572 orders · Page 10 of 12
The assessee requested to withdraw the appeals as they were filed in error and the matter had already been disposed of by another bench of the tribunal.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition for want of evidence, opining that the assessment proceedings revolved solely around AIR information without further corroborating evidence. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, noting that the revenue failed to produce any evidence to substantiate the AIR information and referring to a High Court judgment on the onus of proof.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer did not consider details furnished by the assessee. While the assessee cited Covid-19 for non-compliance with CIT(A) notices, the last notice was issued post-Covid. The Tribunal restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, subject to a cost of ₹2,000.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following a previous ruling in the assessee's own case. The addition in respect of bogus purchases was to be limited to the extent of bringing the GP rate on such purchases to the same rate as other genuine purchases.
The Tribunal noted that the AO did not properly confront the assessee with the issue of incorrect disclosure. Therefore, in the interest of natural justice, the matter was restored to the AO for fresh consideration with a final opportunity for the assessee to present their case.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act levied on additions made merely on estimations is unsustainable. High Courts have consistently held that if an addition is made purely on an estimated basis without concrete evidence of concealment, no penalty is leviable.
The Tribunal held that the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148 was not obtained from the 'specified authority' as required by the amended Section 151 of the Income Tax Act, given that more than three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. Consequently, the notice and the entire reassessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148 was not obtained from the 'specified authority' as required by the amended Section 151 of the Income Tax Act, given that more than three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. Consequently, the notice and the entire reassessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act levied on additions made merely on estimations is unsustainable. High Courts have consistently held that if an addition is made purely on an estimated basis without concrete evidence of concealment, no penalty is leviable.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had submitted documents online before the CIT(A) which were not considered. Therefore, in the interest of natural justice, the case was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal based on an incorrect assumption that the dispute was settled under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. The assessee clarified that the dispute settled was from a different assessment order (under Section 143(3)), not the one under appeal (under Section 147 read with Section 144B). Therefore, the CIT(A) wrongly appreciated the facts.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without considering the merits due to the assessee's non-appearance, violating principles of natural justice. The issue requires factual verification. Therefore, the assessee should be given one final opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal noted that similar issues concerning the deduction of interest income under Section 80P for cooperative societies have been decided in favor of the assessee by coordinate benches and High Courts. The interest earned on surplus funds deposited with banks was considered attributable to the business activity of the cooperative society.
The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench had already decided the appeal against the same CIT(A) order. Therefore, the current appeal was considered infructuous and did not require adjudication.
The CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is obligated to decide the appeal on merits. The impugned order is set aside.
The Tribunal held that income from the sale of CERs is a capital receipt, not chargeable to tax. This decision followed the consistent view of various High Courts, including the Bombay High Court, and a coordinate bench of the ITAT.
The Tribunal, considering that the income from the sale of CER is related to environmental concerns and is not directly linked to the business operations, held that it is a capital receipt not chargeable to tax. The Tribunal relied on various High Court and ITAT decisions, including a decision of the Bombay High Court, which consistently treated such income as a capital receipt.
The Tribunal noted that the tax effect was below the threshold specified in CBDT Circular No. 17/2019, which prohibits appeals by the revenue in such cases. This circular is also applicable to pending cases.
The Tribunal restored the issue of bank deposits to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the AO and provide explanations for the deposits.
The Tribunal found that a duplicate appeal concerning the same impugned order was already in the process of being heard. Therefore, the current appeal was dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 1,04,00,200/- was made by the AO based solely on SFT portal information without proper verification or inquiry. The assessee had provided evidence of booking the property in 2012 and making substantial payments, with the project facing litigation and delays. The Tribunal further held that the addition of Rs. 3,39,800/- under Section 56(2)(x) was not applicable as the property had not been received by the assessee, and the sale deed had not been executed, making the provision operational only upon receipt of the property.
The ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal emphasized the principles of natural justice and directed that the assessee be given an adequate opportunity to present their case with evidence.
The Tribunal noted that a previous co-ordinate bench had restricted the disallowance to 50% to meet the ends of justice, considering it was partly an estimation. The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) is not leviable on disallowances made on an estimate basis, as the AO must clearly prove concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the interest expenditure was connected to the sale of the proprietorship concern, which is liable for capital gains. The assessee also failed to substantiate the deduction with evidence of TDS or actual payment of interest.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to record his satisfaction regarding the correctness of the assessee's claim before invoking Rule 8D, as mandated by Section 14A(2). Therefore, the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A) was incorrect.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to record his satisfaction regarding the correctness of the assessee's claim before invoking Rule 8D, as mandated by Section 14A(2). Therefore, the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A) was incorrect.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the interest expenditure was connected to the sale of the proprietorship concern, which is liable for capital gains. The assessee also failed to substantiate the deduction with evidence of TDS or actual payment of interest.
