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412 orders · Page 5 of 9
The Tribunal considered that the assessee had handed over his business and noted a decline in net profit in prior years. While restoring the addition related to TCS return for de novo adjudication, it directed the AO to consider an estimated net profit of 2% on cash deposits of ₹13,62,000, restricting the addition accordingly.
The Tribunal noted that a similar appeal for the same facts and grounds was already filed and heard. The present appeal was identified as a duplication and therefore infructuous.
The Ld. Commissioner dismissed the appeal in limine due to non-compliance. However, considering the facts, the Tribunal found that the Ld. Commissioner failed to decide on merits and thus remanded the case back for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the agreement for the second flat was for a property yet to be constructed and was eventually terminated due to the builder not obtaining necessary approvals. Consequently, the assessee did not purchase a second residential house within the stipulated period. The Tribunal found that the assessee was entitled to the exemption under Section 54F(1) of the Act.
The Tribunal noted that while the assessee did not comply with hearing notices, the CIT(Appeals) failed to decide the appeal on merits. Therefore, considering the facts and for substantial justice, the impugned order was set aside and the case was remanded to the Ld. Commissioner for fresh decision.
The tribunal observed that the assessee failed to provide sufficient documentary evidence to substantiate the claim of deduction for interest paid on capital received from a partnership firm. Both lower authorities also could not decide the issue properly due to lack of specific replies and documents.
The Tribunal held that the process of compressing natural gas into CNG constitutes 'manufacture' as defined under Section 2(29BA) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the assessee is eligible for deductions under Section 32AC and additional depreciation.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(Exemption) had condoned the delay in filing Form 10. Therefore, the Tribunal deemed it fit to restore the issues to the Assessing Officer (AO) to decide afresh after considering the orders of the CIT(Exemption) condoning the delay.
The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of depreciation, confirming that the claim for the road as a tangible asset was already decided against the assessee by the jurisdictional High Court. Regarding the claim of the right to collect toll as an intangible asset, the Tribunal found the Madras High Court's decision (L&T Infrastructure Development Projects Ltd.), which applied the principle of *noscitur a sociis* and rejected this claim, to be binding as it was the sole High Court decision on this specific issue and was not shown to be *per incuriam*. The Tribunal confirmed that the amortisation benefit granted by lower authorities was in consonance with CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2014.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeals for both assessment years. The primary issue was the claim for depreciation on the Project Road. The Tribunal held that the decision of the Hon'ble Madras High Court in L & T Infrastructure Development Projects Limited vs. ACIT is binding as it is the sole decision by any Hon'ble High Court on the issue and there is no contrary decision from any other Hon'ble High Court, including the jurisdictional High Court. This decision held that the toll road is not an intangible asset. The Tribunal also noted that the claim of depreciation treating the road as a tangible asset (plant and machinery or building) was covered against the assessee by decisions of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order denying depreciation. The Tribunal upheld the benefit of amortization for the concession period granted by the AO and upheld by the CIT(A), finding it to be in consonance with CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2014. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the arguments concerning Section 115JA and the applicability of certain Supreme Court decisions, as these were not the core of the appeal before them.
The Tribunal condoned the delay due to sufficient cause. It was held that the Ld CIT(A) acted beyond his powers by setting aside the matter to the AO and should have decided the appeal on merits. Therefore, the order of the Ld CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal directed the assessee to provide evidence for cost of improvement and brokerage to the Assessing Officer for verification. It also held that for Section 54 exemption, the investment in the new property must be in the assessee's name, following the Bombay High Court's precedent, thus disallowing the exemption.
The Tribunal noted that the authorities below doubted the Assessee's transactions primarily due to the alleged non-filing of the original return. However, the Assessee claimed to have filed the return, with the acknowledgment not being filed due to counsel's error. Considering the Assessee's claim as bonafide, the Tribunal decided to remand the case to the AO.
The Tribunal observed that the addition was made on an estimated basis. It is a settled proposition of law that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained on additions made on an estimated basis, especially when the addition represents the profit element in accommodation entries rather than 100% bogus purchases.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to provide documentary evidence for the 2013 agreement and payments, leading the lower authorities to uphold the addition. However, the assessee presented additional evidence before the Tribunal, including an allotment letter and bank statements from 2013.
