657 orders · Page 4 of 14
The Tribunal held that the TPO's order was passed after the period of limitation prescribed under Section 92CA(3A) of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the subsequent assessment proceedings initiated based on this order were also considered invalid.
The Tribunal restored the case to the CIT(E) for deciding the matter on merit. The assessee was directed to make due compliance and was to be provided adequate opportunities to make necessary submissions.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), rendering the CIT(A)'s dismissal as time-barred incorrect. Since the delay in filing Form 10B was condoned by the competent authority, the ground for denying exemption under Section 11 no longer survived. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant the exemption of INR 8,21,871/-.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had shown a profit of approximately 10% on the tainted purchases, which was higher than the regular net profit. Relying on the Bombay High Court's decision in Mohommad Haji Adam & Co., the Tribunal held that no further addition was warranted.
The Tribunal acknowledged the 80-day delay and the incorrect information in Form No. 35, validating the CIT(A)'s initial dismissal. However, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the file of the CIT(A), directing the assessee to submit a proper application for condonation of delay by resubmitting Form No. 35. The CIT(A) is to then consider the condonation application and, if satisfied about sufficient cause, decide the appeal on its merits.
The Tribunal held that the property was indeed purchased in 1992 for Rs. 3,51,000/-, as evidenced by the agreement and subsequent maintenance charges paid by the assessee to the housing society. The later registration and stamp duty payment at market value reflected the then-prevailing rates, not the actual purchase consideration.
The Tribunal held that Section 250 of the Income Tax Act mandates the CIT(A) to decide appeals on merits and does not permit summary dismissal. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside because it failed to adjudicate the appeal on its merits.
The Tribunal, while acknowledging that the appellant could not produce all necessary documents due to the age of the transactions and reliance on brokers, considered the appellant's low net profit as declared in their return. They decided to reduce the profit addition from 12.5% to 5% of the disputed purchases, deeming it to meet the ends of justice.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and restored the case to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard and directing compliance with notices.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not pursue its appeal before the CIT(A) diligently, leading to an ex-parte order. The Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the CIT(A) for a decision on merit after providing the appellant a reasonable opportunity to be heard, considering the non-compliance due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Section 14A should be restricted to the suo moto disallowance made by the assessee, as the Assessing Officer did not record proper satisfaction. It also held that incentives under the New Sugar Industry Promotion Policy are capital in nature. The issue of foreign exchange gain was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh decision.
The Tribunal upheld the profit rate of 1% on sales concerning bogus transactions, following previous decisions. However, regarding the disallowance of loss on investment sale, the Tribunal remanded the issue back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the AO had disallowed the deduction primarily due to the lack of documentary evidence for raw material costs and the genuineness of sales, as many parties to whom the organic manure was allegedly sold could not be contacted or did not respond to notices. The CIT(A) had confirmed the AO's order. However, the Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the matter to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that while the limitation period for filing an appeal is 30 days, the appellate authority has the power to condone delays if sufficient cause is shown. The Tribunal emphasized that substantial justice should not be denied on technicalities and procedural law is subservient to justice.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a cooperative society, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P of the Act. It further held that the interest income received from other cooperative banks falls within the ambit of Section 80P(2)(d) and is not taxable in the hands of the assessee due to the principle of mutuality, as the other cooperative banks are also cooperative societies.
The tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal without adjudicating the grounds on merits. Citing a jurisdictional High Court precedent, it was held that an appeal cannot be dismissed for non-prosecution. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee acted on a bonafide belief and that TDS was deducted on income. Relying on High Court judgments, the Tribunal found the penalty unjustified, especially since the assessee is a welfare fund not engaged in profit-making activities.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to consider the additional evidence and the remand proceedings were not concluded. The AO also failed to complete the remand proceedings and submit a report. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263, as the Assessing Officer had made sufficient inquiries and the issue of loans from the same parties was already addressed in the prior assessment year. The Tribunal quashed the PCIT's orders and restored the AO's assessment orders.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A)'s order was not sustainable in law for multiple reasons: (i) the order was passed in the name of a deceased person, (ii) the CIT(A) lacked the authority to restore the issue to the AO for adjudication on merit, and (iii) the CIT(A) did not properly adjudicate the legal objections raised by the assessee, particularly regarding the non-service of notice to all legal heirs.
