524 orders · Page 8 of 11
The Tribunal held that the AO cannot reject the valuation methodology adopted by the assessee, especially when it is a recognized method like DCF. The Tribunal further noted that valuation is not an exact science and projections can vary, and the actual performance of the company exceeded projections.
The Tribunal held that the Pr.CIT was not justified in assuming jurisdiction under Section 263. Following a coordinate bench's decision in an identical prior year, the Tribunal found no reason to differ.
The Tribunal held that the employees' contribution to PF and ESI is considered the employer's income. Deduction is allowed only if the amount is deposited in the employee's account before the due date stipulated under the respective Acts, as per the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the benefits of the India-Singapore DTAA regarding capital gains on the sale of CCDs. The Tribunal found that the Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) was sufficient evidence of residency and that the revenue failed to prove tax avoidance or lack of beneficial ownership.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the disallowance of operating expenses to 2% due to the assessee's failure to fully substantiate its claims. The Tribunal also dismissed the revenue's grounds regarding depreciation on crates, following a previous order in the assessee's own case.
The Tribunal held that CSR expenditure incurred before the insertion of Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) was allowable. It also addressed issues related to interest on loans to shareholders and re-calculation of revenue under the percentage completion method.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the disallowance of operating expenses to 2% due to the assessee's failure to fully substantiate its claims. The Tribunal also dismissed the revenue's grounds regarding depreciation on crates, following a previous order in the assessee's own case.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal, noting the consistent non-appearance before all authorities and the lack of any evidence to support the assessee's contentions. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the orders of the lower authorities.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that CSR expenditure incurred before the insertion of Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) was allowable. It also addressed issues related to interest on loans to shareholders and re-calculation of revenue under the percentage completion method.
The Tribunal held that the AO had made plausible inquiries based on the material available and the assessee had discharged its onus. The Pr.CIT's allegations of inadequate inquiry were not substantiated and the revisional jurisdiction was not properly invoked.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had made a plausible assessment based on the material available and the inquiries made. The Pr.CIT's dissatisfaction with the extent of inquiry, without demonstrating a substantive error or prejudice to revenue, did not justify revision under Section 263.
The Tribunal held that the Pr.CIT's revisional action was unjustified as the Assessing Officer had made plausible inquiries based on the material available. The Pr.CIT failed to demonstrate a substantive error or prejudice to revenue, nor did he conduct his own inquiries.
The Tribunal held that the revenue can tax expenditure incurred in earlier years if it is proved to be bogus and that liabilities can be deemed ceased over time, considering non-payment and intention. The CIT(A)'s disallowance was upheld based on the facts.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(b) is not automatic and can be waived if there is a reasonable cause for failure, as per section 273B. Considering the assessee had paid due taxes and similar penalties were deleted in other cases, the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(b) is not automatic and can be waived if there is a reasonable cause for failure, as per section 273B. Considering the assessee had paid due taxes and similar penalties were deleted in other cases, the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(b) is not automatic and can be waived if there is a reasonable cause for failure, as per section 273B. Considering the assessee had paid due taxes and similar penalties were deleted in other cases, the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(b) is not automatic and can be waived if there is a reasonable cause for failure, as per section 273B. Considering the assessee had paid due taxes and similar penalties were deleted in other cases, the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(b) is not automatic and can be waived if there is a reasonable cause for failure, as per section 273B. Considering the assessee had paid due taxes and similar penalties were deleted in other cases, the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(b) is not automatic and can be waived if there is a reasonable cause for failure, as per section 273B. Considering the assessee had paid due taxes and similar penalties were deleted in other cases, the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(b) is not automatic and can be waived if there is a reasonable cause for failure, as per section 273B. Considering the assessee had paid due taxes and similar penalties were deleted in other cases, the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the addition was not based on incriminating material found during the search, and therefore, Section 153C was wrongly invoked. Additionally, it was held that TDS was not required on EDC payments to HUDA.
The Tribunal found that the partnership deed for the new firm was registered on 01.01.2009 and manufacturing commenced from 01.04.2009. Therefore, AY 2010-11 was the initial year for claiming 100% deduction under Section 80-IC, and the AO's disallowance was incorrect.
The Tribunal found that the partnership deed for the new firm was registered on 01.01.2009 and manufacturing commenced from 01.04.2009. Therefore, AY 2010-11 was the initial year for claiming 100% deduction under Section 80-IC, and the AO's disallowance was incorrect.
The Tribunal found that the partnership deed for the new firm was registered on 01.01.2009 and manufacturing commenced from 01.04.2009. Therefore, AY 2010-11 was the initial year for claiming 100% deduction under Section 80-IC, and the AO's disallowance was incorrect.
