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The Tribunal noted that notices were sent to an incorrect email address of the assessee. Considering this and to ensure justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the Ld. Addl./Joint Commissioner for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal noted that notices were sent to an incorrect email address of the assessee. Considering this and to ensure justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the Ld. Addl./Joint Commissioner for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that transactions stemming from a High Court-approved amalgamation scheme are binding on statutory authorities. The revaluation of land to fair market value upon conversion to stock-in-trade is taxable only upon actual sale as per Section 45(2) of the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority and remitted the issue of claiming exemption under Section 11 back to the AO, directing consideration of Form 10 based on CBDT Circular No. 7/2018.
The Tribunal held that information from a pen drive found during a third-party search cannot be considered credible evidence without corroboration. The AO failed to provide the assessee with adverse material and conduct independent inquiries.
The Tribunal, noting that the assessee had filed additional evidence not produced before the lower authorities and that opportunities were not fully utilized, decided to give the assessee one more chance. The issues were remanded back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment.
The Tribunal, noting that the assessee had filed additional evidence not produced before the lower authorities and that opportunities were not fully utilized, decided to give the assessee one more chance. The issues were remanded back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment.
The Tribunal, noting that the assessee had filed additional evidence not produced before the lower authorities and that opportunities were not fully utilized, decided to give the assessee one more chance. The issues were remanded back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 154(7) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which prescribe a mandatory time limit of four years from the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be amended was passed, are absolute. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order was passed on 25.02.2015, and the financial year ended on 31.03.2015. Therefore, the four-year period expired on 31.03.2019. The assessee's application for rectification was filed on 09.10.2019, which was beyond the statutory time limit. The Tribunal found no ambiguity in the word 'shall' used in Section 154(7), indicating its mandatory nature. The cited Supreme Court decisions in Shelly Products and Jaswinder Pal Singh were distinguished as not applicable to the facts of the present case, as they dealt with different circumstances regarding refunds. The Tribunal concluded that the AO's action in rejecting the belated claim was in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and the assessee's failure to act within the prescribed timeframe could not be overlooked. The consequential ground relating to interest under Section 234B was also dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the facts and nature of contracts in the present years were identical to those before the Hon'ble ITSC, and the assessee's eligibility for deduction under Section 80IA was squarely covered in its favor by the ITSC's order. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had also allowed the deduction for AY 2018-19, and the Revenue's appeal against that order was dismissed on technical grounds. The Revenue had not presented any new facts or circumstances to controvert the findings of the ITSC or the CIT(A) for AY 2018-19. Therefore, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the well-reasoned findings of the Ld. CIT(A) and upheld the order allowing the deduction. The Tribunal reasoned that merely because the assessee was paid by the Government for development work, or had entered into a contract with the Government, did not disentitle it to the deduction under Section 80IA(4). The Tribunal also relied on decisions in Adhunik Infrastructure, Bhinmal Contractors Property & Land Developers, and Montecarlo Construction Ltd. The appeals for AYs 2015-16 and 2017-18 were dismissed as the facts and circumstances were identical to AY 2014-15. The issue regarding the admission of additional evidence was not expressly decided but the CIT(A)'s order allowing the deduction was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's case was covered by previous orders of the ITAT and High Court, which supported the claim for deduction. The Revenue failed to provide new evidence to dispute the prior findings.
The Tribunal held that since the Assessee has settled the dispute under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and paid the tax, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's case was covered by previous orders of the ITAT and High Court, which supported the claim for deduction. The Revenue failed to provide new evidence to dispute the prior findings.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee cooperative society from its investments with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The proviso in Section 80P(4) does not exclude such income as the cooperative bank itself is a cooperative society.
For AY 2010-11, the Tribunal noted that the assessment order was already quashed by a coordinate bench, and therefore the penalty arising from it was also quashed. For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) to provide a fresh opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
For AY 2010-11, the Tribunal noted that the assessment order was already quashed by a coordinate bench, and therefore the penalty arising from it was also quashed. For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) to provide a fresh opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had purchased GDRs which were converted to equity shares and then sold, and there was no short selling. The AO's reopening based on the allegation of short selling was incorrect. The Tribunal also noted that the SEBI report relied upon by the DRP did not name the assessee.
