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699 orders · Page 8 of 14
The Tribunal held that the issue of depreciation allowance was debatable and that the overall effect of the adjustments across the three assessment years was revenue neutral. Consequently, the penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(c) was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the long-term capital gains of Rs. 84,79,100/- were not genuine and were a colorable device to convert unaccounted money into fictitious exempt LTCG to evade taxes. The Tribunal found that the transaction failed the test of human probabilities, as no prudent person would invest a huge amount in a consistently loss-making company like M/s. Kappac Pharma Limited, especially when the assessee was a novice in share trading. The assessee failed to dispel the suspicions raised by the AO and establish the genuineness of the transaction. The Tribunal noted that the business model of M/s. Kappac Pharma Limited was held by coordinate benches to be a provider of bogus exempt LTCG. The onus was on the assessee to prove the genuineness of the trading, which they failed to discharge. The Tribunal also considered the financial health and trading history of the companies involved, and the AO's verification of trade data and modus operandi, which were akin to bogus LTCG. The Tribunal found that the share price movement and profit earned were beyond human probabilities, indicating a well-planned scheme. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the disallowance made by the AO. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the assessment order passed by the AO was upheld. The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 35AD for AY 2017-18 was to be deleted. The NPK Fertiliser Unit qualified as a "specified business" under Section 35AD(8)(c)(vii), and all conditions for weighted deduction were satisfied. Incidental use of certain assets for another fertilizer unit within the same business did not violate Section 35AD(7A)/(7B). Furthermore, the condition of "claimed and allowed" in prior years was not met in AY 2017-18, making the disallowance legally untenable. The Tribunal directed the deletion of the disallowance made under Section 35AD. Regarding the stock difference for AY 2019-20, the Tribunal held that minor timing discrepancies between physical stock and book records, constituting a marginal percentage of total inventory, could not be the basis for disallowance, especially when plausibly explained as a timing issue. The AO's ad-hoc rate for computing disallowance was also unjustified. Consequently, the disallowance under normal provisions and the consequential adjustment under Section 115JB were deleted. The issue regarding additions being beyond the scope of Section 153A was kept open as the issues were decided on merits. For AY 2019-20, the Tribunal confirmed the deletion of disallowance under Section 14A, holding that in the absence of any exempt income, the invocation of Section 14A is legally untenable, and the amendment by the Finance Act, 2022, is prospective. The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed, and the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the conditions for deeming the loans as dividend under Section 2(22)(e) were not met. The loans were not directly advanced by SFSPL to the assessee, and the transactions between SFSPL and the lending entities appeared to be in the normal course of business. The Tribunal found no evidence that the payment by SFSPL was for the benefit of the assessee as a shareholder.
The Tribunal, while acknowledging the initial lack of justification for non-filing, found the additional documents presented by the assessee to be essential for a just decision. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that co-operative banks are primarily co-operative societies, and interest income derived from them is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d). Therefore, the disallowance was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the notice under section 148 was issued beyond the time limit and with an invalid sanction, rendering it void ab initio. Consequently, all subsequent actions, including the assessment order, were also void.
The Tribunal held that the embargo of not filing Form 10B is only for claiming benefit under Section 11. As the assessee paid the penalty for late filing, it is eligible for expenses incurred on establishment and activities. The Tribunal also held that income should be taxed at slab rates, not Maximum Marginal Rate (MMR), referencing a Special Bench decision.
The Tribunal held that the embargo of not filing Form 10B is only for claiming benefit under Section 11. As the assessee paid the penalty for late filing, it is eligible for expenses incurred on establishment and activities. The Tribunal also held that income should be taxed at slab rates, not Maximum Marginal Rate (MMR), referencing a Special Bench decision.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated based on a notice issued after obtaining approval from an authority (Pr. CIT – 20) which was not competent as per the amended Section 151(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the notice under Section 148 was deemed invalid, rendering all subsequent actions void ab initio.
The Tribunal followed a coordinate bench's decision. It noted that the audit report was filed with the return and before the processing, even if after the due date. The denial of exemption solely on this ground was considered incorrect.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer were unsustainable as they were based on suspicion and conjecture, without rebutting the assessee's documentary evidence. The Tribunal followed its own previous decision in the assessee's own case for a different assessment year.
The Tribunal held that the NPK Fertiliser Unit qualifies as a specified business under Section 35AD, and incidental use of assets does not violate the provisions. Minor stock differences were deemed not a basis for disallowance, and Section 14A cannot be applied when no exempt income is earned.