The Tribunal noted that the law does not permit filing an appeal for the second time for the same cause. Considering the assessee's submissions, the Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263, as the Assessing Officer had made sufficient inquiries and the issue of loans from the same parties was already addressed in the prior assessment year. The Tribunal quashed the PCIT's orders and restored the AO's assessment orders.
The CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's appeal, upholding the addition. The Tribunal found that the addition was based on estimation in the absence of complete documentary evidence and explanations. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law as they were initiated without proper 'reason to believe' and were time-barred. Consequently, the grounds raised by the Revenue on merit were rendered academic.
The Tribunal held that an appeal against an order passed by the Dispute Resolution Panel under Section 144C(5) of the Income Tax Act is not maintainable as per Section 253 of the Act. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to examine the audited financial statement of the lender company, M/s Samyak Exim Pvt. Ltd., to ascertain the creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction. The assessee was given an opportunity to produce further evidence.
The Tribunal noted that the documents supporting the appellant's claims were filed for the first time before the ITAT. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) to consider these documents and pass a fresh order on merits.
The Tribunal reversed the orders of the lower authorities and directed the deletion of the addition of Rs. 84,69,010/-. The Tribunal found overwhelming evidence that the entire payment for the property was made by Mr. V. Arumugam Pillai through his bank account with the Central Bank of India, Bhayander. The builder confirmed receiving payments from Mr. Pillai, and receipts were issued in the name of Mr. Pillai and his wife, detailing cheque numbers, amounts, and the bank. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer did not establish that this bank account belonged to the assessee. The Tribunal also considered the builder's confirmation that payments were not made by the assessee but by Mr. Pillai, despite the existence of a project balance sheet showing the asset. The Tribunal found that the addition was made solely based on the affidavit of Mr. Pillai and the assessee's balance sheet, without sufficient independent inquiry into the ownership of the bank account. Consequently, Ground No. 2 of the appeal was allowed. In light of this decision, Grounds No. 3 and 4 were not required to be adjudicated.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had maintained separate accounts for excise duty and service tax, which, according to the guidance notes, would not be included in the turnover. The Tribunal directed the assessing officer to consider the tax rate at 25% instead of 30%.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to provide cogent material connecting the assessee to any alleged modus operandi of price rigging. The assessee had discharged her onus by submitting documentary evidence, and the AO did not conduct independent verification.
The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities rejected the claim solely on the grounds of insufficient documentation without examining the merits. The Tribunal referenced a High Court decision supporting the assessee's claim if prior year book profits were increased by these provisions. The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided Appendix E with year-wise breakup of written-back provisions.
The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities rejected the claim solely on the grounds of insufficient documentation without examining the merits. The Tribunal referenced a High Court decision supporting the assessee's claim if prior year book profits were increased by these provisions. The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided Appendix E with year-wise breakup of written-back provisions.
The Tribunal decided to remit the issue of credit card expenses and cash deposits back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after the assessee provides necessary documentation. For unsecured loans, the Tribunal deleted the addition related to the opening balance of Rs. 1,53,70,000/- but sustained the addition of Rs. 5,40,000/- for fresh credit received during the year due to lack of explanation. The disallowance of travelling expenses was dismissed.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to examine the creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction in light of the audited financial statements of the lender company, which were not previously filed. The grounds challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings were dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is consequential to the assessment order. If the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) in the quantum assessment are deleted by the appellate authorities, then the basis for levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c) ceases to exist. In this case, the additions made by the AO for the assessment years 2009-10 to 2011-12 were deleted by the CIT(A) in the quantum appeals. Consequently, the penalty orders passed by the AO and upheld by the CIT(A) are unsustainable. The Tribunal followed the ratio laid down in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta (2008) 297 ITR 317 (Bom), which held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained if the additions are deleted in appeal. The penalty orders were quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the AO relied heavily on the 'Insight Portal' without providing the data to the assessee for proper explanation. Regarding sundry creditors, the Tribunal observed that the AO had accepted the corresponding purchases. Citing previous judgments, the Tribunal held that if purchases are accepted, additions for related sundry creditors under Section 68 are not tenable, especially when the settlement of these creditors was through sales.
