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406 orders · Page 4 of 9
Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in CIT Vs. Jasjit Singh, the Tribunal held that for Section 153C proceedings against a 'person other than the searched person,' the date of search is the date of recording the satisfaction note by the AO of the searched person. As this date was 22.02.2021, the relevant block of six assessment years commenced from A.Y. 2015-16. Since A.Y. 2014-15 fell outside this statutory six-year block, the assessment order was invalid and quashed.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) found that the approval granted by the JCIT under Section 153D was a 'hollow & cosmetic approval' accorded without application of mind, and thus unenforceable. Relying on earlier tribunal decisions and an Allahabad High Court judgment, the ITAT quashed the assessment orders. The cross-objections by the assessee were allowed, and the revenue's appeals were dismissed.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) found that the approval granted by the JCIT under Section 153D was a 'hollow & cosmetic approval' accorded without application of mind, and thus unenforceable. Relying on earlier tribunal decisions and an Allahabad High Court judgment, the ITAT quashed the assessment orders. The cross-objections by the assessee were allowed, and the revenue's appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the revenue received from background screening services is not 'Royalty' as it does not involve the use of copyright or imparting of commercial experience. The services rendered do not qualify as Fees for Technical Services (FTS).
The Tribunal observed that while initial forms (1, 2, 3) under the VSVS Act were downloaded, final forms (4, 5) were not available, indicating that the VSVS process was not completed. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the CIT(A) had misapprehended the facts and erred in treating the appeals as withdrawn without a final settlement under the VSVS Act. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication (de novo) on merits.
The Tribunal, with no objection from the Ld. DR, remitted the matter back to the file of the CIT(E). The CIT(E) was directed to provide a fresh opportunity to the assessee to present its application and thereafter pass a speaking order.
The Tribunal held that since the CIT(A) granted relief based on the remand report of the AO, the Revenue was precluded from filing an appeal. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that assessments made under Section 153C for specific assessment years were outside the scope of the section, rendering them void ab initio. Consequently, the related assessments were also treated as void.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, accepting the assessee's explanation. It held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals as infructuous, as the assessee had not opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme concerning the Section 201(1A) orders. Consequently, the matters were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits in accordance with law.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, accepting the assessee's explanation. It held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals as infructuous, as the assessee had not opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme concerning the Section 201(1A) orders. Consequently, the matters were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue itself admitted that the additions made under Section 153C were not based on incriminating material. Therefore, the appeals assailing these additions were liable to be allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, accepting the assessee's explanation. It held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals as infructuous, as the assessee had not opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme concerning the Section 201(1A) orders. Consequently, the matters were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that since the Revenue itself acknowledged that the additions made under Section 153C were not based on incriminating material and proposed to initiate proceedings under Section 148, the appeals assailing the Section 153C additions were liable to be allowed.
The tribunal ruled that the management/processing fee was intrinsically linked to the loan and qualified as 'interest' under Section 2(28A) of the Income Tax Act, encompassing service fees for borrowed money. Consequently, it was exempt from taxation in India under Article 11(3)(b) of the India-Germany Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA).
The Tribunal held that since the Revenue itself acknowledged that the additions made under Section 153C were not based on incriminating material and proposed to initiate proceedings under Section 148, the appeals assailing the Section 153C additions were liable to be allowed.
The Tribunal held that since the Revenue itself acknowledged that the additions made under Section 153C were not based on incriminating material and proposed to initiate proceedings under Section 148, the appeals assailing the Section 153C additions were liable to be allowed.
The Tribunal found that the deposits were sales on behalf of Mother Dairy, and the assessee's actual commission income was low. It ruled that the assessee acted under a bonafide belief that an audit was not required as the transactions belonged to Mother Dairy. Therefore, the penalty levied under Section 271B was deleted.
The Tribunal observed that the source of the cash deposits was clearly explained by the earlier withdrawal from the same bank account, which originated from maturity proceeds of fixed deposits. The reason for holding the cash for 14 months was found to be bonafide due to the circumstances surrounding the son's medical college admission and a subsequent court order. Consequently, the Tribunal deleted the addition made under section 69A.
