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24 orders · Page 1 of 1
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of Section 80P deduction in the Section 143(1) intimation was a mistake apparent from the records and beyond the scope of prima facie adjustments. Furthermore, based on jurisdictional High Court precedent, interest received by a cooperative society from a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of Section 80P deduction in the Section 143(1) intimation was a mistake apparent from the records and beyond the scope of prima facie adjustments. Furthermore, based on jurisdictional High Court precedent, interest received by a cooperative society from a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of Section 80P deduction in the Section 143(1) intimation was a mistake apparent from the records and beyond the scope of prima facie adjustments. Furthermore, based on jurisdictional High Court precedent, interest received by a cooperative society from a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E was invalid for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as Section 200A did not have the enabling provision for such levies before that date. The Kerala High Court's judgment was followed.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E, processed under Section 200A, for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was invalid. This was based on the jurisdictional High Court's ruling that the amendment enabling such levies was prospective.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A of the IT Act did not have an enabling provision to levy fees under Section 234E for belated TDS returns. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods before this date was invalid.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) by adopting a liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause'. On merits, the Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, processed under Section 200A, was invalid, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision.
The Tribunal held that belated filing of returns does not disentitle the assessee to deduction under Section 80P, citing the jurisdictional High Court's decision. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal restored the issue of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) to the AO for fresh examination in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in The Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy fees under Section 234E for belated TDS returns filed prior to June 1, 2015, as Section 200A was amended to allow such adjustments only from that date. The levy was therefore invalid.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy fees under Section 234E for belated TDS returns filed prior to June 1, 2015, as Section 200A was amended to allow such adjustments only from that date. The levy was therefore invalid.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy fees under Section 234E via an order under Section 200A for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as the amendment enabling this was prospective. The levy of late fees in these cases was therefore invalid.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy fees under Section 234E for belated TDS returns filed prior to June 1, 2015, as Section 200A was amended to allow such adjustments only from that date. The levy was therefore invalid.
The Tribunal held that belated filing of returns does not disentitle the assessee to deduction under Section 80P, citing the jurisdictional High Court's decision. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal restored the issue of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) to the AO for fresh examination in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in The Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) by adopting a liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause'. On merits, the Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, processed under Section 200A, was invalid, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) by adopting a liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause'. On merits, the Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, processed under Section 200A, was invalid, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) by adopting a liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause'. On merits, the Tribunal held that the levy of late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, processed under Section 200A, was invalid, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A of the IT Act did not have an enabling provision to levy fees under Section 234E for belated TDS returns. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods before this date was invalid.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A of the IT Act did not have an enabling provision to levy fees under Section 234E for belated TDS returns. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods before this date was invalid.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A of the IT Act did not have an enabling provision to levy fees under Section 234E for belated TDS returns. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods before this date was invalid.
The Tribunal held that prior to June 1, 2015, Section 200A of the IT Act did not have an enabling provision to levy fees under Section 234E for belated TDS returns. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods before this date was invalid.
The assessee's counsel requested to withdraw the appeal, and the Departmental Representative had no objection. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance for delayed payment of employees' contribution to PF and ESI was a prima facie adjustment permissible under Section 143(1)(a)(i) or 143(1)(a)(iv) of the Act. The Tribunal also noted that the issue on merits was covered against the assessee by the jurisdictional High Court's decision.
The ITAT held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was bad in law. The tribunal found that the AO had indeed inquired into the share application money and that the assessee had provided evidence of share allotment and attempted to rectify bank misreporting.
The tribunal noted the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal, which was not objected to by the Departmental Representative. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as withdrawn.