDS as reflected in Form 26AS.
The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench had set aside a similar matter concerning 12AB registration to the file of the Ld. CIT(E). Following this precedent and considering the limited prayer, the present appeal was also set aside to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.
On the validity of section 153C proceedings for AY 2011-12 and AY 2012-13, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals, finding these years outside the purview of section 153C. For AY 2017-18, the Tribunal also allowed the assessee's appeal, implying the assessment under section 143(3) was not sustainable. Regarding the rejection of books of accounts, the Tribunal dismissed the revenue's ground, following a coordinate bench decision in Padmashree D Y Patil University. It held that since capitation fees could not be added as unexplained income under section 68, the foundation for rejecting the books failed, and the assessee's books should be accepted. Concerning depreciation on opening balances, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow depreciation for AY 2013-14 and AY 2014-15, as the restriction to claim depreciation on assets whose value was allowed as application of income was statutory only from AY 2015-16. For other years, the issue was remitted to the AO for verification, allowing depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income. The revenue's ground on depreciation was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the notice for reopening the assessment under Section 148 was issued beyond the six-year limitation period applicable under the old regime, rendering the reassessment order void ab initio.
On the issue of the validity of assessments under Section 153C for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2017-18, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that AYs 2011-12 and 2012-13 were outside the six-year period preceding the search. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment for AY 2017-18 was completed under Section 143(3) instead of Section 153C, which was also unsustainable. Consequently, the appeals for these years were allowed in favour of the assessee, and the revenue's appeals were dismissed. Regarding the rejection of books of accounts, the Tribunal followed a coordinate bench decision in the case of Padmashree D Y Patil University, holding that since there was no evidence of the assessee collecting capitation fees, the foundation for rejecting the books failed. Thus, the rejection was set aside, and the assessee's books were accepted. The revenue's ground on this issue was dismissed. Concerning the disallowance of depreciation on the opening balance of assets, the Tribunal noted that the restriction to claim depreciation on assets treated as application of income was introduced only from AY 2015-16. Therefore, depreciation was allowed for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15. For other years, the issue was remitted back to the AO for verification and allowing depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income. The revenue's ground was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
1. Regarding the sustainability of assessments under section 153C for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2017-18: The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2017-18. The reasoning is that the AO's satisfaction note was dated August 6, 2018. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that AYs 2011-12 and 2012-13 fall outside the six assessment years preceding the year of search (AY 2019-20), making assessments under section 153C for these years unsustainable. For AY 2017-18, which falls within the six-year block, the assessment should have been completed under section 153C, not section 143(3) as done by the AO. The ratio is that the assessment period for section 153C must strictly adhere to the six preceding years from the year of search/requisition, and the date of the satisfaction note is crucial for determining this period. The revenue's appeals for these years were dismissed. 2. Regarding the rejection of books of accounts: The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's ground. Following a coordinate bench decision in Padmashree D Y Patil University, it was held that if there is no evidence of capitation fee collection, the basis for rejecting books fails. Since the Tribunal had already held that capitation fees could not be added under section 68, the reason for rejecting books was identical to the cited case. Therefore, the books of accounts of the assessee trust were accepted for all years. 3. Regarding disallowance of depreciation: The Tribunal partly allowed the revenue's ground. It directed the AO to allow depreciation on the opening value of assets for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15, as the restriction on claiming depreciation on assets whose value was allowed as application of income was introduced only from AY 2015-16. For other years, the issue was remitted back to the AO to verify and allow depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income, after providing an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the material seized from employees lacked evidentiary value as it was not found in the assessee's possession and was not corroborated. The arguments regarding the applicability of Section 153C for certain AYs were also considered, and the assessment for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2017-18 were found to be unsustainable.
The Tribunal ruled that the revenue should not benefit from incorrect tax rate application. It restored the matter to the Assessing Officer, directing the AO to verify the assessee's claim for the 5% treaty rate on interest income (including surcharge and cess) and allow it if found to be correct as per law.
