ITAT Kolkata Judgments — October 2026

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the Revenue's appeals. Regarding the validity of reassessment proceedings initiated beyond four years, the Tribunal found that the assessment was originally framed under Section 143(3). As per the First Proviso to Section 147, reassessment beyond four years is permissible only if there was a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts. The Tribunal noted that the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer did not contain any such finding of failure by the assessee. Therefore, the reassessment was held to be null and void, bad in law, and rightly quashed by the CIT(A). This decision was based on the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in ACIT vs. CEAT Ltd. ([2023] 146 taxmann.com 108(SC)). Concerning the additions under Section 69A, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order deleting the additions. The Tribunal noted that the amounts received as refunds or loans were duly recorded in the audited books of account and supported by necessary documentation like loan confirmations and repayment details. The CIT(A) had correctly appreciated these factual aspects, and the additions were deleted as the transactions were recorded and supported by evidence.

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the Revenue's appeals. Regarding the validity of reassessment proceedings initiated beyond four years, the Tribunal found that the assessment was originally framed under Section 143(3). As per the First Proviso to Section 147, reassessment beyond four years is permissible only if there was a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts. The Tribunal noted that the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer did not contain any such finding of failure by the assessee. Therefore, the reassessment was held to be null and void, bad in law, and rightly quashed by the CIT(A). This decision was based on the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in ACIT vs. CEAT Ltd. ([2023] 146 taxmann.com 108(SC)). Concerning the additions under Section 69A, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order deleting the additions. The Tribunal noted that the amounts received as refunds or loans were duly recorded in the audited books of account and supported by necessary documentation like loan confirmations and repayment details. The CIT(A) had correctly appreciated these factual aspects, and the additions were deleted as the transactions were recorded and supported by evidence.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (PCIT) for issuing the notice under Section 148 of the Act was mechanical and without an independent application of mind. The notation 'yes, I am satisfied' by the PCIT did not reflect the required objective satisfaction based on material available. The Tribunal relied on several Supreme Court and High Court decisions, including Income-tax Officer vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das, Commissioner of Income-tax-5, Mumbai vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd., Principal Commissioner of Income-tax-6 vs. Meenakshi Overseas (P.) Ltd., and S. Goyanka Lime and Chemical Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, to emphasize that sanctioning authorities must apply their mind independently and cannot merely rubber-stamp the Assessing Officer's proposal. The Tribunal distinguished the case of Meenakshi Overseas Pvt. Ltd. by noting the absence of a detailed letter from the sanctioning authority to the AO. Consequently, the notice issued under Section 148 and the assessment framed under Section 147/143(3) were quashed. As a consequential relief, the penalty orders confirmed by the CIT(A) were also quashed. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (PCIT) for issuing the notice under Section 148 of the Act was mechanical and without an independent application of mind. The notation 'yes, I am satisfied' by the PCIT did not reflect the required objective satisfaction based on material available. The Tribunal relied on several Supreme Court and High Court decisions, including Income-tax Officer vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das, Commissioner of Income-tax-5, Mumbai vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd., Principal Commissioner of Income-tax-6 vs. Meenakshi Overseas (P.) Ltd., and S. Goyanka Lime and Chemical Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, to emphasize that sanctioning authorities must apply their mind independently and cannot merely rubber-stamp the Assessing Officer's proposal. The Tribunal distinguished the case of Meenakshi Overseas Pvt. Ltd. by noting the absence of a detailed letter from the sanctioning authority to the AO. Consequently, the notice issued under Section 148 and the assessment framed under Section 147/143(3) were quashed. As a consequential relief, the penalty orders confirmed by the CIT(A) were also quashed. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (PCIT) for issuing the notice under Section 148 of the Act was mechanical and without an independent application of mind. The notation 'yes, I am satisfied' by the PCIT did not reflect the required objective satisfaction based on material available. The Tribunal relied on several Supreme Court and High Court decisions, including Income-tax Officer vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das, Commissioner of Income-tax-5, Mumbai vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd., Principal Commissioner of Income-tax-6 vs. Meenakshi Overseas (P.) Ltd., and S. Goyanka Lime and Chemical Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, to emphasize that sanctioning authorities must apply their mind independently and cannot merely rubber-stamp the Assessing Officer's proposal. The Tribunal distinguished the case of Meenakshi Overseas Pvt. Ltd. by noting the absence of a detailed letter from the sanctioning authority to the AO. Consequently, the notice issued under Section 148 and the assessment framed under Section 147/143(3) were quashed. As a consequential relief, the penalty orders confirmed by the CIT(A) were also quashed. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (PCIT) for issuing the notice under Section 148 of the Act was mechanical and without an independent application of mind. The notation 'yes, I am satisfied' by the PCIT did not reflect the required objective satisfaction based on material available. The Tribunal relied on several Supreme Court and High Court decisions, including Income-tax Officer vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das, Commissioner of Income-tax-5, Mumbai vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd., Principal Commissioner of Income-tax-6 vs. Meenakshi Overseas (P.) Ltd., and S. Goyanka Lime and Chemical Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, to emphasize that sanctioning authorities must apply their mind independently and cannot merely rubber-stamp the Assessing Officer's proposal. The Tribunal distinguished the case of Meenakshi Overseas Pvt. Ltd. by noting the absence of a detailed letter from the sanctioning authority to the AO. Consequently, the notice issued under Section 148 and the assessment framed under Section 147/143(3) were quashed. As a consequential relief, the penalty orders confirmed by the CIT(A) were also quashed. