ITAT Delhi Judgments — May 2025

The Tribunal held that the sales tax subsidy/incentive constituted a capital receipt and was not liable to tax. It also ruled that the Assessing Officer has a duty to allow allowable claims even if not explicitly made in the return.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were not in accordance with the mandate of Section 147 of the Act due to procedural defects. The notice for reopening was quashed, rendering the issues on merits academic.

The Tribunal held that the claim for exclusion of sales tax subsidy/incentive was admissible even if made during proceedings under Section 153A or via revised computation. The Assessing Officer has a duty to consider allowable claims suo motu.

The Tribunal held that the seized agreement to sell, even if from a third party and unsigned, could not be automatically dismissed as a 'dumb document' without further inquiry. The Tribunal found the matter fit for remand to the CIT(A) to decide afresh after considering the implications of the seized agreement.

The Tribunal held that the sales tax subsidy/incentive received by the assessee was a revenue receipt and not a capital receipt. Furthermore, the claim for exclusion of this subsidy could not be made for the first time during proceedings under Section 153A if it was not claimed in the original or revised return.

The Tribunal held that the sales tax subsidy received by the assessee is in the nature of revenue receipt and is therefore taxable. The specific approach to recognizing the subsidy in accounts for AY 2013-14 and 2014-15 required further verification by the AO.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders invalid. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C read with Section 143(3) were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the approval process under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders illegal and liable to be quashed. Similar issues were adjudicated by coordinate benches, upholding the assessee's grounds.

The Tribunal held that the sales tax subsidy/incentive received by the assessee constitutes a capital receipt and is not liable to tax. It further held that the Assessing Officer is duty-bound to consider and allow such claims even if not made in the original return, especially when proceedings under Section 153A are initiated.

The Tribunal held that the approval process under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders illegal and liable to be quashed. Similar issues were adjudicated by coordinate benches, upholding the assessee's grounds.

The Tribunal held that the approval process under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders illegal and liable to be quashed. Similar issues were adjudicated by coordinate benches, upholding the assessee's grounds.

The Tribunal is considering grounds raised by the assessees concerning the mechanical approval under Section 153D of the Act. The specific outcome of these appeals is not detailed in the provided excerpt.

The Tribunal held that the approval process under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders illegal and liable to be quashed. Similar issues were adjudicated by coordinate benches, upholding the assessee's grounds.

The Tribunal held that the approval process under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders illegal and liable to be quashed. Similar issues were adjudicated by coordinate benches, upholding the assessee's grounds.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer is duty-bound to consider and allow allowable claims even if not made in the return, citing various Supreme Court decisions. The claim for non-taxability of sales tax subsidy was allowed.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer is duty-bound to consider and allow allowable claims, even if not explicitly made in the return, relying on various High Court and Supreme Court decisions. The claim for non-taxability of sales tax subsidy was allowed.

The Tribunal held that in the absence of contrary evidence from the revenue disproving the assessee's sales, the addition was not sustainable. The Tribunal noted a direct correlation between cash outflow and deposits, and relied on a precedent that additions cannot be made in demonetization cases solely based on variances in cash deposits and sales ratio if the genuineness of sales is established.

The Tribunal held that the cash deposits of Rs. 30,00,000/- made on 12.11.2016 were from cash sales, which were part of the total sales accepted by the AO. Since the cash sales were accepted, there was no reason to disbelieve the assessee's explanation for the source of cash deposits.

The Tribunal held that while purchases might be bogus, only a certain percentage should be sustained as income, considering the actual benefit earned. The assessee had declared a GP rate of 2.1%, and the Tribunal directed that a differential rate of 10% (totaling 12.5%) be added as income.

The Tribunal held that the approval process under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders illegal and liable to be quashed. Similar issues were adjudicated by coordinate benches, upholding the assessee's grounds.

The Tribunal held that the approval process under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders illegal and liable to be quashed. Similar issues were adjudicated by coordinate benches, upholding the assessee's grounds.

The Tribunal found that the assessee was not granted a proper opportunity of being heard and the rejection was without proper opportunity. Therefore, the Tribunal remitted the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding the reasons for delay to be bonafide. The matter was restored to the AO for denovo assessment.

