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891 orders · Page 10 of 18
The Tribunal noted the assessee's application for withdrawal and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, acknowledging it should have been filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals).
The tribunal held that the assessment order was not sustainable in law because the mandatory Section 143(2) notice was not issued, despite the assessee filing a return in response to a Section 148 notice.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim depreciation on the road construction as admissible on intangible assets, respectfully following judicial precedents. It cited the Special Bench of ITAT Hyderabad in ACIT vs. M/s. Progressive Construction Limited, which held that the right to operate a toll road and collect toll charges under a BOT contract constitutes a business or commercial right envisaged under Section 32(1)(ii) of the Act, making it an intangible asset eligible for depreciation. The Tribunal also ruled that the negative grant of Rs. 595 crores, which is a liability to be paid to NHAI from the 15th year as per the concession agreement, should be included in the cost of the asset. The assessee, following the mercantile system, correctly accounted for this ascertained liability which accrued upon project completion. Therefore, the PCIT's direction to reduce this amount was unjustified. Consequently, the impugned orders directing disallowance of depreciation and reduction of the negative grant were set aside. Appeals ITA Nos. 3389 & 3390/Del/2017 were allowed.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal on merits in a cryptic manner. Considering the facts, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim depreciation on road construction as an intangible asset, following judicial precedents. It also held that the 'negative grant' is an ascertained liability and part of the project cost, allowing its inclusion. Consequently, the PCIT's orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the approval for reopening was mechanical and vitiated the entire reopening process. Therefore, the reopening was quashed.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee itself declared the income from other sources, it cannot later claim it as an application of income for Section 11 exemption. The findings of the lower authorities were upheld.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim depreciation on the road construction as admissible on intangible assets, respectfully following judicial precedents. It cited the Special Bench of ITAT Hyderabad in ACIT vs. M/s. Progressive Construction Limited, which held that the right to operate a toll road and collect toll charges under a BOT contract constitutes a business or commercial right envisaged under Section 32(1)(ii) of the Act, making it an intangible asset eligible for depreciation. The Tribunal also ruled that the negative grant of Rs. 595 crores, which is a liability to be paid to NHAI from the 15th year as per the concession agreement, should be included in the cost of the asset. The assessee, following the mercantile system, correctly accounted for this ascertained liability which accrued upon project completion. Therefore, the PCIT's direction to reduce this amount was unjustified. Consequently, the impugned orders directing disallowance of depreciation and reduction of the negative grant were set aside. Appeals ITA Nos. 3389 & 3390/Del/2017 were allowed.
The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps in the new faceless hearing system, which might have led to the ex-parte decision. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication, granting the assessee three opportunities, subject to the condition that they bear the risk and responsibility of proving their case.
The Tribunal noted that both the AO and CIT(A) passed ex-parte orders without the assessee's participation and that the CIT(A) did not decide all grounds on merits. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the issue was restored to the AO for de-novo assessment, with a direction for the AO to provide an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal rejected the Revenue's request for adjournment to obtain a status report. It observed that no additions were made based on the seized material in the assessment, and thus allowed the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had demonstrated the LTCG nature of the capital gain with documentary evidence. The PCIT's view, based on audit objections without independent application of mind, was set aside.
The tribunal held that a percentage-based addition for unexplained cash deposits is not permissible and deleted the impugned addition. For the deemed annual letting value, the addition was restricted to a lumpsum amount, not to be treated as a precedent.
The Tribunal noted the possibility of communication gaps with the new virtual hearing mechanism and a lack of effective compliance with Section 250(6) of the Act. The Tribunal set aside the appeal and restored it to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee could not present her case before the Assessing Officer due to the proprietor's death, it was appropriate to restore the case to the Assessing Officer for denovo assessment.