The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities did not verify the TDS details reflected in Form 26AS. The Tribunal directed the assessee to furnish Form 16A and a reconciliation statement to the AO for verification. It was also directed that not providing tax credit for TDS deducted is against the law.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-compliance but also observed that the Commissioner dismissed the appeal without deciding on merits. For substantial justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order.
The Tribunal observed that when the assessee raises an issue regarding property valuation and requests the AO to appoint a DVO, it becomes essential to determine the property's value through the DVO. Disregarding the controversy of whether the request was made to the AO, the Tribunal decided to remand the case to the AO for consideration of the assessee's claim and for referring the valuation to the DVO.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's father was the actual purchaser and had made all payments from his funds, offering rental income and capital gains to tax. The additions made by the AO in the assessee's hands were not sustainable.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had claimed the purchases were Rs.3,92,92,169/- and argued that only the profit element, not the entire bogus purchase amount, should be added. The Ld. Commissioner had not properly adjudicated this point. The Tribunal directed the Ld. Commissioner to verify the purchase amount and to add only 5% of the alleged bogus purchases, if justified, instead of 100%.
The Tribunal noted that a Co-ordinate Bench in the assessee's own case for the same assessment years held that no penalty under section 271(1)(c) can be levied when the addition is sustained on an estimated basis. The CIT(A)'s decision to partially delete the penalty, attributable to the reduced disallowance on an estimation basis, was therefore upheld.
The Tribunal held that the AO's rejection of the books of accounts was not tenable as it was based on a small sample of alleged bogus purchases (less than 1% of total purchases) without proper examination of the entire accounts. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A)'s findings did not properly pertain to the assessee's case.
The Tribunal held that Section 40A(3) is not attracted as the expenses were incurred on behalf of principals and not debited to the assessee's P&L account. The payments to individual labourers did not exceed the prescribed limit, and business exigency justified cash payments.
The Tribunal observed that the Assessee remained un-represented before the Ld. Commissioner, and the failure to file a condonation petition was due to the death of their previous tax consultant. Considering the peculiar facts, the Tribunal decided to afford one more opportunity to the Assessee.
The Tribunal restored the issue of TDS reconciliation to the CIT(A) for further verification, allowing the assessee an opportunity to submit evidence. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds regarding software license fees and interest income on FDs, and upheld the CIT(A)'s restriction on disallowance under Section 14A.
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal by deleting the disallowance of depreciation and restricting the Section 14A disallowance to the extent of exempt income earned. The Revenue appealed this order.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessee remained non-compliant before the Ld. Commissioner. However, considering the death of the previous tax consultant and the need for proper adjudication, the case was remanded to the Ld. Commissioner for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal observed that the Ld. Commissioner's order reproduced the Assessee's detailed submissions but did not clearly indicate if they were considered. To ensure substantial justice and a fresh decision, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the file of the Ld. Commissioner. The Ld. Commissioner was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity to the Assessee to substantiate his claims with relevant submissions and documents.
The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal. For bogus purchases, the disallowance was restricted to 8% of the alleged amount, estimating profit. For R&D expenses, several items like clinical trial expenses, building repairs, and exhibit batches were held eligible for weighted deduction, while R&D salary was rejected and foreign consultancy charges were restored for fresh examination. For Section 14A, the interest disallowance was deleted, and the other disallowance was to be recomputed based on investments yielding exempt income.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 was invalid as it was based on a change of opinion and not on any new material. The details of the advance were already disclosed during the original scrutiny assessment, and no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts was established.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessee had disclosed the exports and offered them for taxation. The discounted amount received from the bank was accounted for as a contingent liability and subsequently realized. The Tribunal found that the addition made by the revenue was unsustainable given the peculiar facts and circumstances, especially since the amount was offered for taxation and the revenue did not refute the Assessee's claims.
