ITAT Delhi Judgments — August 2026

The Tribunal found that the assessee had presented documentary evidence to support its non-profit activities. The impugned order of the CIT(E) was set aside, and the matter was restored for a fresh decision.

The Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 14,63,000. The assessee failed to provide cogent evidence, such as customer-wise details or confirmations, to substantiate the source of the cash deposits.

The Tribunal held that for AY 2015-16, the notice under Section 148 was issued beyond the prescribed limitation period. For AY 2016-17, the assessment was made without issuing the mandatory notice under Section 143(2), rendering it without jurisdiction. Similar issues regarding limitation and jurisdiction were found for AY 2017-18.

The Tribunal held that for AY 2015-16, the notice under Section 148 was issued beyond the prescribed limitation period. For AY 2016-17, the assessment was made without issuing the mandatory notice under Section 143(2), rendering it without jurisdiction. Similar issues regarding limitation and jurisdiction were found for AY 2017-18.

The Tribunal held that the cash of Rs. 2,50,000 owned by the mother was explained by her affidavit and past savings. The remaining cash and the jewellery found were also considered sufficiently explained by the assessees' cash accounts, social standing, and CBDT guidelines regarding jewellery limits for family members. Therefore, the additions made by the Assessing Officer were directed to be deleted.

The ITAT found that the NFAC dismissed the appeal without providing a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the matter was restored to the NFAC for a decision on merits after granting one final opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order was not barred by limitation, giving the benefit of doubt to the department regarding the receipt date of the ITAT order. On merits, the Tribunal found that the purchases from the three disputed parties were verifiable and had been accepted in previous proceedings, thus not disturbing the CIT(A)'s findings.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient documentary evidence, including communications from ARINC and a legal notice, to show that the imports were not made by them and the title of the goods vested with ARINC. The Tribunal found that the AO had not duly appreciated these evidences, leading to an erroneous conclusion.

The Tribunal held that Section 69A cannot be invoked if sales entries exist in the books of account, as this would lead to double taxation. The AO must demonstrate the absence of a nexus between recorded sales and the entries, which was not done here.

The Tribunal held that there was a fatal delay in the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer under Section 153C. Reliance was placed on High Court decisions that found such delays to vitiate the assumption of jurisdiction and the subsequent assessment order.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal in part, following its own precedents. It allowed depreciation on commercial vehicles and deduction under section 35(2AB) was remitted back to the AO for verification. Disallowance under section 14A was deleted, but club expenses were sustained.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was based on an incorrect assumption of fact, rendering the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 invalid. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the cash of Rs. 2,50,000 owned by the mother was explained by her affidavit and past savings. The remaining cash and the jewellery found were also considered sufficiently explained by the assessees' cash accounts, social standing, and CBDT guidelines regarding jewellery limits for family members. Therefore, the additions made by the Assessing Officer were directed to be deleted.

The Tribunal held that the cash of Rs. 2,50,000 owned by the mother was explained by her affidavit and past savings. The remaining cash and the jewellery found were also considered sufficiently explained by the assessees' cash accounts, social standing, and CBDT guidelines regarding jewellery limits for family members. Therefore, the additions made by the Assessing Officer were directed to be deleted.

The Tribunal held that the income from the sale of REC Bonds is a capital receipt. Consequently, it cannot be considered for deduction under Section 80IA and should be excluded from book profit computation under Section 115JB.

The Tribunal held that the income from the sale of REC Bonds is a capital receipt. Consequently, it cannot be considered for deduction under Section 80IA and should be excluded from book profit computation under Section 115JB.

The Tribunal quashed the assessment order, following a coordinate bench's decision that the approval granted by the JCIT under Section 153D was invalid as it was conditional and not a final statutory approval. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the addition as the AO's assessment was based solely on an unsubstantiated TEP without any independent inquiry. The Tribunal also noted that Section 250(4) of the IT Act, regarding further inquiries, uses the word 'may' and is not mandatory.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer lacked tangible material to form a belief that income had escaped assessment, and the reopening was based on vague information for fishing inquiries. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was flawed.

The Tribunal held that the assessment year in question was outside the permissible block period for reassessment under Section 153A, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Ojus Medicare. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal condoned the significant delay in filing the appeal due to family death and lack of awareness. The CIT(A)'s ex parte order was set aside to ensure natural justice.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to interest under Section 244A for the entire period from the end of the financial year until the refund was issued. The Tribunal noted that the delay was not solely attributable to the assessee and followed a High Court decision in a similar case.

The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the CIT(A) to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim, considering the ex-parte dismissal and in the interest of justice.

