457 orders · Page 3 of 10
The Tribunal held that a 100% disallowance for bogus purchases is not justified when sales are not doubted, as sales are impossible without purchases. However, the addition should be limited to the extent of bringing the gross profit rate on such purchases to the same level as genuine purchases.
The Tribunal held that 100% disallowance for bogus purchases is not permissible when sales are not doubted, as sales are impossible without actual purchases. The profit element in such purchases should be limited to the gross profit rate of genuine purchases.
The Tribunal noted that the concession for disallowance of cash expenses was based on a mixed question of law and fact, and remitted the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination. Similarly, the disallowance for bogus purchases was also remitted for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in partly upholding the Section 14A disallowance after concluding that it was impermissible due to the reassessment being based on an issue not pursued. For the second assessment year, the Tribunal directed examination of whether dividend income was offered to tax, making disallowance under Section 14A unsustainable if so.
The Tribunal held that interest paid on borrowed capital used for acquiring land for business purposes is deductible under Section 36(1)(iii), even if the land is a capital asset and business activities have not fully commenced.
The Tribunal held that a 100% disallowance for bogus purchases is not justified when sales are not doubted, as sales are impossible without actual purchases. The addition should be limited to the profit element embedded in such purchases.
The Tribunal held that when sales are not doubted, a 100% disallowance for bogus purchases is not justified, as sales are impossible without actual purchases. However, given the purchases were made from the grey market, a partial disallowance is appropriate.
The Tribunal held that since both the office premise and warehouse formed part of the 'Building' block and depreciation was claimed on the entire block, the WDV of the entire block should be deducted from the sale consideration as per Section 50(1) of the Act. The addition made by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the shares were investments, not stock-in-trade, based on previous decisions in the assessee's own case. Consequently, the valuation loss was disallowed. The Tribunal also confirmed the disallowance under Section 14A, citing a Supreme Court judgment that made the distinction between investor and stock-in-trade irrelevant for this purpose.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had conceded the addition before the CIT(A) by signing the order sheet. Since the assessee accepted the matter at the lower appellate stage, they cannot agitate the same issue further.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in allowing indexation benefit from the period the previous owner held the asset, following the High Court's decision which was upheld by the Supreme Court's dismissal of the SLP.
The Tribunal held that when sales are not doubted, a 100% disallowance for bogus purchases is not permissible. The addition should be limited to the extent of bringing the gross profit rate on such purchases to the same rate as other genuine purchases.
The Tribunal held that broken period interest is an allowable expenditure, following Supreme Court decisions, and confirmed the deletion of the AO's addition. It also upheld the deletion of depreciation on leased assets, relying on its own previous orders. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal regarding Section 14A disallowance, following High Court and Tribunal precedents.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee requested withdrawal of the appeal and the revenue had no objection. Therefore, the appeal was treated as withdrawn.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following its own previous orders for the same assessee. It found that the professional fees were not bogus and that TDS was not required on payments to foreign parties who had no permanent establishment in India. The disallowance of keyman insurance premiums was also rejected.
The Tribunal held that broken period interest is an allowable expenditure, following Supreme Court decisions, and confirmed the deletion of the AO's addition. It also upheld the deletion of depreciation on leased assets, relying on its own previous orders. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal regarding Section 14A disallowance, following High Court and Tribunal precedents.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities did not indicate systematic engagement in property sale and purchase. Therefore, the gain on the sale of flats should be treated as capital gains, not business income.
The Tribunal held that 100% disallowance on bogus purchases is not permissible when sales are not doubted, as sales are impossible without purchases. The addition should be limited to the profit element embedded in such purchases.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the additions based on additional evidence without giving the AO an opportunity to verify it. The matter was set aside to the AO for verification of the evidence.
The Tribunal held that while share trading loss is speculative, it can be set off against derivative profits. Losses from jobbing and arbitrage are also to be set off against derivative profits. The AO's apportionment of expenses was found to be absurd and was directed to be recomputed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the penalty. Since the quantum addition was already deleted by the ITAT, the basis for levying the penalty no longer existed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had proved the nature and source of credit for the sale proceeds of shares and rights, thus no addition could be made under Section 68. However, it was noted that the assessee acted as a conduit for a colorable device.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence and set aside the CIT(A)'s order, remanding the case back to the AO. The AO is directed to pass a fresh assessment order after considering the additional evidence and providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to conclusively prove that the unreconciled amount represented understated income. The Tribunal also noted that the unreconciled amount was a miniscule percentage of the assessee's gross receipts, supporting the assessee's claim.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is obligated to decide the appeal on merits. The ex-parte order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence filed by the assessee, including the report of the DDIT (Investigation) Ambala, which was relevant to the grounds of appeal. This report, along with other documentary evidence such as the agreement to sale and affidavits of witnesses, indicated that the cash deposit in the assessee's bank account was plausible as it related to the sale proceeds of agriculture land. The Tribunal noted that this material was not before the AO and involved factual appreciation. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the ground of appeal to the file of the Assessing Officer for verification of facts and to grant necessary relief in accordance with law. The Assessing Officer was directed to provide the assessee with an opportunity of being heard before passing an order. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal regarding depreciation on stock exchange cards. It upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions related to client assistance and maintenance charges, excess depreciation, and mark-to-market loss. The Tribunal also upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of disallowance for non-deduction of TDS on transaction charges.
