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191 orders · Page 2 of 4
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause due to communication issues. It set aside the orders of both the CIT(A) and the AO, remitting the matter back to the AO for a fresh assessment (de novo). The ITAT directed the AO to provide the assessee a proper opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision. It found that the assessee had sufficiently proven the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the share transactions, including receipt through banking channels and reflection in books, thereby discharging the initial onus.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received for the failure of performance guarantee parameters of the machinery is a capital receipt and outside the purview of taxation. The compensation was not intended to subsidize the cost of the capital asset but to compensate for the revenue loss due to underperformance.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal regarding the transfer pricing adjustment, citing a coordinate bench decision and Supreme Court ruling. It also allowed the appeal against penalty proceedings and interest levy, and restored the issues of credit for advance tax and DDT to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal observed that the lower authorities confirmed additions due to the assessee's lack of documentary evidence. Considering the assessee's submission of additional evidence and an undertaking that these could not be presented earlier, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. The AO is directed to consider the additional evidence, and the CIT(A)'s order is set aside.
The Tribunal held that the revisional order under Section 263 was invalid because the issues raised by the Pr.CIT were not the subject matter of the reassessment proceedings that culminated on 15.03.2022. Furthermore, the time limit for revising the original assessment dated 15.10.2018 under Section 263 had already expired, making the Pr.CIT's action time-barred.
The Tribunal held that the addition of ₹16,36,800/- made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was incorrect and could not be sustained. The Tribunal noted that the assessee, a retired Government employee, had received ₹83 lacs as retirement benefits. The investment in LIC was made from cash received from I-Core Services Limited, which was a repayment of an FDR. The Tribunal found that the assessee had sufficient sources to make the investment in LIC, and the evidence filed by the assessee corroborated this. The Tribunal observed that the cash received from I-Core Services Limited was the source of the LIC investment. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act was not justified. It noted that the recipient, M/s Srei Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., had offered the interest income to tax, which was a key finding from the first round of appeal. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages (P) Ltd. Vs. CIT, stating that no disallowance should be made if the payee has offered the income to tax. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that Form 26A was not applicable for the Assessment Year 2008-09, as it was introduced by amendment in 2012. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the Assessing Officer was directed to delete the addition. Regarding the deduction under Section 80IA, the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s finding to be perverse and factually incorrect. It noted that the assessee had filed its return within the time allowed under Section 139(1), although it did not claim the deduction initially. The Tribunal reiterated that a claim for deduction could be made before the appellate authority for the first time, as had happened in the first round of litigation where the CIT(A) had allowed the deduction by admitting an additional ground. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the AO to allow the deduction of ₹1,08,41,626/- under Section 80IA.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding it genuine and bonafide. On merits, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, stating that the assessee provided sufficient evidence including loan confirmations, bank statements, and ledgers demonstrating that loans were taken via banking channels and repaid with interest after TDS. The Tribunal noted the AO relied on third-party statements without establishing their direct relevance to the assessee's case.
The ITAT set aside the CIT(Appeals)'s ex-parte order, remitting the case back to the CIT(Appeals) to provide the assessee one more opportunity of being heard, in adherence to natural justice. The assessee was cautioned to cooperate promptly with the proceedings.
The Tribunal deleted the addition u/s 68, finding that the share application money was received in the preceding year and later converted to share capital or refunded, citing relevant judicial precedents. The addition u/s 14A was also deleted as no exempt income was earned by the assessee during the year. The issue regarding the AIR mismatch/Section 50C, which pertained to assets treated as stock-in-trade and the applicability of Section 43(A), was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after hearing the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessment framed by the Assessing Officer was invalid. The Tribunal noted that the notice under Section 143(2) clearly indicated 'Limited Scrutiny' and was selected under CASS. However, the subsequent notice under Section 142(1) along with a questionnaire contained 16 detailed queries, effectively treating the case as a complete scrutiny. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that if the AO intended to conduct a detailed examination beyond the scope of limited scrutiny, proper procedure, including recording satisfaction and converting it to complete scrutiny, should have been followed. The Tribunal relied on the decisions of coordinate benches in Shri Vijay Kumar and Dev Milk Foods Pvt. Ltd., which supported the view that a limited scrutiny assessment cannot be converted into a full scrutiny assessment without following due process. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed as bad in law. The issue regarding the applicability of Section 56(2) was not decided as the assessment itself was set aside.
Given the assessee's participation in the VSVS 2024 Scheme, the assessee requested to withdraw the appeal, which was not opposed by the Ld. DR. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the assessee the liberty to revive the appeal if they are unsuccessful in the VSVS-24 for any reason.