The Tribunal found that the AO and CIT(A) had wrongly applied Section 69 of the Act. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment after considering the assessee's claim regarding DTAA benefits and the factual verification of cheque non-encashment.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim depreciation on road construction as an intangible asset, following judicial precedents. It also held that the 'negative grant' is an ascertained liability and part of the project cost, allowing its inclusion. Consequently, the PCIT's orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was invalid. The primary reason for this decision was the finding that the approval granted by the prescribed authority under Section 151(2) to the Assessing Officer's proposal for reopening was mechanical and common to eleven cases. This fact, as stated by the Tribunal, went unrebutted by the department. Citing the Supreme Court decision in CIT Vs. S. Goyanka Lime and Chemical Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 64 taxmann.com 313 (SC), the Tribunal quashed the assessment. Consequently, all other pleadings on merits were rendered academic. The appeal was allowed, and the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps and the challenges with virtual hearings. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the appeal was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication with three effective opportunities for hearing.
The Tribunal held that while the lower authorities had treated the entire purchase of immovable property amounting to Rs. 24.50 lakhs as unexplained investment, a lumpsum addition of Rs. 2.00 lakhs would be just and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances. The Tribunal reasoned that the assessee had received payment vouchers of Rs. 44,11,745/- from the Central Government under the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority and made withdrawals, though not satisfactorily explained. The Tribunal explicitly stated that this decision shall not be treated as a precedent. The assessee was granted relief of Rs. 22.5 lakhs. Necessary computation was to follow as per law. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee's explanation for cash deposits was rejected, the deposits represented business turnover. A lump sum addition of Rs. 1,00,000/- was deemed appropriate, not to be treated as a precedent.
The Tribunal found that several companies selected as comparables were not appropriate due to differences in product lines, business segments, or functional profiles. The Tribunal also considered the assessee's arguments regarding the exclusion of certain companies based on filters like 'non-core components'.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC proceeded ex-parte and acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps due to the new system of faceless hearings. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the appeal back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps, especially with the new virtual hearing mechanism. It also noted potential non-compliance with section 250(6) of the Act in the lower appellate order. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that based on recent Supreme Court and High Court decisions, the new scheme under section 148 was applicable to the assessee's case. Therefore, the assessment framed under the old scheme was considered invalid and a non-est in the eyes of law.
The Tribunal decided to restore the penalty appeal to the Assessing Authority for adjudication after the outcome of the quantum appeal. Other issues were kept open.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's appeal is allowed. The primary grounds for disallowance of Section 13A exemption by the lower authorities were the timing of the return filing and the alleged violation of Section 13A(d) regarding cash donations. The Tribunal noted that the assessee filed its return on February 2, 2019. The due date for filing a return of income under Section 139(4) of the Act, which allows for delayed filing, was March 31, 2019. The assessee contended that its return was filed within this extended period. The Tribunal also considered the CBDT clarification dated April 23, 2019, which clarified that exemption under Section 13A is available if the return is filed within the time limit available under Section 139(4). The Tribunal found that the assessee had complied with the conditions for claiming exemption under Section 13A. Specifically, the return was filed within the permissible time frame under Section 139(4), and the issue of cash donations was not substantial enough to warrant denial of the entire exemption, especially when details were provided. Therefore, the denial of exemption under Section 13A by the AO and CIT(A) was held to be erroneous. Consequently, the addition made to the assessee's income and the consequential levy of interest and fees were also deleted. The Tribunal did not specifically address the alternative ground raised by the assessee regarding the computation of income after deducting expenditure.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's bank statement showing a withdrawal of Rs. 7,00,000/- and the possibility of accumulated past savings. Consequently, the addition was reduced to Rs. 11,30,000/-, providing relief to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that both the AO and CIT(A) orders were ex-parte and the CIT(A) had not decided all grounds on merits. In the interest of justice, the matter was restored to the AO for de-novo assessment, with a direction to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had decided the issue without giving adequate opportunity to the assessee to be heard, even though notices were issued but not complied with. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) ought to have given due opportunities to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was invalid because the approval for issuing it beyond three years was not obtained from the authority specified in Section 151(ii) of the Act. Consequently, the reopening proceedings and the assessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps with virtual hearings and also noted a lack of effective compliance with Section 250(6) of the Act in the lower appellate order. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter was set aside and restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's action of reopening was based on seeking verification of bank entries rather than having recorded specific reasons to believe income had escaped assessment. Quoting a precedent, the Tribunal concluded the reopening was not sustainable in law.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's appeals were not maintainable because the CIT(A) had already accepted the assessee's contentions and granted relief in the lower appellate proceedings. Consequently, the appeals were rejected.