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessees. The primary issue was the eligibility of compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the assessees had filed appeals after becoming aware of favorable judgments from co-ordinate benches of the ITAT, such as the Chandigarh Bench in Harish Kumar vs. ITO and the Ahmedabad Bench in Jayeshkumar Tulsidas Sutaria vs. ITO. These judgments, dealing with similar facts and the same BSNL VRS-2019 scheme, had allowed the exemption. The Tribunal found that the assessees were entitled to the benefit of Section 10(10B) and that the compensation amount was not taxable as per the Act. The Tribunal also observed that the Income Tax Department should not collect tax on income that is exempt under Section 10(10B). The Tribunal respectfully followed the cited judgments and allowed the appeals, directing that the assessees be granted the exemption.

The Tribunal held that the delay of 96 and 97 days in filing the appeals is condoned. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, emphasizing a liberal approach to condoning delay when supported by justifiable reasons to ensure substantial justice. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal noted that the impugned orders of the CIT(A) were ex-parte, and the Assessee had not participated in those proceedings. Furthermore, the CIT(A) had not decided all grounds of appeal on their merits. The Tribunal also acknowledged that the Assessee had not made full compliance before the Assessing Officer. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment. The Assessing Officer is directed to provide an opportunity of being heard to the Assessee before passing the assessment order, and the Assessee is directed to participate in the proceedings without fail. The appeals are partly allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessees. The primary issue was the eligibility of compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the assessees had filed appeals after becoming aware of favorable judgments from co-ordinate benches of the ITAT, such as the Chandigarh Bench in Harish Kumar vs. ITO and the Ahmedabad Bench in Jayeshkumar Tulsidas Sutaria vs. ITO. These judgments, dealing with similar facts and the same BSNL VRS-2019 scheme, had allowed the exemption. The Tribunal found that the assessees were entitled to the benefit of Section 10(10B) and that the compensation amount was not taxable as per the Act. The Tribunal also observed that the Income Tax Department should not collect tax on income that is exempt under Section 10(10B). The Tribunal respectfully followed the cited judgments and allowed the appeals, directing that the assessees be granted the exemption.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessees. The primary issue was the eligibility of compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the assessees had filed appeals after becoming aware of favorable judgments from co-ordinate benches of the ITAT, such as the Chandigarh Bench in Harish Kumar vs. ITO and the Ahmedabad Bench in Jayeshkumar Tulsidas Sutaria vs. ITO. These judgments, dealing with similar facts and the same BSNL VRS-2019 scheme, had allowed the exemption. The Tribunal found that the assessees were entitled to the benefit of Section 10(10B) and that the compensation amount was not taxable as per the Act. The Tribunal also observed that the Income Tax Department should not collect tax on income that is exempt under Section 10(10B). The Tribunal respectfully followed the cited judgments and allowed the appeals, directing that the assessees be granted the exemption.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessees. The primary issue was the eligibility of compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the assessees had filed appeals after becoming aware of favorable judgments from co-ordinate benches of the ITAT, such as the Chandigarh Bench in Harish Kumar vs. ITO and the Ahmedabad Bench in Jayeshkumar Tulsidas Sutaria vs. ITO. These judgments, dealing with similar facts and the same BSNL VRS-2019 scheme, had allowed the exemption. The Tribunal found that the assessees were entitled to the benefit of Section 10(10B) and that the compensation amount was not taxable as per the Act. The Tribunal also observed that the Income Tax Department should not collect tax on income that is exempt under Section 10(10B). The Tribunal respectfully followed the cited judgments and allowed the appeals, directing that the assessees be granted the exemption.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessees. The primary issue was the eligibility of compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the assessees had filed appeals after becoming aware of favorable judgments from co-ordinate benches of the ITAT, such as the Chandigarh Bench in Harish Kumar vs. ITO and the Ahmedabad Bench in Jayeshkumar Tulsidas Sutaria vs. ITO. These judgments, dealing with similar facts and the same BSNL VRS-2019 scheme, had allowed the exemption. The Tribunal found that the assessees were entitled to the benefit of Section 10(10B) and that the compensation amount was not taxable as per the Act. The Tribunal also observed that the Income Tax Department should not collect tax on income that is exempt under Section 10(10B). The Tribunal respectfully followed the cited judgments and allowed the appeals, directing that the assessees be granted the exemption.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 298 days in filing the first appeal before the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal reasoned that while it is expected for assessees to file appeals on time, if the cause for delay is bona fide and beyond the assessee's control, it can be construed as a sufficient cause. The Tribunal referred to the Hon'ble Supreme Court's clarification that delays with sufficient cause should be viewed liberally to ensure substantial justice. Citing the landmark decision in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC), the Tribunal held that justifiable reasons for delay should make way for substantial justice. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the file of the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment, with a direction that the assessee be provided an opportunity of being heard before passing the new assessment order. The issue of the merits of the assessment itself was not decided by the ITAT.

