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699 orders · Page 6 of 14
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's grounds 1 and 2 as not pressed. Regarding ground 3 of the assessee and grounds 1 and 2 of the revenue, which concerned the addition on account of bogus purchases, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). The Tribunal found no illegality or perversity in the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the addition to 12.5% of the alleged bogus purchases. The reasoning was that the assessee failed to produce the parties for examination to prove the genuineness of the transactions. The Tribunal distinguished the case of PCIT vs. Kanak Impex (India) Ltd. on facts and circumstances, finding it not applicable. The Tribunal also did not agree with the assessee's plea to reduce the addition to 5%, considering the holistic view taken by the CIT(A) in restricting the addition from 18.5% to 12.5%. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, dismissing both the assessee's and revenue's appeals on this issue.
The Tribunal held that when incriminating material is found during a search on a third party, and that material pertains to the assessee, proceedings must be initiated under Section 153C, not Section 147. Therefore, the notice issued under Section 147 was without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that since the entire investment and the difference in valuation were considered in the hands of the husband, there was no justification for making any additions in the hands of the assessee. Consequently, the penalty levied under Section 271AAC was also deleted.
The Tribunal held that since the entire investment and the difference in valuation were considered in the hands of the husband, there was no justification for making any additions in the hands of the assessee. Consequently, the penalty levied under Section 271AAC was also deleted.
The Tribunal held that the genuineness of the loan must be adjudicated first, as the allowability of interest is consequential. Therefore, the order of the Ld. JCIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was correct in assuming revisionary jurisdiction under section 263. The AO's failure to conduct proper inquiries regarding the 80G deduction for CSR expenses rendered the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 was incorrect. The AO had indeed examined the issue of Section 80G deduction for CSR expenses, as evidenced by the questionnaire and the assessee's detailed reply.
The tribunal held that the amendment to Section 11(3) of the Income Tax Act was prospective. Therefore, the utilization of accumulated funds in the year immediately following the prescribed period was permissible.
The Tribunal, noting the similarity of facts to a previous case (Ajay Jaisinghani), decided to remit the issue back to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) is directed to adjudicate the appeal on its merits.
The Tribunal, following a coordinate bench decision, held that the delay in filing Form 10B was procedural and should be condoned, especially since the return was filed within the extended due date and the substantive conditions for exemption were met.
The Tribunal decided to remand the issue back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for a fresh decision, allowing the appellant to raise any grounds. This was because the Ld. CIT(A) had not passed an order on merits.
The Tribunal held that neither the CPC nor the CIT(A) provided the appellant with a proper opportunity to explain its case. The submissions filed by the appellant were not considered. Therefore, the Tribunal remitted the issue back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was a non-filer and underreported income, fitting the description of furnishing inaccurate particulars. The penalty was justified, and there was no reason to interfere with the appellate order.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. PCIT was factually incorrect in stating that the AO had not conducted enquiries. The AO had taken a plausible view, and since two views were possible, the PCIT could not assume jurisdiction under section 263.
The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities' orders were ex-parte and the appellant's written submission was not considered. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) to provide a reasonable opportunity to the appellant and pass a fresh order. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148 was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 151 of the Act, as concluded by the Supreme Court in the Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal case. Therefore, the notice was set aside.
The case involved a difference of opinion between the Judicial and Accountant Members, leading to the nomination of a Third Member. The Third Member concurred with the Judicial Member's view, resulting in the majority view dismissing the revenue's appeal.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal in limine without providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to justify the delay. The principles of natural justice were violated. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the file of the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that payments made to clinical labs for clinical trials are pass-through costs and should be excluded from the cost base for calculating the operating margin. The Tribunal also rejected an additional ground raised by the assessee regarding the assumption of jurisdiction by the AO after a significant delay.
