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362 orders · Page 3 of 8
The Tribunal held that the TPO's order was barred by limitation. Consequently, the assessee was not an 'eligible assessee' under Section 144C(15)(b)(i), rendering the subsequent proceedings and the final assessment order without jurisdiction and void.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict additions on bogus purchases to 9% of the purchase value, following a High Court ruling. However, the Tribunal confirmed the additions made under Section 68 for unexplained cash credits, as the assessee failed to provide satisfactory evidence or original cash books.
The Tribunal held that the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) is not allowable on interest income earned from deposits with cooperative banks and nationalized banks, as it does not partake the character of its operational income. However, the validity of reopening was considered differently for different assessment years.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to allow the assessee to file a certificate as prescribed under the first proviso to Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act. The Assessing Officer was directed to decide the matter afresh after considering this certificate.
The Tribunal held that the issue of telescoping the addition of gross profit on unaccounted sales with the bogus long-term capital gains needed fresh consideration. The cross-objections by the assessee were dismissed.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal based on the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 17/2019 for filing appeals. The Revenue was given liberty to restore the appeal if it could prove an exception applied.
The Tribunal held that the issue of telescoping the addition of gross profit on unaccounted sales with the bogus long-term capital gains needed fresh consideration. The cross-objections by the assessee were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the order of the TPO was passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. Consequently, the assessment order was considered void and bad in law.
The Tribunal held that the issue of telescoping the addition of gross profit on unaccounted sales with the bogus long-term capital gains needed fresh consideration. The cross-objections by the assessee were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the discounted price was justified as HHPL bore significant expenses that the assessee would otherwise incur. The Tribunal also noted that similar issues had been decided in favour of the assessee by the Tribunal in earlier years.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to allow the assessee to file a certificate as prescribed under the first proviso to Section 201(1) of the Income Tax Act. The Assessing Officer was directed to decide the matter afresh after considering this certificate.
The Tribunal held that the order for special audit was bad in law as it was based on surmises and not objective criteria, as required by Section 142(2A). Consequently, the assessment order was also quashed as being time-barred and unsustainable.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal partly. It noted that the ground related to bad debts was withdrawn by the assessee. For the repairs expenses, the Tribunal relied on a prior ITAT decision that had set aside the PCIT's order on this issue, making the addition unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Section 14A cannot exceed the exempt income earned. Regarding common expenses for Section 80-IA deduction, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer to follow earlier settled precedents in the assessee's own case.
The Tribunal held that since the addition/disallowance in the quantum proceedings was deleted by the Tribunal itself, the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) could not be sustained. The CIT(A) had rightly deleted the penalty.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied when the addition to income is made on an estimated basis. Following various judicial precedents, the penalty levied was quashed.
The Tribunal restored the issue of arm's length price for services to the TPO for fresh consideration, stating the facts were identical to a previous year's decision. The cross-objection by the revenue regarding depreciation on goodwill was dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the discounted price was justified as HHPL bore significant expenses that the assessee would otherwise incur. The Tribunal also noted that similar issues had been decided in favour of the assessee by the Tribunal in earlier years.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Section 14A cannot exceed the exempt income earned. Regarding common expenses for Section 80-IA deduction, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer to follow earlier settled precedents in the assessee's own case.
The Tribunal confirmed the disallowance of employees' contribution to provident fund and ESIC, as the same were not remitted within the statutory due dates. The issue was considered no longer res-integra in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services P. Ltd.
The Tribunal held that for unabated/completed assessments, additions under Section 153A can only be made if based on incriminating material found during the search. Since the additions were not supported by such material, they were liable to be deleted.
The Tribunal partly allowed the Revenue's appeal. The disallowance under Section 14A was restricted to the dividend income. The addition under Section 68 was deleted. However, the CIT(A)'s relief on guest, foreign travel, and gift/entertainment expenses was reversed, while telephone and vehicle expenses were confirmed.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. This was based on CBDT Circular No. 17/2019, which mandates that departmental appeals should not be filed if the tax effect is below INR 50,00,000. The tax effect in this case was below the specified limit.
The Tribunal held that the fourth proviso to Section 153A can only be invoked if the escaped income is represented in the form of an asset, as defined in Explanation 2. Since the escaped income in this case (bogus purchases and disallowed professional fees) was not shown to be in the form of an asset, the reopening was not in accordance with the law.
