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412 orders · Page 2 of 9
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal, holding that the AO's action of treating part of the payments as genuine and the rest as ingenuine was illogical and lacked reasoning. The CIT(A) also noted that the AO incorrectly invoked Section 69C as the expenditure was accounted for and the source was not disputed. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A), finding the AO's estimation to be ad-hoc and not based on explained expenditure.
The Tribunal held that the AO cannot assume the role of a businessman and estimate profits arbitrarily. The AO did not bring any material on record to show that the assessee's books of accounts were unreliable or that the offered explanations for the fall in GP ratio were incorrect. The assessee's submission of a specific bill showing a GP of 4.58% was noted, and the Tribunal relied on a precedent where similar additions were deleted.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not granted sufficient opportunity of being heard due to the gap in notices. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that joint ownership of other residential properties does not disentitle an assessee from claiming deduction under Section 54F. Following the Madras High Court's decision, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal, following the Bombay High Court precedent in Mohd. Farhan A. Shaikh, held that the penalty notice was invalid due to its ambiguity and failure to specify the exact charge. Consequently, the penalty imposed was deleted, and the assessee's jurisdictional ground was allowed, rendering other grounds academic.
The CIT(A) deleted the additions, finding that the evidence relied upon by the AO, including loose papers and WhatsApp chats, was not sufficiently corroborated or properly established to warrant the additions. The tribunal is now hearing an appeal against this deletion.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A) was required to decide the appeal on the grounds raised by the assessee by way of a reasoned order. Since the Ld. CIT(A) did not decide the grounds on merit, the order was set aside and restored back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh decision.
The Tribunal found that the TPO/AO did not record any finding that the information provided by the assessee was inaccurate or insufficient to determine the Arm's Length Price (ALP). Importantly, any Transfer Pricing (TP) adjustment made by the TPO was subsequently deleted by the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) and accepted by the Revenue. Following judicial precedents, the Tribunal ruled that penalty u/s 271G is not sustainable under these circumstances, especially when there was no lack of bonafides or supine indifference from the assessee in providing records.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had correctly allowed the deduction u/s 80ID, deleted additions on opening balances of unsecured loans, and deleted disallowances of salary and commission.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment for AY 2014-15 was bad in law as the time limit for issuing notice under Section 149 of the Act had expired on March 31, 2021. Consequently, all assessment orders for the years under consideration were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the issue was covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court of Bombay in the case of Mohmmad Haji Adam & Co. The High Court's decision stated that additions should be restricted to bring the gross profit rate on purchases to the same rate as other genuine purchases. Since the assessee claimed a gross profit rate of 4%, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer erred by estimating income without rejecting the assessee's books of accounts, as required by Section 145 of the Act. The difference in closing stock was found to be based on an incorrect comparison.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Section 14A cannot exceed exempt income or expenses claimed. It also ruled that Rule 8D disallowance cannot be applied to Section 115JB. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for verification and restriction of disallowance.
The Tribunal found that the commission income of Rs. 22,85,000, which appeared in Form 26AS for AY 2017-18, was indeed declared by the assessee in the profit and loss account for AY 2017-18. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to adequately prove the source of cash deposits from sales and withdrawals. Considering the net profit rates reported, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to adopt a Net Profit (NP) rate of 3.5% on the total cash deposit to be treated as income.
The Tribunal followed a coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case, holding that no disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D is warranted when exempt income is earned on shares/stocks held as stock-in-trade. Consequently, the disallowance made by the AO was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had furnished necessary details and documentary evidence to prove the genuineness of the loan transactions. The bank statements and financial statements of the lenders indicated their capacity to lend. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee had successfully discharged the initial burden under Section 68 of the Act.