The Tribunal noted that the lower appellate authority refused to condone the delay in filing the appeal, which was partly during the Covid-19 pandemic. Citing relevant case law, the Tribunal condoned the delay and directed the deletion of the impugned long-term capital gains addition.
The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps due to the faceless hearing system. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication, providing the assessee with three effective opportunities to present their case.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee was not entitled to Section 11 exemption for want of a tax audit report, the denial of deduction for business expenditure was not justified. The matter was restored to the assessing authority for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that neither the Assessing Officer nor the CIT(A) had properly examined the existence of the partnership firm and the genuineness of the transactions. The additional evidence submitted by the assessee was also not properly examined. Therefore, the case was fit to be remanded back to the AO.
On the issue of limitation (CO Ground 1), the Tribunal found from the assessment record that the assessment order was 'made' on 31.03.2016 and the order sheet recorded that the order under Section 143(3) was passed on 31.03.2016. The assessee could not prove otherwise. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the assessment order was not barred by limitation and dismissed the assessee's cross-objection. On the issue of Section 50C (Revenue Ground 2), the Tribunal found that the land in question was agricultural land, notified under the Land Acquisition Act, and acquired by an award in 1987-88. The SDM confirmed its status as private agricultural land under acquisition, with no construction permitted. Relying on the decision in Hindustan Industrial Resources Ltd. vs ACIT and other DLF cases, the Tribunal held that the character of the land at the time of sale was agricultural, and the circle rate for residential areas applied by the AO was not warranted. The CIT(A)'s deletion was upheld, and Revenue's Ground 2 was dismissed. The Tribunal did not explicitly address Revenue's Ground 1 concerning Section 68.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's rejection of the short-term capital loss was based on suspicion and lacked cogent material. The CIT(A) erred in upholding this disallowance without appreciating the facts and evidence presented by the assessee.
The Tribunal found prima facie merit in the assessee's case, noting that the assessee was added as an account holder in a succeeding financial year and thus could not have been assessed for deposits in the relevant year. The case was accepted in principle, allowing the Assessing Officer to verify the bank certificate.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's appeals were not maintainable because the CIT(A) had already accepted the assessee's contentions and granted relief in the lower appellate proceedings. Consequently, the appeals were rejected.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the cash deposits were from sales. While the assessee could not fully substantiate all deposits, a lump-sum addition of Rs. 3,50,000 was deemed appropriate. Furthermore, the addition was directed to be taxed under normal provisions, not Section 115BBE, following a Madras High Court ruling.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's bank statement showed debits corresponding to these investments, made from past savings. In the absence of any adverse allegations, the Tribunal concluded that the bank debits could not be treated as unexplained.
The Tribunal noted that both the A.O. and Ld. CIT(A) passed ex-parte orders, and the Ld. CIT(A) did not decide all grounds on merits. In the interest of justice, the matter was restored to the A.O. for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal allowed the Revenue's request to withdraw its appeal. Since the CIT(A) had already deleted the disputed addition through a rectification order, the Revenue's appeal became infructuous. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s findings were just, fair, reasonable, and legal. The assessee has a single PAN, and the income and losses have been assessed and treated consistently in prior years, with set-offs allowed. The DTAA does not prohibit the set-off of PE losses against HO income, and the previous orders of the Assessing Officers allowing such set-offs were in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s findings were just, fair, reasonable, and legal. The assessee has a single PAN, and the income and losses have been assessed and treated consistently in prior years, with set-offs allowed. The DTAA does not prohibit the set-off of PE losses against HO income, and the previous orders of the Assessing Officers allowing such set-offs were in accordance with law.