The Tribunal held that the impugned expenditures were incurred in the ordinary course of business, either for expansion, investor compliance, or defending legal proceedings, and did not result in the creation of a capital asset or enduring benefit. Therefore, they were allowable as revenue expenditure.
The Tribunal held that the NPK Fertiliser Unit qualifies as a specified business under Section 35AD, and incidental use of assets does not violate the provisions. Minor stock differences were deemed not a basis for disallowance, and Section 14A cannot be applied when no exempt income is earned.
The Tribunal considered the request for withdrawal and the lack of objection from the Revenue. The Tribunal allowed the appeal to be withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the surcharge was incorrectly levied as the total income was below the threshold limit. The issue of mismatch in tax payable and net amount payable was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification. The grounds related to validity and consequential interest were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that a loose paper, without independent corroboration or inquiry, cannot be a valid basis for initiating proceedings under Section 153C. The evidence relied upon by the AO was found to be unsubstantiated.
The Tribunal held that the credit for TDS should be allowed in the assessment year in which the income is assessable to tax, as per Section 199 of the Act read with Rule 37BA(3)(i). The assessee's claim that the income related to the TDS was offered to tax for AY 2016-17 was found to be in accordance with the Act. The Tribunal found no merit in the appellate order and noted a lack of specific discussion on relevant provisions. The Tribunal set aside the appellate order, opining that if the assessee's claim of income being assessed for AY 2016-17 is correct, then TDS credit should be allowed for AY 2016-17, irrespective of when it appears in Form 26AS. The matter was restored to the AO for reconsideration, directing verification of the TDS credit in the year the income is assessable/assessed. The alternative direction for rectification of TDS returns was deemed unnecessary if the primary direction was complied with. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that an assessment made under section 144 is a best judgment assessment and cannot be deemed erroneous merely because the PCIT has a different view. The Tribunal also noted that the assessed income was higher than what the PCIT suggested, thus not prejudicial to revenue.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's action of claiming foreign exchange gains as expenditure instead of reporting it as income constituted misrepresentation or suppression of facts, falling under Section 270A(9)(a). The CIT(A) was justified in rectifying the Assessing Officer's initial invocation of Section 270A(9)(e).
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that neither surcharge nor additional cess was applicable given the returned and assessed income was below Rs. 50 lakhs. The Tribunal also noted that the appeal was dismissed without adequate opportunity. Consequently, the appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's reasonable cause for not appearing before the CIT(A) and decided to give one more opportunity to represent the case. A cost of Rs. 2,000/- was imposed on the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding reasonable cause for the assessee's non-appearance before the CIT(A) due to incorrect email communication. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee himself had admitted the purchases were bogus. It also considered recent decisions of the Supreme Court and Bombay High Court which upheld 100% disallowance for bogus purchases. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that a loose paper, without independent corroboration or inquiry, cannot be a valid basis for initiating proceedings under Section 153C. The evidence relied upon by the AO was found to be unsubstantiated.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was extraordinary and not sufficiently explained. The assessee's contention of contesting other legal matters and a bonafide belief that earlier issues would be re-examined was not accepted. The Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation of delay, consequently dismissing the appeal as unadmitted.
The Tribunal concurred with the CIT(A)'s decision, stating that the Income Tax Act does not permit filing multiple appeals against the same assessment order. Once an appeal is disposed of on merits, a second appeal on the same assessment order is not maintainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee provided satisfactory explanations and documentary evidence for the nature and source of the jewellery, which was duly recorded in the books of accounts and accepted by the GST Department. Consequently, the addition made under Section 69A of the Income Tax Act was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities passed ex-parte orders without allowing a fair opportunity to the assessee. The addition of the entire sale consideration without proper verification was incorrect. The matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of 100% of the purchases was not justified. The assessee had provided substantial documentary evidence for the purchases, and the non-compliance of the supplier to a notice under Section 133(6) does not automatically disprove the transaction. The Tribunal reduced the disallowance to 12.5% of the impugned purchases.
The Tribunal noted the appellant's non-compliance and the CIT(A)'s admission of additional evidence without proper verification by the AO. Principles of natural justice require the Revenue to have an equal opportunity to examine the material. Therefore, the matter is remitted back to the CIT(A).