The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was not leviable because the self-assessment tax paid by the assessee (Rs. 2,16,470) exceeded the total tax assessed (Rs. 2,08,142). As per Explanation 4(c) of Section 271(1)(c), when self-assessment tax paid before the notice is more than the tax sought to be evaded, the penalty cannot be levied.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment proceedings void. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that since the substantive addition in the related case of Ritesh Kumar Gupta was deleted by the ITAT, the protective addition made in the assessee's hands for the same assessment year also did not survive. Consequently, the deletion by the CIT(A) was upheld.

The Department, with the approval of the Competent Authority, sought to withdraw the present appeal as they intended to pursue another appeal filed for the same assessment year. The assessee had no objection.

The tribunal held that the assessee's reason for the delay in filing the appeal was bonafide, and thus condoned the delay. The case was restored to the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment, with a direction to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to make submissions.

The Tribunal found that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by the volume of cases approved in a short period and the identical wording of approval letters. Consequently, the assessment orders were deemed void.

The Tribunal held that the approval required under section 153D of the Act for assessment orders in search/requisition cases must involve an application of mind by the approving authority. A mechanical approval renders the assessment order void. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment orders were barred by limitation under section 153B.

The Tribunal found that the approval under section 153D of the Act was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind by the Additional CIT. The approval process was found to be non-compliant with the statutory requirements, rendering the assessment orders void.

The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D of the Act requires an independent application of mind by the approving authority and cannot be a mechanical or ritualistic exercise. The assessment orders were found to be invalid due to lack of proper approval.

The Tribunal held that the approval under section 153D was not granted with due application of mind, as evidenced by the perfunctory manner of approval for a large number of cases. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment orders were barred by limitation under section 153B.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as it was impossible for the Additional CIT to have reviewed the numerous draft assessment orders and case records in the given time. Therefore, the assessment orders were deemed void-ab-initio.

The Tribunal held that the approval required under section 153D of the Act for assessment orders in search/requisition cases must involve an application of mind by the approving authority. A mechanical approval renders the assessment order void. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment orders were barred by limitation under section 153B.

The Tribunal held that the penalty notice was ambiguous and defective because it was omnibus and did not specify which limb of Section 271(1)(c) the penalty was being levied under. The initiation and levy were on different grounds ('concealment of income' vs. 'furnishing inaccurate particulars').

The Tribunal held that the short-term capital loss was genuine, and thus deleted the addition of commission. It also directed the AO to verify and provide relief on account of double taxation for the amount taxed under section 68. The disallowance of bad debt was reversed, allowing it as a business expenditure under section 37.

The Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for a denovo assessment, allowing the assessee a reasonable opportunity to make submissions. Grounds challenging the reopening were dismissed as not pressed.

The Tribunal held that the NFAC erred in dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution without deciding the appeal on merits, as required by Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal noted that the Senior DR admitted that the assessee did not submit submissions and that the NFAC had not decided the appeal on merit. Considering the facts and circumstances and for fair play, the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the NFAC. It directed the NFAC to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim and decide the issue on merit. The assessee was also directed to cooperate in the proceedings before the NFAC. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the AO's assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue as it was passed without proper inquiry or verification, especially concerning claimed expenses when the assessee admitted to having no business on hand. The PCIT rightly exercised revisionary powers.