The Tribunal, following the decision in PCIT v. Mohommad Haji Adam & Co., held that purchases cannot be rejected without disturbing sales in case of a trader. Additions should be restricted to the extent of gross profit on impugned purchases.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) issued only one notice in each case and did not provide an adequate opportunity for hearing or sufficient reasoning for sustaining the additions. The appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that in an identical case for AY 2010-11, the addition was restricted to 10% of the bogus purchases. Following this precedent and the High Court's decision in PCIT v. Mohommad Haji Adam & Co., the Tribunal directed the AO to restrict the addition to 10% of the bogus purchases.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) was not warranted if the conditions of the proviso to Section 201 were met. Since the assessee provided supporting documents before the Tribunal, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification of these additional evidences.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated based on the same information previously examined, constituting a 'change of opinion' and amounting to a 'review', which is not permitted under Section 147 of the Act. Therefore, the reassessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 184 days in filing the appeal, considering the explanation provided by the assessee as reasonable and not due to malafide intent. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) did not adjudicate the alternative plea raised by the assessee and set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate his claim of earning commission income and that he was acting as a commission agent. The Tribunal also noted that the revenue accepted a 0.5% commission in similar cases, but the assessee's reported gross receipts were significantly lower than what would be expected for a 1% commission. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication.
The assessee's appeal was dismissed as withdrawn because it was a duplicate appeal that had already been disposed of by the same bench. The assessee intended to withdraw this appeal on this ground.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence furnished by the assessee. Due to the need for examination of these evidences, the Tribunal decided to restore the issues to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed it was a case of short deduction, not non-deduction, and presented new evidence. The Tribunal decided to restore the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication after verifying the supporting evidence presented by the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the interest expenditure should be considered on a net basis (expenditure minus income). Furthermore, the disallowance computed by the AO exceeded the total expenses related to earning exempt income, particularly D-mat charges. Since the assessee had already suo moto disallowed a significant amount, no further disallowance was warranted.
The Tribunal condoned a 136-day delay in filing the appeal, finding the reasons reasonable. Recognizing the assessee's challenges to the additions and applying principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order. All disputed issues were remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, providing the assessee another opportunity to present its case, subject to a cost payment of Rs. 5000/-.
The tribunal held that the disallowance of Rs. 23,77,284/- under Section 14A was not justified as the loans were taken for capital contribution and the remuneration received from the firm was already taxed. Ground No. 2 was not considered as it was not raised before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the CIT(A) did not reflect whether the assessee was afforded an opportunity of hearing. While the CIT(A) made a general reference to the assessee's submissions, these were not part of the order, and no reasons were provided. The Tribunal found a lack of due application of mind, critical analysis, or objective consideration in the CIT(A)'s order, which is expected of a first appellate authority. The Tribunal emphasized that the absence of analysis mummifies the core spirit of an order and that reasons are the life of the law. Citing Section 250(6) of the Act, which requires the CIT(A) to state points for determination, decision, and reasons, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate in the interest of justice and fair play to remit the matter back to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits and to pass a speaking order. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be diligent and cooperative and instructed the CIT(A) to ensure observance of the principles of natural justice. No observations were made on the merits of the case. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that a previous order of the ITAT in the assessee's own case had already set aside the order passed under Section 263. Since the Section 263 order was quashed, the subsequent assessment order based on it was rendered invalid.
The Tribunal observed that the addition was sustained on an estimated basis. It held that no penalty under Section 271(1)(c) can be levied when the addition is based on estimation, especially when sales in the books of accounts were accepted. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities.
The Tribunal noted that the tax effect in both appeals was below the monetary limits stipulated in CBDT Circular No. 03/2018 and Circular No. 17/2019, which directs that no appeal shall be filed before the Tribunal if the tax effect is below Rs. 50,00,000/-.
The Tribunal noted that the tax effect in both appeals was below the monetary limits stipulated in CBDT Circular No. 03/2018 and Circular No. 17/2019, which directs that no appeal shall be filed before the Tribunal if the tax effect is below Rs. 50,00,000/-.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had reported the transactions as trading losses and not LTCG. The revenue failed to substantiate that the assessee obtained LTCG or short-term capital loss (STCL) and did not establish any unaccounted money transactions. The transactions were through a SEBI registered broker, supported by contract notes and STT, with sale proceeds received through banking channels.