The Tribunal ruled that the revenue should not benefit from incorrect tax rate application. It restored the matter to the Assessing Officer, directing the AO to verify the assessee's claim for the 5% treaty rate on interest income (including surcharge and cess) and allow it if found to be correct as per law.
1. Regarding the sustainability of assessments under section 153C and 143(3) for AY 2011-12, AY 2012-13, and AY 2017-18: The Tribunal found that AY 2011-12 and AY 2012-13 were outside the six-year block preceding the search, making the assessments under section 153C unsustainable. For AY 2017-18, which fell within the six-year block, the assessment should have been under section 153C, not 143(3). Consequently, the appeals for AY 2011-12, AY 2012-13, and AY 2017-18 filed by the assessee were allowed, and the revenue's appeals for these years were dismissed. The ratio is that the scope of section 153C is strictly limited to the six assessment years preceding the relevant assessment year, and the assessment procedure must align with the correct section based on the timing of the search and satisfaction note. 2. On the rejection of books of accounts: Following the decision of a coordinate bench in the case of Padmashree D Y Patil University, the Tribunal held that since there was no evidence to show the assessee collected capitation fees, the basis for rejecting the books of accounts failed. The revenue's ground was dismissed. 3. Concerning the disallowance of depreciation on opening balance of assets: The Tribunal noted that the restriction on claiming depreciation on assets whose value was allowed as application of income was introduced only from AY 2015-16. Therefore, the denial of depreciation on this ground for AY 2013-14 and AY 2014-15 was not tenable. Depreciation was directed to be allowed for these two years. For other years, the issue was remitted back to the AO for verification to allow depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income. The revenue's ground was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. Regarding the validity of assessments under Section 153C for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2017-18, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals for these years and dismissed the revenue's appeals. This implies the Tribunal found the assessments for AYs 2011-12 and 2012-13 to be outside the purview of Section 153C and that the assessment for AY 2017-18 was not conducted correctly under Section 143(3) instead of 153C. The ratio is that the timing of the satisfaction note and the six-year look-back period are crucial for the applicability of Section 153C. 2. The issue of denial of exemption under Section 11 in respect of capitation fees was remitted back to the AO for fresh examination, with the assessee directed to furnish details and cooperate. The Tribunal noted that the addition of capitation fee as unexplained under Section 68 was not sustainable, but the denial of exemption under Section 11 requires further factual verification. 3. The issue of addition towards corporate donations received from Abdul Fakir Malim was also remitted back to the AO for fresh examination, with the assessee to furnish details. The Tribunal acknowledged the need for factual examination. 4. On the rejection of books of accounts, the Tribunal dismissed the revenue's ground, following a coordinate bench decision in the case of Padmashree D Y Patil University. The reasoning was that if there is no evidence to show collection of capitation fees, the basis for rejecting the books fails. The Tribunal held that the books of accounts should be accepted. 5. Regarding depreciation on the opening balance of assets, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow depreciation for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15, as the restriction on claiming depreciation on assets treated as application of income was statutorily introduced only from AY 2015-16. For other years, the issue was remitted back to the AO for verification and allowance of depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income. The revenue's ground was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessments for AY 2011-12 and AY 2012-13 were unsustainable as they fell outside the six-year period preceding the search year for the purpose of Section 153C. The Tribunal also held that the assessment for AY 2017-18, which was within the six-year period, should have been completed under Section 153C, not Section 143(3), making the assessment under Section 143(3) unsustainable. Therefore, the assessee's appeals for these years were allowed, and the revenue's appeals were dismissed. Regarding the rejection of books of accounts, the Tribunal followed a coordinate bench decision in the case of Padmashree D Y Patil University, holding that since the addition of capitation fees was not sustainable, the foundation for rejecting the books failed. Thus, the books of accounts were to be accepted, and the revenue's ground was dismissed. Concerning depreciation on the opening balance of assets, the Tribunal noted that the restriction on claiming depreciation on assets whose value was allowed as application of income was effective only from AY 2015-16. Accordingly, depreciation was directed to be allowed for AY 2013-14 and AY 2014-15. For other years, the issue was remitted back to the AO for verification, allowing depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income. The revenue's ground on this issue was partly allowed for statistical purposes. The appeals for AY 2013-14 to 2016-17 were partly allowed.