The Tribunal, noting that the underlying addition in the quantum appeal was deleted, concluded that the consequential penalty order could not stand. Accordingly, the impugned penalty order and the order of the Ld. CIT(A) were set aside.
The Tribunal held that assessments made under Section 153C for specific assessment years were outside the scope of the section, rendering them void ab initio. Consequently, the related assessments were also treated as void.
The Tribunal observed that while initial forms (1, 2, 3) under the VSVS Act were downloaded, final forms (4, 5) were not available, indicating that the VSVS process was not completed. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the CIT(A) had misapprehended the facts and erred in treating the appeals as withdrawn without a final settlement under the VSVS Act. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication (de novo) on merits.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without adjudicating on the merits and that Section 251 of the Income Tax Act does not permit dismissal for non-prosecution. Therefore, the case was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication.
The tribunal deleted the addition for alleged rental income as there was no first floor. It was held that the Rs. 1,90,000 receipt was offered as income in a subsequent year. The disallowance for travelling expenses was deleted, and disallowances for telephone and vehicle expenses were restricted to 10%.
The Tribunal held that assessments made under Section 153C for specific assessment years were outside the scope of the section, rendering them void ab initio. Consequently, the related assessments were also treated as void.
The Tribunal held that the penalty notice was invalid because it did not strike off the inapplicable limb of Section 271(1)(c), relying on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in *PCIT vs. Sahara India Life Insurance Company Ltd.* Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the underlying additions leading to the penalty were either deleted in a separate order or remanded to the CIT(A), rendering the penalty unsustainable on merits. Accordingly, the impugned penalty order was set aside.
The tribunal held that since the assessee was a non-resident and had rendered all services outside India, the salary and allowances received for these services could not be deemed to accrue or arise in India as per Section 9(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, which specifies that salary is taxable in India only if "earned in India" (i.e., for services rendered in India). Therefore, the income was not taxable in India.
The tribunal held that since the assessee was a non-resident and had rendered all services outside India, the salary and allowances received for these services could not be deemed to accrue or arise in India as per Section 9(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, which specifies that salary is taxable in India only if "earned in India" (i.e., for services rendered in India). Therefore, the income was not taxable in India.
The Tribunal, relying on a co-ordinate bench order and the Karnataka High Court decision in Fatheraj Singhvi, held that Section 234E's provisions are effective from 01.06.2015 and cannot be applied retrospectively. It found that since the assessee had deposited the tax and filed the statement on 05.04.2014, there was no violation of Section 200(3). Consequently, the levy of fee under Section 234E and interest under Section 220(2) were cancelled.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was based on surmise and conjecture without cogent material. It further found no merit in making additions under Section 69A and ruled that the assessee was entitled to exemption for long-term capital gains under Section 10(38).
The Tribunal, following the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd., held that employee contributions towards EPF/ESI must be deposited by the employer on or before the specified due dates to be eligible for deduction under the Income Tax Act. The Supreme Court clarified that the non-obstante clause in Section 43B does not extend to these amounts, which are held in trust, and timely deposit is an essential condition for deduction.
The Tribunal held that, in accordance with CBDT Circular No. 17/2019, departmental appeals are not to be filed before the ITAT if the tax effect does not exceed Rs. 50 lakhs. Since the tax effect in the present appeal was below this monetary limit and no exceptions were shown, the appeal was deemed not maintainable.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the assessee was given various opportunities but did not produce books of accounts and vouchers. However, the AO also mentioned receiving some information through ITBA without specifying the documents or information provided by the assessee. In light of these circumstances, the Tribunal was of the considered opinion that remitting the matter to the AO would serve the interest of justice. The AO was directed to decide the issues afresh after providing the assessee with an adequate opportunity of being heard. The assessee was also directed to cooperate with the AO. The Tribunal did not make any specific findings on the merits of the individual grounds of appeal, as the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication. The operative direction was to allow the appeal for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal partly allowed the first ground, restricting the disallowance under Section 36(1)(iii) to 15% of net interest expenses (Rs.51,427/-), aligning with a previous ITAT order for AY 2011-12. For the second ground concerning Section 14A, the Tribunal directed the AO to re-compute the disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(ii) based on net interest expenses and under Rule 8D(2)(iii) considering only investments that yielded exempt income, restoring the issue for fresh quantification. The CIT(A)'s enhancement of disallowances without providing an opportunity to the assessee was also noted.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's application for withdrawal, agreeing that the appeal had become infructuous due to the subsequent assessment order with NIL addition. With no objection from the Revenue, the tribunal allowed the withdrawal.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) found it appropriate to remand the matter back to the CIT(E) for a de novo examination. The assessee is directed to present all relevant details sought by the CIT(E) without seeking unnecessary adjournments.