The Tribunal decided to condone the delay in filing the appeal before it, considering the reasons provided by the assessee and in the interest of justice. On the merits, the Tribunal found that the impugned order of the CIT(A) was not based on merits, lacked proper application of mind, and did not contain any critical analysis or objective consideration. The Tribunal emphasized that the absence of analysis indicates a non-application of mind and undermines the spirit of the order. It noted that the CIT(A) was expected to state points for determination, decisions, and reasons as required by Section 250(6) of the Act. Consequently, in the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to remit the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits and to pass a speaking order. The assessee was directed to be diligent and cooperative, and the CIT(A) was directed to ensure observance of principles of natural justice. The Tribunal explicitly stated that no observations were made regarding the merits of the case. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, and the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge its onus to prove the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the cash loans as required under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal noted that the loans were old, some lenders were unavailable, and the Supreme Court's decision in Lovely Exports was not applicable as the genuineness of the loans was not established.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in quashing the assessment order. The Tribunal noted that the order dated 26.02.2021 passed by the CIT(Exemptions) under Section 263 of the Act had already been set aside by a previous order of the ITAT dated 22.04.2022 in the assessee's own case for AY 2015-16 and 2016-17. The ITAT's reasoning in that order was that for invoking Section 263, both conditions – that the assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue – must be satisfied. Since the ITAT found the assessment order was not erroneous, one of the mandatory conditions was not met, and thus the CIT(E) erred in exercising revisional powers. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the assessment order passed under Section 143(3) based on the now-set-aside Section 263 order does not survive, as its foundation has collapsed. The Tribunal found no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order of the CIT(A). The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed, subject to the outcome of the appeal pending before the Hon'ble High Court.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT correctly invoked section 263, as the original assessment order by the FAO was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue by levying tax at a normal rate instead of the higher rate prescribed under section 115BBE for the addition made under section 68. The Tribunal found that the FAO's failure to apply section 115BBE resulted in revenue loss, validating the PCIT's revisional action. The Tribunal found no perversity in the PCIT's order.
The Tribunal, citing the Supreme Court's observations in Collector, Land & Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Others, held that refusing to condone delay can defeat justice, while condoning it allows for a decision on merits. Therefore, to prevent grave injustice, the issues were restored to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the revisionary order passed by the CIT under section 263 of the Act had been quashed by a prior ITAT order. The assessment order was passed in consequence of this quashed revisionary order. Therefore, the assessment order itself was rendered void ab initio.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had indeed claimed the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) in its return of income, contrary to the finding of the CIT(A). The Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in The Mavilayi Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. vs. CIT, also directed the AO to grant the deduction. Furthermore, the AO was directed to grant credit for the self-assessment tax, subject to verification.
The CIT(A) allowed the deduction u/s 80GGA of the Act, holding that the assessee is eligible for this deduction. The Tribunal, relying on a co-ordinate bench's decision, upheld the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal acknowledged the Bombay High Court's ruling in a similar case (*PCIT v. Mohommad Haji Adam & Co.*) which suggested additions for bogus purchases should be restricted to the gross profit rate when sales are not disputed. However, in the instant case, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the AO's findings and confirmed the addition of 12.5% of the impugned bogus purchases.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT correctly invoked section 263 as the Assessing Officer (AO) had failed to make necessary inquiries and failed to bring the entire bogus investment to tax under Section 69B, which rendered the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of additions, finding that the assessee's consistent use of the project completion method should be maintained. It also ruled that the interest on advances to the subsidiary was allowable as a business expediency, relying on Supreme Court judgments.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not given an opportunity for a personal hearing, which is a violation of natural justice principles. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside as not legally sustainable.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal ex parte without dealing with the merits of the case. The Tribunal emphasized the provisions of Section 250 of the Act, which mandates a speaking order on the merits. Given the circumstances, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to remit the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in *Mavilayi Services Co-operative Bank Limited*, held that Section 80P(4) is not applicable if the co-operative society does not hold a banking license to lend money to the public. Since the appellant society does not possess such a license, the deduction for interest/dividend income from co-operative banks is allowable under Section 80P(2)(d) which specifically covers 'any income by way of interest' from co-operative societies. Therefore, the disallowance made by the lower authorities was not sustainable.