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891 orders · Page 6 of 18
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal without appreciating the facts and that the appeal was an exceptional attempt to seek justice. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) to condone the delay and decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal ex-parte and adjudicated on merits. However, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remit the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision, explicitly refraining from commenting on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) has no power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is obliged to dispose of the appeal on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the grounds of appeal on merit.
The Tribunal found merit in the Revenue's arguments supporting the CIT(A)/NFAC's remand directions. The Tribunal clarified that the assessee is free to raise all legal and factual submissions in the consequential proceedings.
The Tribunal noted that the quantum appeals related to the assessment orders had been remanded back to the AO. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and the penalty matter, directing the AO to re-examine the imposition of penalties after giving effect to a previous Tribunal order.
The Tribunal noted that the quantum appeals related to the assessment orders had been remanded back to the AO. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and the penalty matter, directing the AO to re-examine the imposition of penalties after giving effect to a previous Tribunal order.
The Tribunal noted that the quantum appeals related to the assessment orders had been remanded back to the AO. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and the penalty matter, directing the AO to re-examine the imposition of penalties after giving effect to a previous Tribunal order.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not get sufficient opportunity to produce documents and that the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order without deciding all grounds on merit. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the issue to the AO for a de-novo assessment, ensuring the assessee is given an opportunity.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the assessee's old age and ill health. The issue was the disallowance of employee's PF/ESI contribution paid after the due date. The Tribunal directed the AO to verify if the delay was from the actual salary payment date.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC erred in dismissing the appeal by adopting a hyper-technical approach and not condoning the delay. The assessee had shown sufficient cause for the delay, and the matter was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the lease agreements were operating leases, not finance leases, and therefore, the lease rentals were not taxable as interest under Article 11 of the India-Ireland DTAA. The addition made by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal granted an extension of stay for a further period of 180 days or until the disposal of appeals, whichever is earlier, directing the assessee to produce paper books and avoid adjournments.
The CIT(A) admitted the additional evidence after the AO failed to furnish a remand report, subsequently deleting the additions related to the unsecured loan and time deposit, confirming only the interest income. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the CIT(A) had followed due procedure under Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules and the revenue failed to controvert the findings based on verified documents.
The Tribunal noted that reassessment proceedings were initiated under Section 148. The assessee's objection was filed on 08.11.2016, and the reassessment order was passed on 23.10.2017 and 17.11.2017. The Tribunal directed the AO to dispose of the objections and decide whether Section 153C or Section 147 is applicable. For AY 2014-15, the TPO was directed to apply LIBOR + 200 basis points for computing interest.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions related to bogus sales (Ground 1), cash receipts (Ground 2), depreciation (Ground 3), and unsecured loans (Ground 6). The Tribunal also upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions for unexplained share capital (Ground 4) and partly confirmed the disallowance under Section 40A(3) for staff welfare expenses (Ground 5).
The Tribunal noted that reassessment proceedings were initiated under Section 148. The assessee's objection was filed on 08.11.2016, and the reassessment order was passed on 23.10.2017 and 17.11.2017. The Tribunal directed the AO to dispose of the objections and decide whether Section 153C or Section 147 is applicable. For AY 2014-15, the TPO was directed to apply LIBOR + 200 basis points for computing interest.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s approach of deleting an addition based on additional evidence without obtaining a remand report from the AO was contrary to Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules. The matter was remanded.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to illness and admitted the appeal for adjudication. The appeal filed by the assessee against the quantum of income was allowed for statistical purposes and restored to the CIT(A). Consequently, the appeal against the penalty order was also allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the lease agreements were indeed operating leases, not finance leases. The reasoning was based on the fact that the ownership of the aircraft remained with the lessor (assessee), and the revenue failed to demonstrate from the lease agreements that the nature of the lease was finance lease. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Asea Brown Boveri Limited vs Industrial Finance Corporation of India Ltd. and Association of Leasing & Financial Services vs Union of India to differentiate between operating and finance leases. The Tribunal also noted that the AO accepted ownership with the lessor and that depreciation was claimed by the lessor. The Tribunal found no merit in the revenue's argument that lease rents were taxable as interest under Article 11 of the India-Ireland DTAA, as the lease was determined to be an operating lease. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 74,37,77,694/- was deleted. Ground no. 2 was dismissed as not pressed. Ground no. 6 (interest u/s 234B) and ground no. 6.1 (penalty u/s 270A) were dismissed as consequential and premature, respectively. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the lease in question is an operating lease, not a finance lease. The AO and DRP's re-characterization of the lease as a finance lease was not supported by evidence from the lease agreements. The Tribunal relied on the fact that the ownership of the aircraft remained with the lessor, and the depreciation was claimed by the lessor. The Tribunal also noted that the lease period was six years, which is consistent with an operating lease. Regarding the taxability as interest under Article 11 of the India-Ireland DTAA, the Tribunal, following a Special Bench decision in a similar case involving Indigo, held that the lease rentals are in the nature of rent and not interest, as the Revenue failed to demonstrate that the lease was a finance lease. Therefore, Article 11 of the DTAA would not apply. The assessee succeeded on grounds related to the nature of the lease and taxability. Ground No. 2 (limitation) was dismissed as not pressed by the assessee. Ground No. 6 (interest under Section 234B) was dismissed as consequential. Ground No. 6.1 (penalty under Section 270A) was dismissed as premature. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the lease in question was an operating lease, not a finance lease. The AO's re-characterization was not supported by the lease agreements. The Tribunal noted that the ownership of the aircraft remained with the lessor, and the lessor claimed depreciation. The Tribunal also referred to the Special Bench's decision in a similar case involving Indigo, which held that lease rentals paid by the lessee were in the nature of rent and not interest, as the Revenue failed to demonstrate that the lease was a finance lease. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Article 11 of the India-Ireland DTAA would not apply. The assessee succeeded on the grounds related to the merits of the addition. Ground no. 2, concerning the validity of the assessment order on limitation, was dismissed as not pressed. Ground no. 6, regarding interest under Section 234B, was dismissed as consequential. Ground no. 6.1, challenging penalty proceedings under Section 270A, was dismissed as premature. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the AO and CIT(A) erred in valuing the shares at book value instead of considering the stamp duty value for immovable properties as per Rule 11UA(1)(c)(b) for determining the Fair Market Value (FMV) at the time of sale. The Tribunal found the assessee's valuation, supported by a merchant banker's report, to be in accordance with the law.
The Tribunal held that the lease agreements were indeed operating leases, not finance leases. The reasoning was based on the analysis of the Aircraft Specific Lease Agreement (ASLA) and the Common Terms Agreement (CTA), which indicated the lessor retained ownership. The Tribunal noted that the Revenue failed to demonstrate from the lease agreements that the nature of the lease was finance lease. It relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Asea Brown Boveri Limited vs Industrial Finance Corporation of India Ltd. and Association of Leasing & Financial Services vs Union of India to differentiate between operating and finance leases. The Tribunal also noted that the AO accepted ownership with the lessor and that the lessor claimed depreciation. Regarding the taxability as interest under Article 11 of the DTAA, the Tribunal, following a Special Bench decision concerning Indigo, held that the lease rentals were in the nature of rent and not interest, as the Revenue could not establish it was a finance lease. Consequently, the addition of Rs.74,37,77,694/- made by the AO was deleted. Grounds related to limitation, interest under Section 234B, and initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 270A were dismissed as not pressed, consequential, or premature, respectively. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to examine the correctness of the assessee's accounts and made a mistake in calculating the disallowance. Recording of proper satisfaction is a prerequisite for invoking Section 14A, which was not met.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the CIT(A) to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to present its case. The assessee is directed to cooperate with the proceedings before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessments, additions cannot be made without incriminating material. Since the Revenue could not show any incriminating material for the sustained addition of Rs. 13,00,000/-, the assessee's appeal on this ground was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the primary issue regarding the applicability of Section 115-O of the Act on dividend distribution tax was decided against the assessee by a Special Bench. The additional ground related to this was admitted but ultimately rejected on merits. Grounds 3 to 5 were not pressed.
The Tribunal noted that reassessment proceedings were initiated under Section 148. The assessee's objection was filed on 08.11.2016, and the reassessment order was passed on 23.10.2017 and 17.11.2017. The Tribunal directed the AO to dispose of the objections and decide whether Section 153C or Section 147 is applicable. For AY 2014-15, the TPO was directed to apply LIBOR + 200 basis points for computing interest.