1. Regarding the validity of assessments under section 153C for AY 2011-12 and AY 2012-13, the Tribunal noted the assessee's argument that these years were outside the six-year block. The Tribunal found that the issue required further examination on merits and accordingly remitted the matter back to the AO for fresh adjudication, directing the assessee to cooperate and furnish necessary details. The Tribunal did not decide the issue on merits but remanded it for proper assessment. 2. For AY 2017-18, the Tribunal also remitted the issue to the AO for examination on merits, similar to the other AYs, to be decided after calling for required details and providing an opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal did not decide the validity of the assessment for AY 2017-18 but remanded it. 3. On the rejection of books of accounts, the Tribunal followed a coordinate bench decision in the case of Padmashree D Y Patil University, which held that rejection of books based on unproven capitation fees was unjustified. The Tribunal found that the reason for rejection in the assessee's case was identical. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the books of accounts should be accepted and dismissed the revenue's ground. 4. Concerning the disallowance of depreciation on the opening balance of assets, the Tribunal observed that the AO's denial was based on the asset's value being treated as application of income. The Tribunal noted that this restriction was statutory only from AY 2015-16. For AY 2013-14 and 2014-15, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow depreciation. For other years, the Tribunal remitted the issue back to the AO to verify and allow depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income, after providing a hearing opportunity. The revenue's ground was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that for AYs 2011-12 and 2012-13, the assessments under section 153C were invalid as these years were outside the six-year period preceding the relevant assessment year of the search. For AY 2017-18, the assessment under section 143(3) was also considered not in line with the provisions. Regarding the rejection of books of accounts, the Tribunal followed a coordinate bench decision in the case of Padmashree D Y Patil University, holding that since there was no evidence to show the assessee collected capitation fees, the basis for rejecting the books failed. Therefore, the books of accounts should be accepted. On the issue of depreciation, the Tribunal noted that the restriction on claiming depreciation on assets whose value was allowed as application of income was introduced only from AY 2015-16. Accordingly, depreciation on the opening balance of assets was directed to be allowed for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15. For other years, the issue was remitted to the AO for verification, allowing depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income. The assessee's appeals for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2017-18 were allowed, and the revenue's appeals for these years were dismissed. Appeals for AYs 2013-14 to 2016-17 were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal restored both the assessee's and Revenue's appeals to the file of the assessing officer for fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee liberty to file all evidences.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided a reasonable explanation for the cash deposits, supported by the opening cash balance as per the Cash Book. Therefore, the addition to the extent of the opening cash balance was deleted.
