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189 orders · Page 3 of 4
The Tribunal observed that the amendment to Section 143(1)(a)(v), which brought Chapter-VI provisions under processing purview, was effective from 01.04.2021. For AY 2019-20, the unamended Section 143(1)(a) applied, which excluded such provisions from processing. Therefore, the ITAT held that the deductions could not have been denied by the AO under the unamended Section 143(1)(a) for AY 2019-20 and directed the AO to allow the claimed deduction.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the appeal on merits and did not pass a speaking order as required by Section 250(6) of the Act. The CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution.
The Tribunal found that due to non-compliance before the lower authorities, the full facts were not examined. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the AO.
The Tribunal found the impugned order to be cryptic and lacking in factual discussion. It set aside the order and remanded the matter to the AO for fresh assessment, directing the assessee to produce investors for examination.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order without considering the assessee's submission. Therefore, the matter is remanded back to the CIT(A) to re-examine the issue on merits after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by allowing the assessee's appeal without calling for a remand report from the Assessing Officer to verify the genuineness of the transactions.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by allowing the assessee's appeal without calling for a remand report from the Assessing Officer to verify the genuineness of the transactions.
The Tribunal condoned the 44-day delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause due to the partner's illness. It set aside the orders of both the CIT(A) and the AO, remitting the matter back to the AO for a fresh (de novo) assessment, granting the assessee a proper opportunity to be heard and submit evidence.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to pass a speaking order, as required by Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, and did not properly adjudicate the grounds of appeal. The AO also failed to provide reasons for disallowing the additional claim.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was bad in law as it was based on a change of opinion and lacked any finding of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts. The reopening notice was consequently quashed.
The Tribunal held that Rule 8D should only be applied to investments that have actually yielded exempt income during the year. The disallowance made by the assessee voluntarily should be given credit for. The matter was remanded to the AO for fresh computation.
The Tribunal held that for the assessment year 2014-2015, the Pr.CIT's order under Section 263 was liable to be quashed. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order under Section 153A r.w.s. 143(3) was passed in consequence of a search, but no incriminating material was found concerning carbon credits. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell (P) Ltd. to state that for Section 153A assessments, there must be incriminating material. Since the Pr.CIT's revision was based on the premise that the AO had considered certain hard disk data (SME/HD/1 and SME/HD/2) as incriminating, but the CIT(A) had already held these not to be incriminating, the foundation for the Pr.CIT's order was lost. Therefore, the appeal for AY 2014-2015 was allowed. Regarding the issue of Section 80IA deduction for other assessment years, the Tribunal held that the Pr.CIT's order under Section 263 was liable to be upheld. The Tribunal interpreted Explanation 1(c) to Section 263 to mean that the revisionary powers extend to 'such matters' not considered and decided in appeal, which is a restrictive term. The Tribunal found that the AO's error in computing the Section 80IA deduction by not apportioning common expenses was a specific matter not directly addressed in the appeals before the CIT(A) or ITAT. Therefore, the Pr.CIT had the power to revise such an order. Consequently, the appeals for AYs 2017-2018 to 2019-2020 were dismissed.
The Tribunal found that while the assessee did file ledger accounts for domestic sales, the AO required more details like PAN and addresses. For export sales, a ledger account with party names and amounts was filed. Regarding the limited scrutiny argument, the Tribunal noted that the AO's reasons for scrutiny were broad and generic, encompassing the issues before the Tribunal, thus rejecting this argument. However, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's argument that books of accounts were not rejected and some details were indeed filed. Considering the totality of facts, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the AO for fresh assessment. The AO is to examine the books of accounts to his satisfaction and seek any further details deemed necessary for a correct assessment, with the assessee directed to cooperate.
For ITA No.873/Kol/2024 (carbon credit issue), the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, setting aside the Section 263 order. It held that the foundational incriminating material cited for the Section 153A assessment was deemed non-incriminating by the CIT(A), thus invalidating the Pr.CIT's revision. For ITA Nos.1016-1020/Kol/2024 (Section 80IA issue), the Tribunal upheld the Section 263 orders, distinguishing between 'subject matter' and 'such matters' under Section 263 Explanation 1(c) and finding that the specific error in expense apportionment was a 'such matter' not previously considered, thus causing prejudice and warranting revision.