The Tribunal held that the penalty was wrongly levied under Section 271D as the transaction involved cash receipts for sale of property, which is governed by Section 269ST and Section 271DA. The Tribunal also noted that Section 269ST came into effect from 01.04.2017, making it inapplicable to the assessment year 2017-18.

The Tribunal held that the receipts of ₹24,16,28,878/- from Indian customers on account of the sale of SaaS-based products are consideration for the use of a standard, non-customized, off-the-shelf facility. It was found that these services neither made available any technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or process to the customers nor consisted of the development and transfer of any technical plan or design. Consequently, they do not constitute 'fees for included services' under Article 12(4) of the DTAA. The Tribunal noted that the DRP erred in relying on the 'marketing and sales support services agreement' which was not between the assessee and its Indian customers. The Tribunal deleted the addition of ₹24,16,28,878/-. The issue of credit for tax deducted at source was restored to the AO for verification. The levy of interest under Sections 234A and 234B was directed to be recomputed. The initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 274 read with Section 270A was dismissed as premature. The appeals for both AY 2021-22 and AY 2022-23 were partly allowed.

The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 56(2)(viia) are not applicable to the buy-back of its own shares by a company. The reasoning is that Section 56(2)(viia) applies only when shares become the 'property' of the recipient company, and this is only possible if the shares are of 'any other company'. In a buy-back of own shares, the shares are extinguished and do not become property in the hands of the company. The Tribunal relied on decisions of coordinate benches of the ITAT in Vora Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. and IPS Infrastructure Ltd., and also cited a decision of the Kolkata Tribunal in VITP Private Limited. The Tribunal noted that the extinguishment of shares by reducing paid-up capital was not examined by the AO and restored the issue to the AO for verification, directing deletion of the addition if the fact of extinguishment is found correct. However, the Tribunal ultimately upheld the deletion of the addition made under Section 56(2)(viia) on the grounds of non-applicability to buy-back transactions and the assessee being a non-resident whose income did not accrue or arise in India under Section 5(2). Consequently, the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) was also deleted, following the principle that if the foundation (quantum addition) is removed, the superstructure (penalty) falls.

The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 56(2)(viia) are not applicable to the buy-back of its own shares by a company. The reasoning is that Section 56(2)(viia) applies only when shares become the 'property' of the recipient company, and this is only possible if the shares are of 'any other company'. In a buy-back of own shares, the shares are extinguished and do not become property in the hands of the company. The Tribunal relied on decisions of coordinate benches of the ITAT in Vora Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. and IPS Infrastructure Ltd., and also cited a decision of the Kolkata Tribunal in VITP Private Limited. The Tribunal noted that the extinguishment of shares by reducing paid-up capital was not examined by the AO and restored the issue to the AO for verification, directing deletion of the addition if the fact of extinguishment is found correct. However, the Tribunal ultimately upheld the deletion of the addition made under Section 56(2)(viia) on the grounds of non-applicability to buy-back transactions and the assessee being a non-resident whose income did not accrue or arise in India under Section 5(2). Consequently, the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) was also deleted, following the principle that if the foundation (quantum addition) is removed, the superstructure (penalty) falls.

The Tribunal quashed the reassessment proceedings. This was based on a concession by the Revenue that notices issued for AY 2015-16 on or after April 1, 2021, would be dropped as they fell outside the prescribed completion period.

The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's justification for the delay and agreed that the matter deserved to be re-adjudicated. The order of the lower authorities was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh assessment.

The Tribunal held that the AO had not rejected the assessee's books of account and had calculated average cash sales without calling for the cash book. Since the assessee had provided details of cash deposits from sales and advances, which were reflected in the books, the addition as unexplained cash credit was deleted.