1. Regarding the validity of Section 153C proceedings for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2017-18: The Tribunal found that AYs 2011-12 and 2012-13 were outside the six-year block preceding the relevant assessment year for the search. Therefore, the assessments for these years under Section 153C were held unsustainable. For AY 2017-18, the Tribunal noted that it fell within the six-year block, and the AO had completed the assessment under Section 143(3). The Tribunal held that the appeals for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2017-18 were allowed in favour of the assessee. The reasoning was that the assessments for AYs 2011-12 and 2012-13 were initiated beyond the permissible period under Section 153C, and the assessment for AY 2017-18 was also dealt with in a manner that led to relief for the assessee. The ratio is that the scope and period of assessment under Section 153C must strictly adhere to the statutory limitations concerning the block of assessment years. The operative direction was to allow the assessee's appeals for these years. 2. Regarding the addition towards unaccounted capitation fee/development fee: The Tribunal noted that the assessee conceded that this issue required factual examination and prayed for a remand. The revenue did not object. Accordingly, the Tribunal remitted this issue back to the AO for examination on merits. 3. Regarding the rejection of books of accounts: The Tribunal followed the decision of a coordinate bench in Padmashree D Y Patil University (supra), which held that rejection of books of accounts based on unproven capitation fees is not justifiable. The Tribunal found that the reason for rejection in the present case was identical to the cited case. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the books of accounts should be accepted and dismissed the revenue's ground on this issue. 4. Regarding depreciation on the opening balance of assets: The Tribunal noted that the restriction on claiming depreciation on assets whose value was allowed as application of income was introduced only from AY 2015-16. For AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow depreciation on the opening value of assets. For other years, the issue was remitted back to the AO for verification and allowing depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income, after providing an opportunity of being heard. The revenue's ground was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessments for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2017-18 were unsustainable. For AYs 2011-12 and 2012-13, these years were outside the six-year period preceding the search, rendering the Section 153C assessments invalid. For AY 2017-18, it fell within the six-year period, and the assessment should have been under Section 153C, not Section 143(3). The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's ground regarding the rejection of books of accounts, following a coordinate bench decision in the case of Padmashree D Y Patil University, holding that the rejection was not justified as the primary reason (capitation fees) was not established. Regarding depreciation on opening balances, the Tribunal ruled that the denial of depreciation on this ground was not tenable for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15, directing the AO to allow it. For other years, the issue was remitted to the AO for verification, allowing depreciation only on assets whose value was not allowed as application of income. The ratio is that the validity of Section 153C assessments depends on the correct identification of the six-year block period relative to the search/requisition date, and books of account should not be rejected solely on unproven allegations of unrecorded income if the primary basis for rejection is unsubstantiated. Depreciation on assets treated as application of income is subject to statutory provisions and verification.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings for AY 2016-17 were invalid and liable to be quashed due to a lack of valid sanction under section 151(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the reassessment was initiated well beyond three years from the end of AY 2016-17, and the alleged escaped income exceeded ₹50 lakhs. As per section 151(ii), only the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, or their equivalents were competent to grant approval in such cases. The sanction obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-5, Mumbai, was therefore incompetent and without jurisdiction. Citing the Supreme Court in Rajeev Bansal v. Union of India, the Tribunal stated that a notice issued without valid approval from the prescribed specified authority is void ab initio. The deeming fiction in Ashish Agrawal was intended to save notices during the transitional period but did not bypass jurisdictional requirements. The defect was not merely procedural but jurisdictional, striking at the root of the Assessing Officer's power. Consequently, the reassessment order and the consequential additions on account of penny stock transactions were rendered invalid and did not survive for adjudication. The appeal by the Revenue was dismissed as infructuous, and the cross-objection by the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A), allowing the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Totgar's Co-operative Sale Society Ltd., stating that it pertained to Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and not Section 80P(2)(d), making the AO's reliance misplaced.
The Tribunal held that filing Form 10EE is a procedural requirement. Once the option under Rule 21AAA is exercised in a previous year, it continues to apply to all subsequent years, making fresh filing mandatory only if the assessee becomes non-resident. Denial of relief on procedural grounds when Form 10EE was filed in the prior year is not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the claim for deduction under Section 80-IA cannot be denied merely on the technical ground of delayed uploading of Form 10CCB, as the revised return cured the omission and the substantive right to deduction should be preserved.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) passed the order without affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity to present necessary evidence. Therefore, the matter was restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for reconsideration.
The Tribunal held that the right to carry forward losses and depreciation is a statutory entitlement and the AO should have recognized and given effect to it. However, the lower authorities failed to undertake this exercise properly.
The Tribunal condoned the delay after finding sufficient cause. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, with directions to consider all evidence and afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence to prove the genuineness of purchases, including payment by account payee cheques and reconciliation of stock. The AO failed to conduct independent inquiries and relied solely on third-party information.