For ITA No.873/Kol/2024 (carbon credit issue), the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, setting aside the Section 263 order. It held that the foundational incriminating material cited for the Section 153A assessment was deemed non-incriminating by the CIT(A), thus invalidating the Pr.CIT's revision. For ITA Nos.1016-1020/Kol/2024 (Section 80IA issue), the Tribunal upheld the Section 263 orders, distinguishing between 'subject matter' and 'such matters' under Section 263 Explanation 1(c) and finding that the specific error in expense apportionment was a 'such matter' not previously considered, thus causing prejudice and warranting revision.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal for AY 2014-2015 (ITA No.873/Kol/2024). It held that the assessment order under Section 153A r.w.s. 143(3) was passed in consequence of a search, but no incriminating material was found regarding the carbon credits. The CIT(A) had also held that the documents considered were not incriminating. Since the foundation for the Section 153A assessment was lost and no incriminating material was found concerning the carbon credits, the Pr.CIT's order under Section 263 was set aside. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals for AYs 2017-2018 to 2019-2020 (ITA Nos.1016 to 1020/Kol/2024). It interpreted Explanation 1(c) to Section 263, stating that the Pr.CIT's powers extended to 'such matters' not considered and decided in appeal, not the entire 'subject matter'. The Tribunal found that the specific issue of apportionment of expenses for Section 80IA deduction was not the subject matter of the earlier appeals, and the AO's failure to consider these expenses was an error that prejudiced the revenue. Therefore, the Pr.CIT was justified in invoking Section 263 powers for these assessment years.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal for AY 2014-2015. It held that the assessment order under Section 153A r.w.s. 143(3) was passed in consequence of a search and seizure operation. However, it was an admitted fact that no incriminating material was found during the search in relation to the carbon credits. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A), in its order against the Section 153A assessment, had held that the seized documents (SME/HD/1 and SME/HD/2) were part of the regular books of accounts and no incriminating documents were found. Following the Supreme Court decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal concluded that the very foundation for the Section 153A assessment order was lost due to the absence of incriminating material. Consequently, the Pr.CIT's order under Section 263 failed and was set aside. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals for AYs 2017-2018 to 2019-2020. It interpreted Explanation 1(c) to Section 263, stating that the Commissioner's powers extend to 'such matters' not considered and decided in appeal, which is a restrictive term. The Tribunal found that the AO, in the assessment order, had only considered depreciation for Section 80IA deduction and had not considered other expenses like head-office expenses, finance cost, and employee benefits. This omission was an error that prejudiced the deduction. The Tribunal held that the issue of apportioning these expenses was not the subject matter of the appeal before the CIT(A) or ITAT, and therefore, the Pr.CIT was within his powers under Section 263 to invoke revisionary powers concerning this specific error in computation, as it was not decided in the prior appeals. The Pr.CIT's order was upheld.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D can only be made when exempt income is actually earned, and since there was none, the addition was invalid. It further ruled that no upward adjustment for Section 14A disallowance should be made while computing book profit under Section 115JB, citing various High Court and ITAT Special Bench decisions.
The Tribunal noted that both the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) had failed to look into the facts of the case and had simply made the addition. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer.
For ITA No.873/Kol/2024 (Shyam Metalics and Energy Ltd., AY 2014-2015), the Tribunal held that the assessment order under Section 153A r.w.s. 143(3) was passed in consequence of a search and seizure operation. However, it was an admitted fact that no incriminating material was found in relation to the carbon credit issue. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had held that the documents considered (SME/HD/1 and SME/HD/2) were part of the regular books of accounts and not incriminating. Following the Supreme Court decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., which requires incriminating material for assessments under Section 153A, the Tribunal found that the foundation for the Pr.CIT's revisionary order was lost. Consequently, the Pr.CIT's order was set aside, and the assessee's appeal was allowed. For the other appeals (ITA Nos. 1016-1020/Kol/2024), the Tribunal held that the Pr.CIT's powers under Section 263 extend to 'such matters' not considered and decided in appeal, not the entire 'subject matter'. The Tribunal found that the specific issue of apportionment of common expenses for calculating Section 80IA deduction was not the subject matter of the assessment order or the appeals before the CIT(A) or the ITAT. Therefore, the Pr.CIT was justified in invoking his powers under Section 263. The appeals of both assessees in these cases were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the subsequent order passed by CIT(A), Faceless, Mumbai was without jurisdiction, as a valid appellate order had already been passed by the competent authority. The Tribunal directed the DCIT to give effect to the earlier order of CIT(A)-16, Kolkata.
The Tribunal held that MAT credit should include education cess, following Supreme Court and ITAT precedents. It also allowed the refund of DDT paid on dividends that became non-taxable due to amalgamation, relying on High Court decisions.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order did not consider the assessee's submissions and therefore, remanded the issue back to the CIT(A) for re-examination on merits.
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal, deleting the additions due to the lack of corroborative evidence. The ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, confirming that in the absence of any independent corroborative evidence for the alleged loan and interest, the additions were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the filing of Form 10BB was before the issuance of intimation under Section 143(1) and that the delay was a procedural lapse. Citing a jurisdictional High Court ruling, the Tribunal found that filing the audit report is procedural and directory in nature.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The delay was condoned, and the order of the CIT(A) was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for disposal on merits.
The Tribunal held that the surcharge is leviable based on the quantum of income falling within a given range, not on the applicable tax rate. It directed the recomputation of tax liability applying the correct surcharge rates.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, concluding that the sum of Rs.8,00,056/- was an advance received during FY 2011-12 and its addition in the current assessment year (2013-14) was not justified. Consequently, the reopening of the assessment was deemed bad in law as the issue did not relate to the assessment year under consideration.
