ITAT Delhi Judgments — February 2025

The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee, allowing the deduction under section 80P for the interest income. The Tribunal noted that while the Gujarat High Court in Brahmarshi Co-op. Credit Society Ltd. had ruled in favour of the Revenue, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vaveru Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd. had ruled in favour of the assessee, there was no guidance from the jurisdictional High Court of Allahabad on this specific issue. Citing the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal-I vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. [1973] 88 ITR 192 (SC), the Tribunal concluded that in the absence of a clear jurisdictional precedent, the view supporting the assessee's case should be adopted. Therefore, the sole substantive ground against the department was accepted. Necessary computation was directed to follow as per law. No other grounds were pressed.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence to prove its charitable nature and genuine activities. The rejection by the Ld. CIT(Exemption) was based on grounds that were not substantiated by material evidence.

The Tribunal held that the seized documents did not belong to the assessee and their contents did not conclusively prove on-money payments or receipts. Furthermore, for one assessment year, the assessment was wrongly framed under Section 143(3) instead of Section 153C.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) enhanced the disallowances by making additions on account of new sources of income without issuing an enhancement notice, which is a statutory requirement. The CIT(A) does not have the power to make additions on account of new sources of income.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee's reconciliation details were overlooked by the lower authorities. Therefore, to ensure natural justice, the matter pertaining to the excess stock addition (ITA No. 1414/Del/2023) was set aside to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. Consequently, ITA No. 1413/Del/2023, an appeal against an order under Section 263 linked to the same assessment, was dismissed as infructuous.

The Tribunal held that the seized documents did not belong to the assessee and their contents did not conclusively prove on-money payments or receipts. Furthermore, for one assessment year, the assessment was wrongly framed under Section 143(3) instead of Section 153C.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order was bad in law due to lack of jurisdiction and failure to issue a mandatory notice under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act within the statutory time limit. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, the matter required a de novo assessment. The Tribunal observed that the Ld. CIT(A) had not decided the issue on merit and had affirmed the ex-parte order of the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the Tribunal remitted the issues back to the file of the Assessing Officer with directions to decide the same afresh. The Assessing Officer was directed to give adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The Ld. DR of the Revenue had no objection to this direction. The assessee was directed to fully cooperate with the Assessing Officer during the proceedings. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence to prove its charitable nature and genuine activities. The rejection by the Ld. CIT(Exemption) was based on grounds that were not substantiated by material evidence.

The Tribunal held that the possibility of communication gaps at various levels could not be ruled out. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that there was no effective compliance with Section 250(6) of the Act in the impugned lower appellate order, which mandates the framing of points of determination followed by detailed adjudication. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to set aside the assessee's appeals and restore them to the CIT(A) for fresh and appropriate adjudication. The CIT(A) is directed to provide three effective opportunities of hearing to the appellant, at the appellant's risk and responsibility, for consequential proceedings. The appeals are allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) erred by not seeking a remand report from the AO, especially since one party had admitted to providing accommodation entries. The Tribunal remitted the issue of bogus purchases back to the AO for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that due to the moratorium declared under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the appeals cannot be adjudicated at present. The appeals are dismissed without prejudice to the assessee's right to seek revival later.

The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to appear before the CIT(A) and comply with notices, leading to the confirmation of additions. However, for the sake of justice, the Tribunal decided to give the assessee another opportunity to be heard by the first appellate authority.

The Tribunal upheld the rejection of books of account due to unverifiable purchases and creditors. However, it restricted the addition on account of gross profit to a reasonable estimate and deleted the addition on sundry creditors, deeming it unjustified after the GP estimation.

The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessment and appellate orders were passed ex-parte. Considering the assessee is an elderly lady and requested another opportunity, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the AO and CIT(A) to allow for a de novo assessment.

The Tribunal restricted the commission income taxed in Jindal's hands and directed telescoping of other additions against commission and long-term capital gains. The additions made in the hands of the other entities for credits and commission income were deleted as they were pass-through entities and the income was taxed in Jindal's hands.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's satisfaction for initiating proceedings under Section 153C was not properly recorded. It was found that the AO failed to demonstrate how the seized material had a bearing on the determination of the total income for the specific assessment years in question.

The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition on sundry creditors, finding that the AO's remand report accepted their genuineness. The Tribunal also directed the AO to restrict the estimated net profit rate to 3.5% based on preceding and succeeding assessment years.

The Tribunal held that the AO erred by not considering the opening balance of Rs. 28,85,000/-, which led to an incorrect determination of negative cash balance. The addition made based on this flawed reasoning was deemed improper.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was unsustainable. It found that the Assessing Officer (AO) had conducted necessary inquiries and verified the claims during the original and reassessment proceedings, and the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue.

The Tribunal held that the cash deposit was plausible from the assessee's available funds. It further ruled that the addition for the property sale was unjustified as it was based on a 'dumb document' without corroborating evidence. The Tribunal also allowed indexation on the cost of improvement as the cost itself was accepted.

The Tribunal held that the assessments for assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08 were invalid as they were not covered by the statutory block of six assessment years counted backwards from the date of satisfaction. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the seized material did not conclusively 'belong' to the assessees, a prerequisite for invoking Section 153C.

The Tribunal held that the assessments for assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08 were invalid as they were not covered by the statutory block of six assessment years counted backwards from the date of satisfaction. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the seized material did not conclusively 'belong' to the assessees, a prerequisite for invoking Section 153C.

