39 orders · Page 1 of 1
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of payments to partners was justified due to the lack of evidence proving they were working partners. However, it allowed the motor car repair expenses, stating that ownership of the asset is not a prerequisite for claiming such expenses when the expenditure is incurred for the firm's business.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of payments to partners was justified due to the lack of evidence proving they were working partners. However, it allowed the motor car repair expenses, stating that ownership of the asset is not a prerequisite for claiming such expenses when the expenditure is incurred for the firm's business.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of payments to partners was justified due to the lack of evidence proving they were working partners. However, it allowed the motor car repair expenses, stating that ownership of the asset is not a prerequisite for claiming such expenses when the expenditure is incurred for the firm's business.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of payments to partners was justified due to the lack of evidence proving they were working partners. However, it allowed the motor car repair expenses, stating that ownership of the asset is not a prerequisite for claiming such expenses when the expenditure is incurred for the firm's business.
The Tribunal held that income assessed as business income would qualify for deduction under Section 80P(1) read with Section 80P(2)(a)(i). Income from interest on deposits or dividend would be deductible under Section 80P(1) read with Section 80P(2)(d) if arising from cooperative societies/banks. Any remaining income would be taxable.
The Tribunal held that income assessed as business income would qualify for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) to the extent it relates to eligible activities. Income from deposits with cooperative societies and cooperative banks would be deductible under Section 80P(2)(d), while any remaining income would be taxable.
The Tribunal held that income assessed as business income would qualify for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) to the extent it relates to eligible activities. Income from deposits with cooperative societies and cooperative banks would be deductible under Section 80P(2)(d), while any remaining income would be taxable.
The Tribunal held that income assessed as business income would qualify for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) to the extent it relates to eligible activities. Income from deposits with cooperative societies and cooperative banks would be deductible under Section 80P(2)(d), while any remaining income would be taxable.
The Tribunal held that income assessed as business income would qualify for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) to the extent it relates to eligible activities. Income from deposits with cooperative societies and cooperative banks would be deductible under Section 80P(2)(d), while any remaining income would be taxable.
The Tribunal held that income assessed as business income would qualify for deduction under Section 80P(1) read with Section 80P(2)(a)(i). Income from interest on deposits or dividend would be deductible under Section 80P(1) read with Section 80P(2)(d) if arising from cooperative societies/banks. Any remaining income would be taxable.
The Tribunal held that income assessed as business income would qualify for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) to the extent it relates to eligible activities. Income from deposits with cooperative societies and cooperative banks would be deductible under Section 80P(2)(d), while any remaining income would be taxable.
The Tribunal held that income assessed as business income would qualify for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) to the extent it relates to eligible activities. Income from deposits with cooperative societies and cooperative banks would be deductible under Section 80P(2)(d), while any remaining income would be taxable.
The Tribunal held that income assessed as business income would qualify for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) to the extent it relates to eligible activities. Income from deposits with cooperative societies and cooperative banks would be deductible under Section 80P(2)(d), while any remaining income would be taxable.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of payments to partners was justified due to the lack of evidence proving they were working partners. However, it allowed the motor car repair expenses, stating that ownership of the asset is not a prerequisite for claiming such expenses when the expenditure is incurred for the business.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order was unmaintainable as it was ex-parte and did not address the grounds of appeal. The Tribunal clarified that the Vivad Se Vishwas settlement pertained to the initial dispute, and the subsequent Section 148 proceedings concerned a different issue regarding the valuation for Section 54F deduction.
The Tribunal held that the claim for deduction under section 80P is not allowable if not claimed in the return of income as per Section 80A(5). The assessee's counsel could not counter the reliance placed by the revenue on various High Court decisions upholding this principle.
The Tribunal held that the first appellate authority failed to provide a proper hearing to the assessee. The matter was therefore restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination of the assessee's claim for exemption under sections 11 and 12 of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of payments to partners was justified due to the lack of evidence proving they were working partners. However, it allowed the motor car repair expenses, stating that ownership of the asset is not a prerequisite for claiming such expenses when the expenditure is incurred for the firm's business.