The Tribunal held that the absence of a valid notice under Section 143(2) renders the reassessment order void ab initio and a nullity. The requirement of issuing this notice cannot be dispensed with and is not curable.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, holding that it was not intentional or wilful. The Tribunal further held that the professional fees for valuation of know-how were revenue expenditure and allowable under Section 37(1) of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the absence of a notice under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act renders the reassessment order void ab initio and a nullity. The requirement of issuing this notice cannot be dispensed with and is not a curable procedural irregularity.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of advertising and marketing expenses. However, it found the explanation for the source of funds for the cash credit to be unsubstantiated and restored the matter to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal held that the AO's restriction on carrying forward deficits beyond 8 years was a mistake apparent from the record, as there is no such statutory limitation for charitable trusts. The Tribunal directed the AO to allow complete set-off and carry forward of deficits without the 8-year restriction.
The Tribunal, following a previous similar ruling, restricted the addition to 6.5% of the bogus purchase, considering that the books of account were not rejected and sales were not disputed. The issue of reopening under Section 147 was not pressed by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is obliged to decide the appeal on merits. The ex-parte order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the payment for distributing copyrighted software on a principal-to-principal basis was not royalty. Therefore, the assessee was not liable to deduct TDS, and the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) was deleted.
The Tribunal upheld the reopening of assessment as it was based on tangible material received after the initial processing. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal confirmed the CIT(A)'s estimation of profit at 6% on the non-genuine purchases.
The Tribunal admitted an additional ground challenging the validity of penalty proceedings and restored all issues to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's explanation for non-disclosure due to bona fide reasons and inability to pay tax earlier due to time limits for re-opening assessments needed examination.
The Tribunal held that interest earned on ICDs should be treated as business income, as it represents income from parking surplus business funds. It also allowed expenditure incurred for earning interest income as business expenditure.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) should be computed by considering only those investments that yielded exempt income during the year. This aligns with the Special Bench decision in CIT v/s Vireet Investment Pvt. Ltd.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the Section 68 addition, finding the loan transactions genuine and supported by evidence. It also sustained a partial disallowance of brokerage expenses but dismissed the revenue's appeal on this point.
The Tribunal upheld the Pr. CIT's decision, stating that housing loan interest cannot be capitalized as cost of acquisition for capital gains and that carry forward of long-term capital loss is not allowed if the return is filed belatedly.
The Tribunal held that interest income from fixed deposits should be treated as income from other sources. However, it directed the AO to consider net interest expenditure for disallowance under Section 36(1)(iii) and allowed depreciation on fixed assets.
The Tribunal held that the absence of a mandatory notice under Section 143(2) renders the reassessment order void ab-initio and a nullity. The Tribunal followed various High Court and Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the mandatory nature of this notice.
The Tribunal held that since the assessment order under which the penalty was levied had been quashed by a coordinate bench, the penalty could not survive on a standalone basis. Therefore, the penalty was vacated.
The Tribunal held that the absence of a mandatory notice under Section 143(2) renders the reassessment order void ab-initio and a nullity. The Tribunal followed various High Court and Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the mandatory nature of this notice.
The Tribunal found that the AO's verification of the source of funds for the loans was insufficient. The Tribunal directed the AO to re-examine the bank statements of the lenders and other related transactions to ascertain the genuineness of the loan transactions.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to provide material to prove that 15% interest was unreasonable and that equating fixed deposit rates with unsecured loans was incorrect. It also held that while partial disallowance for motor car and telephone expenses was justified due to personal use, disallowances for sales promotion and travel expenses were not.
The Tribunal found substance in the assessee's argument that a portion of the interest disallowance was excessive. The matter was remanded back to the AO for fresh determination after considering the assessee's working and providing an opportunity for a hearing.
The Tribunal held that Section 80P(2)(d) clearly allows deduction for interest income derived by a cooperative society from its investments with any other cooperative society, including cooperative banks. Previous Supreme Court and High Court decisions relied upon by the lower authorities were distinguished.
The Tribunal held that the assessment framed under Section 153C was invalid because the incriminating material (the diary) was found during a survey under Section 133A, not a search under Section 132 or requisition under Section 132A. Therefore, the AO lacked jurisdiction to proceed under Section 153C.