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699 orders · Page 3 of 14
The Tribunal held that penalty cannot be levied on additions made on an estimated basis, especially when the grounds for concealment or inaccurate particulars are not proven. The issue of penalty on estimated additions is no longer debatable.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to comply with the opportunities given to substantiate their claim and also failed to file a delay condonation application for the appeal. Therefore, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in disallowing the deduction. The assessee had filed the return before the due date, and similar deductions had been allowed in previous years, establishing a principle of consistency. The Tribunal followed coordinate bench decisions and deleted the addition.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act is invalid. This decision is based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal, as recorded in paragraph 19(f) of that judgment. The concession stated that for Assessment Year 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under TOLA. The Tribunal also noted that the approval for the notice under Section 148 was obtained from the PCIT, Central – 3 on 28/07/2022, whereas as per the amended provisions of Section 151 of the Act under the new regime, the approval should have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner (PCCIT) if more than three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. Since the notice was issued with approval from a lower authority than prescribed, it is invalid. Consequently, the assessment order is liable to be quashed. The other issues raised in the appeals and cross-objections were left open.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the matter back to the CIT(A) for joint adjudication of both the present appeal and a related pending appeal concerning a reassessment. The assessee is to be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not given adequate opportunity to present its case, especially concerning the adjournment request which was ignored. The CIT(A) passed the order on the same day the adjournment was requested.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) should have been condoned, considering the COVID-19 pandemic period as per the Supreme Court's directions. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form 10B can be condoned, and exemption u/s 11 and 12 should not be denied solely on this procedural ground, provided other conditions for exemption are met.
The Tribunal held that the addition was made on the basis of reasons recorded for reopening, making the ratio of CIT v. Jet Airways inapplicable. However, due to a factual dispute regarding the sourcing of funds for commodity transactions from professional receipts and a claim of no opportunity of being heard by the CIT(A), the matter was restored.
The Tribunal held that the excess consideration paid over fair value of assets/liabilities acquired in slump sales should be treated as goodwill eligible for depreciation. It also directed the AO to allow brought forward unabsorbed depreciation based on prior year orders.
The Tribunal condoned the 509-day delay in filing the appeal due to a bonafide reason concerning the assessee's tax consultant's health issues. The case was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 390 days, finding the reasons provided by the assessee to be genuine and bonafide, similar to previous cases involving associate trusts. The CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate the appeal on its merits.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had opted for the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and consequently sought to withdraw the appeal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is legally entitled to claim a deduction under section 80G of the Act out of CSR expenses, subject to factual verification. The Tribunal found that the AO's assessment order, which allowed the claim, was not erroneous. The PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under section 263 was therefore found to be incorrect. The reasoning was that the issue of CSR expenses being eligible for deduction under section 80G was no longer res integra, having been settled by various Tribunal judgments, including the jurisdictional Tribunal. The AO had accepted the claim in consonance with these settled legal principles. The Tribunal noted that there is no restriction in the Act disallowing CSR expenses from being considered for section 80G deduction if they otherwise qualify as donations. The Tribunal relied on the decision in Goldman Sachs Services (P.) Ltd. and directed the AO to verify if the payments qualified as donations under section 80G and, if so, to allow the requisite amount. The Tribunal quashed the order of the PCIT, allowing the assessee's grounds of appeal.
The Tribunal noted that the assessment order u/s 143(1)(a) did not clearly specify under which sub-section the adjustment for delayed PF and ESIC payments was made. Finding a lack of clear reasoning, the Tribunal set aside the order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee must justify the delay before the CIT(A) as the delay occurred prior to the CIT(A)'s proceedings. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) to decide the delay issue afresh after considering evidence and affidavits.
The Tribunal held that the AO's failure to dispose of the assessee's objections before proceeding with the assessment and issuing notice u/s 142(1) constituted a breach of mandatory procedure, as laid down by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the reasons for reopening were based on information pertaining to a different assessee (HUF), making the reopening invalid.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had made due inquiries and considered the submissions and documents provided by the assessee. A mere difference of opinion by the PCIT does not make the assessment order erroneous or prejudicial to revenue.