The Tribunal held that the assessees failed to provide a reasonable cause for the delay in obtaining and furnishing the TAR. The plea that the TAR was available at the time of assessment was rejected as legally untenable.
The Tribunal held that the assessees failed to provide a reasonable cause for the delay in obtaining and furnishing the TAR. The plea that the TAR was available at the time of assessment was rejected as legally untenable.
The Tribunal held that the assessees failed to provide a reasonable cause for the delay in obtaining and furnishing the TAR. The plea that the TAR was available at the time of assessment was rejected as legally untenable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide sufficient reasons for the inordinate delay in filing the appeals. The Tribunal emphasized that the law of limitation operates strictly and equitable considerations are not applicable for condoning such delays.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide sufficient reasons for the inordinate delay in filing the appeals. The Tribunal emphasized that the law of limitation operates strictly and equitable considerations are not applicable for condoning such delays.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's claim of higher indirect expenditure was unsubstantiated and misconceived. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the estimation of suppressed income by the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal restored the issue of disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) to the AO for considering the assessee's case with reference to the second proviso thereto, applicable in principle for the current year. The assessee's appeal was dismissed due to delay and lack of merit.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to demonstrate absence of negligence or satisfactory diligence in prosecuting its appeals. Relying on various Supreme Court judgments, the Tribunal emphasized that the law of limitation operates with rigor and equitable considerations are not applicable for condoning delays.
The Tribunal restored the issue of disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) to the AO for considering the assessee's case with reference to the second proviso thereto, applicable in principle for the current year. The assessee's appeal was dismissed due to delay and lack of merit.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide sufficient reasons for the inordinate delay in filing the appeals. The Tribunal emphasized that the law of limitation operates strictly and equitable considerations are not applicable for condoning such delays.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance should be on the interest earned, not the investment itself. It set aside the matter to the Assessing Officer to re-quantify the disallowance based on the audited accounts.
The Tribunal held that the Rs. 100 lakh grant was a corpus donation as it was for maintaining the trust's buildings, which form part of its corpus. However, the Rs. 16.35 lakh donation was not substantiated as a corpus donation and was treated as income subject to application rules.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT's revisionary order, finding that the AO's assessment was indeed erroneous. The AO had not properly examined whether the payments to doctor-trustees attracted Section 13(1)(c) by comparing them with professionals of similar standing.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance should be on the interest earned, not the investment itself. It set aside the matter to the Assessing Officer to re-quantify the disallowance based on the audited accounts.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activity of letting built-up space and providing amenities constituted carrying on a business. Therefore, it was not entitled to exemption under Section 11 due to the amended Section 2(15). However, the assessee was allowed to claim depreciation up to AY 2014-15.
The Tribunal held that the assessments were to be restored to the Assessing Authority for re-computation. The claim of Association of Persons (AOP) was rejected, and the ERF was to be considered as business income, with proper computation of costs and expenses.
The Tribunal held that the assessments were to be restored to the Assessing Authority for re-computation. The claim of Association of Persons (AOP) was rejected, and the ERF was to be considered as business income, with proper computation of costs and expenses.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activity of letting built-up space and providing amenities constituted carrying on a business. Therefore, it was not entitled to exemption under Section 11 due to the amended Section 2(15). However, the assessee was allowed to claim depreciation up to AY 2014-15.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activity of letting built-up space and providing amenities constituted carrying on a business. Therefore, it was not entitled to exemption under Section 11 due to the amended Section 2(15). However, the assessee was allowed to claim depreciation up to AY 2014-15.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer erred in invoking Section 68 as the transfer of assets and liabilities was part of a business transfer. The ledger accounts showed agreement between the parties, and the dispute among partners did not invalidate the business transfer.
The Tribunal found the assessment order to be non-speaking and lacking in proper reasoning. The CIT(A)'s dismissal was also found to be flawed. The Tribunal set aside the assessment and remanded the matter back to the AO for fresh assessment.