The Tribunal held that the assessment framed under Section 153C read with Section 143(3) for AY 2009-10 was bad in law. This was because the relevant assessment year fell outside the scope of Section 153C, as the date of recording satisfaction by the AO (15.03.2016) meant AY 2009-10 was beyond the permissible six assessment years.
The Tribunal found that the AO's disallowance was based on unserved notices to some contractors. However, the CIT(A) had relied on proceedings from a subsequent year. The Tribunal decided to remand the issue back to the AO for a fresh decision on merits after allowing the assessee an opportunity to present evidence.
The Tribunal held that the penalty notice was invalid because it did not specify whether the penalty was for concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Following the jurisdictional High Court's decision, the penalty was cancelled.
The Tribunal held that interest earned on surplus funds deposited with banks is attributable to the business of providing credit facilities and is eligible for deduction under Section 80P. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not get a proper opportunity to present its case before the AO regarding the shed's valuation and its impact on the sale being a slump sale. Relying on a Supreme Court judgment, the Tribunal set aside the order on this limited issue.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should be given another opportunity to present the details sought by the CIT(E) based on the principles of natural justice. The issue was remanded back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity of hearing by the AO, as the assessment order was passed within two days of issuing the show-cause notice. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that even if a wrong provision of law is mentioned, the action is not invalid if there is a provision that can address the factual situation. The Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. was relied upon.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) incorrectly recorded that multiple notices were issued and that the assessee's request for adjournment was ignored. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer to examine whether the payments of contribution were made within 15 days (plus a grace period) from the close of the month in which salary was disbursed. The AO was directed to ascertain the meaning of 'every month' from the PF and ESI authorities.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition on loans, finding that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence for identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the lenders. However, the Tribunal reversed the CIT(A)'s deletion of disallowances on certain expenses, restoring the AO's disallowances.
The Tribunal held that employee's contribution to PF/ESI, if paid after the due date under the relevant Act, is subject to Section 36(1)(va) and not eligible for deduction under Section 43B. Therefore, the disallowance was upheld.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and admitted the additional evidence. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that UISPL cannot be treated as a "person responsible for paying" for the purpose of Section 194C read with Section 204 of the Act. The amendment to Section 204(v) by the Finance Act 2020, effective from 01.04.2020, was found to be prospective and did not apply to the assessment year in question.
The Tribunal held that belated payment of employee's contribution to ESI and PF after the due date prescribed under the relevant Act is an incorrect claim and liable for adjustment. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the profit element in 'on-money' receipts should be restricted to 22.5% for certain assessment years. It also allowed deduction under Section 80IB(10) on additional income from eligible projects, provided the claim was made in the original return.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was willing to produce documentary evidence for claimed expenses and that an adequate opportunity of being heard was not granted. Therefore, the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal condoned the 28-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The case was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, preferably after the quantum assessment appeal is decided.
The Tribunal held that the assessment framed under Section 153C read with Section 143(3) for AY 2009-10 was bad in law. This was because the relevant assessment year fell outside the scope of Section 153C, as the date of recording satisfaction by the AO (15.03.2016) meant AY 2009-10 was beyond the permissible six assessment years.
The Tribunal held that the profit element in 'on-money' receipts should be restricted to 22.5% for certain assessment years. It also allowed deduction under Section 80IB(10) on additional income from eligible projects, provided the claim was made in the original return.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the issue to the AO. The AO was directed to verify if the deposits were made within the due dates or on the next working day if the due date fell on a holiday, as per the General Clauses Act.
The Tribunal held that while the initial statements suggested no connection, the subsequent retraction and evidence of services rendered by Ms. Ramita Jain and Mrs. Sangitha Jain warranted allowing the professional fees. Regarding bogus purchases, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the addition to 6% as a partial relief.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal under a wrong impression. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that payments for bandwidth services did not constitute royalty under the India-UK DTAA and Section 9(1)(vi) of the IT Act. Amendments to domestic law cannot unilaterally alter treaty provisions without bilateral renegotiation.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid as the conditions laid down in the first proviso to Section 147 were not satisfied. The assessee had fully disclosed material facts during the original assessment, and the reopening was based on information already considered.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided prima facie evidence for the source of Rs. 12,88,220/- of the seized cash. The remaining amount was presumed to be accumulated profits from his business. Since the sales were already included in his profit and loss account and offered to tax, the addition under Section 69 was not warranted.