The Tribunal held that the reference to Hong Kong for information was not in accordance with the DTAA provisions for the period prior to its effective date. Consequently, the extension of the limitation period was invalid, making the assessment orders barred by limitation.
The Tribunal noted that reassessment proceedings were initiated under Section 148. The assessee's objection was filed on 08.11.2016, and the reassessment order was passed on 23.10.2017 and 17.11.2017. The Tribunal directed the AO to dispose of the objections and decide whether Section 153C or Section 147 is applicable. For AY 2014-15, the TPO was directed to apply LIBOR + 200 basis points for computing interest.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation. The primary issue revolved around the validity of the extension of the limitation period under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B of the Act, which allows for exclusion of time taken for exchange of information under an agreement referred to in Section 90 or Section 90A. The Tribunal noted that the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and Hong Kong came into force on November 30, 2018. According to Paragraph 5(c) of Article 26 of the DTAA, requests for information for periods prior to November 30, 2018, must be relevant to a fiscal year or taxable event occurring after that date. The reference made by the AO to the Competent Authority of Hong Kong on December 4, 2018, sought information for Assessment Years 2011-12 to 2017-18, which included periods prior to the DTAA's effective date and was not demonstrably relevant to a subsequent fiscal event. Therefore, the reference was not in terms of the DTAA, and the benefit of exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not available. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down by the Delhi High Court (supra) and concluded that the assessments were barred by limitation and thus set aside. Consequently, Ground of Appeal No. 1 of the assessee was allowed, and other grounds were not adjudicated.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition made under Section 68, holding that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing confirmation of accounts, lender's PAN and ITR, bank statements, and audited financial statements. The Tribunal also dismissed the grounds related to the disallowance of interest and commission, as they were consequential to the deletion of the main addition.
The Tribunal deleted the addition under Section 68, stating that the amount represented purchases and Section 68 provisions do not apply. The addition under Section 41(1) was also deleted as the liabilities continued to exist, supported by confirmations and payment details. For the commission disallowance under Section 37(1), the Tribunal restricted it to Rs. 40,000/-, as confirmations were provided for the remaining amount.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation. The primary issue revolved around the validity of the extension of the limitation period under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B of the Act, which allows for exclusion of time taken for exchange of information under an agreement referred to in Section 90 or Section 90A. The Tribunal noted that the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and Hong Kong came into force on November 30, 2018. According to Paragraph 5(c) of Article 26 of the DTAA, requests for information for periods prior to November 30, 2018, must be relevant to a fiscal year or taxable event occurring after that date. The reference made by the AO to the Competent Authority of Hong Kong on December 4, 2018, sought information for Assessment Years 2011-12 to 2017-18, which included periods prior to the DTAA's effective date and was not demonstrably relevant to a subsequent fiscal event. Therefore, the reference was not in terms of the DTAA, and the benefit of exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not available. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down by the Delhi High Court (supra) and concluded that the assessments were barred by limitation and thus set aside. Consequently, Ground of Appeal No. 1 of the assessee was allowed, and other grounds were not adjudicated.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the CCM transactions were within the permissible limits as per exchange guidelines and that the assessee had indeed earned a profit on the sale of shares, which was duly offered to tax. The AO's assumptions were found to be erroneous.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation. The primary issue revolved around the validity of the extension of the limitation period under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B of the Act, which allows for exclusion of time taken for exchange of information under an agreement referred to in Section 90 or Section 90A. The Tribunal noted that the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and Hong Kong came into force on November 30, 2018. According to Paragraph 5(c) of Article 26 of the DTAA, requests for information for periods prior to November 30, 2018, must be relevant to a fiscal year or taxable event occurring after that date. The reference made by the AO to the Competent Authority of Hong Kong on December 4, 2018, sought information for Assessment Years 2011-12 to 2017-18, which included periods prior to the DTAA's effective date and was not demonstrably relevant to a subsequent fiscal event. Therefore, the reference was not in terms of the DTAA, and the benefit of exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not available. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down by the Delhi High Court (supra) and concluded that the assessments were barred by limitation and thus set aside. Consequently, Ground of Appeal No. 1 of the assessee was allowed, and other grounds were not adjudicated.