The Tribunal restored the issue of TDS reconciliation to the CIT(A) for further verification, allowing the assessee an opportunity to submit evidence. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds regarding software license fees and interest income on FDs, and upheld the CIT(A)'s restriction on disallowance under Section 14A.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had issued notices but the assessee failed to respond. However, the CIT(A) should have decided the appeal on merit as per Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the order of CIT(A) was set aside.
The CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's appeal ex-parte without discussing the merits of the case. The Tribunal noted that while the assessee did not comply with notices, the CIT(A) was expected to provide reasons for the decision as per Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for denovo adjudication on merit.
The ITAT observed that the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order without discussing the merits of the case and in violation of natural justice principles. Therefore, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to afford the assessee another opportunity.
The Tribunal noted that the loan amount of Rs. 1,35,00,000/- was received by the assessee from Neeta Maloo and was likely a bonafide mistake in grouping it with Mangal Credit. The bank statements showed the funds were received by Neeta Maloo from her husband. However, due to non-compliance with a notice under section 133(6) and signature discrepancy, verification of Neeta Maloo's identity was required.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the CIT(A) and restored the matters for fresh adjudication on merits, recognizing the assessee's statutory right to appeal. This was made conditional upon the assessee depositing a cost of Rs. 5,000/- per appeal into the Prime Minister's Relief Fund within sixty days.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) upheld the Ld. CIT(A)'s order. It ruled that a summary dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) by the Supreme Court without providing reasons does not constitute a declaration of law binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. Therefore, the CIT(A) was justified in relying on the jurisdictional High Court precedent (M/s. Mohd. Haji Adam & Co.) instead of the Supreme Court's summary dismissal in N.K. Proteins Ltd. for restricting the addition to the GP rate.
The Tribunal noted the application for withdrawal of the appeal. It was stated that the appeal was filed due to an inadvertent error and that the Corporate Debtor is under moratorium due to CIRP. Therefore, the Assessee requested no further action.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from its investments with another co-operative society is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). Following a coordinate bench decision, the Tribunal directed the AO to grant the deduction.
The Tribunal noted that the present appeal was a duplicate of an earlier appeal that had already been heard. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the explanation to Section 14A, introduced by the Finance Act 2022, is clarificatory and retrospective. They also noted that the issue of whether disallowance under Section 14A is attracted even without exempt income is not settled by the Supreme Court. Following various High Court and Tribunal decisions, the Tribunal directed the AO to restrict the disallowance under Section 14A to the extent of exempted income earned.
The Tribunal held that the explanation to Section 14A, introduced by the Finance Act 2022, is clarificatory and retrospective. They also noted that the issue of whether disallowance under Section 14A is attracted even without exempt income is not settled by the Supreme Court. Following various High Court and Tribunal decisions, the Tribunal directed the AO to restrict the disallowance under Section 14A to the extent of exempted income earned.
The Tribunal considered that while the statement admitting suppressed sales was retracted, accepting that no additional expenses were incurred for these sales is contrary to commercial principles, especially since the assessee's accounts were not rejected. A reasonable net profit margin should be applied to the suppressed sales.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's submission that the order u/s. 143(1) was received on February 8, 2023, constituted sufficient cause to condone the delay. Therefore, the delay of 4036 days was condoned.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 365 days, stating that substantial justice should prevail over technicalities and that filing an appeal is a statutory right. The Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the CIT(E) to consider the eligibility of the assessee-Trust for registration.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, following the Supreme Court's ruling that substantial justice should prevail over technicalities. However, since the Ld. CIT(A) did not decide the issue on merit, the Tribunal restored the matter back to the Ld. CIT(A) for a fresh consideration after providing an adequate opportunity to both parties.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer for verification. The eligibility for deduction depends on whether the cooperative bank conducts banking business as defined under Section 5(b) of the Banking Regulation Act. If it does not, the interest income is eligible for deduction.
The tribunal noted that the assessee did not receive a proper opportunity of being heard due to the non-receipt of notices at the correct addresses. Therefore, the tribunal decided to remit the appeal back to the Ld. CIT(A) to provide the assessee an opportunity to present their case with necessary evidence.