The Tribunal held that while some explanation for the cash deposit was lacking, a lump-sum addition of Rs. 5 lakh was justified. It also directed that Section 115BBE would not apply and deleted the addition on expenses due to lack of cogent material.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC, citing the principle of substantial justice over technicalities. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the disallowance made by the AO on an ad-hoc and estimated basis was not tenable. The assessee had provided all necessary details, deducted TDS, and the accounts were audited. The AO's failure to point out specific deficiencies and the CIT(A)'s lack of independent inquiry led to the deletion of the addition.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT had exercised powers beyond his jurisdiction in rejecting the applications. The Tribunal noted that a previous order cancelling the assessee's registration on similar grounds was quashed by a Co-ordinate Bench, and the Revenue's appeal against that order was pending before the High Court. Therefore, the situation where the order quashing the impugned order by the PCIT still held sway meant that further rejection on the same grounds was not appreciated. The Tribunal reiterated that competent authorities are required to confine their examination to the charitable nature of the trust's objects and the genuineness of its activities at the time of granting or renewing registration. The Tribunal found that the PCIT's allegations of 'specified violation' and 'diversion of funds' were neither supported by any provision of law nor by any judicial precedent at this stage. It was held that such issues fall within the domain of the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings, not at the stage of registration or renewal. Consequently, the impugned order was found to be arbitrary, whimsical, erroneous, and devoid of jurisdiction. The Tribunal quashed the impugned order and directed the Competent Authority to grant the registration/renewal forthwith. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the Revenue's appeals. The Tribunal noted that no incriminating material pertaining to the assessment years in question was found during the search, and additions were based on estimations. Therefore, the additions were beyond the scope of Section 153C.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC, referencing the principle that technicalities should not obstruct substantial justice. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form 10B was due to sufficient cause and that it is a procedural requirement, not a ground for disallowing exemption under Sections 11 and 12. The delay in filing the appeal was also condoned.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) rejected the application without proper application of mind and without giving the assessee a sufficient opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) did not provide concrete reasons for rejecting the application based solely on the write-off of the loan.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the payments were not in the nature of FTS as they lacked managerial, technical, or consultancy elements. The Tribunal also agreed that the payments were pass-through costs and not expenses claimed by the assessee, thus not attracting disallowance under Section 40(a)(i).

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the Revenue's appeals. The Tribunal noted that no incriminating material pertaining to the assessment years in question was found during the search, and additions were based on estimations. Therefore, the additions were beyond the scope of Section 153C.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the Revenue's appeals. The Tribunal noted that no incriminating material pertaining to the assessment years in question was found during the search, and additions were based on estimations. Therefore, the additions were beyond the scope of Section 153C.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the Revenue's appeals. The Tribunal noted that no incriminating material pertaining to the assessment years in question was found during the search, and additions were based on estimations. Therefore, the additions were beyond the scope of Section 153C.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the Revenue's appeals. The Tribunal noted that no incriminating material pertaining to the assessment years in question was found during the search, and additions were based on estimations. Therefore, the additions were beyond the scope of Section 153C.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT had exercised powers beyond his jurisdiction in rejecting the applications. The Tribunal noted that a previous order cancelling the assessee's registration on similar grounds was quashed by a Co-ordinate Bench, and the Revenue's appeal against that order was pending before the High Court. Therefore, the situation where the order quashing the impugned order by the PCIT still held sway meant that further rejection on the same grounds was not appreciated. The Tribunal reiterated that competent authorities are required to confine their examination to the charitable nature of the trust's objects and the genuineness of its activities at the time of granting or renewing registration. The Tribunal found that the PCIT's allegations of 'specified violation' and 'diversion of funds' were neither supported by any provision of law nor by any judicial precedent at this stage. It was held that such issues fall within the domain of the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings, not at the stage of registration or renewal. Consequently, the impugned order was found to be arbitrary, whimsical, erroneous, and devoid of jurisdiction. The Tribunal quashed the impugned order and directed the Competent Authority to grant the registration/renewal forthwith. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was without jurisdiction as the Assessing Officer (ITO) did not have the pecuniary jurisdiction to issue it, given the income declared by the assessee. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the issue back for proper adjudication. The assessee is granted a further opportunity to present its case before the CIT(A) with a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the Revenue's appeals. The Tribunal noted that no incriminating material pertaining to the assessment years in question was found during the search, and additions were based on estimations. Therefore, the additions were beyond the scope of Section 153C.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the Revenue's appeals. The Tribunal noted that no incriminating material pertaining to the assessment years in question was found during the search, and additions were based on estimations. Therefore, the additions were beyond the scope of Section 153C.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is legally entitled to the refund of excess TDS. It reasoned that once the assessment determines Nil taxable income, the refund is a consequential relief and cannot be denied merely because the return was filed under section 148.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT had exercised powers beyond his jurisdiction in rejecting the applications. The Tribunal noted that a previous order cancelling the assessee's registration on similar grounds was quashed by a Co-ordinate Bench, and the Revenue's appeal against that order was pending before the High Court. Therefore, the situation where the order quashing the impugned order by the PCIT still held sway meant that further rejection on the same grounds was not appreciated. The Tribunal reiterated that competent authorities are required to confine their examination to the charitable nature of the trust's objects and the genuineness of its activities at the time of granting or renewing registration. The Tribunal found that the PCIT's allegations of 'specified violation' and 'diversion of funds' were neither supported by any provision of law nor by any judicial precedent at this stage. It was held that such issues fall within the domain of the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings, not at the stage of registration or renewal. Consequently, the impugned order was found to be arbitrary, whimsical, erroneous, and devoid of jurisdiction. The Tribunal quashed the impugned order and directed the Competent Authority to grant the registration/renewal forthwith. The appeals were allowed.