The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer, directing that the assessee be granted adequate opportunity to present his plea regarding his 1/3rd share in the property and that the remaining portion belonged to his brothers. The Revenue did not object to this proposition.
The Tribunal found that in the interest of justice, the matter needs to be remitted to the file of the AO. The AO is directed to reconsider the assessee's request for granting deduction for the cost of the house and the exemption under section 54F of the Act, and to provide adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, confirming that the assessee's business had indeed commenced in F.Y. 2012-13, thus rendering the AO's basis for adding interest income incorrect. Regarding the Section 68 addition, the ITAT found the identity, genuineness (remittance through proper banking channels with RBI approval), and creditworthiness (sufficient balance in lender's bank account) of the 100% shareholder to be established. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed, and the assessee's cross-objection became otiose.
The Tribunal held that the management fees of Rs. 2,55,02,202/- were not taxable as FIS/FTS because the Departmental Authorities failed to demonstrate that the 'make available' condition under Article 12(4)(b) of the India-Singapore DTAA was satisfied. For the software license fees of Rs. 1,60,00,000/-, the Tribunal concluded that the assessee sold software licenses, not services, and since the authorities only taxed it as FTS and not royalty, this amount was also not taxable as FTS. Both additions made by the AO were directed to be deleted.
The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance, a decision upheld by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). The ITAT found that the assessee's Memorandum of Association explicitly permitted the business of borrowing and lending money, and since funds were lent at a higher interest rate, there was no diversion of funds towards interest-free advances. The interest income was consistently accepted as business income in previous and subsequent assessment years.
The Tribunal found that the value determined by the Stamp Valuation Authority (Rs. 48 lakhs) was the same as the actual sale consideration declared by the assessee. Since the consideration under Section 50C matched the declared sale consideration, the Tribunal concluded there was no basis for the differential addition and consequently deleted the addition of Rs. 29,19,400/- made by the AO.
The Tribunal found that the bank statements furnished by the assessee for the relevant period did not show any credit of Rs. 19,00,000/-. It concluded that the basic prerequisite for an addition under Section 68, i.e., a sum being credited in the books of account, was not met. Therefore, the addition made was based on surmise and conjecture and was directed to be deleted. The ground challenging the validity of re-assessment proceedings was not adjudicated, as relief was granted on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's income, collected as maintenance charges from members and used for their benefit, is exempt on the principle of mutuality. Therefore, the additions made by the AO were inappropriate.
The ITAT held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal as infructuous, as the revisional order on which the dismissal was based had already been quashed by the ITAT. Consequently, the CIT(A) was obligated to adjudicate the appeal on its merits. The ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the AO's 'cut and paste' approach was erroneous. The Tribunal agreed that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence for the bad debts and excess material consumption, making the CIT(A)'s deletion justified.
The tribunal acknowledged the Supreme Court's view that a payer is not liable if the payee has already paid tax, a fact requiring verification. Therefore, it remanded the matter to the DCIT(TDS) to examine whether the deductees had included the relevant income and paid tax, directing both parties to obtain necessary details and complete rectification under section 154 within 180 days.
The Tribunal held that the income from sub-licensing of software cannot be treated as 'income from other sources' under Article 23(3) of the DTAA because it could be characterized as either royalty (Article 12) or business income (Article 7). Since it's not taxable as royalty and there's no Permanent Establishment for business income, it cannot be taxed under the residuary provision. The addition was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee produced additional documents and financial statements during the appeal. Considering these new submissions and guided by the Supreme Court's decision in `ACIT(E) vs. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority`, the Tribunal decided to remand the case to the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh examination. The AO was directed to consider the new evidence and financial statements in light of the judicial pronouncements.