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534 orders · Page 6 of 11
The First Appellate Authority dismissed the assessee's appeal, erroneously believing the assessee had availed the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme and withdrawn the appeal. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had neither withdrawn the appeal nor paid taxes under the scheme.
The Tribunal held that the AO made the addition solely on the basis of non-compliance with notices without proving cessation of liability. The assessee had provided evidence of subsequent payments and substantiating documents, which were not considered by the AO. Therefore, the addition was unwarranted.
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks fall within the definition of cooperative societies under Section 2(19) of the Income Tax Act, and therefore, interest earned on investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The lower authorities' orders were reversed.
The Tribunal observed that the tax effect of Rs.16,49,230/- is below the monetary limit of Rs.50,00,000/- set by CBDT Circular No. 17/2019 (amending Circular No. 3/2018) for filing appeals before the ITAT. Consequently, the revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal deleted the addition made on account of the difference between ITR and service tax/GST returns, finding the assessee's explanation satisfactory. It also deleted the addition made on account of payments to retired partners, relying on judicial precedents that treated such payments as diverted income.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals due to sufficient cause. For the penalty appeal (ITA No. 83/M/2024), the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The duplicate appeal (ITA No. 88/Mum/2024) was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that while there were partial submissions before the Assessing Officer, there was no compliance at the first appellate stage. However, in the interest of justice, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing the CIT(A) to provide reasonable opportunities and call for a remand report if necessary.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee could not make compliance before the CIT(A) due to the illness of their earlier counsel, which was considered a bonafide reason. The Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merit, allowing the assessee an opportunity to present their case.
The CIT(A) sustained the addition regarding contract receipts and restricted the addition for immovable property investment to Rs. 14,01,000. The Tribunal observed that the assessee faced difficulties in furnishing documents due to issues with e-mail communication during appellate proceedings.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals due to sufficient cause. For the penalty appeal (ITA No. 83/M/2024), the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The duplicate appeal (ITA No. 88/Mum/2024) was dismissed as withdrawn.
The ITAT condoned the delay of 112 days in filing the appeal, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and the ex-parte nature of the CIT(A) order. It remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits, emphasizing that the CIT(A) must ensure principles of natural justice are followed, and the assessee must be diligent in attending hearings.
The Tribunal held that the issue of transfer pricing adjustment was rendered infructuous and academic due to accepting the primary arguments. Consequently, the appeal by the Revenue was dismissed. The legal issues raised by the assessee were also deemed academic and did not require separate adjudication.
The Tribunal, while noting the assessee's non-compliance, decided to grant one more opportunity to present the case before the CIT(A) in the interest of natural justice. The issues were remanded for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal, acknowledging the principles of natural justice, decided to remand the case back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. This grants the assessee another opportunity to present documentary evidence to substantiate their case. The assessee is directed to comply and cooperate with the proceedings without undue delay.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have decided the assessee's appeal along with the pending appeal of the co-partner, where the same amount was added substantively. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal, acknowledging the principles of natural justice, decided to remand the case back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. This grants the assessee another opportunity to present documentary evidence to substantiate their case. The assessee is directed to comply and cooperate with the proceedings without undue delay.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee was denied a reasonable opportunity of hearing at both the assessment and first appellate stages. To ensure justice, particularly as the assessee is deceased and represented by a legal heir, the impugned order was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration, with directions to provide the assessee a proper opportunity of being heard.
The tribunal held that Rule 128(9) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, requiring Form 67 to be filed by the due date of the return, is directory and not mandatory. Relying on several coordinate bench decisions, it was concluded that a delay in filing Form 67 should not lead to the denial of legitimate FTC, especially when filed before the completion of assessment. The assessee was found eligible for the foreign tax credit.
The Tribunal held that no TP adjustment is required for the corporate guarantee provided by the assessee to its AE, following its own earlier decision. Consequently, the appeal by the Revenue and the cross-objections by the assessee were dismissed.
The Tribunal noted the rejection was due to the incorrect sub-clause selection. Recognizing the assessee's claim of portal issues and in the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(E) to allow the assessee to re-submit the application under the correct sub-clause and decide the registration afresh after granting a hearing.
The Tribunal held that Section 79 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is not applicable in this case because there was no change in the shareholding pattern of the group, despite a change in the proportion of shares held by the two main shareholders. The Tribunal relied on a previous ITAT decision for the same assessee regarding similar facts and grounds.
The Tribunal observed that the assessment and penalty orders were passed against a company, while the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order against the individual assessee. The CIT(A) did not decide the case on merits, nor was it clear if the assessee raised the issue of the order being passed in the wrong name before the first appellate authority.
The Tribunal referred to CBDT Circular No. 3/2018 and Circular No. 17/2019, which stipulated that appeals shall not be filed before the ITAT if the tax effect does not exceed Rs. 50,00,000/-. Since the tax effect in this appeal was below the monetary limit, it was considered for dismissal.