The Tribunal condoned an 18-day delay in filing the appeal and set aside the CIT(E)'s order. The case was remitted back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, with directions to pass a fresh order after hearing the assessee and reviewing all documentary evidence and judicial pronouncements on the nature of the macro insurance activities.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not fully appreciated the facts, particularly regarding the non-existence of share applicant companies and the failure of directors to appear. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee's cross-objections regarding jurisdiction were not adjudicated by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that an application for final registration cannot be rejected on the ground that activities commenced before provisional registration. The date of commencement of activity for this purpose is counted after the grant of provisional registration.
The Tribunal noted that both the AO and Ld. CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders due to the assessee's non-appearance. In the interest of justice, and considering the documents now submitted by the assessee's representative, the Tribunal remitted the appeal back to the Assessing Officer. The AO is directed to provide the assessee with an opportunity to be heard, consider all relevant documents, and pass a fresh order on the merits.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's failure to comply with summons for directors of shareholder companies. Upon the assessee's AR undertaking to produce the directors before the AO, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the AO for fresh consideration, directing the assessee to establish genuineness and creditworthiness, failing which the AO is at liberty to pass an order without prejudice.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the file of the AO, directing the AO to pass an order after giving the assessee an opportunity to present their case and produce documentary evidence.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, accepting the 'sufficient cause' explanation. For both applications, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT (Exemption) and remanded the matters back for fresh consideration, instructing the CIT (Exemption) to provide the assessee a proper opportunity to be heard and submit all relevant evidence.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was bad in law due to the Assessing Officer lacking jurisdiction to issue the notice under Section 148, as per CBDT instructions regarding monetary limits for non-corporate assessees. The assessment proceeding was quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, accepting the 'sufficient cause' explanation. For both applications, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT (Exemption) and remanded the matters back for fresh consideration, instructing the CIT (Exemption) to provide the assessee a proper opportunity to be heard and submit all relevant evidence.
The Tribunal ruled that the ex-parte dismissal by the CIT(A) was not justified in the interest of substantial justice. It remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity to present its case.
The CIT(Appeals) allowed the assessee's appeal on legal grounds, finding the reassessment proceedings to be invalid because the AO shifted the basis of assessment from the initial reason for reopening. The Tribunal upheld this decision.
The Tribunal observed that both lower authorities had passed ex-parte orders primarily due to the assessee's non-compliance in providing evidence. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remit the case back to the Assessing Officer. The AO is directed to pass a fresh order after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity to present all documentary evidence and legal arguments.
The Tribunal held that since the orders passed by the lower authorities (AO and CIT(A)) were ex-parte and there was no proper compliance by the assessee, it was inclined to remit the appeals to the file of the AO in the interest of justice. The Tribunal directed the AO to pass a fresh order after affording a reasonable opportunity to the assessee to place all documentary evidence and present arguments on both factual and legal bases. The Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court had passed a final order on this issue, and the assessee had failed to provide details or documentary evidence before the CIT(A) despite opportunities. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found reasonable cause for the delay, noting the significant adjustments in the intimation and lack of prior opportunity. It remitted the case back to the Addl/JCIT(A) to condone the delay, allow the assessee to file a proper justification for the delay, and decide the appeal on merits after providing a fresh opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order in the assessee's own appeal (I.T.A. No.: 2317/KOL/2025) had already been set aside for de novo consideration, with directions to grant opportunity of hearing to both the assessee and the AO. Therefore, the present appeal by the revenue does not survive and is allowed for statistical purposes, allowing the AO to make submissions during the fresh proceedings before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to pass a speaking order on merits, as required by Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, and had dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 522 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), finding the reasons plausible and reasonable. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal, following a coordinate bench decision, held that the provisions of Section 143(1)(a)(v) allowing disallowance of Section 80P deductions for belated returns, and the conditions of Section 80AC, are applicable only from 01.04.2021. For AY 2018-19, Section 80AC falls outside the purview of intimation u/s 143(1)(a), therefore, the disallowance of the Section 80P deduction for late filing in an intimation is not permissible.
The Tribunal, upon reviewing the assessee's bank account, sales records, and cash deposit details, determined that the assessee possessed adequate funds. It was held that the deposit was indeed made from sales and was reflected in the cash book, leading to the deletion of the addition made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal noted that the issue had already been decided in favor of the assessee by the CIT(A) for assessment years 2015-2016 and 2017-2018. Finding the assessee's reasons for the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A) reasonable, and to prevent substantial injustice, the Tribunal condoned the delay and restored all three appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the issue had already been decided in favor of the assessee by the CIT(A) for assessment years 2015-2016 and 2017-2018. Finding the assessee's reasons for the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A) reasonable, and to prevent substantial injustice, the Tribunal condoned the delay and restored all three appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the issue had already been decided in favor of the assessee by the CIT(A) for assessment years 2015-2016 and 2017-2018. Finding the assessee's reasons for the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A) reasonable, and to prevent substantial injustice, the Tribunal condoned the delay and restored all three appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.