The Tribunal noted that the payments were made to individual labourers who were under the direct supervision of the assessee, indicating an employer-employee relationship rather than a contractual one. The Assessing Officer failed to identify a contractor or establish the existence of a contract for carrying out specified work. Relying on case law, the Tribunal found that Section 194C and consequently Section 40(a)(ia) were not applicable.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. While the assessee did not appear, the Tribunal noted the lack of opportunity for natural justice and remitted the matter back to the CIT(Appeals) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal held that for Assessment Year 2017-18, there was no requirement under Section 80AC(ii) or Section 80A(5) of the Income Tax Act to file a return of income to claim deduction under Section 80P. The conditions requiring return filing by the due date for such deductions apply from AY 2018-19 onwards. Therefore, the assessee cannot be denied the deduction, and the addition made by the AO was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the Assessing Officer was without any basis. The Tribunal noted that the assessee is the owner of agricultural land and had provided necessary details and evidences to the AO. Crucially, the Tribunal observed that the department had accepted the agricultural income from the same land in AY 2005-06 and 2006-07, with significant amounts accepted in those years (₹1,89,07,751/- for AY 2005-06 and ₹64,28,220/- for AY 2006-07). Furthermore, the assessee had produced a certificate from the local revenue authority confirming the land as 'Adangal' and detailing the produce. Considering these facts, the Tribunal found no justification for treating the agricultural income as bogus. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition. The ratio decidendi is that established agricultural income from owned land, supported by revenue authority certificates and past acceptance by the department, cannot be arbitrarily treated as bogus without contrary evidence.
The Tribunal held that additions cannot be solely based on higher stock figures presented to a bank for securing credit limits, especially when the assessee's books of accounts were duly audited and the stock information was verified by auditors. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the AO to delete the addition.
The Tribunal held that interest earned from surplus funds invested in deposits with banks and government securities is eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i). It also held that additions made by the CIT(A) on issues not raised in the limited scrutiny assessment are not permissible.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, noting the assessee's participation in the DTVSVS 2024. However, it granted the assessee the liberty to revive the appeal by filing a miscellaneous application if they are not successful in the VSVS-24 for any reason.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both assessment years, finding that the assessee had reasonable and sufficient cause for the delay. The Tribunal noted that the assessee was in imprisonment from January 2022 to April 2022, which led to his income tax matters being unattended. Furthermore, the demise of his chartered accountant, Mr. K.K. Jha, and the subsequent search for a new consultant contributed to the significant delays. The Tribunal observed that there was no proper representation before the Assessing Officer (AO) or the CIT(A). In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the AO and directed the AO to make fresh assessments de novo for both AY 2015-16 and AY 2017-18. The assessee was granted an opportunity to be heard and make further submissions. The grounds taken by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the additions made by the AO or the confirmation of reassessment proceedings, as the matter was remanded for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal held that interest earned from surplus funds invested in deposits with banks and government securities is eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i). It also held that additions made by the CIT(A) on issues not raised in the limited scrutiny assessment are not permissible.
The Tribunal held that interest earned from surplus funds invested in deposits with banks and government securities is eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i). It also held that additions made by the CIT(A) on issues not raised in the limited scrutiny assessment are not permissible.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for both AY 2015-16 and AY 2017-18, finding that the assessee had reasonable and sufficient cause for the delay, including issues with his tax consultant and personal circumstances. The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not have proper representation before the AO or the CIT(A). For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) accepted the justification for the delay but did not consider it sufficient for non-compliance. For AY 2017-18, the CIT(A) condoned the delay but dismissed the appeal as non-maintainable. Considering the lack of proper representation and the ex-parte nature of the orders, the Tribunal set aside the assessment orders of the AO for both assessment years and directed the AO to make fresh assessments de novo. The assessee was granted an opportunity of being heard. The grounds taken by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the additions or the initiation of reassessment proceedings, as the matter was remanded for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals) to meet the principle of natural justice. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(Appeals) with a direction to provide one more opportunity of being heard to the assessee, cautioning the assessee to cooperate.
The Tribunal held that interest earned from surplus funds invested in deposits with banks and government securities is eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i). It also held that additions made by the CIT(A) on issues not raised in the limited scrutiny assessment are not permissible.
The Tribunal condoned the 123-day delay in filing the appeal before it, acknowledging the assessee was prevented from filing on time. To ensure natural justice, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) with a direction to provide another opportunity to the assessee to file a condonation petition and dispose of the appeal without influence from previous observations.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation as the notice was issued beyond the permissible period and TOLA benefits were not applicable. For AY 2014-15, the addition on account of sales to Radhey Enterprises was set aside as the sale proceeds could not be treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68.
The Tribunal held that adjustments to exempt income, which are debatable, cannot be made in an intimation under section 143(1). Since the adjustments made were debatable, the intimation was unsustainable.