The ITAT noted that the assessee's appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) was filed with a delay of 33 days, and no petition for condonation of delay was filed. Consequently, the Ld. CIT(A) dismissed the appeal on delay and laches, and also proceeded to decide the appeal on merits. The Tribunal held that it is a well-settled legal principle that once an appeal is dismissed on delay and laches, the appellate authority cannot adjudicate the appeal on merits. However, considering the meagre delay of 33 days and the absence of a condonation petition, the ITAT restored the appeal to the file of the Ld. CIT(A). The assessee was granted liberty to file an application for condonation of delay, explaining the sufficient cause. The Ld. CIT(A) was directed to consider this application liberally and then decide the appeal on merits, providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard. The issue of merits was not decided by the ITAT.

The Tribunal held that the delay of 96 and 97 days in filing the appeals is condoned. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, emphasizing a liberal approach to condoning delay when supported by justifiable reasons to ensure substantial justice. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal noted that the impugned orders of the CIT(A) were ex-parte, and the Assessee had not participated in those proceedings. Furthermore, the CIT(A) had not decided all grounds of appeal on their merits. The Tribunal also acknowledged that the Assessee had not made full compliance before the Assessing Officer. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment. The Assessing Officer is directed to provide an opportunity of being heard to the Assessee before passing the assessment order, and the Assessee is directed to participate in the proceedings without fail. The appeals are partly allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 4,00,000/- under Section 80GGC for a contribution to a registered political party made through banking channels. The department's stance was that the political party accepted bogus donations. The Tribunal observed that while the Ld. CIT(A) dismissed the appeal after considering various Tribunal orders, it failed to adjudicate all the grounds of appeal and did not delve into the factual aspects of the case. Consequently, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to decide the appeal afresh. The Ld. CIT(A) is to provide specific findings on all grounds of appeal after considering any submissions or documents filed by the assessee. The principle here is that an appellate authority must decide all grounds raised and consider factual aspects, adhering to principles of natural justice.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A), noting that the assessee's case involved similar facts to those decided by co-ordinate benches of the ITAT, which had allowed the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the assessee, an employee of BSNL, availed VRS and received compensation, and the issue concerned the benefit under Section 10(10B) of the Act. The Tribunal found that the revenue could not provide any material to counter the judgments relied upon by the assessee. The Tribunal distinguished the revenue's relied-upon judgment (Delhi Development Authority vs. and others) as not applicable on the principle of parity of the same organization. The Tribunal emphasized that the Income Tax Act itself does not grant the right to collect tax on such compensation, and therefore, tax should not be collected on exempt income as per Section 10(10B). The Tribunal respectfully followed the judgments cited, including those from co-ordinate benches of the ITAT in cases like Harish Kumar vs. ITO and Jayeshkumr Tulsidas Sutaria Vs. ITO, which dealt with similar issues of condoning delay and accepting appeals for exemption under Section 10(10B) for BSNL VRS compensation. Consequently, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal considered the submissions and perused the record. Recognizing that the assessee is an old Trust and had been granted approval under Section 12A of the Act, the Bench decided to provide one more opportunity to the assessee to justify its claim. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Learned CIT(E) and remanded the issue back to the CIT(E) for reconsideration of the assessee's claim. The assessee was directed not to seek unnecessary adjournments and to file the required evidence for renewal. For statistical purposes, the grounds of appeal were partly allowed. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the delay in filing the application but rather provided an opportunity for re-adjudication.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 54 days in filing the first appeal before the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal reasoned that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that delay in filing appeals, when supported by justifiable reasons and beyond the control of the assessee, should be looked into liberally to ensure substantial justice. The reasons provided by the assessee, including the medical ailment of the assessee's child preventing timely checking of emails and the subsequent discovery of the assessment order, were considered sufficient cause. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a de-novo assessment. The Tribunal also directed that the assessee be provided with an opportunity of being heard before passing the de-novo assessment order. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal noted that both the order of the Assessing Officer and the order of the NFAC were ex-parte, with the assessee not participating in the proceedings. Crucially, the Tribunal observed that the NFAC had not decided all the grounds of appeal on their merits. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for a de-novo assessment. The Assessing Officer was directed to provide the assessee an opportunity of being heard before passing the assessment order in accordance with law. The assessee was also directed to participate in the assessment proceedings without fail. The ratio decidendi is that where orders are passed ex-parte without deciding all grounds of appeal on merits, principles of natural justice are violated, necessitating a fresh assessment with due opportunity to the assessee. The operative direction is to remand the matter to the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 115 days in filing the first appeal before the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's submission that the delay was due to illness and mental instability, supported by a medical prescription. Citing the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC), which emphasizes a liberal approach to condoning delay when supported by justifiable reasons for substantial justice, the Tribunal found the cause for delay to be bona fide and beyond the assessee's control. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for a de-novo assessment. The assessee was to be provided an opportunity of being heard before the de-novo assessment order is passed. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A), noting that the assessee's case involved similar facts to those decided by co-ordinate benches of the ITAT, which had allowed the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the assessee, an employee of BSNL, availed VRS and received compensation, and the issue concerned the benefit under Section 10(10B) of the Act. The Tribunal found that the revenue could not provide any material to counter the judgments relied upon by the assessee. The Tribunal distinguished the revenue's relied-upon judgment (Delhi Development Authority vs. and others) as not applicable on the principle of parity of the same organization. The Tribunal emphasized that the Income Tax Act itself does not grant the right to collect tax on such compensation, and therefore, tax should not be collected on exempt income as per Section 10(10B). The Tribunal respectfully followed the judgments cited, including those from co-ordinate benches of the ITAT in cases like Harish Kumar vs. ITO and Jayeshkumr Tulsidas Sutaria Vs. ITO, which dealt with similar issues of condoning delay and accepting appeals for exemption under Section 10(10B) for BSNL VRS compensation. Consequently, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus by furnishing documentary evidence, including share application forms, cheques for purchase, bank statements, demat statements, and Form 20B. The Tribunal noted that GCM Securities Limited was a SEBI-approved, BSE-listed company with growing assets. The AO's addition was based on the Directorate of Investigation's report without specific evidence linking the assessee to manipulation. The Tribunal also relied on the ITAT Kolkata's decision in the case of Smt. Rachna Agarwal, a family member of the assessee, which involved identical facts and the same scrip, where the addition was deleted. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order and held that the lower authorities were not justified in not allowing the exemption under Section 10(38). Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the AO to allow the exemption and delete the consequential addition.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law and liable to be quashed. The primary reason was that the Assessing Officer had not formed an independent belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. Instead, the AO appeared to have acted on borrowed satisfaction and instructions from the DDIT (Investigation) Unit, Kolkata, without an independent application of mind. Furthermore, the CIT(A) had noted jurisdictional issues with the officer who initiated the proceedings, as well as a lack of a live nexus between the material and the belief of escapement, citing various High Court and Supreme Court precedents. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding that the reassessment proceedings were vitiated. Regarding the addition under Section 68, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had correctly appreciated the facts. The assessee had provided documentary evidence, including IT returns, audited accounts, bank statements, and confirmations, establishing the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the share subscribers. The Tribunal noted that the alleged adverse statement of Sri Mahendra Sethia was general and not specific to the assessee, and he was not produced for cross-examination. The AO had also accepted similar share transactions with other investors. Therefore, the addition under Section 68 was not sustained. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed on both legal and merit grounds.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal in limine by not condoning the delay of 136 days, without deciding the issue on merit. This action was found to be in violation of the provisions of Section 250(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment framed by the Ld. AO was ex-parte under Section 144 read with Section 144B of the Act, as the assessee did not respond to notices. Considering these facts and in adherence to the principles of natural justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal back to the file of the Ld. AO. The Ld. AO is directed to decide the matter afresh after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Act was invalid. The reopening was initiated after a period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year (AY 2018-19). According to Section 151 of the Act, for reopening beyond three years, the approval must be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner (PCCIT) or Chief Commissioner (CCIT). However, in this case, the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148A and the notice under Section 148 was granted by the Principal Commissioner (PCIT), Kolkata-1. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India and others Vs. Rajeev Bansal, which clarified that the specified authority for granting sanction under Section 151 is directly correlated to the time when the notice is issued. Non-compliance with the strict time limits prescribed under Section 151 affects the AO's jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the reopening of assessment and the consequent assessment order. The assessee's appeal on this legal issue was allowed. The Tribunal did not decide the issues on merit, leaving them open for future consideration if necessary. The Revenue's appeal, which challenged the deletion of additions by the CIT(A), became infructuous due to the quashing of the assessment order and was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Act was invalid. The reopening was initiated after a period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year (AY 2018-19). According to Section 151 of the Act, for reopening beyond three years, the approval must be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner (PCCIT) or Chief Commissioner (CCIT). However, in this case, the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148A and the notice under Section 148 was granted by the Principal Commissioner (PCIT), Kolkata-1. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India and others Vs. Rajeev Bansal, which clarified that the specified authority for granting sanction under Section 151 is directly correlated to the time when the notice is issued. Non-compliance with the strict time limits prescribed under Section 151 affects the AO's jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the reopening of assessment and the consequent assessment order. The assessee's appeal on this legal issue was allowed. The Tribunal did not decide the issues on merit, leaving them open for future consideration if necessary. The Revenue's appeal, which challenged the deletion of additions by the CIT(A), became infructuous due to the quashing of the assessment order and was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was void ab initio and without jurisdiction. The reasoning was that a search was conducted on the assessee on 12.02.2020. The assessment year under appeal, AY 2013-14, falls within the extended 'relevant assessment year' contemplated in Section 153A(1) of the Act, specifically within the ten assessment years preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year of search (AY 2020-21). The mandatory conditions of the fourth proviso to Section 153A, including the asset representation of income exceeding Rs. 50 lakh and requisite satisfaction and approval, were met. The Tribunal emphasized that Section 153A is a self-contained code for search assessments and has an overriding effect on general reassessment provisions like Section 148. Since the reopening was admittedly founded on search material, the case squarely fell within the domain of Section 153A alone. Therefore, the notice under Section 148 and all subsequent proceedings were quashed. The ground raised under Rule 27 was allowed, rendering the Revenue's appeal infructuous.

The Tribunal held that Ground No. 2, concerning the disallowance of deduction under Section 80GGC for donation to Yuva Jan Jagruti Party, is dismissed. The AO's finding that the donation was bogus was based on admissions recorded under Section 132(4) during search proceedings, which have evidentiary value. The assessee failed to provide any further evidence to controvert these findings. The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s decision on this issue. Regarding Ground No. 3, relating to interest on borrowed capital for house construction, the issue is remanded to the AO. The assessee needs to file necessary evidence regarding the nature of construction to avail the benefit of deduction on interest payment for a housing loan. This ground is partly allowed for statistical purposes. For Ground No. 4, the AO is directed to allow the required credit of taxes deducted at source. This ground is allowed for statistical purposes. Ground No. 7, concerning the deduction for professional tax, is also allowed for statistical purposes, with the AO directed to allow it as per law upon the assessee filing the required evidence. Other grounds were considered academic or consequential and did not require separate adjudication. The appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the enhancement made by the CIT(A) in the case of Smt. Sujata Pyne was completely unjustified. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had deleted Rs. 3,59,853/- out of a total addition of Rs. 20,93,853/- without proper basis and without considering the assessee's submissions regarding the difference in valuation methodology. The Tribunal further observed that the CIT(A) had enhanced the assessment by Rs. 1,47,48,248/- in Smt. Sujata Pyne's case, which was also added in the hands of Smt. Shruti Pyne, indicating uncertainty. In Smt. Shruti Pyne's case, the Tribunal found that the jewellery belonged to the firm M/s. Binod Bihari Dutt (BBD) and the remaining was gifted by her father, thus the source was fully explained. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the additions in both cases. The appeals of the assessees were allowed on all grounds.

The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the application in Form 10AB by the assessee should be condoned. The Tribunal considered the facts of the case and noted that the CBDT, vide Circular No. 6/2026, had granted condonation for filing Form 10AB electronically for approval under clause 2 of the first proviso to Section 80G. Therefore, the Tribunal was inclined to condone the delay. The Tribunal decided to restore the appeal to the file of the CIT(E) with a direction to decide the same on merits after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The appeal of the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the dismissal of the appeal by the Ld. CIT(A) in limine for not condoning the delay of 578 days, without deciding the issue on merit, was in violation of Section 250(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. To meet the ends of justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to condone the delay. Consequently, the appeal was restored back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to decide the same on merit after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The principle established is that appellate authorities should endeavor to decide matters on merit rather than dismissing them on procedural technicalities, especially when there is a significant delay that can be reasonably addressed.