The Tribunal held that the assessments for assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08 were invalid as they were not covered by the statutory block of six assessment years counted backwards from the date of satisfaction. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the seized material did not conclusively 'belong' to the assessees, a prerequisite for invoking Section 153C.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by the same-day approval for multiple years and lack of file movement reflection. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.

The Tribunal held that the local agent, Rajalakshmi International Corporation (RIC), was an independent consultant and not a dependent agent PE. Therefore, the business income was not taxable in India. The Tribunal also noted that the issue of FTS was decided in favor of the assessee in a previous assessment year.

The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments, noting that the sections are welfare-oriented. The Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to reconsider the application, condone any delay as per the proviso to section 12A(1)(ac), and decide the issues afresh.

The Tribunal held that for unabated assessments (AY 2012-13 and 2009-10), any addition must be based on seized material, as per the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT Vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. The Revenue's counsel could not pinpoint any such incriminating material for the AY 2012-13 addition. Therefore, the Revenue's grounds for these years were found to be without merit and were rejected. For the abated assessment (AY 2013-14), the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order clearly indicated that the assessee had provided all the necessary details regarding agricultural lands and produce before the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the Revenue's ground for this year was also found to be without merit and rejected. The Tribunal found no merit in any of the Revenue's appeals.

The Tribunal held that the assessments for assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08 were invalid as they were not covered by the statutory block of six assessment years counted backwards from the date of satisfaction. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the seized material did not conclusively 'belong' to the assessees, a prerequisite for invoking Section 153C.

The tribunal held that the approval granted by the JCIT under Section 153D was mechanical and without application of mind, violating the mandatory requirements of the Act. Consequently, the assessment order was vitiated.

The Tribunal held that blank letterheads, without any content, cannot be considered incriminating material to form the basis for any addition under Section 153A. Following the landmark decision in Abhisar Buildwell, the assessments were quashed as the foundation itself did not exist.

The Tribunal held that the property was purchased as a long-term investment and not as stock-in-trade. Therefore, the assessee was eligible for exemption under Section 54 of the Act.

The Tribunal held that the approval for reopening was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind by the prescribed authority. Citing the decision in CIT vs. S. Goyanka Lime and Chemical Ltd., the Tribunal concluded that such mechanical approval vitiates the reopening.

The Tribunal held that the deposits in the bank accounts were not in cash but were transfers from a partnership firm and a company where the assessee was a director. The source of these deposits was found to be explained and verifiable. Therefore, the addition was deleted.

The Tribunal held that a common approval obtained from the prescribed authority for multiple assessment years, as was the case here, vitiates the entire assessment. Relying on various judicial precedents, the Tribunal admitted the additional ground raised by the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficiently established the creditworthiness of her husband, Shri Mewa Singh Sangwan, from whose bank accounts the capital contribution was transferred. Therefore, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was deleted.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have admitted the additional evidence filed by the assessee, as not admitting them violated the principles of natural justice. The CIT(A) has plenary powers to dispose of an appeal and should have considered the evidence.

The Tribunal held that vehicle running expenses incurred for the benefit of employees and declared as perquisites were allowable. Similarly, club expenses, also treated as perquisites and supported by details, were allowed as a matter of commercial expediency.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) order was well-reasoned and that the presumption under Section 132(4A) of the Act was not justified against the assessee, as the lockers belonged to the company and not the individual director. The addition should be made in the hands of the company.

The Tribunal held that once the combined benchmarking approach, which included royalty payments as an operating expense and resulted in an arm's length margin, was accepted by the TPO, a separate adjustment for the royalty transaction was not permissible. The Tribunal relied on High Court judgments supporting this view.

The Tribunal, following the decision of the Hon'ble Madras High Court in Nannusamy Mohan (HUF) vs. ACIT, decided to dispose of the appeal. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had availed the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme, 2024, and submitted the relevant forms. In light of this, the Tribunal granted liberty to the assessee to seek restoration of the appeal if the declaration filed under the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme is not accepted by the Revenue. The Tribunal reasoned that keeping the appeal pending would be unnecessary given the assessee's intention to resolve the dispute through the scheme. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal with the liberty to recall it under specific circumstances. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the original assessment or appeal.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was unsustainable. It found that the Assessing Officer (AO) had conducted necessary inquiries and verified the claims during the original and reassessment proceedings, and the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue.

The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(E) and remitted the issue back to the CIT(E) to decide the applications afresh after providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. The assessee was directed to provide all necessary details and evidence.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting liberty to the assessee to seek restoration if the 'Vivad se Vishwas Scheme' application fails.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by a single approval for multiple assessees and assessment years without mentioning seized material. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 127(2) for cancelling registration was bad in law. However, it found that the assessee engaged in non-genuine activities, warranting cancellation of registration.

The tribunal held that a penalty order passed in the name of a dead person is unsustainable and without jurisdiction. Such an order is considered null and void.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E) failed to provide adequate opportunity to the assessee and violated principles of natural justice. The impugned orders were set aside, and the matter was restored to the Ld. CIT(E) for a fresh decision.

The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench in the assessee's own case for the same assessment year had already deleted the disallowance of depreciation. Following this precedent, the Tribunal held that the basis for the penalty order no longer survived and deleted the penalty.

The Tribunal held that in cases of unabated assessment under Section 153A, additions can only be made based on incriminating material found during the search. Since no such material was referenced by the AO, the assessment order was deemed to be without jurisdiction.