The Tribunal restored both the assessee's and Revenue's appeals to the file of the assessing officer for fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee liberty to file all evidences.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) passed the appellate order without considering the assessee's written submissions, thereby denying a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The matter was restored to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The assessee had filed the necessary forms under the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme, and the Revenue had no objection to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal noted that the tax dispute was settled under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, and the Departmental Representative did not oppose the withdrawal request. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's request for withdrawal.
The Tribunal dismissed the additional grounds challenging the validity of the assessment order. While the assessment order incorrectly mentioned the dates of the Section 143(2) notice, the revenue produced documentary evidence showing the notice was issued and served within the limitation period. Therefore, the additional grounds were dismissed. On the merits, for the addition related to funds received from Dhyaneshwari Multi State Urban Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., the Tribunal, considering the past history of similar transactions and the assessee's acceptance of a 0.05% commission rate in earlier years, directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to restrict the addition to 0.05% of the deposit. This ground was partly allowed. Regarding the purchase of mutual funds, the Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed a switchover of funds but failed to provide details to the lower authorities. In the interest of justice, the issue was restored to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication after the assessee furnishes evidence of the switchover and explains the source of investment. This ground was allowed for statistical purposes. Concerning the penalty under Section 270A, the Tribunal found no merit in its levy as it was based on estimated additions. The AO was directed to delete the penalty. This ground was allowed.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had a right to raise additional grounds before the DRP and that the DRP is empowered to examine issues arising from assessment proceedings. Since the claim was made before both the AO and DRP, the matter was restored to the AO.
The Tribunal held that cash payments for land, treated as stock-in-trade and part of work-in-progress, are business expenditures subject to Section 40A(3). The reduction of land cost due to disallowance is a logical consequence and does not create separate taxable income.
The Tribunal decided that the assessee had sufficiently explained the source of the cash deposits made during the demonetisation period. Regarding the Rs. 9,50,000 received on cancellation of the agreement for sale, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission, noting the production of a notarised deed of cancellation dated 02/11/2016 and confirmation from the seller. The Tribunal held that the mere absence of the original deed should not go against the assessee, especially since the initial purchase of land was through banking channels. For the Rs. 1,56,000 received as permanent alimony, expenses of Iddat and Meher amount, the Tribunal acknowledged that issues related to marriage and its dissolution do not require strict commercial rules. It noted the withdrawal of Rs. 5,59,000 by the assessee before the marriage date and the details of wedding expenditures. The Tribunal concluded that the execution date of the settlement deed (03/05/2019) should not be the sole basis to reject the claim that the cash was received from the groom's side. Consequently, the addition sustained by the CIT(A) under Section 69A was deleted. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal dismissed the additional grounds regarding the Section 143(2) notice. While the assessment order mentioned a notice dated 07/10/2019, which appeared time-barred, the revenue produced evidence of a notice dated 22/09/2019, served on 23/09/2019. The Tribunal found this to be an inadvertent error in the assessment order and dismissed the grounds. Regarding the addition of Rs. 39,00,000/- from Dhyaneshwari Multi State Urban Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., the Tribunal noted the past history of similar transactions and directed the AO to restrict the addition to 0.05% of the deposit, accepting the ld. Counsel's submission. This ground was partly allowed. For the mutual fund investment of Rs. 15,55,000/-, the Tribunal restored the issue to the AO, directing the assessee to furnish evidence of switchover and explain the source, and the AO to verify and decide afresh. This ground was allowed for statistical purposes. The penalty levied under Section 270A was deleted as it was based on estimated additions, and the AO was directed to delete the penalty. This ground was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment under Section 147 was invalid and unsustainable due to the absence of suppression of material facts by the assessee. Consequently, the revisionary order passed under Section 263 was without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding sufficient cause. It held that the CIT(A) erred by passing an ex-parte order without adjudicating the grounds on merits and that an appeal cannot be dismissed for non-prosecution.