In the interest of justice, considering the facts and circumstances, the issues in the appeal are restored back to the file of the AO. The AO is directed to pass a fresh assessment order after providing proper and sufficient opportunities to the assessee to be heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and restored the issue to the NFAC. The assessee was granted one final opportunity to submit their claim, and directed to cooperate with the NFAC proceedings. The grounds raised were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the AO's assumption of jurisdiction u/s 147 was flawed due to reliance on an unsigned and irrelevant agreement to sale, and an unverified statement. The reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation. The primary issue revolved around the validity of the extension of the limitation period under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B of the Act, which allows for exclusion of time taken for exchange of information under an agreement referred to in Section 90 or Section 90A. The Tribunal noted that the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and Hong Kong came into force on November 30, 2018. According to Paragraph 5(c) of Article 26 of the DTAA, requests for information for periods prior to November 30, 2018, must be relevant to a fiscal year or taxable event occurring after that date. The reference made by the AO to the Competent Authority of Hong Kong on December 4, 2018, sought information for Assessment Years 2011-12 to 2017-18, which included periods prior to the DTAA's effective date and was not demonstrably relevant to a subsequent fiscal event. Therefore, the reference was not in terms of the DTAA, and the benefit of exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not available. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down by the Delhi High Court (supra) and concluded that the assessments were barred by limitation and thus set aside. Consequently, Ground of Appeal No. 1 of the assessee was allowed, and other grounds were not adjudicated.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) and restored the appeal back to the CIT(A)'s file for fresh adjudication. The assessee was granted one more opportunity to represent their case with documentary evidence.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation. The primary issue revolved around the validity of the extension of the limitation period under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B of the Act, which allows for exclusion of time taken for exchange of information under an agreement referred to in Section 90 or Section 90A. The Tribunal noted that the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and Hong Kong came into force on November 30, 2018. According to Paragraph 5(c) of Article 26 of the DTAA, requests for information for periods prior to November 30, 2018, must be relevant to a fiscal year or taxable event occurring after that date. The reference made by the AO to the Competent Authority of Hong Kong on December 4, 2018, sought information for Assessment Years 2011-12 to 2017-18, which included periods prior to the DTAA's effective date and was not demonstrably relevant to a subsequent fiscal event. Therefore, the reference was not in terms of the DTAA, and the benefit of exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not available. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down by the Delhi High Court (supra) and concluded that the assessments were barred by limitation and thus set aside. Consequently, Ground of Appeal No. 1 of the assessee was allowed, and other grounds were not adjudicated.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act on 30.06.2022 was barred by limitation, following the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal and Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, and a decision of the Jurisdictional High Court.
The Tribunal determined that the assessee had indeed rectified the defects, leading to the allowance of the miscellaneous application and the revival of the original appeal. Furthermore, noting that a similar quantum appeal had been remanded, the Tribunal also allowed ITA No.18/Del/2020 for statistical purposes and remanded it to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits, ensuring the assessee is given an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal allowed the Revenue's M.A. and restored the appeal to its original number, acknowledging that the tax effect at the time of the original decision met the criteria. Subsequently, considering the revised tax effect limit, the Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation. The primary issue revolved around the validity of the extension of the limitation period under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B of the Act, which allows for exclusion of time taken for exchange of information under an agreement referred to in Section 90 or Section 90A. The Tribunal noted that the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and Hong Kong came into force on November 30, 2018. According to Paragraph 5(c) of Article 26 of the DTAA, requests for information for periods prior to November 30, 2018, must be relevant to a fiscal year or taxable event occurring after that date. The reference made by the AO to the Competent Authority of Hong Kong on December 4, 2018, sought information for Assessment Years 2011-12 to 2017-18, which included periods prior to the DTAA's effective date and was not demonstrably relevant to a subsequent fiscal event. Therefore, the reference was not in terms of the DTAA, and the benefit of exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not available. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down by the Delhi High Court (supra) and concluded that the assessments were barred by limitation and thus set aside. Consequently, Ground of Appeal No. 1 of the assessee was allowed, and other grounds were not adjudicated.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 495 days in preferring the appeal before the NFAC/CIT(A), being satisfied with the explanation provided by the assessee. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the issue was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after hearing the assessee.
The ITAT held that the NFAC erred in dismissing the appeal for non-compliance without deciding on the merits, which contravenes Section 250(6) of the Act. The tribunal restored the matter to the NFAC, directing it to provide one final opportunity to the assessee to present its case and pass a speaking order on merits.