The Tribunal noted that the DVO's report was neither before the Assessing Officer nor the DRP when the addition of INR 19,21,291/- was made. The Tribunal observed that the DVO's report itself contained contradictions regarding the valuation date. Specifically, Annexure II, which listed sale instances, was titled 'Sale Instances (For FMV as on 01/02/2018)', while the DVO's concluding remarks mentioned adopting a derived rate of INR 92,136/- per Sqm. as on 13/12/2017. Furthermore, Annexure I used a BUA rate as on 09/05/2017 to determine the Fair Market Value as on 13/12/2017, but no sale instance of 09/05/2017 was found. The Tribunal also noted that the DVO had accepted several contentions of the assessee regarding the property's condition and location. Considering the overall facts and the objective of putting the issue to rest, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to adopt the sale rate of INR 62,227/- per Sq. Meter (from the sale instance dated 02/09/2017) for determining the Fair Market Value as on 13/12/2017 and to pass a Rectification Order under Section 155(15). Accordingly, Grounds 1 to 5 raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. Ground No. 6 concerning penalty proceedings under Section 270A was dismissed as premature.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. While the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 65,14,594 as unexplained cash credit, the first appellate authority passed an ex-parte order upholding the addition without considering merits. The Tribunal remanded the case back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred by issuing the show-cause notice on 22.12.2024 and passing the rejection order on 28.12.2024, which did not provide sufficient time for the appellant to respond. The Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant one more opportunity.
The Tribunal held that the issue is highly debatable and the view taken by the Assessing Officer (AO) was a plausible one. The PCIT's view was considered a change of opinion, which does not justify assuming jurisdiction under Section 263.
The Tribunal held that the use of 'and' in the penalty notice and order, instead of 'or', vitiated the penalty proceedings. Following the jurisdictional High Court's decision, the Tribunal deleted the penalty.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed by the AO was invalid as it did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 144C. Consequently, the revisionary order passed by the PCIT under Section 263 was also considered bad in law and without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) erred in passing an ex-parte order by ignoring the assessee's timely filed submissions, which violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the matter was remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) for a de novo meritorious adjudication, ensuring the assessee is provided a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that as per Section 36(1)(va) of the Act, employee's contributions are deductible only if credited to the fund before the statutory due date, not just before the return filing date. The decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in 'Checkmate Services Pvt Ltd' was relied upon.
The Tribunal held that the Commissioner ought to have considered the application on merits after giving the assessee an opportunity to furnish requisite details.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had erred in dismissing the appeal based on incorrect information regarding the filing date. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for a reasoned order.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) to reconsider the application for condonation of delay. The CIT(A) was directed to provide the assessee an adequate opportunity to furnish supporting evidence for the delay and then decide the condonation afresh. If the delay is condoned, the CIT(A) should proceed to adjudicate the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal found that there was a sufficient cause for the non-compliance with the notice issued by the CIT(A). Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside and the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had erred in dismissing the appeal based on incorrect information regarding the filing date. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for a reasoned order.
The Tribunal noted a typographical error in the CIT(A)'s order regarding the tax rate. It held that the special rate of 12.5% accepted by the CIT(A) is applicable, and any additions should also be taxed at this rate, not 30%. The AO is directed to compute the tax accordingly.
The Tribunal held that the AO issued the notice for reopening without proper application of mind, as the assessment records already contained all relevant details. The reasons recorded did not establish a bonafide belief that income had escaped assessment or that there was a lack of full disclosure.
The Tribunal found a disconnect between the AO's draft assessment order and the DRP's directions, as the DRP's findings pertained to a different scrip than the one in the AO's order. Consequently, the matter was remanded back to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263. Since the original assessment for the year was finalized and not abated by the search, the PCIT could not revise it under Section 263 based on issues that were not part of the search or did not arise from incriminating material found during the search.