The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the ITO Ward 31(3) Kolkata was invalid due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The Tribunal relied on the fact that the assessee's returned income exceeded Rs. 20 Lakhs, which vested jurisdiction with the DCIT/ACIT Circle 31, not the ITO Ward 31(3). The Tribunal noted that the non-issuance of a valid notice under Section 143(2) is not a procedural irregularity but a fundamental defect that is not curable under Section 292BB of the Act. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decision in Asst. CIT vs. Hotel Blue Moon, stating that non-issuance of notice under Section 143(2) is not curable. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee had raised objections regarding the lack of valid service of notice under Section 143(2) in a letter dated 16.11.2009, which prevented the application of Section 292BB. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the notice and set aside all consequent proceedings. The appeal of the assessee was allowed on the legal issue of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus by providing documentary evidence, including share application forms, cheques, bank statements, and demat statements, which established the identity of parties, genuineness of transactions, and source of investment. The Tribunal noted that the AO's addition was based on the Investigation Wing's report without specific material linking the assessee to manipulation. The Tribunal also considered that GCM Securities Limited was a profit-making company and that identical facts in the case of Smt. Rachna Agarwal (a family member) led to deletion of additions by the ITAT, with no appeal filed by the Revenue. The Tribunal found that the lower authorities were not justified in disallowing the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 10(38) amounting to ₹77,78,476/-. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the AO was directed to delete the consequential addition and allow the exemption under Section 10(38). The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 143(2) was issued by the ITO, whereas the assessment order was passed by the ACIT, Circle-26(1), Kolkata. The Tribunal noted that the income declared by the assessee was below Rs. 15 lakhs. Relying on the decision of the Kolkata Tribunal in ITA No. 3004/KOL/2025 (Kiran Devi Patni) and the Kolkata High Court's decision in PCIT Vs M/s Nopany & Sons, the Tribunal found that the notice issued by the ITO was invalid and consequently quashed it. Since the notice was quashed, all consequent proceedings were set aside. The Tribunal observed that the assessment order was passed by the ACIT, Circle-26(1), Kolkata, who lacked jurisdiction in view of CBDT Circulars. Therefore, the assessment framed was quashed, and the appeal of the assessee was allowed on the legal issue. The issue on merit was rendered academic. The ratio decidendi is that an assessment order passed pursuant to a notice issued by an officer without jurisdiction, or by an officer who subsequently lacks jurisdiction to pass the assessment order, is invalid and liable to be quashed.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus under Section 68 by filing all the requisite documents and evidences pertaining to the share subscribers before the AO. The Tribunal noted that the AO did not conduct any independent inquiry or investigation into the evidences filed by the assessee. The addition was made solely on the ground that the subscribers did not comply with the summons issued under Section 131 of the Act. The Tribunal found this reasoning to be flawed, stating that once the assessee discharges its initial burden, the AO cannot make an addition based on the non-compliance of summons by third parties, especially when the assessee has provided substantial documentary evidence. The Tribunal relied on the jurisdictional High Court's decisions in PCIT vs. Bright Commodeal Pvt Ltd and PCIT vs. M/S Shipra Enclave Pvt Ltd, which emphasized that documented traceability through banking channels carries greater evidentiary weight than the subjective suspicion of an AO or the non-appearance of directors. The Tribunal concluded that the ratio in NRA Iron & Steel applies only to 'phantom' or 'non-existent' entities, not to active, traceable taxpayers. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the AO was directed to delete the addition. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law and liable to be quashed. The primary reason was that the Assessing Officer had not formed an independent belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. Instead, the AO appeared to have acted on borrowed satisfaction and instructions from the DDIT (Investigation) Unit, Kolkata, without an independent application of mind. Furthermore, the CIT(A) had noted jurisdictional issues with the officer who initiated the proceedings, as well as a lack of a live nexus between the material and the belief of escapement, citing various High Court and Supreme Court precedents. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding that the reassessment proceedings were vitiated. Regarding the addition under Section 68, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had correctly appreciated the facts. The assessee had provided documentary evidence, including IT returns, audited accounts, bank statements, and confirmations, establishing the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the share subscribers. The Tribunal noted that the alleged adverse statement of Sri Mahendra Sethia was general and not specific to the assessee, and he was not produced for cross-examination. The AO had also accepted similar share transactions with other investors. Therefore, the addition under Section 68 was not sustained. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed on both legal and merit grounds.