The Tribunal held that the issue raised by the PCIT regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80G for CSR expenditure was highly debatable. Therefore, any view taken by the Assessing Officer (AO) during assessment was a plausible view, and the PCIT's view amounted to a change of opinion, for which Section 263 jurisdiction could not be assumed.
The Tribunal held that the issue of claiming CSR expenditure as donation under Section 80G is a debatable issue. They further noted that the PCIT's view was a change of opinion, which is not a valid basis for assuming jurisdiction under Section 263.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the Assessing Officer/TPO in respect of the sale of electricity was uncalled for, and the enhancement by the DRP was not tenable. The Tribunal also noted that the DRP observed the TPO failed to examine the Arm's Length Price of steam sales.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263. The Tribunal reasoned that payments forming part of CSR expenditure do not form part of the profit and loss account for computing income under the head 'Profits and Gains of Business or Profession'. However, if certain payments that are part of CSR expenditure are otherwise eligible under Section 80G, the deduction under Section 80G cannot be denied, as the benefit under Chapter VI-A is available for computing 'Total Taxable Income'. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's definition of donation in P.V.G. Raju (supra), stating that a payment made without any material return and without consideration, and not for quid pro quo, is a donation. The Tribunal found no material on record to conclude that the intention behind the donations was for material return or quid pro quo. The revenue's contention that contributions are made as part of a mandate and not voluntarily was not sufficient to negate the donation status. The Tribunal distinguished the case of Agilent Technologies (International) (P.) Ltd. (supra) as factually different. Therefore, the order passed under Section 263 could not be sustained, and the assessee was allowed to claim deduction under Section 80G. Ground 2 raised by the assessee was allowed. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s dismissal of the appeal in limine without deciding on merits was not justified, following the precedent set by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court. The delay in filing the appeal before the ITAT was condoned due to the appellant's medical condition. The appeal was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh speaking order on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CPC's adjustment of tax rate without issuing a notice and providing an opportunity for hearing violated the principles of natural justice and the mandate of Section 143(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding that substantial justice should be preferred over technicalities. The matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication after providing an opportunity for the assessee to present evidence, with a cost of Rs. 2000/- to be deposited.
The Tribunal held that the NPK Fertiliser Unit qualifies as a specified business under Section 35AD, and incidental use of assets does not violate the provisions. Minor stock differences were deemed not a basis for disallowance, and Section 14A cannot be applied when no exempt income is earned.
The Tribunal, following the decision of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court, restricted the addition to the average gross profit rate of 2.73% earned by the assessee in the business line, considering that the assessee had furnished relevant documents for purchases which were not rejected by the AO.
The Tribunal condoned the significant delay in filing the appeal, considering the principles of substantial justice over technicalities and the explanation of sufficient cause provided by the assessee. The appeal was admitted to be heard on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay considering the assessee's age, illiteracy, reliance on a tax consultant, and communication difficulties during the Covid period. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) order was passed ex-parte without deciding on merits and thus set aside the appellate order.
The Tribunal noted that during the hearing, the learned Authorized Representative (AR) of the assessee pleaded for the withdrawal of the instant appeal. The Tribunal considered this request and granted it. Consequently, the appeal, having been withdrawn by the assessee, was dismissed. The Tribunal did not adjudicate on the merits of the grounds of appeal concerning the additions made under Section 68 for the loan and interest. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. No issues were expressly left undecided, as the appeal was disposed of on a procedural basis.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order and the CIT(A) order were passed ex-parte. Although the delay in filing the appeal was condoned, the assessee's behavior in not complying with lower authorities was noted. The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that co-operative banks are primarily co-operative societies, and interest income derived from them is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d). Therefore, the disallowance was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the notice under section 148 was issued beyond the time limit and with an invalid sanction, rendering it void ab initio. Consequently, all subsequent actions, including the assessment order, were also void.
The Tribunal held that the mistake in selecting the wrong sub-clause was inadvertent and not fatal. It directed the CIT(E) to treat the application as filed under the correct sub-clause, consider it on its merits after providing an opportunity of hearing, and decide the case accordingly.