The Tribunal held that the Assessee's application could not be adjudicated properly due to lack of submissions and documents. Therefore, the case is remanded to the Commissioner for fresh decision after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the medical reasons provided and the supporting documents as bonafide. The Tribunal further decided to remand the case to the AO for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee had provided sufficient documentary evidence to prove the genuineness of the sub-contracting transactions. Regarding out-of-book purchases, the Tribunal found the AO's reliance on the input-output ratio to be speculative and lacking a scientific basis.
The Tribunal held that the AO issued the notice for reopening without proper application of mind, as the assessment records already contained all relevant details. The reasons recorded did not establish a bonafide belief that income had escaped assessment or that there was a lack of full disclosure.
The Tribunal held that it is the bounden duty of the Commissioner to decide the appeal on merit, even if the assessee is absent or non-compliant. Therefore, the case was remanded back to the Commissioner for a decision on merit.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance was unsustainable as there was no evidence of penal action or conviction under the Insurance Act against the assessee for violating its provisions. Therefore, Explanation-1 to Section 37(1) was not attracted. The Tribunal also noted that the disallowance was based on a report from Central Excise authorities, which was not sufficient grounds for disallowance under the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal on the issue of penalty related to ad-hoc disallowances of salary, wages, and administrative expenses. The Tribunal found that the AO did not establish that these cash expenditures were false. The disallowances were made due to the lack of verification of vouchers for cash expenses, not because the expenses were found to be false. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the condition that the falsity of expenses should emerge from the search action was not satisfied. Therefore, the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) could not be levied merely because the AO made additions in the assessment order. The Tribunal also allowed the appeal concerning penalties on interest and depreciation expenses. It found that the AO did not record any finding to cover these disallowances under the definition of undisclosed income comprising entries of expenses in the books of accounts. The Tribunal noted that the AO did not establish how the issue of depreciation was unearthed during the search action. In the absence of clear findings of fact satisfying the conditions for undisclosed income under Section 271AAB, the penalty could not be sustained. Consequently, all appeals for assessment years 2014-15 to 2020-21 were partly allowed.
The tribunal noted that the dispute was resolved under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024, and allowed the assessee's application to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding sufficient cause for the assessee's inability to file the appeal on time. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits after granting the assessee a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the AO issued the notice for reopening without proper application of mind, as the assessment records already contained all relevant details. The reasons recorded did not establish a bonafide belief that income had escaped assessment or that there was a lack of full disclosure.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance was unsustainable as there was no evidence of penal action or conviction under the Insurance Act against the assessee for violating its provisions. Therefore, Explanation-1 to Section 37(1) was not attracted. The Tribunal also noted that the disallowance was based on a report from Central Excise authorities, which was not sufficient grounds for disallowance under the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, are applicable to the assessee. The Tribunal reasoned that the payments made by the assessee to its foreign reinsurer for reinsurance services constitute royalty or license fees in the context of the Act. The Tribunal distinguished the present case from the precedents relied upon by the assessee, stating that the nature of the payments in this case is different. The Tribunal found that the assessee had failed to deduct tax at source on these payments as mandated by Section 195 of the Act. Consequently, the disallowance of these expenses under Section 40(a)(iib) was upheld. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided. The operative direction is to uphold the disallowance.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance was unsustainable as there was no evidence of penal action or conviction under the Insurance Act against the assessee for violating its provisions. Therefore, Explanation-1 to Section 37(1) was not attracted. The Tribunal also noted that the disallowance was based on a report from Central Excise authorities, which was not sufficient grounds for disallowance under the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal held that the adjustment made by the CPC under section 143(1) was beyond the scope of permissible adjustments and was made without giving the assessee an opportunity. On merits, the issue of deduction under section 80P(2)(d) has been decided in favour of cooperative housing societies by coordinate benches.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance was unsustainable as there was no evidence of penal action or conviction under the Insurance Act against the assessee for violating its provisions. Therefore, Explanation-1 to Section 37(1) was not attracted. The Tribunal also noted that the disallowance was based on a report from Central Excise authorities, which was not sufficient grounds for disallowance under the Income Tax Act.