The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied on additions based on estimations or deeming fictions, as there was no finding of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the AO. Furthermore, the penalty proceedings were initiated for furnishing inaccurate particulars, but the penalty order invoked concealment of income, indicating ambiguity and inconsistency.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals and the assessee's cross-objections. The Tribunal adopted the reasoning from its earlier decision in the connected case of Sh. Sanjay Jindal (ITA Nos. 8511 to 8516/Del/2019) decided on 21st December, 2023. The core of the decision was that the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer under section 153C was not in accordance with law. Specifically, it was found that the satisfaction note did not refer to any particular seized material belonging to the assessee, nor did it specify the assessment years to which the seized materials related. Furthermore, it did not explain how the seized materials were incriminating in nature. The Tribunal affirmed the view of the learned first appellate authority that the satisfaction note was vague, bland, and bereft of necessary reasoning, citing the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Sinhgad Technical Education Society. The Tribunal held that the amendment to section 153C(1) by substituting 'belonging to' with 'pertaining to' did not negate the ratio laid down in Sinhgad Technical Education Society. The Tribunal also found that the additions made were not sustainable as they were not based on any incriminating materials found during search and seizure operations, and that the additions made to the assessee's income did not have any relation or nexus with the seized materials. The Tribunal further noted that in the case of M/s. Orient Craft Ltd., the Tribunal had previously held that purchases from the assessee's proprietary concern were genuine and the seized materials relating to these purchases were not incriminating. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision that the section 153C proceedings were non-est in the eyes of law, dismissing the Revenue's appeals and rendering the assessee's cross-objections infructuous.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals and the assessee's cross-objections. The Tribunal adopted the reasoning from its earlier decision in the connected case of Sh. Sanjay Jindal (ITA Nos. 8511 to 8516/Del/2019) decided on 21st December, 2023. The core of the decision was that the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer under section 153C was not in accordance with law. Specifically, it was found that the satisfaction note did not refer to any particular seized material belonging to the assessee, nor did it specify the assessment years to which the seized materials related. Furthermore, it did not explain how the seized materials were incriminating in nature. The Tribunal affirmed the view of the learned first appellate authority that the satisfaction note was vague, bland, and bereft of necessary reasoning, citing the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Sinhgad Technical Education Society. The Tribunal held that the amendment to section 153C(1) by substituting 'belonging to' with 'pertaining to' did not negate the ratio laid down in Sinhgad Technical Education Society. The Tribunal also found that the additions made were not sustainable as they were not based on any incriminating materials found during search and seizure operations, and that the additions made to the assessee's income did not have any relation or nexus with the seized materials. The Tribunal further noted that in the case of M/s. Orient Craft Ltd., the Tribunal had previously held that purchases from the assessee's proprietary concern were genuine and the seized materials relating to these purchases were not incriminating. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision that the section 153C proceedings were non-est in the eyes of law, dismissing the Revenue's appeals and rendering the assessee's cross-objections infructuous.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, stating that the satisfaction note of the Assessing Officer was vague and lacked necessary details about the seized material and its nexus with the assessee's income. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction under section 153C was invalid.

The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals and the assessee's cross-objections. The Tribunal adopted the reasoning from its earlier decision in the connected case of Sh. Sanjay Jindal (ITA Nos. 8511 to 8516/Del/2019) decided on 21st December, 2023. The core of the decision was that the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer under section 153C was not in accordance with law. Specifically, it was found that the satisfaction note did not refer to any particular seized material belonging to the assessee, nor did it specify the assessment years to which the seized materials related. Furthermore, it did not explain how the seized materials were incriminating in nature. The Tribunal affirmed the view of the learned first appellate authority that the satisfaction note was vague, bland, and bereft of necessary reasoning, citing the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Sinhgad Technical Education Society. The Tribunal held that the amendment to section 153C(1) by substituting 'belonging to' with 'pertaining to' did not negate the ratio laid down in Sinhgad Technical Education Society. The Tribunal also found that the additions made were not sustainable as they were not based on any incriminating materials found during search and seizure operations, and that the additions made to the assessee's income did not have any relation or nexus with the seized materials. The Tribunal further noted that in the case of M/s. Orient Craft Ltd., the Tribunal had previously held that purchases from the assessee's proprietary concern were genuine and the seized materials relating to these purchases were not incriminating. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision that the section 153C proceedings were non-est in the eyes of law, dismissing the Revenue's appeals and rendering the assessee's cross-objections infructuous.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. Considering that the assessee was not heard by the CIT(A) and the grounds of appeal were not properly adjudicated, the Tribunal restored the issues to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.

The Tribunal found the issue to be identical to a previously adjudicated case (ITO vs. Shivani Gupta) involving the same company and similar facts, where the CIT(A)'s order deleting the addition was upheld. Relying on this precedent and a Delhi High Court judgment, the Tribunal confirmed the CIT(A)'s decision, as the Revenue failed to present any contrary material. The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus to prove the genuineness of the transactions.

The Tribunal noted that there was no discussion or evidence in the lower authorities' orders to establish that the assessee had transferred any capital asset. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that the addition of short-term capital gains of Rs. 2,25,00,000/- lacked corroborative evidence and directed its deletion.

The Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for a de novo assessment, granting the assessee an opportunity to make submissions. The impugned order was set aside.

The Tribunal held that the definition of 'professional services' in Article 15(2) of the DTAA is inclusive, not exhaustive, and does not require services to be governed by a professional body. It also found that the 'make available' requirement of Article 12(4)(b) was not satisfied.