The Tribunal held that as per CBDT Circular No. 7/2020, if payment is not made under the Vivad se Vishwas scheme, the declaration becomes null and void. Therefore, the CIT(A) should have decided the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal held that as per CBDT Circular No. 7/2020, if payment is not made under the Vivad se Vishwas scheme, the declaration becomes null and void. Therefore, the CIT(A) should have decided the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, acknowledging the lack of effective service of orders due to the spam folder issue. The matter was restored to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on merits, ensuring the assessee gets a proper opportunity to present its case.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had purchased GDRs which were converted to equity shares and then sold, and there was no short selling. The AO's reopening based on the allegation of short selling was incorrect. The Tribunal also noted that the SEBI report relied upon by the DRP did not name the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the additions. The Revenue failed to provide material evidence to counter the assessee's claim that the transactions were genuine and the capital gains were offered to tax. The Assessing Officer relied heavily on an investigation report without independent verification.
The Tribunal held that the adjustment enhancing the disallowance of Rs. 3,69,663/- (remuneration and interest paid to partners) made by the CPC in the section 154 proceedings was impermissible as it was not a mistake apparent on record concerning the assessee's application for TDS credit. The Tribunal emphasized that an enhancement of income or disallowance of a claim without issuing a notice and granting an opportunity of being heard is bad in law and against the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal noted that the Revenue has other remedies, such as under sections 147 or 263 of the Act, to correct such issues. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the section 154 order dated 28.06.2024 to the extent it disallowed the claim for remuneration and interest paid to partners. The Assessing Officer was directed to restrict verification solely to the TDS credit claimed in the assessee's section 154 application. The issue regarding the non-allowance of TDS credit was implicitly directed to be considered in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the transfer of property occurred in 2006 as per the agreement, and the registration in 2018 was merely a formality. The conditions for invoking Section 56(2)(x) were not met as the consideration was paid in 2006, and Section 50C could not be invoked based on the later registration value.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 for AY 2015-16 dated 28.07.2022 was barred by limitation as the six-year period from the end of the AY expired on 31.03.2022. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the non-grant of Foreign Tax Credit (FTC) is not a permissible adjustment under section 143(1) of the Act. Regarding the denial of FTC, the Tribunal noted that while the CPC disallowed it for non-submission of Form 67 within the stipulated time, the assessee's AR argued that the filing of Form 67 is directory and not mandatory, and that the amendment to Rule 128(9) allowing furnishing of Form 67 up to the due date of filing under section 139(4) should be applied retrospectively. The Tribunal, following various coordinate bench decisions, held that the filing of Form 67 is directory in nature and a mere delay will not preclude the assessee from getting the benefit of tax credit. It further held that the amendment in Rule 128 is curative and should apply retrospectively. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow the Foreign Tax Credit of INR 19,96,823/-. For the interest under sections 234A, 234B, and 234C, the AO was directed to compute it as per the provisions of the Act, as these were consequential.
The Tribunal held that the Form 10BB was digitally signed and uploaded on the same date as the return of income. The validation on a later date was a procedural aspect and did not invalidate the filing. Therefore, the exemption could not be denied.
The Tribunal held that the sale of shares was not bogus, as the purchase was accepted, and the sale was conducted through the stock exchange with proper documentation. The additions made by the AO were deleted.
The Tribunal held that the receipts in dispute are not taxable in India. Regarding the first issue, concerning maintenance, support, and training services, the Tribunal noted that for a receipt to be FTS under Article 12(4)(b) of the India-Singapore DTAA, the service provider must make available technical know-how, knowledge, or skill to the service recipient, enabling the recipient to independently apply it. The Tribunal reasoned that if technical knowledge were truly made available, there would be no need for recurring services. It respectfully followed a coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2018-19, which held that such services did not 'make available' technical skill or expertise, and thus were not taxable as FTS. For the second issue, concerning additional services for software migration, the Tribunal found that the AO had not provided any material to demonstrate that technical knowledge, know-how, or skill was made available to enable independent application by the client. The burden was on the department to prove the 'make available' condition, which it failed to do. The Tribunal also distinguished the AY 2018-19 situation, where similar income was offered due to a service PE, which was not alleged in the impugned AY. Consequently, the receipts were treated as business receipts not taxable in India in the absence of a PE. Both grounds were allowed in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition under Section 68, finding that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence. It also confirmed the allowance of the full Section 54F deduction, relying on the principle that the entire sale consideration was paid by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that while the rental income was declared under 'income from house property', it should be treated as 'income from other sources' under Section 57 of the Income Tax Act, thereby allowing proportionate expenses. The AO was directed to re-compute the taxable income by verifying the rental income and allowing proportionate expenses against it under Section 57.
The tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal without considering additional evidence furnished by the assessee, which violates the principles of natural justice. The tribunal set aside the impugned order.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer misconceived the facts by assuming the entire disallowance related to the housing loan. The Tribunal found that a portion of the interest expense was related to a loan taken for investment purposes, which generated interest income. Therefore, deduction for this portion of the interest expense was allowed.
The Tribunal found that the addition was based solely on the statement of a third-party director of the builder, which was not properly examined or cross-examined by the AO. The builder's subsequent confirmation letter, which contradicted the earlier statement, was also ignored by the lower authorities. The Tribunal noted that the AO did not provide an opportunity for cross-examination and relied on a statement without independent investigation.
The Tribunal held that income from parking facilities should be treated as business income, following the principle of consistency and Supreme Court/High Court precedents. The claim for depreciation on the parking facility building was allowed.
The Tribunal held that income from parking facilities should be treated as business income, following the principle of consistency and Supreme Court/High Court precedents. The claim for depreciation on the parking facility building was allowed.
The Tribunal, noting that the First Appellate Authority had not properly examined the evidence, and citing previous remands in the assessee's own case, set aside the First Appellate Authority's order. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, ensuring the assessee receives a due and reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee did not provide sufficient evidence to establish the nexus between the withdrawn funds and interest income. The arguments presented by the assessee were found to be distinguishable from relied-upon case laws, and thus the disallowance made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was upheld.
The Tribunal upheld the disallowance made by the AO under Section 14A read with Rule 8D. It found no error in the AO's computation and rejected the assessee's arguments regarding sufficient own funds and lack of dividend income, noting that the legislative intent is to disallow expenditure relatable to earning of exempt income irrespective of whether such income was earned.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in deleting additions without a proper remand report from the AO and without verifying the evidence furnished by the assessee. The Tribunal restored the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was not due to malafide or recklessness and fell within normal human conduct. Condoning the delay would allow for substantial justice to be served by deciding the case on merits.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal also granted liberty to the appellant to reapproach the bench if the AO takes any action to rectify the assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) adopted a hyper-technical approach in considering the grounds for condonation of delay. The right of appeal is a statutory right that should not be denied on technical grounds unless there is inordinate delay or gross negligence. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. MST. Katiji & Ors., which emphasizes a liberal approach to condoning delay to do substantial justice and avoid meritorious matters being thrown out. The Tribunal found that the assessee's explanation constituted sufficient cause for the delay. Consequently, the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and the case was restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) to be disposed of on merits after considering the material on record. The assessee was directed to present its case within 90 days of the order. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) did not deal with the assessee's submissions or supporting documents. Citing a previous similar case for AY 2012-13, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal decided that the issue of publicity expenses hinges on the terms of the agreement between the assessee and the producer. Due to new evidence submitted by the assessee, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the issue back to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that since the income was offered to tax and accepted, and in light of a similar case involving the assessee's sister where credit for TDS was allowed, the assessee should be granted credit for the TDS.
The Tribunal ruled that the reassessment proceedings initiated u/s 148 were invalid as they were commenced beyond four years without any failure by the assessee to disclose material facts or new tangible material. Consequently, the revisional order passed by the PCIT u/s 263, being based on an invalid reassessment, was held to be without jurisdiction and quashed.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from its investments with other co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). It was clarified that Section 80P(4) does not disallow this deduction for the assessee society, even if the investment is in a co-operative bank, as the assessee itself is not a co-operative bank claiming deduction.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from its investments with other co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). It was clarified that Section 80P(4) does not disallow this deduction for the assessee society, even if the investment is in a co-operative bank, as the assessee itself is not a co-operative bank claiming deduction.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from its investments with other co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). It was clarified that Section 80P(4) does not disallow this deduction for the assessee society, even if the investment is in a co-operative bank, as the assessee itself is not a co-operative bank claiming deduction.