The Tribunal found that the partnership deed for the new firm was registered on 01.01.2009 and manufacturing commenced from 01.04.2009. Therefore, AY 2010-11 was the initial year for claiming 100% deduction under Section 80-IC, and the AO's disallowance was incorrect.
The Tribunal found that the partnership deed for the new firm was registered on 01.01.2009 and manufacturing commenced from 01.04.2009. Therefore, AY 2010-11 was the initial year for claiming 100% deduction under Section 80-IC, and the AO's disallowance was incorrect.
The Tribunal found that the partnership deed for the new firm was registered on 01.01.2009 and manufacturing commenced from 01.04.2009. Therefore, AY 2010-11 was the initial year for claiming 100% deduction under Section 80-IC, and the AO's disallowance was incorrect.
The Tribunal found that the partnership deed for the new firm was registered on 01.01.2009 and manufacturing commenced from 01.04.2009. Therefore, AY 2010-11 was the initial year for claiming 100% deduction under Section 80-IC, and the AO's disallowance was incorrect.
The Tribunal found that the partnership deed for the new firm was registered on 01.01.2009 and manufacturing commenced from 01.04.2009. Therefore, AY 2010-11 was the initial year for claiming 100% deduction under Section 80-IC, and the AO's disallowance was incorrect.
The Tribunal held that notional brought forward losses from earlier years cannot be adjusted against the profit of the eligible undertaking for the purpose of Section 80IA deduction. The Tribunal also held that interest subsidy, being a capital receipt, should be excluded from book profit computation under Section 115JB.
The Tribunal held that the AO had made adequate enquiry by obtaining the father's affidavit explaining the source of cash deposits and by promptly informing the father's AO. Therefore, the revisionary order was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in disallowing the deduction. The assessee had invested the sale proceeds in the capital gains account and started construction within the stipulated period, which satisfies the conditions of Section 54F, even if construction was not fully completed.
The tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, stating that depreciation on leased assets is allowable to the owner (lessor or lessee) based on the terms of the finance lease agreement, as clarified by CBDT Circular No. 2/2001 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in ICDS Ltd. vs. CIT.
The tribunal dismissed the appeal as the assessee opted to settle the dispute under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2020'. Liberty was granted to restore the appeal if the dispute is not settled as per the scheme.
The Tribunal found that the assessee's claim of non-receipt of notices could not be disregarded. Therefore, the appeal was allowed to restore the issues to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition solely on the basis of establishing the identity of the share applicants. The assessee failed to demonstrate the creditworthiness of the share applicants.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in rejecting the books of account solely based on auditor's qualifications, especially when the assessee provided evidence of maintaining accounts and stock details. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted a detailed inquiry regarding the corpus donation, and the assessee had provided all necessary supporting documents. The CIT's conclusion that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue was found to be contrary to the facts.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT failed to satisfy the twin conditions for exercising powers under Section 263, as the VAT was deposited before the due date and the EPF disallowance was already made by the assessee. Therefore, the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to revenue.
The tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be imposed when the income is determined on an estimate basis. Since the additions sustained by the CIT(A) were on an estimated basis, the penalty was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to apply his mind to the issue of provision for doubtful debts, considering the limited information provided by the assessee and the lack of further inquiry. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in invoking Section 263.
The Tribunal held that the addition was made based on the statement of Dr. P. Mahalingam, and the assessee was denied the opportunity to cross-examine him. This violated the principles of natural justice, rendering the addition invalid.
The Tribunal found that the assessee claimed the provision was already adjusted in the profit and loss account. To ensure justice and examine the possibility of double disallowance, the matter was remitted back to the AO.
The Tribunal held that the addition was made based on the statement of Dr. P. Mahalingam, and the assessee was denied the opportunity to cross-examine him. This violated the principles of natural justice, rendering the addition invalid.
The Tribunal held that Section 56(2)(vii) can only be invoked if the property is purchased for a consideration less than the stamp duty value. Since the property was purchased at circle rates, the invocation of the section was incorrect.
The Tribunal upheld the additions made by the departmental authorities on account of unexplained share application money and commission paid thereon. The assessees failed to furnish evidence to establish the source and genuineness of the share capital introduced.
The Tribunal held that Section 56(2)(vii) can only be invoked if the property is purchased for a consideration less than the stamp duty value. Since the property was purchased at circle rates, the invocation of the section was incorrect.
The Tribunal held that a penalty notice must specify the charge under Section 271(1)(c) to be valid. Since the notice was omnibus and lacked specificity, the penalty was unsustainable.
The Tribunal noted that the quantum appeal for the same assessment year had been remanded to the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the penalty order was set aside as it did not survive. The Assessing Officer was granted liberty to pass a fresh penalty order if deemed fit after giving effect to the quantum appeal order.