The Tribunal noted that the assessment years in question were unabated. It also observed that the Assessing Officer had issued a show cause notice and the assessee had furnished partial details, leading to the addition. The Tribunal considered the additional evidence submitted by the assessee before the CIT(A) regarding the loan transaction.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had made a suo motu disallowance but lacked detailed justification. It was found that borrowed funds might not have been entirely for business purposes. Consequently, the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for a fresh determination.
The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(E) that the onus was on the assessee to prove its eligibility for registration. However, in the interest of justice, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148A was not sustainable as the AO failed to establish the assessee's involvement in any sham transaction and showed a lack of application of mind. The additions/disallowances made in the reopened proceedings were therefore quashed.
The Tribunal held that since the revision order passed by the Ld.PCIT under Section 263 was quashed by the Tribunal itself, the assessment order passed to give effect to it would also fall. Therefore, the Ld.CIT(A) was justified in allowing the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal held that material found and seized from a third party's premises cannot be used for assessment under Section 153A against the assessee. Such material, if incriminating, should be used under Section 153C.
The Tribunal deleted the addition on account of unsecured loans and disallowed interest thereon, finding that the loan was not an accommodation entry. It also deleted additions related to 'on money' receipts, following its earlier decisions in similar cases.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel submitted a letter to withdraw the appeal as the assessee was no longer aggrieved. In view of this, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal decided on the issues as follows: Regarding the addition of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- (KDC, AY 2016-17) and Rs. 50,00,000/- (Mangesh D. Gaikar, AY 2016-17) from M/s. Annex Tradelink Private Limited, the Tribunal found that the assessee had failed to establish the creditworthiness of the lender and the genuineness of the transaction. The Tribunal noted that the seized documents indicated the lender was a shell company. Therefore, the additions were upheld. Consequently, the disallowance of interest on these loans (Rs. 9,19,480/- for KDC and Rs. 3,87,945/- for Mangesh D. Gaikar) was also upheld. On the issue of "on money" receipts for flat sales (KDC for AY 2017-18, ME for AY 2014-15, Mangesh D. Gaikar for AY 2018-19), the Tribunal found that incriminating material was found during the search, including seized documents and admissions by Shri Mangesh Gaikar. The Tribunal held that the documents seized from Mrs. Suvarna D. Amte, though containing flat details, when read in conjunction with other seized materials and the admission of Shri Mangesh Gaikar, supported the revenue's claim of unaccounted cash receipts. The Tribunal rejected the assessee's argument that the partner's admission in his individual capacity did not bind the firm. The Tribunal also addressed the contention regarding Section 153D approval, noting that the Assessing Officer had provided explanations and that the issue of mechanical approval was not substantiated. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the assessment orders on this ground. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that in unabated assessment years, additions cannot be made without incriminating material found during the search, following the Supreme Court's decision in Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. Consequently, assessment orders based on such additions were quashed.
The assessee's counsel requested to withdraw the appeal. The reason provided was that the CIT(E) had granted the certificate for regular registration under section 12A.
The Tribunal noted that the core of the dispute revolves around whether the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) were based on incriminating material found during the search, as required for assessments under Section 153A/153C. The assessees argued that no such material was found, and the AO's conclusions were drawn without proper inquiry or opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal observed that the AO had made additions based on alleged accommodation entries and "on money" receipts, partly relying on the admission of a partner (Mr. Mangesh Gaikar) in his individual capacity for unaccounted receipts from projects constructed by him. However, the assessees contended that this individual admission did not automatically implicate the firms (KDC and ME) in receiving unaccounted income. The Tribunal also considered the procedural ground regarding the approval under Section 153D. Given the emphasis on the absence of incriminating material and the procedural fairness arguments, the Tribunal decided to examine these aspects more closely. The Tribunal found merit in the assessees' plea that the additions were not substantiated by direct incriminating material seized during the search and that the AO had not provided adequate opportunities for the assessees to explain their position. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and remanded the matters back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that Article 14(4) of the India-Spain DTAA is not applicable as the assessee's shareholding (9.65%) in the company does not constitute a controlling interest. Furthermore, the value of immovable property as a percentage of total assets did not exceed 50% based on the provided valuation reports.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings cannot survive if the assessment order on which it is based has been set aside. Since the addition made in the assessment order for AY 2011-12 was set aside by a previous Tribunal order, the penalty levied on that basis is unsustainable.