The Tribunal held that the enhancement made by the CIT(A) in the case of Smt. Sujata Pyne was completely unjustified. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had deleted Rs. 3,59,853/- out of a total addition of Rs. 20,93,853/- without proper basis and without considering the assessee's submissions regarding the difference in valuation methodology. The Tribunal further observed that the CIT(A) had enhanced the assessment by Rs. 1,47,48,248/- in Smt. Sujata Pyne's case, which was also added in the hands of Smt. Shruti Pyne, indicating uncertainty. In Smt. Shruti Pyne's case, the Tribunal found that the jewellery belonged to the firm M/s. Binod Bihari Dutt (BBD) and the remaining was gifted by her father, thus the source was fully explained. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the additions in both cases. The appeals of the assessees were allowed on all grounds.

The Tribunal held that the deletion of the addition of ₹8,88,00,000/- by the NFAC was justified. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided extensive documentary evidence, including confirmations from shareholders, their PAN, income-tax returns, audited balance sheets, and bank statements, which collectively established the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The Tribunal observed that the AO had not disputed the existence of these companies nor brought any adverse material to show that the documents were false or fabricated. The Tribunal agreed with the NFAC that the mere non-appearance of directors or shareholders in response to summons under Section 131 cannot, by itself, justify an addition when sufficient documentary evidence is on record. The Tribunal relied on the principles laid down in *Crystal Networks (P) Ltd. v. CIT* and *CIT v. Dataware Pvt. Ltd.*, emphasizing that when documentary evidence establishes the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction, the failure of individuals to appear pursuant to a summons is immaterial. The Tribunal also referred to several other decisions of the jurisdictional High Court and co-ordinate benches that dealt with similar issues of unexplained share capital, where the assessee's appeals were allowed based on the documentary evidence provided. Therefore, the Tribunal found no ground to interfere with the order of the NFAC and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue.

The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Act are invalid and cannot be sustained. The Tribunal reasoned that when income is sought to be assessed based on material found during a third-party search conducted prior to 01.04.2021, Section 153C provides a special and exclusive machinery. This section overrides the provisions of Sections 147 and 148, as per the second proviso to Section 149(1). The Tribunal noted that the AO did not record satisfaction and hand over material to the AO of the other person, nor did the AO of the other person record their own satisfaction, which are prerequisites for proceedings under Section 153C. The Tribunal relied on several judicial precedents, including DCIT vs. Nawal Kumar Kanodia, Sri Dinakara Suvarna vs. DCIT, and Shyam Sunder Khandelwal vs. ACIT, to support its decision. Consequently, the reopening of assessment and the consequent assessment framed were quashed. The ground raised by the assessee in the cross-objection was allowed. The appeal of the Revenue was rendered infructuous and dismissed. Any other grounds raised in the cross-objection were left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Act are invalid and cannot be sustained. The Tribunal reasoned that when income is sought to be assessed based on material found during a third-party search conducted prior to 01.04.2021, Section 153C provides a special and exclusive machinery. This section overrides the provisions of Sections 147 and 148, as per the second proviso to Section 149(1). The Tribunal noted that the AO did not record satisfaction and hand over material to the AO of the other person, nor did the AO of the other person record their own satisfaction, which are prerequisites for proceedings under Section 153C. The Tribunal relied on several judicial precedents, including DCIT vs. Nawal Kumar Kanodia, Sri Dinakara Suvarna vs. DCIT, and Shyam Sunder Khandelwal vs. ACIT, to support its decision. Consequently, the reopening of assessment and the consequent assessment framed were quashed. The ground raised by the assessee in the cross-objection was allowed. The appeal of the Revenue was rendered infructuous and dismissed. Any other grounds raised in the cross-objection were left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the AO and the Ld. CIT(A) failed to appreciate the facts in proper perspective despite documentary evidence. The Tribunal found that the interest debited by the assessee was wrongly disallowed under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. The reasoning was that the loan was taken for a business purpose (development of a construction project), and when that purpose was stalled, the funds were utilized commercially by lending them out at a higher interest rate, generating income. The Tribunal noted that this was the second round of litigation and that setting aside the case would serve no purpose. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the disallowance of Rs.98,39,938. The ratio decidendi is that if borrowed funds are utilized for business purposes, and when the primary business purpose is stalled, the funds are deployed commercially to earn a return, the interest on such borrowed funds should not be disallowed, especially when income is generated from such deployment.