The Tribunal noted that the issue for AY 2021-22 in the case of the same assessee was restored to the file of the CIT(A) by the Tribunal's order dated August 21, 2024, in ITA No. 769/Kol/2024. This order directed the CIT(A) to re-examine the claim regarding the filing of Form 10-IC and other relevant details for AY 2021-22, considering the condonation of delay liberally. Since the issue for AY 2022-23 is connected to the outcome of AY 2021-22, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) is directed to apply the principle of judicial consistency, grant the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and verify the assessee's eligibility for the benefit under Section 115BAA. The Tribunal explicitly mentioned avoiding multiplicity of proceedings. The first issue regarding prior intimation was implicitly dismissed as the CIT(A) noted that no adjustments were made under Section 143(1)(a) and the proviso to Section 143(1)(a) was not applicable.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer were not sustainable. The assessment year 2013-14 was an unabated assessment year as no proceedings were pending and the time limit for issuing notice under Section 143(2) had expired. In such cases, the AO can only make additions under Section 153A if there is incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal noted that the additions were based on information available in the Audit Report/Return of Income or information gathered during post-search inquiries, and not on any seized incriminating material. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pr. CIT, Central-3 vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., which affirmed that in unabated/completed assessments, no addition can be made in the absence of incriminating material unearthed during the search. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the unsecured loans were from specific parties and had been repaid in AY 2015-16, which was accepted by the department. The Tribunal also found that the conditions for invoking Section 153A for assessment years beyond the 6th year from the searched year were not met, as there was no reference to seized documents revealing escaped income of Rs. 50 Lakh or more. Consequently, the additions made by the AO were considered without jurisdiction and bad in law. The CIT(A)'s order deleting the additions was upheld.
The Tribunal observed that reassessment initiated within four years required approval from the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, but the approval was obtained from the CIT/PCIT. Citing High Court judgments, it was held that approval not granted by the legally competent authority renders the entire reassessment proceedings void ab-initio. Therefore, the appeal was allowed on this legal ground.
The Tribunal held that the penalty notices issued by the Assessing Officer were vague as they did not specify the exact limb of failure under Section 44AB for which the penalty was proposed. The Tribunal also found that the assessee had a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the audit report, making the penalty unsustainable.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding no infirmity in the deletion of additions. The AO had relied on information from the investigation wing without independent corroboration or providing the assessee with an opportunity to cross-examine.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation as the notice was issued beyond the permissible period and TOLA benefits were not applicable. For AY 2014-15, the addition on account of sales to Radhey Enterprises was set aside as the sale proceeds could not be treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68.
The tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 143(2) was not in the prescribed format as per CBDT instructions, rendering it invalid. Consequently, all subsequent proceedings were also deemed invalid.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated beyond the statutory period of four years and without proper satisfaction or specific reasons showing failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts. Therefore, the reopening was bad in law.
The Tribunal held that the addition for undisclosed sales was made on an arbitrary estimation basis without proper material. The bad debt write-off was considered sufficient for deduction, following a Supreme Court decision. The interest income addition was based on presumption and assumption, which could not be sustained.
The Tribunal found that the nature of the transaction (outright sale vs. JDA for leasehold property) was the core issue, and neither the AO nor CIT(A) properly appreciated or examined the JDA and leasehold rights. Citing principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter to the AO for fresh consideration, directing a thorough examination of the JDA and leasehold deed to determine if a 'transfer' u/s 2(47) occurred.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was a consequence of an order passed u/s. 263 which was quashed by a coordinate bench. The Ld. CIT(A) had followed judicial discipline in allowing the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee had been given sufficient opportunities but had not appeared. Considering the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the penalty notices issued by the Assessing Officer were vague as they did not specify the exact limb of failure under Section 44AB for which the penalty was proposed. The Tribunal also found that the assessee had a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the audit report, making the penalty unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution by the CIT(A). However, considering that the assessee's written submissions might not have been taken on record, the issues were restored to the CIT(A) for readjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned on unutilized government grants and short-term capital gains arising from mere switching of mutual fund schemes should not be taxed. This decision was based on the principle of consistency, as similar claims were accepted by the Assessing Officer in subsequent assessment years.
The ITAT observed that funds were received through banking channels and share applicants were income tax assessees regularly filing returns. It noted that the AO and CIT(A) did not provide specific findings on defects or adequately consider the evidences provided regarding identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness. Citing judicial precedents, the Tribunal held that non-production of directors in person cannot be the sole basis for adverse inference, and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the addition.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) correctly deleted the addition as the reassessment proceedings were initiated beyond the prescribed time limit and without proper basis. The reasons for reopening were based on suspicion and not on concrete evidence.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had purchased shares via banking channels and sold them, receiving the said amount. All evidence, including responses to Section 133(6) notices and an affidavit from M/s Akul Multitrade Pvt. Ltd. confirming the transactions, was provided. Therefore, the transactions were fully explained, and the addition was not sustainable, leading to the setting aside of the CIT(A)'s order and direction to delete the addition.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal without considering the assessee's evidence of part payments and by solely relying on the counsel's admission. The case was restored to the file of the Ld. AO for de novo adjudication, with directions to examine all evidences the assessee may produce and afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal condoned the 52-day delay, finding it bonafide. Recognizing that the assessee was not given a reasonable opportunity of hearing before the CIT(A), the Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) for re-adjudication to ensure justice, thus allowing the appeal for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment under Section 147 were cryptic and vague. The AO had merely reproduced information received from the investigation wing regarding client code modification and concluded that income had escaped assessment without providing any details of the transactions entered into by the assessee. The Tribunal found a total non-application of mind on the part of the AO to the information received. Therefore, the reopening of assessment based on such cryptic and vague reasons could not be sustained. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the reopening of assessment under Section 147 and the order framed under Section 143(3) of the Act dated 09.08.2016. The ratio decidendi is that reopening of assessment requires detailed application of mind by the AO to the information received, not mere reproduction of external information.