For AY 2018-19, the Tribunal allowed the Revenue's appeal, upholding the disallowance based on the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services. For AY 2019-20, the assessee's appeal was dismissed on similar grounds. For AY 2020-21, the issue was restored to the AO due to a COVID-19 related extension for payment.
The Tribunal noted that the issue of deduction under Section 80P for the assessee had been decided in favor of the assessee by a Co-ordinate Bench for a prior assessment year. Following that precedent, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the Ld. CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence submitted by the assessee under Rule 29 of the IT Rules. The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the AO to decide afresh after considering the additional evidence and Board Instructions No. 3/2017.
The Tribunal held that the refund should be adjusted against the interest component first, similar to how assessee payments are adjusted against interest and then tax. It also held that the assessee is entitled to additional interest under Section 244A(1A) as the provision was in force when the order giving effect was passed, irrespective of the assessment year.
The Tribunal held that while co-operative banks may not be entitled to deduction under Section 80P due to Section 80P(4), a co-operative society earning interest income from investments in a co-operative bank is still eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The AO was directed to allow the claim.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-appearance and failure to provide justifications for additions. The Tribunal felt it appropriate to impose a cost of Rs. 25,000 on the assessee.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) did not decide the appeal on merits and the assessee also failed to comply with notices. Considering the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal restored the case to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits after providing adequate opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that Section 115JB of the Income Tax Act is not applicable to banking companies prior to its amendment by the Finance Act, 2012, relying on the Bombay High Court's decision in Union Bank of India. The Tribunal also held that the assessee is eligible for interest under Section 244A(1A) as the relevant provisions were on the statute book when the appeal effect order was passed.
The Tribunal, in the absence of the assessee and without any contradictory material, confirmed the order of the CIT(A). The CIT(A) had upheld the Assessing Officer's addition.
The Tribunal held that delayed payment of employees' contribution to PF/ESIC is not allowable as a deduction under section 36(1)(va) as per the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment under section 143(1) does not alter this principle.
The Tribunal held that transfer pricing adjustments should be restricted to international transactions only, not the entire manufacturing segment. It also confirmed that the benefit of the +/- 5% tolerance range under Section 92C(2) should be granted, leading to no remaining adjustment.
The Tribunal held that transfer pricing adjustments should be restricted to international transactions only, not the entire manufacturing segment. It also confirmed that the benefit of the +/- 5% tolerance range under Section 92C(2) should be granted, leading to no remaining adjustment.
The Tribunal noted that in cases where sales are not doubted, a 100% disallowance for bogus purchases is not justified. Relying on High Court precedents, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to restrict the addition on bogus purchases to the extent of the gross profit rate, comparable to genuine purchases. If the gross profit rate on bogus purchases was already offered to tax, no further addition would be made.
The Tribunal held that the Originator cannot be treated as an investor under Section 194LBC as they did not hold any securitized debt instrument. The payment of EIS to the Originator was for the residual amount after meeting obligations to investors, not income from an investment in the trust.
The Tribunal held that the TPO's domain is limited to determining the Arm's Length Price (ALP) and not to question the rendition of services or benefits derived. The TPO's order was found to be silent on ALP determination and incorrectly concluded it as NIL.
The Tribunal held that delayed payment of employee's contribution to PF/ESI beyond the due date specified under the respective Acts is not allowable under Section 36(1)(va). The fact that the assessment was under Section 143(1)(a) does not alter this principle.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision. The CIT(A) was directed to provide the assessee with an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Assessing Officer treated the source of property purchase as unexplained investment. However, the CIT(A) deleted the addition. The Tribunal noted that no consideration for the purchase of the properties was paid by the assessee or co-owners during the relevant AY. The purchase of Flat No. 1101 was made on 31/01/2010, and the balance consideration was paid in 2013. The sale proceeds of Flat No. 1101 were used to purchase Flat No. 1202.
The Tribunal held that the retained interest by NBFCs does not constitute 'fees for technical services' under Section 194J or 'commission/brokerage' under Section 194H. Therefore, the bank was not liable for TDS on this amount.
The Tribunal held that the retained interest by NBFCs cannot be considered as interest under Section 2(28A) as there was no borrowing or debt incurred by SBI from the NBFCs. Therefore, SBI was not obligated to deduct TDS under Section 194A.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal on the grounds of limitation, as the appeal was filed within the extended period granted due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee did not receive notice for the reopening of assessment.
The Tribunal held that the retained interest by NBFCs does not constitute 'fees for technical services' under Section 194J or 'commission/brokerage' under Section 194H. Therefore, the bank was not liable for TDS on this amount.
The Tribunal held that the interest retained by NBFCs was not liable for TDS under Section 194A as SBI had not borrowed money. However, it was also held that the retained interest could be considered as service fee, making it liable for TDS under Section 194J or 194H.