The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 9,00,000/- made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not tenable. The Tribunal considered the written submissions and documents filed by the assessee before the lower authorities, including the audit financial statement, balance sheet, tax audit report, and the return of income for the immediately previous year (AY 2022-23) which showed closing cash in hand. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had consistently returned income of over Rs. 1 crore for the last three years and for AY 2024-25. Crucially, the Tribunal observed that the ledger copy of the capital account reflecting the introduction of Rs. 9,00,000/- in cash was provided during assessment proceedings, and these transactions were part of the regular books of accounts. The daily cash flow table also supported the introduction of funds. Therefore, finding substance in the assessee's submissions and documents, the Tribunal deleted the addition. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal considered the submissions and noted that the assessee contended the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) occurred due to illness, hospitalization, inability to run business activities, lack of technical knowledge, and incorrect professional advice. The Tribunal acknowledged that there was no proper representation before the AO and CIT(A) and that the deposits were stated to be from customers. The Bench was of the view that, on the facts of the case, the delay ought to have been condoned by the CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the case back to the CIT(A) for disposal of the grounds of appeal on merit by passing a speaking order. The assessee was to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and Rule 46A of the I.T. Rules, 1962 was to be followed. An opportunity of being heard was also to be provided to the AO, if required. The grounds taken by the assessee were partly allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal allowed the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Shalimar Pellet Feeds Ltd. In that case, the Hon'ble High Court held that the machinery provision under Rule 8D can be applied only with regard to the shares which yielded dividend income in the year under consideration. Therefore, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had erred in confirming the disallowance made by the AO on investments that did not yield dividend income. The disallowance of ₹2,65,36,969/- was deleted. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal noted that there was no proper representation before both the Assessing Officer (AO) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)]. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity to the assessee. Consequently, both the orders of the AO and the CIT(A) in the quantum appeal (ITA No. 2144/KOL/2026) were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the AO for reassessment de novo. The assessee was directed to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and was cautioned against seeking unnecessary adjournments. The grounds in this appeal were partly allowed for statistical purposes. Similarly, for the penalty appeal (ITA No. 2145/KOL/2026), both the orders of the AO and the CIT(A) were set aside and remitted to the AO with a direction to reframe the penalty order after the assessment proceedings were finalized, as per Section 275(1A) of the Act. The grounds in this appeal were also partly allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions or the penalty.

The Tribunal noted that there was no proper representation before both the Assessing Officer (AO) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)]. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity to the assessee. Consequently, both the orders of the AO and the CIT(A) in the quantum appeal (ITA No. 2144/KOL/2026) were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the AO for reassessment de novo. The assessee was directed to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and was cautioned against seeking unnecessary adjournments. The grounds in this appeal were partly allowed for statistical purposes. Similarly, for the penalty appeal (ITA No. 2145/KOL/2026), both the orders of the AO and the CIT(A) were set aside and remitted to the AO with a direction to reframe the penalty order after the assessment proceedings were finalized, as per Section 275(1A) of the Act. The grounds in this appeal were also partly allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions or the penalty.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the order of the CIT(A). The assessee, a non-banking financial company, had invested Rs. 3,00,00,000/- in JM Balanced Fund via account payee cheque and received dividend income. The Tribunal noted that the assessee incurred a Short Term Capital Loss of Rs. 2,54,51,554/- from the sale of JM Balance Fund and JM Equity Fund, and earned dividend income of Rs. 3,13,41,581/-. The assessee had disallowed the STCL of Rs. 2,50,31,484/- under Section 94(7). The Tribunal observed that the investments were made in the open market, supported by mutual fund statements and banking channels, with the source of funds being the assessee's own money. There was no borrowed fund used. The purchase and sale transactions were in the open market, and there was no bar from SEBI. The Tribunal concluded that the transactions were genuine and there was no loss of revenue as the assessee had disallowed the loss under Section 94(7). Therefore, the CIT(A)'s deletion of the disallowance and addition was upheld.

The Tribunal noted that the appeal before the CIT(A) was dismissed for non-prosecution, and the assessment by the AO was also made ex parte. The Bench was of the view that even in a best judgment assessment, income should be computed to the best of judgment, and entire receipts cannot be taxed without allowing for incurred expenses. Therefore, in the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee. The order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and the issue was remanded to him for granting the assessee one more opportunity. The assessee was directed to comply with hearing notices, avoid unnecessary adjournments, follow Rule 46A of the IT Rules, 1962, and an opportunity of being heard was to be provided to the Ld. AO, if required. The grounds taken by the assessee were partly allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 145 days in filing the appeal, finding the reasons provided by the assessee to be bonafide and genuine. The Revenue's counsel did not object to this condonation. However, at the time of hearing, the assessee's counsel requested to withdraw the appeal. The Revenue's counsel did not oppose this request. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the case.