The Tribunal found that the reassessment proceedings were invalid due to a mismatch in the reasons recorded and communicated. Consequently, the additions made by the Assessing Officer were quashed as being beyond the scope of the assessment. Issues decided on merits were confirmed in favor of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) is specifically for income derived by a co-operative society from its investments with any other co-operative society. The decision in the Bangalore Club case is not applicable here, and the matter needs to be restored to the Assessing Officer for verification.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee's activity constituted manufacturing or production, entitling them to additional depreciation. The disallowance under Section 14A was correctly restricted to the exempt dividend income earned.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had furnished sufficient evidence for the purchase and sale of shares through banking channels. The AO's additions were based on investigation reports and unsubstantiated presumptions, without independent inquiry or evidence linking the assessee to price manipulation.
The Tribunal condoned the 42-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding reasonable cause due to the ex-director's ill-health and the circumstances surrounding the non-receipt and non-attendance of notices. The case was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals due to sufficient cause. For the penalty appeal (ITA No. 83/M/2024), the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The duplicate appeal (ITA No. 88/Mum/2024) was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee is a resident of Norway and had income there but found insufficient 'clinching evidence' (like bank certificates) to prove that the funds for property purchase in India originated from Norway. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the case was remanded back to the AO. The assessee is directed to provide bank certificates substantiating the source of funds from Norway, and the AO is to verify these evidences and decide the issue afresh after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal observed that the provision of section 80P(2)(d) does not restrict the claim of deduction for interest income earned from cooperative societies. Citing various judicial pronouncements, including those from the Supreme Court and coordinate benches, the Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the deduction.
The Tribunal, citing its previous order for the same assessee and A.Y., observed that the corresponding sales were not disputed. It directed the AO to restrict the disallowance to 18.25% of the bogus purchases, representing the profit element, rather than 100%. The ground challenging the reopening of assessment was dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal, following various judicial precedents including the Supreme Court's decision in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., held that interest income derived by a co-operative society from deposits with any other co-operative society, including co-operative banks, is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d). It clarified that section 80P(4) applies only to co-operative banks performing banking business, not to other co-operative societies.
The Tribunal observed that the provision of section 80P(2)(d) does not restrict the claim of deduction for interest income earned from cooperative societies. Citing various judicial pronouncements, including those from the Supreme Court and coordinate benches, the Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the deduction.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had a reasonable and sufficient cause for not producing documents due to CBI seizure. Therefore, the lower authorities' orders were set aside.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of disallowances related to interest on NPA and Section 80M deduction. However, the issue of unexplained expenditure was remanded to the AO for further investigation.
The Tribunal held that Section 54EC exemption is applicable for computing book profit under Section 115JB, relying on the Madras High Court's decision in CIT vs. Metal & Chromium Platter (P.) Ltd. The Tribunal found justification in allowing the exemption to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the issue of taxability of borrowed service charges has been consistently decided in favour of the assessee in its own case and group companies' cases by the Tribunal and also resolved under Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). Therefore, the additions made by the Assessing Officer were deleted.
The ITAT acknowledged the assessee's lack of vigilance but noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without discussing merits or ensuring natural justice. Therefore, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits, directing the assessee to cooperate diligently. The ITAT made no observations on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal held that since the foundation for framing the order under section 143(3) was the order of the CIT under section 263, and that order was quashed by this Tribunal, the present order must also fall. Therefore, there was no reason to interfere with the findings of the CIT(A).
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) observed that the assessee was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard by the CIT(A), as the second notice for compliance was reportedly not received. With the consent of both parties, the Tribunal remanded the case to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits after providing adequate opportunity to the assessee, who is also directed to ensure compliance.
The Tribunal noted that the appeal proceedings were initiated after a considerable delay and during the pandemic. Considering the facts and the delay, the Tribunal decided to remit the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication.
Ground 1 was dismissed as infructuous. For Ground 2, recognizing that the CIT(A) had passed an ex parte order without considering the assessee's submissions and that a related issue for an earlier assessment year was pending, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for a de novo meritorious adjudication, providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The tribunal held that the notice issued under section 143(2) by the prescribed authority (NaFAC) was valid. It also held that interest paid by the branch to the head office was not taxable in India based on the India-France DTAA.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to appear on multiple occasions and did not file a condonation of delay application for the time-barred appeal. Given the lack of participation from the assessee and the circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that the assessee was not interested in pursuing the appeal.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) found that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without considering its merits and without adhering to the requirements of Section 250(6) of the Act. The ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the CIT(A) to decide the appeal afresh after providing the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Ground No. 1 of the appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated without proper application of mind by the Assessing Officer, as they were based on an incorrect understanding of the initial assessment process and lacked allegations of failure to disclose material facts. Consequently, the reassessment notice and order were quashed.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a Co-operative Society from investments in Co-operative Banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal followed its own previous decision in the assessee's own case for a different assessment year.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, holding that the consequential assessment was infructuous because a co-ordinate ITAT bench had already quashed the PCIT's original revisional order under Section 263. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, agreeing that the basis for the consequential assessment no longer existed, and dismissed the Revenue's appeal.
The Tribunal observed that ledger accounts prima facie suggested the advances were adjusted against shares purchased, indicating commercial transactions. However, it noted that these submissions were not properly placed before the Assessing Officer previously. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination, directing the AO to consider the ledger accounts and other explanations provided by the assessee.