The Tribunal held that while CSR expenses are not deductible under Section 37(1), there is no corresponding amendment to Section 80G that prohibits the deduction of donations made under CSR if the donee institution is eligible under Section 80G. The exercise of power under Section 263 was also found to be not independent but based on an audit note.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal by liberally construing 'sufficient cause' in favor of substantial justice. The appeals were restored to the CIT(Exemptions) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal by liberally construing 'sufficient cause' in favor of substantial justice. The appeals were restored to the CIT(Exemptions) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that both the assessment order passed by the AO and the appellate order passed by the CIT(A) were ex-parte, primarily due to the assessee's lack of proper compliance. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeal on merits, which is contrary to the mandate of section 250(6) of the Act, requiring the order to state the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for the decision. The Tribunal also referred to section 250(4) and section 251(1)(a) and (b), which empower the CIT(A) to conduct further inquiries or direct the AO to do so, and to confirm, reduce, enhance, or annul an assessment. The appellate order was found deficient in this regard. In the interest of substantial justice, the Tribunal set aside the appellate order and restored the entire matter back to the AO for passing a fresh assessment order (de novo). The AO was given liberty to pass an order after considering the material placed on record if the assessee failed to cooperate. The Tribunal clarified that this decision was not a reflection on the merits of the dispute, which would be adjudicated independently by the AO. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the Ld.CIT(A) to decide the application for condonation of delay afresh. The Ld.CIT(A) is directed to consider the detailed affidavit filed by the assessee and hear both parties.
The Tribunal noted that the appeal was barred by limitation and no application for condonation of delay was made. Therefore, the appeal was rejected in limine on this ground.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the principle of substantial justice over technicalities. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing, with a cost of Rs. 5,000 imposed on the assessee for non-cooperation and absence.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had a reasonable cause for not being able to represent themselves effectively before the Ld. CIT(A) and therefore, one more opportunity should be granted. The matter was restored back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) denied TDS credit for want of a bank statement to prove receipt of rent net of TDS. The assessee has now furnished this as additional evidence. The Tribunal found that this evidence goes to the root of the matter and admitted it. It directed the Assessing Officer to verify the facts regarding the TDS credit claim.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficiently discharged the onus of proving the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan transaction. The documentation provided by the assessee, including the lender's financial statements and bank records, was considered sufficient.
The Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) to provide the assessee with one more opportunity to represent their case, acknowledging that there was a reasonable cause for not appearing.
The Tribunal held that the issue of depreciation allowance was debatable and that the overall effect of the adjustments across the three assessment years was revenue neutral. Consequently, the penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(c) was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the conditions for deeming the loans as dividend under Section 2(22)(e) were not met. The loans were not directly advanced by SFSPL to the assessee, and the transactions between SFSPL and the lending entities appeared to be in the normal course of business. The Tribunal found no evidence that the payment by SFSPL was for the benefit of the assessee as a shareholder.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee, as a stockbroker, acted as an intermediary for client transactions. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee had discharged its onus to explain the nature and source of the credits, and therefore, Section 68 was not applicable.
The Tribunal held that for Ground No. 5 (disallowance of year-end provision for commission), the assessee's appeal is allowed, as the CIT(A) erred in upholding the disallowance. For Ground No. 6 (allowance of discount pertaining to other years), the Tribunal directed the AO to allow the claim subject to verification, as it was a consequential ground related to TDS paid under protest, and allowed it for statistical purposes. The Tribunal also noted that for AY 2015-16, the revenue's appeal on discount was dismissed, and ESOP amortization and Section 14A expenses were also dismissed. However, the revenue's appeal on Revenue Share License Fees (RSLF) was allowed, and the appeal on Lease Charges was dismissed. The overall result for the assessee's appeal was partly allowed, and the revenue's appeal for AY 2015-16 was also partly allowed.