Although the AO initially denied the deduction for delay in filing Form 10DA, the AO subsequently allowed the claim during scrutiny assessment proceedings, rendering the appeal infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the issue is covered by Supreme Court decisions in favour of the appellant. The appellant society is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act for interest earned from cooperative banks. The Tribunal further noted that interest from nationalized banks is also exempt.
The Tribunal held that if no advance tax is payable, the assessee is not required to deposit it, and the appeal should have been admitted on merits. The Tribunal also noted procedural defects in the reopening notice.
The Tribunal held that the assessee provided satisfactory explanations and documentary evidence for the nature and source of the jewellery, which was duly recorded in the books of accounts and accepted by the GST Department. Consequently, the addition made under Section 69A of the Income Tax Act was deleted.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue. The Tribunal noted that the proceedings under Section 153C were initiated based on a loose paper found during a search in the case of RPS Group and Shri Tarun Vohra. The AO relied solely on this loose paper to compute additions under Sections 69A and 69C. The assessee explained that the document pertained to a proposal by a real estate broker for selling flats at a higher price, which did not materialize. Investigations through notices under Section 133(6) to M/s. Sai Estate Consultants, the broker, revealed that no flats were sold through them and no brokerage was received. The Tribunal held that a loose paper, without independent corroboration or inquiry, cannot form a valid basis for initiating proceedings under Section 153C. Therefore, the additions made under Sections 69A and 69C, pursuant to the assessment framed under Section 153C, were quashed on legal grounds. The grounds raised on merits were rendered academic.
The Tribunal held that the order of the PCIT dated March 10, 2025, passed under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was to be set aside. The Tribunal reasoned that the power under Section 263 is to be exercised when an order passed by the AO is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. It is not enough for the Commissioner to show that the revenue has suffered a loss. The order must be erroneous. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court judgment in CIT vs. Max India Ltd. ([2007] 295 ITR 282 (SC)), which held that if two views are possible and the AO has taken one view with which the Commissioner does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, unless the view taken by the AO is unsustainable in law. In the present case, the AO had made enquiries and accepted the assessee's explanation. The PCIT, even after initiating revision proceedings, could not establish that the allowance of the claim was erroneous. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the order of the AO dated August 25, 2022. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) ought to have decided the appeal on merits, especially considering the original return filed pursuant to a notice under Section 148. The Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that while the Assessing Officer might not be bound to accept a claim not made via a revised return, the appellate authorities, including the ITAT, have the power to consider such claims. The Tribunal noted that the claim was substantiated with a CA's certificate and directed the Assessing Officer to verify the eligibility criteria for the deduction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee provided satisfactory explanations and documentary evidence for the nature and source of the jewellery, which was duly recorded in the books of accounts and accepted by the GST Department. Consequently, the addition made under Section 69A of the Income Tax Act was deleted.
The Tribunal held that while the Assessing Officer might not be bound to accept a claim not made via a revised return, the appellate authorities, including the ITAT, have the power to consider such claims. The Tribunal noted that the claim was substantiated with a CA's certificate and directed the Assessing Officer to verify the eligibility criteria for the deduction.
The tribunal noted the appellant's request to withdraw the duplicate appeal and confirmed that the original appeal had already been adjudicated. As the Ld. DR did not object, the tribunal granted permission for the withdrawal of the appeal and dismissed it as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the notice under section 148 was issued beyond the statutory time limit, making the subsequent reassessment order void ab initio. Furthermore, even on merits, the Tribunal found that the loan had been repaid and this repayment was not doubted by the revenue authorities, making the addition unsustainable.
The Tribunal noted that both the CIT(A) and AO passed ex-parte orders. Considering the assessee's circumstances, including being a small contractor unfamiliar with online portals and suffering from jaundice, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the AO.
The Tribunal noted that the delay in filing the audit report was condoned by the CIT(A) and the income was recomputed. Considering the subsequent developments, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the assessee received the shares of St. Ives International Limited as a gift from his brother, without any consideration. Since the assets were fully explained and no investment was made by the assessee, they were not considered undisclosed foreign assets. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was rightly deleted by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh decision, observing that the ex-parte order was passed without giving the assessee adequate opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, noting that the reasons provided by the assessee constituted a 'sufficient cause' and that the delay was not intentional or due to malafides. The Tribunal also restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh decision, as the assessee was ex-parte before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal condoned the delay, accepting the assessee's submission of bona fide reasons. The Tribunal also set aside the ex-parte order of the First Appellate Authority due to a communication gap, directing a de novo adjudication.